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This thesis reads radical indeterminacy into the reflective judgements of Kant’s Critique of the Power 
of Judgement through points of connection between Kant’s aesthetics and the philosophies and writing 
of Theodor Adorno and Maurice Blanchot. These re-situate the ‘ends’ of Kantian aesthetics in the 
historical situation of the 1960s and 1970s. In turn, this historicising of Kantian aesthetics reinterprets 
its original content. Such double reading – from Kant forwards, and back to Kant – is configured 
through what I call ‘reversal’: the indeterminacy of aesthetic reflection calls for a reverse ‘reading’ of 
itself which is not self-defeatingly determined by the aesthetic. Kant thus gives us the vocabulary for 
re-reading his aesthetics of reflection, and from this other indeterminacies of reflection, despite his 
attempt to organise and explain reflective relations through consistently with philosophical form 
through judgement. To read Kant outside his or any philosophy’s economy, the task demanded by 
Adorno’s theory and Blanchot’s writing, asks for poetic readers and writers such as their near-
contemporary, Paul Celan. They understand Celan’s poetry as making legible how Kant’s aesthetic 
might be thought reflectively, thus showing that the indeterminacy Kant attributes to reflection can be 
aesthetically experienced without being effaced by the philosophical judgement implying that 
indeterminacy. This turn back, the turn of verse, forms the hinge between Adorno’s and Blanchot’s 
dialectical and political thinking, allowing the common sense, the un-institutionalised ‘we’ Kant thinks 
ratifies aesthetic judgement, to remain negative or ‘unavowable’. Aesthetics still structures the reading 
of poetry, but such poetry makes the indeterminate implications of Kantian aesthetics legible. 
‘Disconnection’ becomes the organising principle for reflection and politics, implied by but now freed 
from aesthetic judgement, made visible by a poetry of ‘reversal’. We conclude by finding the 
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Aesthetic indeterminacy, indeterminate aesthetics 
 
But no commentaries! Poetry first (then France, Germany etc. later!) 
      Paul Celan to Gisèle Celan-Lestrange 
 
 
In this introduction, I firstly give an account of my reading of Kant’s aesthetic, and the turn to Adorno 
and Blanchot required to undertake this reading. I establish the concepts and terms I will address in the 
thesis: indeterminacy and reflection. I secondly frame in greater detail the critical intervention of 
reading, firstly, Adorno and Blanchot in the context of Kantian aesthetics, and secondly, Adorno and 
Blanchot together in their historical situation. Finally, I give an account of the relation between these 
questions and poetry, and show that their ‘reversal’ of Kant needs poetry for its full articulation, as 
demonstrated with especial historical aptness by Celan. 
 
 
1 – Aesthetics of indeterminacy 
 
Determining the aesthetic: reflection and reflective experience 
‘Aesthetics’ is the part of philosophy that thinks about experiences of beauty (and a range of other 
‘aesthetic’ experiences and features), in nature and art. But the scope of this definition is inherently 
expansive. Does aesthetics concern the experience of beauty, or the features of an object that let us 
judge it to be beautiful? And why should aesthetics only measure ‘beauty’ – surely aesthetic experience 
leads to a host of possible judgements other than just ‘beauty’? And what, indeed, would an aesthetic 
judgement signify? Would it refer to the judger’s experience, or to the features of an object, and would 
such reference ‘mean’ something in the same way that other philosophically delineated judgements do? 
Does saying that something is ‘beautiful’ make the same conceptual impression on an experience/object 
as scientific judgements? To say, ‘this is a tree’ is more determinate than to say, ‘this tree is beautiful 
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(to me)’. What, indeed, does ‘beautiful’ mean, and is its validity conceptually, and therefore universally, 
grounded? 
I think that we can resolve this expansiveness of aesthetics not by finding a correct 
determination of what aesthetics is, or of how it functions, but by characterising its ‘expansiveness’ 
itself, its resistance to determination. The difficulty in defining aesthetics derives from the ‘reflective’ 
experience it thinks. Difficulty in definition, and in determination, is precisely what, for Kant at least, 
provokes aesthetic reflection. And my questions here are likewise reflective, in the sense that they do 
not refer to concepts but instead require singular, and reflexive, consideration. Each of these questions 
is ‘bent back’ upon itself (to invoke the etymology of reflection), and thereby turns back upon the 
conditions of asking, and thinking, them. To say that something is beautiful requires us to think about 
what saying that means, and not merely to decide whether that judgement is correct or not. And whether 
we are concerned with the features of the experience of beauty, or with the features of a beautiful object, 
we are pressed to measure the relation between subject and object: the features of an object are only 
beautiful when experienced, and the features of experience are shaped and constituted by the features 
of the object being experienced. The formal relationship, then, is structurally reflexive: the form of 
experience of an object is conditioned by the form of the object being experienced, which is in turn only 
an object of experience to the extent that it is experienced as such by a subject. Because I cannot 
predicate ‘beauty’ of an object in the way I predicate other determinate features, ‘beauty’ refers, for 
Kant, to the experience of that object. And it is in Kant that we find the outline of this ‘reflexive’ account 
of ‘reflective’ aesthetic experience. Aesthetics is, for Kant, a way to account for reflective experience, 
such as the reflective experience provoked by judging something to be beautiful. The ‘end’ of aesthetics 
is reflection itself, and not in determination of what art should be, or of what should count as beautiful. 
Aesthetics makes sense of the way the subject can experience reflection, and can employ reflection in 
its own judgements.  
For Kant, aesthetics discloses the way judgement functions for the subject who uses judgement 
to think, and the ways judgement’s reflections resemble the reflective way nature is organised (that 
organisms are not produced according to a ‘purpose’ or ‘concept’, as tools are, but are self-generating 
forms). Kant therefore uses the aesthetic to outline the mandate of reflection, and to give 
‘purposiveness’ to reflection which lacks conceptual ‘purpose’. But this also limits aesthetic experience, 
and limits reflection. Art is produced reflectively; and not only its production but also its work is 
coordinated through reflection. A poem, for example, works by being read, and by provoking a certain 
reflective reading in which words are uncoupled from their habitually determinate use. In a painting, 
visual form is itself the subject of reflection, and not merely the vehicle for the appearance of objects. 
In music, sound is patterned such that its different elements respond, reflectively, to one another to 
provoke an experience of sound itself. In each of these, then, reflection is not limited to the experience 
of art, but part of the way art functions. Reflection, again, is collaborative: not just a feature of aesthetic 
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judgement, but part of art’s work. In Kant’s usage, reflection is thinking without conceptual 
determination. Aesthetics describes the conditions of such thinking, and thereby also describes the 
conditions for the kind of reading engaged in by criticism. Criticism is reflective to the extent that it 
reads its literary object indeterminately. Literature is not the ‘terminus’ for criticism, to the extent that 
criticism does not ‘determine’ a text’s meaning but instead ‘reflects’ it; but criticism is nonetheless 
constituted by literature. How far can we extend this aesthetic legibility of indeterminacy gained from 
reflection? What are its limits, when its ends are not, by definition, determined? 
A determination of what aesthetics is, or of what it deals with, is not useful for our concerns 
here. I am concerned rather with the way aesthetics is shaped by the reflection it thinks, and is 
constituted by the indeterminacy it reflectively traces. If the aesthetic thinks not just about, but through 
reflection, then it assumes the form of reflection in order to think it. And, through aesthetics, this gives 
a reflective form to indeterminacy itself. An account of the way aesthetics deals with indeterminacy – 
including its own necessarily indeterminate response to indeterminacy – gives form to the reflective 
conditions of the aesthetic.  
 
A contemporary aesthetics 
In writing The Critique of the Power of Judgement, his third Critique, Kant is motivated by a need to 
find a ground for ‘judgement’ itself, and not just for the scientific or moral uses of judgement. 
Judgements outlined in the rest of his critical project are not reconciled with one another as judgments. 
He finds this ground of this reconciliation in reflection. All judgements, for Kant, employ reflection; in 
his first Critique, for example, reflection is merely a moment in conceptual determination. But if Kant 
is to account for judgement as an independent ‘power’, it must have ground outside the concepts by 
which it is used. Nonconceptual experience is reflective, but it does not claim a priori validity. Uniquely, 
however, the experience of ‘beauty’ is both reflective and makes claims to truth. Reflection cannot have 
any determinate ground, precisely because that would be the end of reflection. So Kant grounds 
reflection in its indeterminacy. But this allows us to use the aesthetic to account for other 
indeterminacies: here, I look at political indeterminacy (in chapter two), and dialectical indeterminacy 
(in chapter three), before turning finally to the indeterminate way poetry reads aesthetic philosophy 
back. The significance of such aesthetics for the contemporary is in the way aesthetics gives form to 
reflective experience, as well as giving form to the conditions of reflective experience.  
I will now turn to contemporary accounts of the aesthetic in order to frame my reading of Kant. 
One problem for contemporary aesthetics is the way that the reflection registered in aesthetic judgement 
can be coerced by other discourses. Because it claims an autonomous ground merely on its own 
operations, aesthetics is open to indeterminacy. For Terry Eagleton, this means that the aesthetic merely 
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‘recasts historical contradictions into ideologically resolvable form’.1 In this characterisation, the 
artwork merely reproduces its social material in aesthetic experience, which is suitably reflective for 
coercion: it makes things seem ‘beautiful’, and reflective, in a way that occludes the historically 
determinate ways those things are produced. One difference, here, is a turn from the conditions of 
experience of beauty to the form of art works. In Eagleton’s characterisation, aesthetic experience is 
determined by the artwork’s form. But this does not take into account the way such experience is 
reflectively constructed both internally (as part of the subjective logic of judgement) and externally (in 
the artwork’s mediation of social and historical form). Indeed, such experience is already a historical 
contradiction: a non-conceptual and yet valid judgement based merely on reflection. My contention is 
that such reflexivity renders the aesthetic open to the contradiction Eagleton claims it stifles. But 
developing such an openness requires accounting for the reflective relation between art and aesthetic 
experience. And in developing such a relation, we posit a possible ‘experience’ of the aesthetic itself. 
I will now turn to contemporary attempts to explain how the aesthetic can be reflected upon, 
and the way that negotiating between ‘aesthetic experience’ and ‘art’s work’ is itself a reflective 
procedure. This is foundational for the reading of Adorno and Blanchot on which my own reading of 
Kant is based. In developing a Kantian reading of aesthetics as structured by an indeterminate, reflecting 
judgement, we can in turn develop a sense of the reflective relation between aesthetics and art, in which 
art is not merely determined by aesthetics. And from this, we can develop a form in which aesthetics 
harnesses reflection to make relations visible in their indeterminacy. A contemporary aesthetics would 
render indeterminate relations, and nonconceptual experience, visible. But it would still require the 
formal conditions of legibility of aesthetics itself. An ‘aesthetics’ of aesthetics would hinge upon the 
same reflective work that characterises Kantian aesthetics. 
We can pick up the narrative of an ‘indeterminate aesthetics’ with the post-Kantian context of 
Romanticism. For Susan Wolfson, Eagleton’s position depends upon a Romantic concept of form as 
‘organic’. But Romanticism itself works through contradiction as form, rather than formally concealing 
it. This is the ‘dialogic’ fragment form of the Jena Romantics. Romantic ‘poems reflect on rather than 
conceal their constructedness (not only aesthetic, but social and ideological); […] sometimes the textual 
forms of reconciliation are visibly factitious (not magical)’.2 If there is form, it is reflectively 
constructed; if there is reconciliation, it is legibly fragmented. This means that aesthetics has to re-think 
form. For Isobel Armstrong, this ‘remade aesthetic’ would amount to ‘a cognitive account of the 
emotions as mutually inclusive’.3 Aesthetics thinks through its separation from its object, and to this 
extent becomes the fragmentation in which that object’s separation from cognition can be thought. This 
                                                      
1 Eagleton, Terry, Criticism and Ideology (London: NLB, 1976), 114 
2 Wolfson, Susan J., Formal Charges: The Shaping of Poetry in British Romanticism (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1997), 14 
3 Armstrong, Isobel, The Radical Aesthetic (Blackwell: London, 2000), 18 
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is specifically because, as Kant said, aesthetics proceeds from pleasure, feeling, and is therefore already 
in dialogue with its lack of objectivity. This leads us to consider Angela Leighton’s characterisation of 
form as elegy. ‘Form, in the sense of body-form as well as in the sense of formal outline or effigy, is a 
word which contains the complex dynamic of elegy itself. For elegy is a literary form defined by the 
body-form which lies somewhere within the container or reliquary of the text; but it is also a form left 
empty, feeling the hollow shell of its literary objectlessness.’4 In the conclusion to this thesis, I will 
consider this elegy of aesthetic experience, that loses its object and thinks that loss. This form of 
aesthetic fragmentation of reflection becomes legible in a reading of poetic form in dialogue with 
critical attempts to read them. And politics might reflectively be registered in its indeterminacy by 
thinking through this form. 
We can find a first turn from subjective aesthetics to objective art in post-Kantian philosophy 
in the development of ‘fragmentary’ form by the Jena Romantics. The fragment marks the displacement 
of subjective self-positing reflection into the art object, such that ‘the infinite self-reflection of the work 
of art is an infinite reflection on the relation of the self-limiting finitude of form to the absolute infinite 
task of reflection itself’.5 By such displacement, the private experience of reflection becomes sociable. 
The infinite reflexivity of self-identity is not so much interrupted as externalised in this sociability.  
A real aesthetic theory of poetry would begin with the absolute 
antithesis of the eternally unbridgeable gulf between art and raw 
beauty. It would describe their struggle and conclude with the perfect 
harmony of artistic and natural beauty. But a philosophy of poetry as 
such would begin with the independence of beauty, with the 
proposition that beauty is and should be distinct from truth and 
morality, and that it has the same rights as these: something that — for 
those who are able to understand it at all — follows from the 
proposition I=I.6 
We move here from a theory of art to a philosophy of poetry. What happens inside aesthetic experience 
should happen ‘outside’ the subject. Aesthetic claims to autonomy come out of self-reflective subjective 
identity. But the fragment proposes its own identity. So if fragmentation articulates identity, this is also 
to say that identity proceeds by fragmentation: by moments of disconnection and objectification. Art is 
true to identity’s fragmentation, not to subjective self-identity.7 In the artwork, reflection happens 
externally to the subject. As Benjamin writes, this ‘infinity of reflection, for Schlegel and Novalis, is 
                                                      
4 Leighton, Angela, On Form: Poetry, Aestheticism, and the legacy of a Word (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 222 
5 Ibid., 65 
6 Schlegel, Friedrich, ‘Athenaeum fragments’, in Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics, ed., trans. by 
J.M. Bernstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 246-60, 25. Schlegel is directly 
critiquing Kant – the ‘unbridgeable gulf’ between subject and object as such – by invoking Fichte and the 
absolute self-identity of the I. 
7 See Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe, Poetry as Experience, trans. by Andrea Tarnowski (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1999), for whom this marks art beginning at the point of ‘real’ separation from Kantian 
aesthetics, a ‘disconnection [déliaison]’ (30). 
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not an infinity of advance but an infinity of connectedness’.8 Reflection connects, rather than negates, 
its objects. Benjamin suggests that to affirm this infinity is to deny ‘the torso character of works’. ‘The 
work of art cannot be a torso; it must be a mobile transitory moment in the living transcendental form. 
By limiting itself in its own form, it makes itself transitory in a contingent figure, but in that fleeting 
figure it makes itself eternal through criticism.’9 Connection, then, happens in critical reflection, formed 
according to a mobile and reflective, fragmentary work. The fragment is this reflection between 
criticism and the artwork. The work’s finite form opens to an infinite critical legibility, a conversation, 
dialogue. The fragment is dialogical.10 But if we read it as a form of communication between object 
and subject, rather than within its own proposed horizontality, we misread its systematic, objective 
‘reality’. Connections are outside the subject. So, in Ideas, the history of reflection becomes the 
dialogue of fragmentation. 
To Novalis: You don’t stay at the threshold of things. On the contrary, 
your spirit is deeply suffused with poetry and philosophy. It was closest 
to me in these images of uncomprehended truth. What you’ve thought 
I think; what I’ve thought you will think or have already thought. There 
are misunderstandings that serve only to confirm the greatest shared 
understanding. Every doctrine of the eternal Orient belongs to all 
artists. I name you instead of all the others.11 
The fragment is addressed ‘to Novalis’. This address is already a dialogue, or writes the way it will be 
critically disconnected from itself. ‘You’ and ‘I’ become confused in this fragmentation/reflection. I 
name you, Novalis, in the singular, in order to name the fragmented plurality of that singularity, name 
you in fragmentation (I think what you think or have already thought) by which the singularity of that 
name is already plural, speaks otherwise. Autonomy preserves the possibility of dialogue. ‘I’ am only 
identically ‘I’ in dialogue. ‘You’ (Novalis) are possible because dialogue is possible. Dialogue is 
possible because of the way the artwork interrupts subjective self-reflection. The artwork interrupts 
self-reflection by embodying it. ‘You don’t stay on the threshold of things’. You depend on the 
sociability marked by poetry. This turn to poetry, then, parallels the philosophical turn to the fragment. 
Poetry’s forms of address do not merely instantiate possible forms of sociability. ‘You’, especially for 
                                                      
8 Benjamin, Walter, Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings Volume 1 — 1913-1926, ed. by Marcus Bullock 
and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1996), 126 
9 Ibid., 183 
10 As we shall see, Blanchot works through exactly these parameters, most explicitly in The Infinite 
Conversation: from ‘interruption’ as the ground of communication, to the reflexivity of critical dialogue as 
a ‘conversation’, to the fragmentary form that grounds (as it unworks) all writing. I will deal with this 
throughout the thesis, but especially in chapter three.  
11 Schlegel, Friedrich, ‘Ideas’, in Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics, ed., trans. by J.M. Bernstein 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 261-68, 268 
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Celan, is a point of disorientation to which the poem is nonetheless bound: ‘you’ are necessarily 
indeterminate, and this indeterminacy fragments rather than instantiates sociability.12 
To return to contemporary aesthetics, this idea of the fragment not merely becoming 
autonomous from aesthetics, but reflecting an aesthetic autonomy for itself, informs Peter Osborne’s 
own post-Kantian distinction between subjective aesthetics of experience and what he calls a ‘historical 
ontology’13 of art. The separation of subjective experience from the object of experience means that, if 
it is to remain viable in the contemporary era, aesthetics must return to the object: ‘it is not the extension 
of sensibility to include the subject’s relation to itself – auto-affection—that is the problem, so much as 
its consequent principled indifference to the character of objects that occasion judgement; in particular, 
its principled indifference to the cognitive, relational, historical and world-disclosing dimensions of 
works of art’.14 In Kant’s own account, ‘[t]here is neither a science of the beautiful, only a critique, nor 
beautiful science, only beautiful art.’15 Aesthetics is not legislative, and is therefore restricted from 
making valid claims about what its objects are. Beauty can only refer to a subjective experience. So 
because we cannot legislate a priori for what the beautiful is, we are limited to describing the aesthetic 
experience of the beautiful. ‘Aesthetics’ describes the subject’s response to the appearance of something 
beautiful, it does not describe the artwork that prompts such experience. For Osborne, subjective 
aesthetics cannot respond to the way art produces its own meanings. In order to think a ‘contemporary’ 
art after Kant, one must think art’s ‘historical ontology’. Aesthetics adequate to the ways art radically 
takes on the reflective work Kant reserves for subjective experience is yet to be thought. A Kantian 
critique of art, not aesthetics, would have to find some way to describe the artwork itself. 
The aesthetic concept of art mistakes one of art’s many conditions for 
the whole. It mistakes art’s necessary aesthetic appearance for the 
ground of its apparently autonomous, and hence infinite, production of 
meaning, which is in fact historically relational […].16 
‘Aesthetics’ can only incompletely account for the autonomous, plural operations of art. From aesthetic 
‘auto-affection’, then, we turn to artistic ‘auto-poiesis’.17 From an account of aesthetic ‘feeling’, we 
turn to an account of what art ‘makes’. This would be an account of the way art operates objectively in 
ways that do not simply reproduce the terms of subjective aesthetic experience. In a way redeploying 
                                                      
12 We shall look at Celan’s ‘exilic’ poetics in detail throughout the thesis, but here it is worth emphasising 
the way lyric questions about address trace philosophical questions about the conditions of communication 
in ways that do not just substantiate those philosophical claims. This move is not restricted to the Romantic, 
and its ends – in Blanchot’s philosophy or Celan’s poetics – are not restricted to the harmonious hopes of 
Jena Romanticism. I will trace the unworking of these hopes in this thesis. 
13 Osborne, Peter, Anywhere Or Not At All: Philosophy of Contemporary Art (London and New York: Verso, 
2013), 49 
14 Ibid., 42 
15 CJ, 184/5:305 
16 Osborne, Anywhere Or Not At All, 49 
17 Ibid., 44 
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Hegel’s critique of Kant,18 such an account of ‘fine art’ and not just of ‘aesthetic experience’ would be 
hinged on the historical manifestation of art in art works. The difference I would emphasise is that such 
manifestation is not simply objective, and that such manifestation exposes the subject to an objectivity 
it loses from itself in judgement. In isolating itself through the ‘aesthetic’ from the ways it ‘shares’ 
reflection with its object in experience, the subject isolates itself from its own affective objectivity: the 
way that pleasure is manifest for a body, or in a body, even reflectively. The experience of art might 
not be merely ‘agreeable’, but its pleasures are as manifest and historically specific as the artworks 
which provoke them. 
There are consequences of this fragmentation of aesthetics from art for our understanding of 
the politics of aesthetic indeterminacy we looked at earlier. If we are to consider aesthetic ‘visibility’ 
of politics, we have to take into account the way art, and not just aesthetic judgement, functions to 
produce visibility. For Hal Foster, this distinction can be made through the ‘avant-garde’. Foster, 
writing in Lacanian terms, in thinking about art, aesthetics mediates between the subject and a hostile 
but constitutive ‘real’. Aesthetics pacifies the real in order to make it available to the subject, 
constituting an ‘image screen’, where the real is pictured according to subjectively available forms. But 
it is simultaneously constituted by the ‘gaze’ of the real that exceeds those subjective forms.19 Where 
aesthetics mediates, art is anti-aesthetic. Yet art – specifically the ‘avant-garde’ – does not tear this 
image screen. Rather, ‘the goal of the avant-garde is not to break with the symbolic order absolutely 
[…] but to reveal it in crisis – to register its points not only of breakdown but also of breakthrough, that 
is, to register the points at which new possibilities are opened up by this very crisis.’20 Art thus provokes 
new aesthetic experiences by coordinating its forms objectively, according to the real, not just by 
reproducing subjective forms. Art proposes a form of negative mediation, in which its difference to the 
actual (contra Arendt) marks a break between the ‘actual’ and the ‘real’. There is an implicit politics to 
this, when read in the context of the preceding discussion. By registering the ways the symbolic order 
is not identical with itself, art registers an indeterminacy in the symbolic. Such indeterminacy, and not 
any actual communicability of judgement, provokes a reflective experience. 
In this thesis, my situating of Kant’s aesthetics assumes a context of late twentieth-century 
accounts of both aesthetics and the political. The Kantian model of reflection serves to illuminate the 
ways accounts of aesthetic experience develop political implications. But more than this, the model of 
reflection also serves as a model for its own reflexivity. Thinking about the relation between aesthetics 
and politics is itself structured by reflection. And thinking through the consequences of aesthetic 
reflexivity – the way its indeterminate ends emerge in non-aesthetic discourse – requires us to account 
                                                      
18 I shall cover this in detail in chapter one. 
19 Foster, Hal, Bad New Days: Art, Criticism, Emergency (London and New York: Verso, 2015), 7-14 
20 Ibid., 17 
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for aesthetic reflexivity itself. Kant’s relation to the writers I focus on here – Adorno, Blanchot, and 
Celan – is itself reflective. Re-reading Kantian aesthetics is a reflective procedure. There is therefore 
an aesthetic at work in this reading. In this thesis, I will try to account for both the ways aesthetics is 
operative in theory, and the ways that such operativity is legibly an aesthetic procedure itself. My 
contention is that re-reading Kantian aesthetics, the kind of re-reading undertaken by Adorno and 
Blanchot, forms a reflective procedure in which the reflexivity of the aesthetic becomes apparent in 
ways fundamental to recent re-readings of the aesthetic. 
 
 
2 – Aesthetics from Kant to Adorno and Blanchot: the scope of the thesis and the question of the 
critical reading 
 
I turn to Adorno, Blanchot, and Celan as readers. Each develops a mode of critical writing responsive 
to the legibility of disconnection. My aim is to think about disconnection through disconnection. My 
claim is that the aesthetic as characterised by Kant, with its grounding in reflection, gives form to this 
reading, and makes visible the conditions and ends of this reading, even as it alters or turns against 
Kant’s own claims. By reading Kant, we can focus these conditions and ends, and show what form a 
contemporary aesthetic, for Adorno and Blanchot, would take. 
 
Why Adorno? – nonconceptual dialectics and nontranscendent aesthetics 
Adorno’s work, in Negative Dialectics, towards a dialectics motivated by the non-conceptual 
‘negativity’ which conceptual thinking obscures can be linked to his sense of aesthetic experience of 
‘dialectics’ in Aesthetic Theory. In Negative Dialectics, Adorno broadly exposes conceptual ‘identity’ 
to the non-conceptual, non-identical aspects of experience which it both occludes and is constituted by. 
A ‘negative’ dialectics would incorporate (reflectively) experience which is ‘non-identical’ to 
conceptual determination. This would require, however, not merely circumventing conceptuality, but 
exposing the conceptual system to the experience it elides or excludes. These exclusions and elisions 
are in complex ways constituted by and experienced in social forms and structures; and yet registered 
subjectively. Making such ‘occlusion’ and ‘elision’ apparent is the task of a negative dialectic. But this 
measurement between society and individual, between subject and object, between conceptual work 
and the object of work, is the task of an aesthetic: an aesthetic gives form to these non-conceptual 
measurements. In such a context, aesthetic experience is pitched negatively. This negativity is 
highlighted when considering Kant, as opposed to Hegel. Aesthetic experience for Kant is inherently 
reflective and therefore indeterminate, because although it involves concepts, it does not employ them 
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determinately. Adorno suggests that this is doubled in the work of art, which not only reproduces but 
produces the reflection Kant registered in the subject. Art is constructed both from social material and 
from the history of artworks – but both ‘material’ and ‘history’ are pitched indeterminately, because 
experienced reflectively, and therefore negatively. The aesthetic, for Adorno, is a form of non-
transcendent experience: its object is not determined by experience, but remains negative. Aesthetic 
experience must therefore be understood from within a negative dialectic, in which its lingering 
negativity is the spur to more and more indeterminate conceptual work.  
But we must also recognise the ways in which such a dialectic is, like aesthetic experience, 
reflectively constructed. This second task will inform much of my reading of Adorno. If we are either 
to produce a viable contemporary aesthetic theory, or a negative dialectic, we have to reckon with the 
ways each does not merely illustrate the other, but is collaborative and mutually constitutive. There 
must be a relation between dialectical philosophy and the negativity of both the experience and 
production of artworks; yet this relation cannot merely be constitutive without invalidating the claims 
on both of negativity. The relation between dialectics and art is itself negative. To make this negativity 
visible, there would have to be a model for a collaborative, negative relation between these discrete 
discourses. We can find such a model in the collaborative way Adorno constructs the negativity of 
aesthetic experience from within a context of the negative dialectic, without thereby positing ‘the 
negative’ itself. 
 
Why Blanchot? – writing, politics, and nontranscendent aesthetics 
Blanchot’s development of ‘fragmentary writing’ in the 1960s and 1970s is motivated by a turn both to 
non-transcendent dialectics, and by way of response to the non-conceptual organisation of politics in 
the 1960s (after Algeria, May ’68). As with Adorno, Blanchot’s sense of dialectics is inseparable from 
its expression. Where for Adorno conceptual dialectics happens in judgement and in society, such that 
aesthetics are part of dialectics, for Blanchot dialectics happens in writing. In The Step Not Beyond, this 
is pitched negatively. Writing there is fragmentary, developed throughout the 1960s (in essays collected 
mostly in The Infinite Conversation), this idea of fragmentary writing is that writing does not negate 
what it writes. It therefore models the kind of non-transcendent ‘work’ of ‘désœuvrement’, ‘unworking’, 
which is the dialectical ‘step’ which does not ‘negate’ (the equivocation of ‘pas’), and indicates without 
moving into a ‘beyond’. Such a writing is, in the terms of this thesis, strictly indeterminate: its terminus 
is reflectively ‘unworked’ from negating any negativity and returned to the quasi-activity of writing 
itself. And as with Adorno, such philosophical developments are entwined with political response. 
Blanchot’s later Unavowable Community responds to May ’68, but comes from a protracted 
engagement with politics after the events of the Algerian war in 1958. Fragmentary writing must 
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therefore be read collaboratively with developing a politics of fragmentation, a politics responsive to 
its fragmentary conditions: community. 
Blanchot’s writing is therefore aligned with both Adorno’s and Kant’s sense of aesthetics: with 
a reflective form that can accommodate its own indeterminacy and the unexpected ways it might 
develop, just as writing, without proposing any ‘beyond’, still negatively indicates the form of a political 
engagement that, like writing, does not master its political object. The organisation of writing, like such 
politics, is not just fragmented but fragmenting. Blanchot does not just use writing to posit or make 
sense of the indeterminate, but is concerned with the ways writing inscribes its own indeterminacy, and 
therefore becomes the only mark or form by which it might be read. There is nothing ‘beyond’ writing 
that could validate it, just as there is nothing but the reflective activities of the aesthetic itself that could 
validate it. Therefore, as with Adorno, Blanchot develops a non-transcendent (anti-Hegelian) version 
of the dialectic, and employs writing to structure the experience of such a dialectic. Again, this becomes 
visible by reading Blanchot through Kant’s reflective aesthetics; in which reading Kant, again, is turned 
reflectively against himself. 
 
Why this moment? – ’68 and the indeterminate organisation of community/politics through writing/art 
Kant develops his aesthetics in order to validate non-conceptually organised, reflective experience. The 
reflecting aesthetic judgement responds to reflective experience and validates it through reflection, i.e., 
without the usual cognitive move of determining it through a concept. The aesthetic therefore gives 
form to non-conceptual, indeterminate, and reflective experience. And this is the kind of experience 
that organises May ’68 politically. Thinking the indeterminacy of such a politics means responding to 
the reflective way they are organised. My three chosen writers, in response to my reading of Kant, give 
form to such a political organisation. Celan’s poetic writing bears witness to the ways the politics of 
May ’68 are organised aesthetically, and his poetry works through this elision in a way that exposes it 
as negative. The unwitting ‘aestheticisation’ of politics is thought through poetically. Blanchot’s 
development of fragmentary writing in response to the fragmentary political organisation of May ’68 
also measures this discrepancy between actual politics and political conditions. And for Blanchot, too, 
such a measurement is the exilic measure of a non-manifest futurity. Such non-manifestation of the 
future is given form in the reflective way politics and writing are organised. And we can finally see the 
collaboration between aesthetics and politics in Adorno’s sense of the aesthetic as a socially constructed 
organisation of reflective experience, where art is the construction of social forms without any 
determination by or of those forms; whose autonomy is irrevocable, but registered negatively in a 
political context of identification and determination. ’68 marks a point of historical contact. But it also 
marks a point where history is reflectively, rather than determinately, organised. It is open to the future 
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and to futurity, and therefore to both retrospective comprehension (in dialectic) and to a present 
indeterminacy. 
 
Critical fragmentation: Adorno and Blanchot 
In reflective, aesthetic experience, experience is fragmented. It is dispersed by its indeterminate 
coordinates, such that its ends are not necessarily indicated by the features of its object. The form of a 
work of art does not fully determine the form of its experience, just as aesthetics cannot adequately 
prescribe the reflective form new art works take. Such experience is therefore reflective in the sense 
that it is collaborative. As indeterminate, the aesthetic judgement must reflectively construct the 
coordinates of its operations, just as a work of art must reflectively construct form without the logical 
precedent of that form in what Kant calls ‘purpose’. My contention in this thesis is that this 
indeterminate relation is reproduced on a critical level. Fragmentation does not rest with the artwork, 
but returns, reverses upon aesthetic experience. The disconnections addressed by Adorno and Blanchot 
give form to a disconnected aesthetic experience of art. The fragmentation of experience, as much as 
the disconnection to which they respond, is legible in the disconnection between these two writers. 
Responding to ‘disconnection’ in these writers means responding to the critical ‘disconnection’ of them. 
Recent attempts to bring these two projects together focus on their asymmetry as collaborative. 
Emmanuel Ravel compares Blanchot’s anti-aesthetic theories of writing with Adorno’s negative-
dialectic-inflected aesthetic theory. ‘The negative dialectic establishes the necessity of appearance by 
the fact that the différance [différance] of meaning [sens] which it engenders alone signals the 
possibility of a coherence to come.’ This appearance of the promise of meaning, of presence as the debt 
of presence connects to the ‘unworking [désœuvrement], by which art’s total destruction of itself is 
generative of new forms’.21 If Blanchot’s writing fragments its own formal coherence, this resonates 
with Adorno’s ‘negative’ dialectic of aesthetic experience, where the fragmentation of coherence 
promises new formal possibilities. This dialectics of promise doubles back into this fragmentation. 
Focusing mostly on Blanchot’s earlier writing and his fiction, William Allen remarks that, for Blanchot, 
art is ‘foreign’ to culture, ‘arising after culture […] for it is too late and only offers a future without 
reconciliation, a utopia, if any, that only responds to the infinite space of the work in its contestation.’22 
Art contests any attempt to accommodate it. It remains negative. This negative is the condition for 
critical contestation. For Allen, Adorno’s ‘historicity’, as ‘an endless process of critique’, helps 
                                                      
21 Ravel, Emmanuelle, Maurice Blanchot et l’art au XXème siècle: Une esthétique du désœuvrement 
(Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2007), 148 [my trans.] 
22 Allen, William S., Aesthetics of Negativity (New York: Fordham University Press, 2016), 73. This idea of 
‘contestation’ is also developed in Liska, Vivian, ‘Two Sirens Singing: Literature as Contestation in Maurice 
Blanchot and Theodor W. Adorno’, in The Power of Contestation, ed. by Kevin Hart and Geoffrey H. 
Hartman (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), pp. 80-100 
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articulate this critical ‘contestation’ in Blanchot’s writing.23 Blanchot’s writing is also subject to the 
ways its errancy is interrupted by its critical and discursive deployment. But Adorno’s ‘aesthetics’ are 
also thereby reflectively subject to writing that can only mark its own discontinuity. Aesthetics are 
subject to repeated displacements by writing.  
Leslie Hill, however, focuses on a disconnection between Adorno and Blanchot. In  Hill’s 
reading of Blanchot, writing, as fragmentary form, proposes ‘a radical futural trace irreducible to 
presence’.24 But Adorno’s sense of fragmentation, according to Hill, attests to the incoherence of a past 
totality, recuperating as fragmented this negative totality.25 Blanchot’s writing, however, asks whether 
the fragment ‘affirmed itself instead as the futural promise of a radical multiplication of writing as a 
proliferating series of singular events?’26 I, however, trace exactly this ‘proliferation’ of serial but 
singular events internally to aesthetic experience. Writing, indeed, is only fragmentary when it passes 
through the fragmentation of aesthetics. So I will challenge the idea that Adorno’s aesthetic is 
recuperative. I will instead suggest that it resists either critically recuperating art as a symbol of 
subjective aesthetic capacity, or repeating art’s incoherence on a critical level. Instead, I will argue, 
Adorno’s thinking constitutes a non-dialectical, non-transcendent aesthetics – to the extent to which 
dialectics are transcendent, which is exactly where aesthetics intervenes. The futural illegibility of new 
art forms is only illegible through their subjective experience. Only subjectivity is subject to this 
illegibility. That means that the future possibilities of fragmentation are registered aesthetically (within 
a history of aesthetic fragmentation) or else obscured. In this way, Blanchot’s written désœuvrement is 
also exposed to the fragmentation of aesthetic experience in reading. This ‘désœuvrement’ of aesthetics 
is installed by the aesthetic itself. It is the debt of thinking to the nonidentical of which aesthetics is the 
history. To think Blanchot’s ‘fragmentation’ of the aesthetic, we must think back through the aesthetic. 
The aesthetic forms the conditions of its reversal in reading. 
This would be to expose Blanchot to history, as well as to expose history to what Blanchot 
designates with writing. Considering the critical field after Blanchot’s death, Michael Holland argues 
that ‘Blanchot’s work is currently cut off from history—its own first of all, but also that of twentieth-
century Europe, in which it is so deeply embedded’.27 Returning Blanchot’s work to history does not 
mean, however, that we can find its meaning there. This particular challenge is set by the work itself. 
His writing, like Adorno’s, responds to disconnection, and it is this response to disconnection that must 
be taken for history. I read Blanchot’s fragmentary writing in the specific context of May ’68. But that 
                                                      
23 Ibid., 252-3 
24 Hill, Leslie, Maurice Blanchot and Fragmentary Writing: A Change of Epoch (New York: Continuum, 
2012), 9 
25 Ibid., 2-5 
26 Ibid., 6 
27 Holland, Michael, ‘État Présent. “Maurice Blanchot”’, in French Studies, 58:4 (2004), pp. 533–538, 537 
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does not mean that we can find the meaning of the event formalised in writing, and neither can we find 
a meaningful content reflected back into writing by the event. Rather, as Blanchot insists, they are 
related in (and through) their mutual dispersal. So I also read Blanchot through his disconnection with 
Adorno, and vice versa. Reading this disconnection means being attentive to the history of this dispersal. 
But this makes legible another form of history. If history is thought through such fragmentary aesthetics, 
then it is read through its discontinuity. Historical discontinuity becomes legible in the aesthetics’ 
fragmentation, as much as writing becomes fragmentary in this legibility. My claim, here, is that this 
forms a critical demand: a demand that we read in a way that is historically specific, without determining 
that relation to history. These writers’ relation to one another, as well as to history, is exilic. A 
reflectively indeterminate aesthetic forms the condition of legibility of such exilic relation. 
 
 
3 – From aesthetics to poetics: Paul Celan, reversal, indeterminate ends 
 
My thesis will finally justify the role of poetry and poetics in this intervention into aesthetics, in order, 
firstly, to suggest that aesthetic reflection parallels the poetic reflection of figuration; secondly, to 
suggest that Kant’s aesthetics are organised figuratively; and thirdly to suggest that the ‘ends’ of Kant’s 
aesthetics are also open to their unanticipated figuration. I will outline a version of reading, prompted 
by reading poetry, that gives form to this figurability of the aesthetic. Finally, I will outline the way 
such figuration can be considered a ‘reversal’. 
 
Figuration and ‘reversal’ 
My focus on ‘legibility’ as a measure of the conditions and capacities of reading is orientated by Celan. 
I am asking about the conditions of reading Celan’s poetry. One must situate his poetry in its historical 
context; but this means developing a way to read that relation between poem and history that develops 
reflectively from the poetry, and specifically from the poetry’s reserved encounter with history itself. 
‘History’ is not simply, determinately represented in this poetry, precisely to the extent that such 
poetry’s work is indeterminately reflective. Events become, in Celan’s alchemical, figurative poetics, 
marks which poetry awaits, just as poetry awaits interpretation, and just as such awaiting reserves from 
interpretation the capacity to determine the poem’s meaning. History is a hermeneutical procedure 
which, in its reflective use of language, the poem both encodes and withdraws from. Even more 
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specifically, I am asking how do we read one poem by Celan, ‘Die Pole’, ‘The Poles’.28 Not just what 
attitude the poem asks us to assume, but in what version of reading would the coordinates of this poem’s 
figurative work become legible? What are the conditions of legibility for this pem? I do not mean to 
suggest that this reflective sense of reading is restricted to this poem. I merely mean to suggest that this 
poem prompts and exercises such a reading for this thesis, deploying the polar stakes upon which my 
sense of ‘reversal’ in and of aesthetics turns. The poles of that poem are the coordinates of my reading 
of Adorno, Blanchot, and Kant. And this is precisely because of the way the poem proposes a figure – 
polarity – which is at once rooted in a specific historical moment, and opened (at its other end) to a 
futurity which is not merely uncertain, but divested of determination. The poem is configured by 
indeterminate ends, which it encodes into the poem in the figure of polarity. There is no end to such 
reading, no point of negation or (polar) attraction to which the poem’s figurative work tends, let alone 
resolves. It traces over the conditions for speaking in common without giving a common ground for 
speech. This, indeed, is the reversal of Kant, from within Kantian reflection, which I undertake to read 
in this thesis. On what ground, Kant asks, might we say that something is true when there is no ground 
for such judgement other than the reflective procedures of that judgement? On what ground, Celan asks, 
might we say ‘we’ when that ‘we’ identifies no ‘us’, no object, no people? As if we could be we without 
us. How does a poem speak (write) towards that ‘you’, that object which is not only not there, but the 
absence of which the poem inscribes? What form of judgement would hold these coordinates together 
– saying we without us, speaking as if there were an object to speak to or about, holding that shared 
way objectivity is lost to such a judgement as the common ground of judgement? The aesthetic 
conceived by Kant gives us resources to make these questions visible, and the poem (and much of 
Celan’s poetry) gives is a reading of that visibility which reflectively reverses the Kantian ends of that 
aesthetic judgement.  
And so, although I have switched between the ‘visibility’ of form afforded by the aesthetic, and 
what the aesthetic makes ‘legible’ or readable, I do not want to leave this difference ambiguous. My 
focus on poetry, and on writing, is a focus on aesthetic legibility. By this I do not mean the ‘aesthetic’ 
way that art makes things perceptible, but the way in which that process is itself readable. I turn to 
poetics to develop this form of reading. If the activity of politics is framed by the political, then the 
activity of poetry is framed by the poetic. Poetics is the study of the conditions of the work of poetry, 
as aesthetics is the study of the conditions of the work of art. The definition of poetics is as ambivalent 
as aesthetics. It can refer to the technical features of poetry, or to a broader theory of poetry. Like 
aesthetics, poetics is internally organised around this reflection between the technical specifics of a 
poem, and the theoretical significance of poetry. In both senses, poetics accounts for the way language 
becomes legibly poetic. Poetics is often opposed to hermeneutics (explaining how language functions, 
                                                      
28 See the appendix for the poem. But also see my reserve in not reading the poem here as an introduction to 
it, and to my reading, which I am attempting merely to frame here. 
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rather than what it means). But by tracing aesthetic reflection as a function of poetics, we could develop 
a poetics of interpretation, and a poetics of aesthetics: a kind of reading in which reflective 
indeterminacy becomes legible. Poetry, at least in my reading of Celan, prompts us to read according 
to indeterminacy, and therefore to read indeterminately. This poetic procedure of indeterminate 
reflection generates a hermeneutic where that reflection is shared, in reading. Celan’s poetics, we shall 
see, encode a future indeterminacy of reading, in which meaning is ‘not beyond’ the poem. 
In turning to poetics, I want to suggest that we can make sense of this poetic use of reflection 
through the concept of ‘figuration’. My emphasis on figuration has two motivations. Firstly, figuration 
is the transformation of ideas into images. It therefore involves reflection, through the reflective 
production of imagery in language. But, secondly, the end of such figuration requires interpretation. 
The work of figuration might be transformative, but it is also indeterminate. It encodes the necessity of 
the interpretation of its meanin. Figuration therefore mimics conceptuality. Where a concept determines 
the characteristics of an object by establishing its identity with the concept, the figure is reflectively 
exposed to an indeterminate identity. The end of figurative transformation remains undecided. The work 
of figuration is therefore ‘aesthetic’ in the sense that it employs reflection without identifying it. 
Poetry’s use of figuration reflects the work of aesthetics. The dynamic interpretative relationship 
between a poem’s text and its context is, in this sense, organised by the figure: interpretation itself 
requires a reflective construction of the possible ends which a poem proposes without at the same time 
determining them. The activity of interpretation is figurative to the extent that reading means responding 
to the indeterminate ways that what one reads is dynamically constructed in the activity of reading. And 
this kind of reading is encoded in the poetry I read here. And so, finally, reading such poetry gives form 
to the way aesthetics functions as indeterminate: the way that the reflection which constitutes aesthetic 
judgement and experience is figurable, not limited to the constraints of aesthetic judgement itself; and 
the way that such figuration is part of the articulation of aesthetics. This way of reading aesthetics gives 
form to the way aesthetic reflection indeterminately emerges in inaesthetic contexts: in politics (through 
community), philosophy (through the dialectics of presence), and, indeed, in the language of poetry. 
This constitutes the structure of this thesis. The figurability of the aesthetic is made legible through 
poetics, which gives formal legibility to the poetic, indeterminate, figurative activity of reading and 
interpretation. Reading poetry gives us the formal resources to re-read the aesthetic. 
Kant proposes the idea that aesthetic judgements are autonomous, neither moral nor 
information based judgements about the world, however much a role reflection plays in constituting 
and conditioning those determining judgements. The reflection set into play in aesthetic experience is 
the same reflection employed in determining judgements. The aesthetic, reflecting judgement is 
therefore both collaborative with and autonomous from conceptual judgements. By turning to poetry, 
we can develop a form for reading the unanticipated, indeterminate, and reflective work of concepts. 
The ends of such reflection are not determined by the aesthetic, but it is possible to read these ends in 
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their indeterminacy. Poetry offers a form of such legibility. By reading poetry, we can read back these 
‘ends’ of aesthetics.29 
In The Poetics of Indeterminacy, Marjorie Perloff argues that, although poetry might open 
language to its ‘indeterminate’, uncontrolled reference, the range of that reference is always structurally 
contained by the ‘poetics’ employed: by the system of poetry itself from which an individual poem 
derives meaning.30 Meaning is developed systematically, structurally. This suggests that a poem is 
always generically measured against this system of meaning.31 My contention here is that such an 
activity of measurement has conditions of legibility, and therefore an aesthetic. This measurement can 
therefore be developed into a poetics of those aesthetics, in which the terms of such reflective 
measurement are made legible in reading poetry. A poetics of aesthetics could make visible the way 
such an aesthetics could operate. The formal conditions of reading poetry are indeterminate, in that 
poetry constructs its own conditions; reading poetry thus offers forms for aesthetic experience, and not 
just forms where the aesthetic is operative. As my title suggests, the thesis moves from ‘aesthetics’ to 
‘poetics’, in order to move from the ‘visibility’ of form to the ‘legibility’ of the aesthetic conditions of 
form itself. This turn, this ‘reversal’, is performed, firstly, by establishing the reflective form of Kantian 
aesthetics; then, secondly, by establishing the susceptibility of those aesthetics to ‘reading’ and ‘re-
reading’; and then, thirdly, by developing such a ‘reading’ as a way both to ‘read’ poetry, and to 
demonstrate poetry’s effective ‘re-reading’ of the aesthetic conditions of reading. These three 
methodological coordinates set the terms of the thesis. They are, necessarily, developed rather in 
tandem. This is because my contention is that Kant’s version of the aesthetic contains the formal seed 
of its own re-reading. We are already, in reading Kant, performing the kind of ‘unworking’ of aesthetics 
Blanchot will develop for writing, and the ‘negative’ of conceptual determination Adorno will develop 
for dialectics, and the ‘indeterminacy’ of figuration that will shape Celan’s poetics. The point, then, is 
to develop the terms and conditions of such legibility. My claim is that, firstly, we can develop such a 
legibility by thinking about the aesthetic as ‘figurable’. Secondly, this ‘figurability’ can be considered 
a ‘reversal’ of the ends of Kantian aesthetics, by the means of Kantian aesthetic reflection. ‘Reversal’ 
                                                      
29 As Gary Banham recognises, in Kant and the Ends of Aesthetics (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 
this recruitment of aesthetic reflection for teleological purposiveness is implicit in Kant’s account of the 
reflecting power of judgement. The aesthetic has its own ‘ends’, but they are indeterminate, and therefore 
not conceptually proper ends at all. Thinking such ‘ending’ involves thinking teleologically and reflectively. 
But I want also to suggest, here, that such thinking invokes an aesthetic legibility itself. For such negative, 
indeterminate ‘end’ to be visible, it must be reflectively legible. Poetry offers a formal account of such 
legibility. 
30 Perloff, Marjorie, The Poetics of Indeterminacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981) 
31 See Jonathan Culler, Structuralist Poetics (London and New York: Routledge, 1975), for an account of 
this ‘structural’ reading of genre that my study of Adorno and Blanchot, in a way, precedes or sets the scene 
for. Part of my task here is to reintroduce apparently inaesthetic criticism to its aesthetic assumptions. 
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acts as the figure for this reflection, and as a figure works reflectively: its ends must be read in their 
indeterminacy, and through the close legibility of poetry. 
 
Buffaloes: indeterminacy and figurability 
My contention is that the kind of reflective forms of judgement theorised in Kant’s aesthetic can give 
form to a politics of spontaneity and indeterminacy, or at least the questions about it. This contemporary 
pre-occupation is anticipated and strikingly brought into play by Rosa Luxemburg. Luxemburg’s 
response to the Russian revolution in a way anticipates the kind of ‘indeterminate aesthetics’ developed 
in response to the political crisis marked by May ’68, to which Adorno, Blanchot, and Celan respond. 
And Luxemburg becomes an important point of orientation for Celan. Politics is not just a question of 
visibility, but also of measurement. Its change depends upon a capacity to measure present impossibility 
against a future possibility. Its determination is reserved in the future. In this it resembles my sense of 
the figure. Any present measurement of politics depends upon its present indeterminacy. If we are, as, 
in reading Rosa Luxemburg, Jacqueline Rose suggests, to develop a ‘poetics of revolution’,32  then we 
must consider this figurative form of measurement in which a revolutionary future might emerge for 
politics. In this reading, it is not a matter of determining the uncertain ways politics can manifest, but 
of making legible the indeterminate form of manifestation of the political. We can make my sense of 
the figure clearer through Paul Celan’s development in his poem ‘Coagula’, written between 1962-
1965, of a poetics that responds directly to Luxemburg’s indeterminate ‘spontaneity’, and which shows 





And the hornslight of your 
Romanian buffaloes 
 
in star’s stead above the 




In a letter from 1917, Luxemburg, looking through the grill of her prison bars in Breslau, 
describes the mistreatment of buffaloes in the yard outside. They are, she guesses, from Romania. 
Imagining their journey from that past to this present means elegising them, measuring the distance 
between this present and their lost past through the loss which that present embodies. ‘How far away, 
                                                      
32 Rose, Jacqueline, Women in Dark Times (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 40 
33 BIT 76-77|78-79 
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how irretrievably lost were the beautiful, free, tender-green fields of Romania.’34 Here is exile, not 
Romania. Here is Romania in exile. Such measurement involves not only the imaginative displacement 
of the objective scene, but also a subjective displacement through imagination, a self-displacement. 
Identifying with the buffaloes means, in an imaginative sense, dis-identifying from the self. ‘I stood 
before it, and the beast looked at me; tears were running down my face—they were his tears.’35 She 
does not cry as herself, but as the buffalo; ‘I’ is displaced into the third person, ‘him’. There is a 
displacement of affect, here, that does not just prompt ‘my’ feelings, but insists on the displacement of 
that ‘I’ with the affect of the other. Not only is ‘here’ exile, but ‘I’ am exiled by this here. Engaging 
reflectively with this other means disengaging with myself, in which this ‘otherness’ takes my place. 
‘My face’; ‘his tears’. Luxemburg herself becomes the figurative space in which the buffaloes’ exile 
becomes legible, literally, in writing this letter, and in which figurative identification their exile is 
opened, indeterminately, to other identifications: first of all, Luxemburg’s own. Figurative displacement 
becomes the condition for identification. 
In ‘Coagula,’ Celan draws upon this letter (or at least we can read this letter into the poem). 
Celan no doubt draws upon his own self-displacement in rendering Luxemburg’s response to these 
buffalos into his own poem. In this alchemical poem, Luxemburg, in her displacement, becomes a figure 
of identification. The poem’s subject is not ‘Rosa’, but her ‘wound’: ‘Auch deine | Wunde, Rosa’ – 
‘You wound | too, Rosa’.36 The poem draws in this wound, opens with this fissure, this wound, adding 
it to the ‘buffaloes’ hornslight’. And Celan’s history is drawn in, too, with the buffaloes and Romania, 
from which (writing now in the 1960s, in Paris) Celan was exiled. But Romania is already a site of 
displacement for Celan.37 His own home country, Bukowina, was not only, like the buffaloes’ Romania, 
lost for him, but lost entirely, subsumed after the war into Ukraine and Romania. Rosa, imprisoned in 
Breslau and eventually murdered in Berlin,38 was, like Celan, from the East (Poland), and so like Celan 
(as he writes in ‘Coagula’s’ alchemical companion poem ‘Solve’) ‘De-easterned’;39 and as Jewish, in a 
more profound sense ‘de-easterned’ in exile from Jerusalem.40 But in ‘Coagula’ we do not get such easy 
identifications. The poem does not make simple affective identifications. The poem is open to the 
displacement of ‘you’, to the exile of ‘you’, the displacement of orientation itself, of the east, of an 
object to mourn. This is the paradox of identification: that any identification proceeds from a 
                                                      
34 Luxemburg, Rosa, The Letters of Rosa Luxemburg, ed. by Georg Adler, Peter Hudis, and Annelies 
Laschitza, trans. by George Shriver (London and New York: Verso, 2011), 1069 
35 Ibid. 
36 BIT 76|77 
37 Celan lived and studied briefly in Bucharest. 
38 Peter Szondi suggests that Luxemburg’s death is the subject of another poem, ‘Eden’: Szondi, Peter, Celan 
Studies, trans. by Susan Bernofsky and Harvey Mendelsohn (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 83-
96 
39 We shall return to the vexed translation of this important word later in the thesis. 
40 A missing heritage drawn upon repeatedly, in Celan’s poetry, by the image of the ‘horn’. 
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displacement. How would we recognise that displacement, without replacing it, without the poem 
standing aesthetically (symbolically, figuratively, or emphatically) in for what is lost? The poem does 
not just mourn a lost object, or a lost homeland, or a lost friend, but a loss of loss, a loss of that capacity 
to identify effectively what is lost 
Luxemburg identifies with the animal, writing, ‘[p]oor wretch, I am as powerless, as dumb, as 
yourself; I am at one with you in my pain, my weakness, and my longing.’41 The animal is a figure of 
her own suffering. But Celan laments a ‘you’ to lament. There is no you, no point of imaginative 
figuration; not just a lost object, but a loss of objectivity: ‘your wound’, not ‘you’. I contend, in this 
thesis, that Kant’s aesthetic also traces this loss of objectivity. The reflecting aesthetic judgement 
responds to a cognitive incapacity to determine its object. It responds by turning inwards, and 
identifying that reflective work with the subject itself. As such, the object is present in aesthetic 
judgement, but indeterminately present. And the subject is made aware of the ‘objectivity’ of the 
subjective faculties, imagination and understanding. This judgement recuperates reflection for 
subjective experience. In this way, it releases a usual suspension of the subject’s own bodily and 
cognitive ‘objectivity’, the subject’s self-presence for consciousness. But it does so by suspending the 
object’s objectivity. This disparity opens Kant’s aesthetic up to its own possible figurative 
displacement. In order to make moral judgements effective in the world, they have to an extent to be 
emptied of effect: there must be a ground beyond either the world or the subject, that is nonetheless 
shared by both, that validates reason in constructing moral judgements. Finding this ground is the task 
of Kant’s third Critique, and Kant finds his answer in reflection itself. As Celan’s poem shows us in 
reading Luxemburg, such a capacity to make moral judgements effective depends upon a suspension of 
the self in the place of the other. A poetic capacity for ‘I’ to speak to ‘you’, to configure ‘you’ into a 
poem, depends upon a figurative capacity to identify not just with the other (I feel sorry for these 
buffaloes), but as the other (I cry their tears), which threatens to displace the other’s affect through 
symbolising it. In grounding an objective capacity to identify moral effectiveness in the subjective 
capacity to judge, Kant similarly threatens to suspend that object. The poem discloses this act of 
figuration for what it is, and thereby exposes it to the multiple suspensions of identity which figures 
outline. The poem does not more effectively make moral identifications. It reflects the way those 
identifications operate. 
In this sense, the poem shows in microcosm the reading this thesis will undertake as a whole. 
Kant’s sense of reflection usefully discloses the reflective forms of identification that hold in political 
structures, and the reflective relations that structure them. But to make this disclosure legible, this 
reflection must itself be susceptible to the reflections of reading. There must be a legibility of reflection. 
The poem affords this legibility to the identifications made by reflection. 
                                                      




Critical dialogue: Celan not encountering Heidegger  
We can see the disconnection that puts dialogue at stake by reading Celan through Heidegger’s poetic 
philosophy – a common starting point for the critical narrative of the entanglement of poetry with 
twentieth-century literary theory. In this thesis, I want to offer a counter-narrative to this Celan-
Heidegger nexus. Reading Celan through Heidegger elides Celan’s engagement with politics. The 
concern of this thesis with aesthetic indeterminacy is motivated by the indeterminacy of the politics. 
Celan reads Hölderlin in parallel with Heidegger, and, despite their difficult encounters and the 
difficulty that attends Heidegger’s politics for Celan,42 together the two sketch out one post-war future 
for poetry: as the site where being might speak.43 Certainly, Celan’s close readings of Heidegger bleed 
into his vocabulary. But we can read Celan with Heidegger, and thus endorse Heidegger’s valorisation 
of language in philosophy, only at the expense of the political in Celan’s poetics.44 This is more than 
just a matter of Heidegger’s veiled and unveiled National Socialist affinities. The kind of ‘fusional’ 
relation which this narrative affords between Celan and Heidegger, between poetry and philosophy, 
elides over exactly the possibility of political discontinuity. The anxious theoretical inheritance of 
Heidegger slips into a paralleled blindness in reading Celan. If Heidegger’s historical situation closes 
off the political (we can read everything in Heidegger but politics), then, it follows, Celan’s poetry 
writes up to the limit of politics. While it is certainly viable to read Heideggerian poetics through 
Celan’s poetry (and beyond), this comes at the expense of a poetics of the political, a poetics which 
could engage with precisely the ‘realities’ of history and political relation which Celan, throughout but 
                                                      
42 It is correct to emphasise Celan’s Jewishness here, which coloured much of his thinking and life, not least 
his exilic relation to history and to his own German language. See Felstiner, John, Paul Celan: Poet, 
Survivor, Jew (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001), who emphasises the significance of 
Celan’s personal experience of the Holocaust, ‘was Geschah’: ‘[i]f language had any point after “that which 
happened,” it was to name the eclipse without profaning it’ (153). This tension over the functional ‘ends’ of 
poetry shapes my thinking about the ‘ends’ of Kantian aesthetics. 
43 This maximal position is advanced by Dennis J. Schmidt in ‘Black Milk and Blue: Celan and Heidegger 
on Pain and Language’, in Word Traces: Readings of Paul Celan, ed. by Aris Fioretos (Baltimore and 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 110-129, for whom Celan was ‘drawn’ to 
Heidegger’s ‘kindred sensibility’ (123). See also Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, The 
Literary Absolute, trans. by Philip Barnard and Cheryl Lester (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988): ‘I think one can 
assert that it is, in its entirety, a dialogue with Heidegger’s thought.’ (33). Mark M. Anderson, in ‘The 
“Impossibility of Poetry”: Celan and Heidegger in France’, in New German Critique, 53 (1991), pp. 3-18, 
suggests that we would be mistaken in asserting that Celan articulates ‘Being’s’ history as the ‘exit from the 
human’’, in which the Holocaust marks a sublime unrepresentable point of history (see especially 14-17); 
see also Pöggeler, Otto, Spur des Worts. Zur Lyrik Paul Celans (Freiburg and Munich: Karl Abler, 1986), 
249. A more detailed exposition of the dialogue with Heidegger comes in Lyon, James K., Paul Celan and 
Martin Heidegger: An Unresolved Conversation, 1951-1970 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2006). 
44 For this dialogue with Heidegger through the poetic figuration of reality, and especially the reconstitution 
of poetry’s ‘ontic’ character from an ‘ontologisation’ of reality, see Nowell-Smith, David, Sounding/Silence: 
Martin Heidegger at the Limits of Poetics (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013); see also Bambach, 
Charles, Thinking the Poetic Measure of Justice (Albany: SUNY Press, 2013), 213-8.  
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particularly in his late work, not just endorses but insists upon. I think that this accounts for some of the 
accusations of late hermeticism in Celan’s work, emphatically resisted on his part.45 Celan seems 
hermetic when decontextualized, when dehistoricised, even as his poetry apparently resists the presence 
of history.  
We might, indeed, be more faithful to Celan’s difficult relation to Heidegger precisely by 
countering it. My hope is that my reading of Celan in this thesis through Adorno and Blanchot will 
unfold something of a suppressed relation between these two thinkers, might present an opportunity to 
think of these uncommon writers ‘in common’. And this is my political point. The divergence of method 
or narrative between these writers itself constitutes one ‘aesthetic’ fate of the political. This introduces, 
inevitably, though in reverse – which is to say, read from the perspective of its future displacement – 
upon Kant’s concept of aesthetic theory. I want to trace the ways in which Kant both establishes and 
displaces the space for the political in his aesthetic theory by reading that double movement – 
placement, displacement – from the perspective of Adorno’s and Blanchot’s re-writing of political, 
communal aesthetics. But I also want to trace this movement as a relation between these writers. This 
is Celan’s point of entry.46 Celan’s poetics offer the figurative space where this relation can be read. 
Before his death, Adorno hoped to write about Celan, sketches of which hope survive in the fragmented 
and posthumous Aesthetic Theory. Blanchot only wrote about Celan in elegy, after his death. 
Historically, then, the relation is already displaced: exilic, fragmented, posthumous, hopeful. But the 
relation is also historically concentrated. Much of the writing where this ‘displaced’ aesthetic-political 
relation is worked out spirals towards or away from May ’68. The date marks Adorno’s sad humiliation 
and decline, and, in Germany at least, a kind of reversal of the hopes for critical theory, for the 
desperately grasped autonomy of aesthetic thinking, in the student occupation of the Frankfurt School 
buildings: a political movement which, in hoping to embody the nonidentical political, instead erases 
the conditions of its possible legibility. In Paris, both Blanchot and Celan lived ambiguously in the 
throes of the student-worker insurrection, and their responses generate a tautly ambiguous sense of 
‘community’ which both reads back into Kantian aesthetic theory and against the apparently liberal 
politics by which les évènements were subsequently narrated. Adorno, Blanchot, and Celan all therefore 
                                                      
45 In a dedication of his copy of Niemandsrose to Michael Hamburger, Celan inscribed ‘Absolutely not 
hermetic’, after mistakenly attributing an accusation of hermeticism in a TLS review to Hamburger. See 
Poems of Paul Celan, 4th edition, trans. by Michael Hamburger (New York: Persea Books, 2002), xxix, and 
351-4. 
46 For Blanchot, Celan mediates his own vexed recuperation of Heidegger. In a letter to Catherine David 
from 1988, Blanchot writes of Heidegger’s ‘refusal, faced with Paul Celan, to ask for forgiveness, a refusal 
that threw Celan into despair and made him sick, for Celan knew, that in the face of the West, the Shoah was 
the revelation of its essence. And that it was necessary to preserve its memory in common, even if it meant 
losing all peace, but in order to preserve the possibility of a relation to others.’ Maurice Blanchot: Political 
Writings, 1953-1993, ed., trans. by Zakir Paul (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), 123. ‘Faced 
with Paul Celan’, Blanchot evokes the political stakes of commonality, relation to others, in relation to this 
caesural event. Celan, for his part, was ‘struck, dismayed’ upon hearing of Adorno’s death in 1969, a year 
before his own. Quoted in Felstiner, Paul Celan, 263 
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resisted politics for the sake of the political, a sense of ‘the political’ which is decisively aesthetic. My 
argument is that we can read in this resistance a kind of pre-history to the theoretical manipulations of 
the aesthetic in the theoretical afterlife of ’68. And this pre-history disturbs the historical by unfolding 
its aesthetic roots, disturbs the communal by expressing its plural, indeterminate, aesthetic roots. 
Celan’s poetry, and the elegiac re-inscription of his already elegiac poetics in English language poetry 
of the 70s – I look at Geoffrey Hill and JH Prynne – marks a point of departure, an exilic movement, 
which describes one fate of aesthetic theory. My hope is that we can expose, in this counter-
Heideggerian narrative, some of the aesthetic pre-history of contemporary literary theory and 
philosophy, but also hold on to some of that ambiguously held sense of political autonomy which so 
strangely marks Blanchot’s, Adorno’s, and, perhaps even less hopefully but more hoped for, Celan’s 
writing, ‘a hope, today, | for a thinking man’s | (coming) | word | in the heart’.47
                                                      
47 Celan’s poem ‘Todtnauberg’, chronicling a visit to Heidegger’s hut, added, to his original inscription in 
Heidegger’s guest book, the words ‘today’ and ‘thinker’s’, meaning the erasure I have superadded is in 
reverse: a hope which is added after it has been disappointed. The word might be coming, might still be 
coming, and the word marks that hope after its possibility (the thinking man’s, Heidegger’s) has been 










In this chapter, I examine the way Kant accounts for reflection in his aesthetic. Kant uses the aesthetic 
to mandate philosophically for reflection in judgement. But here, I want to suggest that the 
indeterminate ways Kant establishes this mandate gives room to turn Kant's account of reflection 
against itself. There is a negativity to Kant's presentation of reflection. My contention in this chapter is 
that Kant’s aesthetic gives form both to reflection and to a reflexive reading, to which it is at the same 
time susceptible. Kant is read according to a ‘reflection’ he describes in his aesthetic. I describe this 
reflexive reading as ‘reversal’. ‘Reversal’ is a structuring principle of Kant’s account of aesthetic 
judgement, but it is also a figure through which Kant’s aesthetic can be read. It shows how Kant’s 
account of the aesthetic speaks of a wider figurability of the aesthetic itself. This figure, ‘reversal’, 
structures the way that Kant is the subject of both exposition and critique, and the way that his aesthetic 
provides a structure of reflection which can give form to such a reading by ‘reversal’. I will develop 
here what I mean by ‘figure’, and by ‘reversal’, in reading Kant’s aesthetic. 
Why this indeterminacy of reflection, and this reversal of determination in aesthetics? For Kant, 
aesthetic judgement is both grounded in and coordinated by reflection, in such a way that the procedures 
of cognition are turned against themselves. In determining judgement, the subject uses a concept to 
determine something particular. The reflecting judgement works in ‘reverse’ of determining judgement. 
It proceeds from the particular, and from subjective experience. Its ends are indeterminate. It accounts 
for the way experience is itself experienced, whether ‘aesthetically’ (in judgements of taste) or 
‘teleologically’ (in judgements about the reflective organisation of nature). Kant uses reflecting 
judgement to account for the indeterminate ways beauty and organisms are experienced. Such 
judgement does not finally determine these experiences, but it does still claim a universal validity. In 
this insistence on the validity of indeterminacy, Kant gives form to non-conceptual experience, and to 
a non-conceptual employment of judgement. In this chapter, I trace the way Kant gives form to 
indeterminacy through reflection. But I also argue that this form is not contained by the aesthetic, 
instead exposing the subject to a reflection which is indeterminate. My contention is that Kant’s 
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judgement works figuratively, and that although it gives form to reflective experience, it is also subject 
to reflection itself. This will have consequences for the way the aesthetic works after Kant.  
I begin after Kant, with Hegel, in order to show, firstly, how Hegel attempts to recover 
reflection from this Kantian indeterminacy, and therefore, secondly, why Kant’s aesthetic remains 
useful for an account of the kinds of reflective indeterminacy that we will encounter in Adorno, 
Blanchot, and Celan. Precisely because reflection, as Kant suggests, is indeterminate – as a non-
conceptual experience with non-conceptual ends – the ways it can be used or configured are 
indeterminate in ways he does not acknowledge. But Kant’s focus on the necessary negativity of 
aesthetic experience and judgement means that his aesthetic can offer a form for thinking through the 
presentation of negativity. This distinguishes Kant from Hegel in aesthetics, but also offers a way, 
through Kantian aesthetics, to read against Hegel’s recruitment of negativity for the positive telos of 
conceptual dialectics. Kant’s account of such ‘negative presentation’ gives form to a negativity which 
Hegel’s dialectics threaten to elide. This becomes clear through reading Adorno’s and Blanchot’s use 
of aesthetics (in Kant’s negative sense) to develop a counter-reading of Hegel. In examining Kant’s 
aesthetic, and what a ‘reversal’ in – and of – that aesthetic would be, we can develop a ‘negative’ version 
of aesthetics which might intervene in Hegel’s version of dialectical negation; and therefore, through 
Kant, we can find a way to the late twentieth-century interventions into dialectics through ‘aesthetics’ 
by Adorno and Blanchot.  
I will firstly give an account of this Hegelian turn. Hegel turns from Kant. But Adorno’s and 
Blanchot’s differently motivated turns from Hegel can be coordinated through a turn back to Kant. 
Secondly, I detail Kantian aesthetics and teleology, with reference to his wider critical project, in order 
to flesh out the idea of the ‘reversal’ of reflection and its ‘figurability’, mapped out in Kant’s aesthetics. 
Finally, I develop this figure of ‘reversal’ more explicitly, by looking at poetry as a turning point (re-
verse) for aesthetic judgement, and concluding with a discussion of the methodological and critical 
implications of developing this ‘figurative’ reading of Kant’s aesthetics.  
 
 
1 – Not Hegel: Hegel, Kant, and negativity  
 
i. Hegel and the ends of aesthetics  
In this section, we trace Hegel’s critique of Kantian aesthetics at the point of reflection. The different 
uses each assign to reflection in the aesthetic marks a difference in their conception of negativity. By 
tracing Hegel’s sense of reflection, we can see how Kant organises reflection indeterminately in his 
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own aesthetic, and therefore how Kant gives access to Adorno’s and Blanchot’s critiques of Hegel at 
this point of the indeterminacy of reflection. 
Hegel ‘turns’ from Kant in the sense that he turns the procedures of Kant’s aesthetic against 
their Kantian ends. For Kant, reflecting, aesthetic judgement does not claim any objective validity, but 
merely the subjective validity of its own reflective work. And the ends of such aesthetic judgement are 
not in determinate concepts, but remain indeterminate: the ‘common sense’ of intersubjectivity (from 
aesthetic judgements of taste); and the ‘connections’ that organise nature (from teleological judgement). 
For Hegel, however, reflection is not merely a subjective experience, but a structuring principle 
manifest in objective artworks. For Hegel, reflection does not merely configure experience, but, in its 
manifestation in art, gives it sensuous form. Art is only indeterminate in the sense that it precedes 
philosophy, which finally determines it. Art thinks in sensuous form what cannot yet be thought 
conceptually. Its indeterminacy is therefore recoverable for philosophy, once conceptual thinking 
becomes adequate to the Idea art thinks sensuously. The reflections of aesthetic judgement form part of 
a more systematic dialectic by showing how the Idea can be manifested sensuously. But in Adorno’s 
and Blanchot’s critiques of Hegel, it is exactly this manifestation through negation that is under 
question. Hegel recruits the indeterminacy of reflection, felt in aesthetic experience, to give structure to 
the reflective, speculative ways dialectical thinking negates what is indeterminate for it. Hegel’s critique 
of Kant therefore makes visible the parameters of a critique of Hegelian negation. By showing how, for 
Hegel, the manifestation of reflection in art deals with reflection’s indeterminacy, we can develop an 
aesthetics of non-manifestation which could turn against this Hegelian model of reflection. 
Hegel famously announces that art, considered ‘in its highest vocation [ihre höchsten 
Bestimmung]’, ‘is and remains for us a thing of the past [ein Vergangenes]’.1 What limits art? Art’s 
‘highest vocation’ would be the manifestation of truth. This is not, as Schiller had it, merely the 
‘appearance’ of truth; nor, as Kant had it, a true (but subjective) pleasure. For Hegel, the Ideal of art is 
the sensuous manifestation of truth. In art, the Concept is reconciled with external appearance. Art is 
‘true’ to the extent that it manifests, objectively, the Idea, which would otherwise be subjective. 
Historically, this means that, to use one of Hegel’s examples, a Greek sculptor makes manifest the idea 
of human perfection which could not yet be articulated as an idea. Art shows that human perfection is 
true. But this manifestation is also art’s limit. Although Hegel characterises art as one of the three modes 
in which the absolute might appear, alongside religion and philosophy, it is the least of these modes 
precisely because it is limited to appearance. ‘The beautiful [Schöne] has its being in pure appearance 
[Schein]’.2 Art, as beautiful, makes the Idea appear. To the extent that it is beautiful, art is Ideal: it is 
the actual reconciliation, in sensuous form, of the internal force of subjectivity (Spirit, the Concept) 
                                                      
1 HA, 11 
2 HA, 4 
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with external appearance and sensuous form. In art, the spiritual Concept is reconciled with sensuous 
appearance. Art is thinking in ‘sensuous form’, and ‘when art is present in its supreme perfection, then 
precisely in its figurative mode it contains the kind of exposition most essential to and most in 
correspondence with the content of truth’.3 Art’s claims to truth are the claims of manifestation: as 
beautiful, art ‘truly’ makes the Concept appear.4 As Ideal, art is the appearance of reconciliation. So art 
is the sensuous embodiment of the Concept; but it is also the ‘ensouling’ of mere sensuous matter. As 
beautiful, lifeless matter ‘shines’ with spiritual content. What is beautiful is ‘ensouled’: ‘the Concept 
ensouls the real existence which embodies it, and therefore is free and at home with itself in this 
objectivity’.5 Beauty thereby articulates the adequacy of natural, and artificial, form for spirit – but also 
the limits of this adequacy. The necessity of art’s appearance constrains the spiritual Concept which is, 
for Hegel, really absolute and universal. There is therefore a complex and collaborative compromise in 
art between organic and manifest ‘life’, and the Spirit that ‘ensouls’ it – a dialectic. 
Thereby the sensuous aspect of a work of art, in comparison with the 
immediate existence of things in nature, is elevated to a pure 
appearance, and the work of art stands in the middle between 
immediate sensuousness and ideal thought. It is not yet pure thought, 
but, despite its sensuousness, is no longer a purely material existent 
either, like stones, plants, and organic life; on the contrary, the 
sensuous in the work of art is itself something ideal, but which, not 
being ideal as thought is ideal, is still at the same time there externally 
as a thing.6 
Art mediates the Idea. Art is limited by the necessity of appearance, and so is aesthetic experience. 
Although art can refine the beauty that appears in nature, such that art can become Ideal, ‘whereby the 
inner soul and spirit is seen at every point’,7 to be adequate to the Absolute it must relinquish sensuous 
particularity. Ideal art might be wholly ‘ensouled’, but Spirit itself requires the self-transparency of 
philosophy, and the philosophical articulation of the Concept which unfolds from its own form. Art 
passes firstly to the specific appearance of Spirit in religious images, and then to this self-transparency 
without appearance in philosophy. As a vehicle of Spirit, art is finite, precisely because its material, like 
nature’s, is finitude itself; whereas Spirit, if it is free, is infinite.8 
                                                      
3 HA, 102 
4 See Pippin, Robert B., ‘What Was Abstract Art? (From the Point of View of Hegel)’, Critical Inquiry, 29:1 
(Autumn 2002), pp. 1-24, for a discussion of Hegel’s relevance, again, to art ‘after’ the end of art, specifically 
when its ‘figurative’ work is overtaken – after its figurative work of correspondence. ‘Figuration’ as I use it, 
however, is not necessarily representation in the Hegelian sense.  
5 HA, 112 
6 HA, 38 
7 HA, 153-4 
8 HA, 97-100; see also ‘Absolute Knowing’ in Phenomenology of Spirit, and The Science of Logic, trans. by 
George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), where Hegel distinguishes between 
‘immediate’ being (which in the aesthetic is associated with aesthetic experience) and the ‘essence’ which 
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For Hegel, art articulates spiritual truth by embodying it. But in order to think the spiritual ‘in 
itself’, one must turn away from art. Art is a transitory moment in the history of Spirit. This transition 
away from art, however, is effected by the very reflection art presents. Art operates reflectively. It is 
constituted by the reflective way Spirit is manifested in sensuous appearance. The external appearance 
is not identical with Spirit, but art’s ‘outside’ is not just mere matter either.9 Its strange, medial quality 
is conferred by aesthetic experience. A person recognises the way an artwork mediates subjective form 
through an object, and this recognition registers the subjective way that objective artworks function. 
The artwork is an object constituted by subjective reflection.  
What is thus displayed is the depth of a suprasensuous world which 
thought pierces and sets up at first as a beyond in contrast with 
immediate consciousness and present feeling; it is the freedom of 
intellectual reflection which rescues itself from the here and now, 
called sensuous reality and finitude. But this breach, to which the spirit 
proceeds, it is also able to heal. It generates out of itself works of fine 
art as the first reconciling middle term between pure thought and what 
is merely external, sensuous, and transient, between nature and finite 
reality and the infinite freedom of conceptual thinking.10 
The artwork is torn between presentation and representation.11 The spiritual ‘beyond’ that it reflects is 
‘suprasensuous’, but its material is markedly sensuous. Art constitutes, to pre-empt Blanchot, a kind of 
‘not beyond’. Its reflective work therefore presents the form of spirit, but is insufficient to represent it. 
Art instantiates reflection, but this reflection is taken on by thinking itself: the experience of art 
supersedes what art presents.12 Once art has disclosed to us the form of this reflection, then that 
reflection exceeds the particular presentation of the artwork. It is for this reason that, historically, art is 
a ‘thing of the past’: it ‘has rather been transferred into our ideas instead of maintaining its earlier 
necessity in reality and occupying its higher place.’13 We stand in need not of art, but of a philosophy 
of art. Without such a universalisation of reflection in philosophy, art would be limited to local historical 
presentation, and its ahistorical significance would be missed. This means going beyond art. In aesthetic 
experience, we must consider the way that art’s objectivity is not sufficient either to the production or 
                                                      
is not beyond being, but mediated being (337). Nature’s immediacies are only true, ‘essential’, when 
mediated by spirit; a process which art leaves incomplete because tied to the appearance of the ‘immediate’. 
9 HA, 20: ‘the inner shines in the outer and makes itself known through the outer, since the outer points away 
from itself to the inner’; and in beautiful organisms, too, there is this structural relation between inside and 
outside: human skin, for example, discloses ‘this swelling life’, even though merely functional: ‘skin itself, 
which permits the inner life to shine through it, is an external covering for self-preservation, merely a 
purposeful means in the service of nature ends.’ (146) 
10 HA, 8 
11 See Taylor, Charles, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p.468, on art’s ‘Darstellung’ 
compared with religion’s ‘Vorstellung’. Art is indefinite presentation. ‘The work of art renders something, 
is faithful to something. But what it is faithful to it does not describe.’ (472) 
12 HA, 103: ‘the ‘after’ of art consists in the fact that there dwells in the spirit the need to satisfy itself solely 
in its own inner self as the true form for truth to take’. 
13 HA, 10 
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the experience of precisely the reflection it presents. Art is lacking, and it presents what it lacks. ‘Art 
invites us to intellectual consideration, and that not for the purpose of creating art again, but for knowing 
philosophically what art is.’14 The beauty of art may well be ‘born of the spirit and born again’,15 but 
what it births is reflection, not art. 
This is the situation that explicitly confronts Adorno in his Aesthetic Theory. Once art, as he 
writes there, has become ‘autonomous’, has liberated itself from its ‘cultic functions’,16 then what does 
it do?17 This autonomy is ‘irrevocable’.18 And this is the situation that less explicitly confronts Blanchot 
in his account of writing. There is, to use Blanchot’s word, a désœuvrement – an ‘unworking’ – of art 
by art, after Hegel: if its function is actively to reconcile truth and appearance, then its ‘untrue’ 
appearance ‘unworks’ that function. What do we make of art’s appearance when it no longer manifests 
truth? Hegel’s ‘retrospective’ sense of art’s history (henceforth we are ‘after’ art as mediator of the 
Concept) reflects his ‘retrospective’ sense of the dialectic’s synthetic operations. Absolute knowledge 
contains the now reconciled history of its articulation; it comes after history. And the reflective ‘truth’ 
of aesthetic experience negates the history of art’s truthful appearance in artworks. The aesthetic 
therefore parallels the dialectic, and offers a possible way into it. Art, too, has a history of its articulation. 
And art for Hegel implies a teleology. Art asks the question of its futurity. The ‘end’ of art is a question 
about the form of its displacement, as well as the ambiguous form of its telos. The question of this 
chapter, and this thesis, is not therefore about the ‘end’ of art, but about the various ‘ends’ of aesthetic 
thinking, and the ‘figurability’ of those ends (their translatability) into unexpected futures. And Kant, 
not Hegel, provides a form for thinking these ends. 
What can we gain for an understanding of the ‘end’ or ‘ends’ of art or aesthetics from relating 
Kantian aesthetics to Hegel’s? We can register how the shift from the subjective experience of ‘beauty’ 
to the objective reconciliations of ‘art’ reinvests Kantian aesthetics with the question of ‘history’ and 
manifestation. Hegel drew upon Kant’s account of the aesthetic pleasure taken from the sensed 
reconciliation between inner subjective experience and external objective form. Hegel agrees with Kant 
that judgements of taste are not merely sensuous, and therefore contingent: they refer to a subjective 
                                                      
14 HA, 11 
15 HA, 2 
16 AT, 1 
17 Arthur C. Danto, in After the End of Art: Contemporary Art and the Pale of History (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1997), argues that art as a ‘history’ has come to an end, because its representational 
practices are now liberated; see also Houlgate, Stephen, ‘Hegel and the ‘End’ of Art’, in The Owl of Minerva, 
29:1 (1997), pp.1-21 for an alternative, more ‘Hegelian’ reading. See also Pippin, Robert B., After the 
Beautiful: Hegel and the Philosophy of Pictorial Modernism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 
who argues that Hegel’s historicisation of beauty gives us a way to read modern painting’s own negotiations 
with history: the ‘problem’ of beauty’s significance, worked out in painting, makes legible problems of social 
intelligibility. 
18 AT, 1 
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capacity to judge, and to a form of judgement, as well as to the form of the object.19 He also agrees with 
Kant that, in aesthetic experience, the subject is positioned towards the world differently from the way 
it is in other conceptual experience: the subject does not desire to appropriate the object, nor, as in 
science, does the subject desire to abstract knowledge from the object.20 But for Hegel, the subject qua 
spiritual is also alienated by nature. Nature limits the spiritual freedom of subjective thought.21 Rather 
than nature, art mediates subjective experience in objective form through beauty, precisely because art 
is constructed out of both sensuous material and subjective experience. Its beauty is ‘born of the spirit 
and born again’.22 But as Julia Peters points out, we cannot divorce Hegel’s claims about the end of art 
from his sense that beauty, too, develops historically. If art cannot easily be emancipated from beauty, 
then not only art, but beauty too is contentious ‘after art’.23 And we can resituate this question of 
‘beauty’ as a question of the experience of art. In other words, we are returned to Kant: the question of 
the ‘end’ of art is a question of the subjective forms, including ‘beauty’, that are the ground of the 
experience of art, and not just of the objective forms of the particular arts. The contentiousness of this 
subjective form is the ground of Kant’s aesthetics. Hegel’s project and claims are troubled when 
‘beauty’ is examined in Kantian terms: as a judgement, and as an experience. And the question also 
turns against itself: what happens to art, and not just to art, but also to aesthetic experience and 
judgement, ‘after’ beauty? 
 
ii. Adorno, Blanchot, and the Kantian critique of Hegel  
‘After’ beauty, art’s mediating role, mandated to beauty, is revoked. Once art no longer manifests the 
reflective work of the Idea, beauty is no longer significant. If art lingers, it is indeterminately. We must 
look elsewhere than Hegel, to Kant, to think this aesthetic indeterminacy. Adorno uses the aesthetic 
experience of art (which is henceforth, in its indeterminacy, negative) to mount an intervention into 
Hegelian dialectics, which are not, for Adorno, adequately responsive to their own negativity. Blanchot 
develops the ways writing is coordinated by indeterminacy in ways that, likewise, intervene in dialectics 
of negation. We can call both of these interventions ‘Kantian’ in the sense that they are configured by 
                                                      
19 HA, 60 
20 HA, 36-7: ‘He leaves it free as an object to exist on its own account; he relates himself to it without desire, 
as to an object which is for the contemplative side of spirit alone.’ 
21 See Gardiner, Patrick, ‘Kant and Hegel on Aesthetics’, in Hegel’s Critique of Kant, ed. Stephen Priest 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), pp. 161-171, and Guyer, Paul, ‘Hegel on Kant's Aesthetics: Necessity and 
Contingency in Beauty and Art’, in Hegel und die “Kritik der Urteilskraft”, eds. H.-F. Fulda and R.-P. 
Horstmann (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1990), pp. 81-99, for an account of this shift from nature to art, and of 
Hegel’s development of the transient ‘necessity’ of art. 
22 HA, 2 
23 Peters, Julia, Hegel on Beauty (New York and London: Routledge, 2014)  
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indeterminacy. But they are post-Hegelian in that this indeterminacy is historically motivated. We can 
see what this means, firstly, in Adorno. 
Hegel describes the necessity of philosophy overturning art. Adorno reverses this situation 
through aesthetics. Aesthetic experience conserves reflection where philosophy abandons it. It is not 
only that art stands in need of philosophy, philosophy stands in need of philosophy. Like art, philosophy 
stands in need of reflection. For Hegel, art’s transience, its provisionality, means its reflective work 
necessarily passes into the determinate form of philosophy. But for Adorno, it is precisely this persistent 
provisionality that registers the ways philosophy has failed to become reflective. Aesthetics would 
respond to this provisionality and, as for Kant, become reflective itself. Aesthetics ‘demands of 
philosophy precisely what philosophy has neglected to do: that it extract phenomena from their 
existence and bring them to self-reflection’.24 Adorno suggests that for Hegel, ‘it was art and not its 
prototypical forms that was transient’.25 The historical manifestations of art are provisional, and so, 
Hegel infers, must be art as a concept. But Adorno reverses art’s transience into a philosophical 
necessity. Philosophy has failed to do exactly what art is supposed to do: to make the identity of the 
Concept actually manifest. ‘That according to Hegel art was once the adequate stage of spirit and now 
no longer is, demonstrates a trust in the real progress of consciousness of freedom that has been bitterly 
disappointed.’26 Apparently negated, art lingers as negative experience in a context where philosophy 
has failed to manifest the experience of freedom. Art’s history is ‘inhomogenous’.27 Its truths are 
contradictory. But when philosophy requires reflection, this negativity is significant. In Negative 
Dialectics, Adorno writes that ‘[p]hilosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment 
to realise it was missed’.28 Philosophy is shown to be necessary in the formal way that art was to be 
shown, by Hegel, to be unnecessary. Philosophy lingers in its need for philosophy, just as art lingers in 
its need for philosophy. Critical aesthetics begins, then, with a need in philosophy. The way that 
philosophy deals with art – aesthetics – shows us how philosophy has not dealt with itself. Art gives 
form to a critical need in philosophy. 
Adorno’s reversal of Hegelian dialectics in Negative Dialectics is an attempt not to overturn 
Hegel’s dialectics, but to re-deploy and re-emphasise them. Hegel’s dialectics are not negative enough. 
The significance of thinking of the ‘negative’ without negating it is that the negative is the motor of 
thinking.29 However, if one is to account for the negative, one must account for its non-manifestation. 
                                                      
24 AT 341/391 
25 AT 272/309  
26 AT 272/309 
27 AT 273/310 
28 ND 3/15 
29 Molly MacDonald argues that the ‘gaps’ of negativity ‘are the gaps on which the entire movement of 
consciousness depends. Without the space created in the movement of negation, there would be no state of 
transformation, no moment in which a retrospective understanding of the preceding shapes of consciousness 
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If the negative could be ‘posited’ or ‘grasped’, then it would not offer the indeterminate, ‘negative’ 
space in which thinking might move or change. Such space must, however, itself be provisional, 
changing, and unexpected, or else it would merely present opportunities for further self-identification. 
A ‘negative’ dialectics would therefore have to develop a model of reflection that could reflect 
provisionality, without the synthesis of that reflection in a final moment of reconciliation. So where 
Hegel sees the strength, and limit, of art in ‘presentation’, in positing as actual what would otherwise 
be spiritual, Adorno sees, in the situation ‘after’ Hegel, art’s provisional character as ‘presenting’, in 
semblance, the kind of reflective experience philosophy lacks. Art does not, for Adorno, posit ‘truth’ 
as reconciliation. It posits contradiction.  Adorno is concerned with thinking contradiction as 
contradictory, and with an experience of negativity not negated through experience. What would a 
dialectics that registered the way it ‘negates’ contradictory experience be like? For Adorno, 
contemporary experience is itself contradictory. We live in a ‘false world’,30 an ‘administered’ world,31 
where the contradictions of reason (the myths of enlightenment) are not just manifest but triumphant. 
We live in a world, that is, which constructs an incapacity for the experience of negativity. Thinking is 
governed by the principle of identification, which derives from the speculative reconciliations of 
reflection registered in art. Dialectics must be re-orientated, and re-coordinated, by this negativity which 
would otherwise be negated. And the motivation for this is the motivation of dialectics itself: experience 
requires negativity, and the subjective freedom to experience depends upon it. 
This attempt to register the experience of negativity also motivated Blanchot, who was involved 
in the French post-Kojèvian, post Jean Hyppolite readings of Hegelian dialectics.32 The impetus of 
Blanchot’s fragmentary writing in the 1960s and 1970s, which is the concern of this thesis, is less 
explicitly anti-Hegelian than in the 1940s and 1950s. There, in ‘Literature and the Right to Death’ for 
example, Blanchot argues that the negativity that drives dialectical thinking and activity in the world 
(the negation of stone and fire in the idea of the stove, for example) is not accounted for by dialectics. 
There are experiences of negativity not susceptible to negation. The crucial experience is death: there 
is death as the negation of experience, but also the ‘other death’, death as the impossibility of negation, 
                                                      
could be gained.’ Hegel and Psychoanalysis (New York and London: Routledge, 2014), p. 107. If dialectics 
is constructed ‘backwards’, through the retrospective Aufhebung that speculatively recognises the real 
identity of apparent contradiction, then it has to be able to position itself in this ‘negative’ way. MacDonald 
indexes this through Freud, but it can equally be read through Levinas, Derrida, and Blanchot, and their 
different senses of the dialectical ‘trace’. See Bruce Baugh, French Hegel (New York and London: 
Routledge, 2003), pp. 19-25, who tracks this development in French thinking from Hyppolite through to 
Derrida. I shall return to this in more detail in chapter three. 
30 AT 15/26; 393/461 
31 AT 268/303 
32 Again, see Baugh, French Hegel, who does not place Blanchot on this trajectory, but does establish it in 
the context Blanchot worked in. 
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the experience of which is impossible.33 This kind of negativity without negation is registered in 
literature. Here the concerns of the anti-Hegelian dialectic develop into Blanchot’s later concerns with 
fragmentary writing. The crucial experience of literature is of fiction – the ‘he/it’ [il] gestured to in The 
Step Not Beyond,34 the ‘third person who is not a third person’35 in The Infinite Conversation, the 
experience of writing that is positioned ‘negatively’ in relation to the world, rather than operatively 
‘negating’ the world. Fiction can register the ways experience itself is disastrously fragmented by the 
negativity by which it is apparently driven. Hegel proposes the negation of contradiction in the way the 
otherwise subjective Spirit can be reconciled with objective appearance in art. But for Blanchot, the 
kind of negativity experienced in literature is the displacement and dismantling of experience as 
possible. In fiction, one is exposed not to ‘an other’, whose identity is finally reconciled with the 
reader’s speculative identifications; one is rather exposed to the ‘other’ of experience, to the ‘third 
person who is not a [dialectical] third’, to the contradictions of non-identity. To write ‘he’ is to expose 
the subject to an incoherence which would otherwise be elided. Such literature is alienating experience 
because it alienates the subject from real capacities of negation that are the condition of experience. In 
such fiction, there is a negativity with which the subject cannot identify. There is nothing, for Blanchot, 
no coherence, to be expected from literature.36 In literature, then, Blanchot finds a non-negated 
negativity which returns us to the experiences of non-dialectical negativity that elude Hegelian 
dialectics. Literature is not the experience of displacement so much as the displacement of experience 
– and this reversal is crucial: literature does not, for Blanchot, offer new and unexpected forms for the 
dialectic of experience so much as expose the subject to an indeterminacy that drives and displaces 
experience. Literature is at once a ‘step’ beyond itself and ‘not’ beyond itself. This constitutes a non-
transcendent aesthetic. 
The measure of Adorno’s and Blanchot’s response to Hegel is, therefore, the dialectic. Both are 
concerned with describing a kind of thinking that can account for the negativity dialectical thinking 
replaces. But both turn to aesthetic experience to make this description. And both describe a non-
                                                      
33 In ‘Literature and the Right to Death’, ‘in the presence of something other, I become other’, and in the 
work of literature, the production of writing, ‘the book […] is precisely myself become other’ (314). 
‘Literature learns that it cannot go beyond itself toward its own end’, that ‘what asserts itself now is the very 
possibility of signifying, the empty power of bestowing meaning – a strange impersonal light’ (329). In the 
place of negation, then, literature ‘asserts’ a negative indeterminacy that cannot posit an ‘end’ [The Work of 
Fire, trans. by Charlotte Mandell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995)]. I want to trace this ‘not 
beyond’ of literature in the later fragmentary writing as it responds to Kant’s ‘indeterminate’ aesthetic, but 
see also The Space of Literature, trans. by Ann Smock (Lincoln, London: University of Nebraska Press, 
1982), and the reflections on the way that writing marks death as both the possibility of negation (and 
therefore experience), and the impossibility of experiencing such negation – is writing, dying, Blanchot asks, 
the experience of ‘radical reversal, where he dies but cannot die, where death delivers him to the 
impossibility of dying?’ (100). 
34 SNB 1/8 
35 IC 384/563 [trans. amended] 
36 SNB 2/8 
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transcendent aesthetic: an experience which does not go beyond itself or its object, which does not 
negate the negativity of experience. Both are guided, however, not by an ‘inversion’ of negation – not 
by positing the negative as if nonconceptual experience could be positively ‘held’ or determined – but 
by the reversal conceptual cognition and judgement undergo when exposed to this nonconceptual 
negativity. And both find the model for such reversal in Kant because it is exactly this ‘reversal’ of 
experience which, covertly, characterises Kantian aesthetics. 
 
iii. From Hegel to Kant  
In what sense is this discomfort with Hegelian dialectics channelled through the aesthetic, and why does 
Kant make this channelling visible? Kant’s divergence from the aesthetics of Hegel outlines the role 
reflection plays in Hegel’s dialectics.  
Hegel’s speculative philosophy mobilises Kant’s dialectical antinomies. The contradictory 
‘antinomies’, for Kant, establish a dialectic which has a regulative function in Kant’s philosophy. The 
Kantian dialectic establishes the parameters of possible experience, by demonstrating the points at 
which antinomy can be reconciled by turning back to what is critically possible.37 Where for Kant 
experience finds its limits at the negative (the critical block where beyond subjectively possible 
experience there is no possible identification of the ‘thing in itself’), for Hegel, upon encountering the 
negative, the form of experience is reconfigured until it is reconciled with what was deemed to be 
negative to that experience. The Hegelian subject is mutable, then, but absolute in its mutability. The 
subject can speculatively move beyond objective contradiction by positing itself as the site for the 
reconciliation of contradiction. The negative is the spur for the subject’s reformation.38 The subject’s 
freedom is its capacity ultimately to reconcile this contradiction through negation.  
This theme runs through Hegel’s philosophy. The Phenomenology of Spirit is an account of the 
activity of spirit, and of the way subjective consciousness extends beyond, and reconciles, objective 
contradictions. The Science of Logic is the account of the result of this reconciliation, which serves as 
the ground for absolute knowledge: knowledge which operates in the self-transparency of the concept 
                                                      
37 See Friedlander, Eli, Expressions of Judgment: An Essay on Kant’s Aesthetics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2015), however, for an account of the way in the third Critique this regulative function – 
due to judgement’s unique lack of a field of legislative operativity – opens onto a more speculative horizon 
of judgement’s function. 
38 In The Restlessness of the Negative, trans. by Jason Smith and Steven Miller (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002), Jean-Luc Nancy describes these contradictions of negativity and their grounding 
role in Hegel’s account of the subject’s dialectical relation to the world in a way counter to Hegel: the subject 
‘remains its contradiction, just as my pain, my death, and my other, or my joy, remain outside of me: outside 
of me — what, being mine, makes me go out of myself. It is what, in me, negates me as me; what negates 
my determination, and what precisely relates it to the other — which is to say, what also relates this 
determination to itself, opening it in itself for itself.’ (42). Nancy’s account recalls Adorno’s, where the 
subject subsists in the contradictions of negativity, and not reconciliation: a prolonged ‘restlessness’. 
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in philosophy, where the means of knowing correspond with what is known, such that knowing is no 
longer agonistic or contradictory experience, but is the subjective unfolding of the concept from itself, 
and from its reconciliation. But this means that any absolute knowing includes, as reconciled, 
contradictory experience. The Science of Logic is the passive repetition that completes the active 
circularity of the Phenomenology of Spirit. But the aesthetic, as the point of negotiation or transition, 
where reflection famously passes from ‘the poetry of imagination to the prose of thought’,39 marks the 
point of transition of reflection. Hegel argues that ‘art has the function of grasping and displaying 
existence in its appearance, as true, i.e. in its suitability to the content which is adequate to itself’,40 and 
that ‘the outer must harmonize with an inner which is harmonious in itself’.41 But with Kant, any 
harmony is won through its indeterminacy. In Kant’s aesthetics, this harmony is non-manifest, in the 
sense that, although universally valid, aesthetic judgement remains subjective. There is no final ‘end’ 
of aesthetic judgement, no manifestation of its effects, except in the free play of judgement itself, and 
in the non-manifest ‘common sense’ shared between subjects. The provisionality of aesthetic 
experience is both a means and an end. Adorno’s and Blanchot’s different concerns with the non-
manifestation of the Hegelian negative, their concern with finding a form in which the negative is 
legible in its non-manifestation, finds a possible articulation in Kant’s version of the aesthetic.  
In the introduction, I suggested that aesthetics can offer a form in which indeterminacies, 
discontinuities, and disconnections are legible as such. Kant’s critical concern with accounting for the 
conditions of possible experience would seem to exclude such disconnections. Indeed, Kant’s aesthetic 
is explicitly concerned with connection: with finding a common ground between the distinct realms of 
nature and reason by which judgement can operate to connect them. If, Kant asks, reason is operative 
in nature (which it must be, otherwise neither scientific knowledge would be possible, nor moral 
demands effective), then there must be a shared principle that connects subjective judgement with the 
objective world it judges. But the problem is that such a principle could only be freedom itself. Only 
the subject’s ‘freedom’ to judge, and nature’s ‘freedom’ to generate new forms autonomously, could 
be the ground adequate to these twin freedoms. If the principle that grounded each were determined, 
then neither would be freely autonomous. The principle must therefore be indeterminate: it must neither 
be manifest nor legislative, and yet still be universally valid. If there is a shared principle that connects 
subjective judgement with the objective world, it is, paradoxically, this free disconnection. Each freely, 
collaboratively, shares in the other’s freedom.  
In order to think such a connection by way of disconnection, Kant had to find experiences in 
which both the subject and object are operative, but free; and experiences in which their operativity was 
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collaborative, but autonomous. The third Critique describes two of these experiences: the aesthetic 
judgement of taste, and the teleological judgement of natural, organic forms. In the former, the subject 
registers its own capacity merely to think, without conceptual reference to an object, and the pleasure 
of this attests to the way that beautiful forms can provoke such free, non-cognitive experience. In the 
latter, the subject’s capacity to judge the ‘teleological’ organisation of natural forms (the way organisms 
appear at once to be a means and an end) registers a correspondence between the organising principle 
of judgement and the organic forms of nature. In both experiences, Kant uses judgement as a measure 
of these twin freedoms. Judgement’s capacity merely to reflect, to operate reflectively – which is to say, 
judgement’s capacity not to determine nature objectively – marks its principle of freedom shared with 
nature. 
Hegel agrees that human experience is internally divided, even contradictory. But such 
contradiction can, for Hegel, be reconciled by the speculative activity of thinking itself.42 For This 
reconciliation is mediated by concepts, with the subject as the vehicle of mediation. For Kant, subjective 
judgement acts as a bridge between ‘different worlds’.43 But for Hegel, art presents this ‘bridging’ work 
objectively.44 It is the task of philosophy to resolve the contradiction between internal and external; art 
gives form to such reconciliation. 
Philosophy affords a reflective insight into the essence of the 
opposition only in so far as it shows how truth is just the dissolving of 
opposition and, at that, not in the sense, as may be supposed, that the 
opposition and its two sides do not exist at all, but that they exist 
reconciled.45 
Philosophy takes on the reconciliation which the reflective form of art indicates. As we saw earlier, it 
is precisely at this point, where philosophy assumes the reflective work that art presents as a reflective 
form, that Adorno turns Hegel against himself. Philosophy, indeed, depends upon a presentation – it 
‘shows’ how truth reconciles – and therefore upon an aesthetic. If truth is to be ‘shown’, then it must 
be shown in a form. But, as Adorno suggests, this means that philosophy itself stands in contradiction. 
It must dissolve its own reflective capacity to ‘show’ truth and become reflection itself. But in order to 
do this, philosophy stands in need of reflection which cannot be posited, or positive, but must be 
negative. And so here we return to Kant’s conception of the aesthetic, in order to expose Hegel’s to its 
                                                      
42 HA, 54: ‘Spiritual culture, the modern intellect, produces this opposition in man which makes him an 
amphibious animal, because he now has to live in two worlds which contradict one another. The result is 
that now consciousness wanders about in this contradiction, and, driven from one side to the other, cannot 
find satisfaction for itself in either the one or the other’. 
43 CPJ 63/5: 175-6 
44 HA, 60: Hegel characterises Kant’s aesthetic as proposing the way that a particular can articulate the 
Concept, ‘[b]ut this apparently perfect reconciliation is still supposed by Kant at the last to be only subjective 
in respect of the judgement and the production [of art], and not itself to be absolutely true and actual.’ Only 
art can make this reconciliation ‘actual’, by making reconciliation its objective work; and only philosophy 
of art can make it ‘true’, by reassuming it into the subjective. 
45 HA, 54-5 
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contradictions. As Kant recognised, the aesthetic experience is negative, in that it does not make claims 
on any object. And the aesthetic judgement is likewise negative, in that it does not claim any objective 
determination. Aesthetic judgement, like aesthetic experience, is reflective and yet universal. Kant’s 
aesthetic, we shall see, is open to reflection, including its own reflection. Kant’s aesthetic is exposed to 
the indeterminacy of both the object of beauty, and the subjective judgement of beauty. This is a shared 
indeterminacy, and therefore a reflective indeterminacy, that parallels the shared conceptual 
determinacy of knowledge judgements. The ground of Kant’s aesthetic is not, therefore, the final ‘truth’ 
of reconciliation in a philosophy of art, but the neutral, provisional, and repeated experience of aesthetic 
indeterminacy itself, in which the subject is repeatedly exposed to unexpected aesthetic forms. There 
are, then, two different histories at work here (and we can recall Adorno’s characterisation of art’s 
history as ‘inhomogenous’): in Hegel’s history, art is an amplification of natural beauty in the Ideal 
which is eventually subsumed into the truth of philosophy; in Kant’s history, art is the unexpected 
harmony of objective form with a subjective capacity to experience such form. Kant, then, leaves room 
for the provisionality of experience, and for the continuing reflection of which, as Hegel recognised, 
philosophy stands in need.  
 
 
2 – On reversal: Kant’s aesthetic and teleology of reflection and reflecting judgement 
 
In suggesting that ‘reversal’ is a figure both for the exposition and critique of Kant’s aesthetic, my 
contention is that Kant’s third Critique is governed, throughout, by reflection. Kant’s concern with 
accounting for reflection is motivated by a problem of grounding the critical faculties he describes in 
his wider critical project. The third Critique gives form to reflection itself. In the first Critique, 
reflection is merely employed in cognition, constituting ‘the state of mind in which we first prepare  
ourselves to find out the subjective conditions under which we can arrive at concepts. It is the 
consciousness of cognition’.46 In the third Critique, however, the capacity to judge reflectively is a 
‘power’ with its own a priori operations and ground. Yet Kant’s aims remain transcendental. He is 
concerned with reflection only to the extent that it falls within the limits of possible subjective 
experience. The problem which motivates the third Critique is that reflection is employed in cognition, 
but does not have any objective content, nor any ‘realm’ where its powers are legislative.  47 And so he 
aims to account for the ways this reflective power of judgement makes sense of an otherwise critically 
obscure point: that judgement, scientific or moral, is at once autonomous and effective in a likewise 
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autonomous world of objects, without claiming any legislative ground for this effective ‘power’. In the 
first Critique, Kant describes how ‘all judgments, indeed all comparisons, require a reflection, i.e., a 
distinction of the cognitive power to which the given concepts belong.’48 But here, with beauty and 
telos, Kant is interested in the way reflection remains operative when there is no cognitive judgement, 
and in the way reflection can operate autonomously, without advancing any conceptual determination.  
The question therefore becomes reflective itself. In what form, and on what ground, can one 
reflectively examine reflection? In asking how reason and nature, how understanding and imagination, 
can be thought in common, Kant is asking what principle connects them. This inscribes a reflexivity 
into reflection itself. My contention is that Kant’s version of reflection works according to a 
‘reversibility’: reflecting judgement operates indeterminately when conceptual determination is not 
possible, and its operations ‘reverse’ those of determination. I will further argue that this reversibility 
exposes Kant’s critical account of reflection to its own ‘reversal’: that the ‘ends’ of reflecting 
judgement, as Kant conceived them – in configuring, if not constructing, an intersubjective ‘common 
sense’; and in configuring, if not constructing, the connection between the form of judgement and 
organic form – are indeterminate in ways that exceed or go beyond the transcendental mandate Kant 
set out for reflection. This will lead us to a ‘figure’ of the aesthetic as ‘reversal’: a form of thinking that 
operates without conceptual determination, and which encodes the ground of its own operations, in 
indeterminate ways. Finally, this will lead us to a potential reading of Kant through Adorno and 
Blanchot who, as we saw in the last section, are both concerned with the ways ‘indeterminate’ 
experience and judgement can be coordinated through forms of ‘negativity’ without negation. The 
reflection described in Kant’s aesthetic helps to organise negativity as indeterminate. My argument here 
is that Kant provides a form for thinking such negativity without negation, but making this form legible 
requires us to reverse his own transcendental logic. 
 
i. Reversal 
What are the terms of this reading? I want to examine Kant’s aesthetic through the figure of ‘reversal’. 
This can be related to the ideas that organise Kant’s aesthetic and his account of reflection: the 
‘indeterminacy’ of aesthetic experience and judgement, and the ‘figurability’ of experience in 
judgement itself. I will read these as aspects of the ‘reversal’ I explore in and through Kant. And finally, 
I will develop these terms with reference to the ‘disconnection’ that such a reversal describes. Here I 
will preliminarily develop the terms of this critique. 
The experience that grounds Kant’s aesthetic is not conceptual. The judgement that arises with 
such experience is likewise not conceptual. If we are to conceive of this experience and this judgement, 
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we cannot do so conceptually. Such aesthetic experience tests the limits of conceptual possibility, by 
invoking judgement without conceptual determination, but with a conceptual judgement. Concepts are 
not, for Kant, always absent from aesthetic judgement; but their presence is not determinate. And this 
logical structure affects interpretation of Kant’s aesthetic. I turn to ‘reversal’, then, both to explain this 
logical structure, and to describe its consequences; not as a concept, but as a figurative manoeuvre or 
configuration of reflection outside conceptual limits. 
 This figure of reversal organises the indeterminate ways reflection operates in aesthetic 
experience and judgement. I draw upon two correlated but distinct meanings of indeterminacy, here, 
and this ambiguity (and this distinction) are important for characterising what I mean by reversal in this 
context. The first is spatial. What is ‘indeterminate’ in this sense does not ‘terminate’ in that it does not 
have a ‘terminus’, an ‘end’ or ‘boundary’. There is no fixed spatial location or end where such 
‘indeterminacy’ can be identified. When I say that a judgement is ‘indeterminate’ in this sense, I mean 
that its object is not fixed, or that there is no fixed point or boundary towards which it is orientated.49 
Kant’s aesthetic judgement of taste is ‘indeterminate’ in the sense that it does not refer to an object, but 
to a subjective capacity to judge reflectively. The second sense of the word is temporal. What is 
‘indeterminate’ in this sense does not finish. This is distinct from the spatial sense in that there is no 
definable close of such ‘indeterminate’ reflection. There is no definable ‘course’ that such judgement 
should take, because it is constituted by the ‘free play’ of subjective faculties. In Kant’s sense, again, 
this means that aesthetic, reflecting judgements are neither spatially limited by any object, nor 
temporally limited by the subject. This reflects Kant’s division of the two pure forms of intuition, space 
and time, into an outer and an inner sense.50 The indeterminacies involved in judgement are twin, in the 
sense that they are simultaneously ‘outer’ (spatial) and ‘inner’ (temporal). There is a further 
consequence to this, which is not logical but critical. If such judgements are logically indeterminate, 
then they are also interpretatively indeterminate, in the sense that their freedom from both an ‘object’ 
and ‘course’ means that their meaning is also unfixed, indefinable. Aesthetic judgements of taste, in 
Kant’s sense, are not the same as critical judgements, but they do form the condition by which criticism 
can take place. Critical indeterminacy therefore rests in the logical indeterminacy of aesthetic 
judgement. 
 In Kant’s account, the aesthetic does not just respond to indeterminacy, but produces it. The 
procedure of cognitive judgement is, for Kant, ‘reversed’ in aesthetic experience. In determining 
judgement, cognition matches a concept to the representation of an object, thus identifying the object 
and determining it. Reflecting judgement occurs when the subject is unable to provide a concept for an 
experience. Unable to proceed from a concept to determine a particular, judgement instead works 
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backwards from the particular. The process of determination is reversed: cognition moves from the 
object determined to the faculties which have cooperated to determine it. This reflecting judgement is 
refocused to consider its own powers. It reflects upon the free play of the faculties, unconstrained by 
the requirement to determine objects. The resulting indeterminacy of aesthetic judgement provokes a 
feeling of pleasure in the subject, a pleasure felt in the way the faculties can work harmoniously, a kind 
of experience different from that produced in the determining of objects.51 In this way, the aesthetic 
both responds to reflection and produces it, in indeterminate ways. There is, again, neither spatial nor 
temporal end to such reflection, other than the transcendental limits of the subject to which Kant 
mandates it.  
This is why, in order to unfasten reflection from these transcendental limits, I turn to figuration 
to describe the movement of reflection in aesthetic experience and judgement. By figuration, I mean a 
‘negative presentation’ of relations. A figure, in this sense, is the mark of the identity of two non-
identical things. But this mark is negative. The figure, then, is the reverse of the concept, in the sense 
that it is exposed to the incompatibility of what it connects. Judgement connects otherwise separate (but 
collaborative) ‘worlds’: reason and nature. From Kant’s dialectic, we know that we are obliged to think 
that reason is effective in nature (or should be), because we have communicable knowledge about 
nature, and we can have moral judgements that are effective in nature. But neither are identifiable, one 
with the other. Their connection, then, must also mark their necessary separation, or distinction. 
Judgement does not collapse this distinction, it moves between each point, like a bridge that 
simultaneously touches each shore. Judgement, like a bridge, marks an indeterminate space in between 
two distinct worlds. It is itself a kind of boundary, in the sense that, for Kant, judgement is operative in 
both ‘realms’ without having a ‘territory’ of its own. It is an experience of Reason but necessarily 
indeterminate; its indeterminacy is what gets it on terms with reason and so denies it conceptual 
definition. Judgement is not legislative itself; it is merely reflective, in the sense of reflectively moving 
between these two realms. So we can see that, as a distinct power, judgement has to be thought of as 
figurative, rather than conceptual: it is not a distinct ‘thing’, but rather an activity; but unlike a concept, 
it does not determine anything. And the contours of its activity are thought through the image of its 
figure. Figuration, then, here describes a connection or relation that remains indeterminate, and 
therefore cannot itself be thought determinately. The relation established by figuration – and here I am 
myself drawing on poetics as a distinct but connected discourse – is one that, like a bridge, only exists 
as the act of crossing, the experience of being connected to two incompatible realms, and has to be 
passed over repeatedly. The figure, then, is reflective in the sense Kant uses the term. But the figure is 
also exposed to the indeterminate ends Kant avoids in mooring reflection to the subject. If we think of 
reflection as functioning figuratively, then its terminus remains reflectively open, because it is moored 
                                                      
51 The ‘pleasure’ of the beautiful is a pleasure in cognition, in judgement itself, and is therefore distinct from 
the ‘agreeableness’ of pleasure in sensation. [CPJ 184/5: 305] 
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to the negativity of reflection, and not to the positive experience of subjective freedom mandated to 
reflection by Kant. 
 
 
ii. Reflection: from aesthetic judgement to common sense 
The terms of this ‘reversal’ as reading both respond to and develop out of Kant’s own aesthetic. Kant’s 
specific exposition of the role of reflection in aesthetic experience and judgement can reflectively 
configure a reading of Kant’s aesthetics. This means there are two levels to ‘reversal’: that firstly, it 
describes the structure of Kant’s own aesthetics; and that secondly, it offers a possible stance or position 
from which Kant’s aesthetics can be read in relation to other critical ideas. This depends upon there 
being a possible ‘experience’ of aesthetic experience, a meta-aesthetic experience whereby the 
reflective work Kant constrains to the aesthetic is deployable outside its transcendentally mandated 
place. Kant’s sense of reflection’s indeterminate work encodes this kind of meta-aesthetic possibility 
into his aesthetics. The second level, then, is read out of the first. Kant’s own structure establishes the 
form by which it can be read. I will now turn to Kant’s account of this reflective work in aesthetic 
judgement (before turning to teleology), and examine the specific way that, for Kant, beauty’s role in 
organising subjective reflection is reproduced in the aesthetic judgement’s organisation of an 
intersubjective common sense. Kant thinks that such ‘common sense’ underwrites community, by 
inscribing a form of communicability. The mere communication without objective content of aesthetic 
judgement outlines the shape of intersubjective communication, and the principle by which it is 
possible. But what kind of ground for community can the ‘communicability’ of aesthetic judgements 
constitute? If aesthetic judgement proceeds indeterminately, then is such indeterminacy likewise 
operative, like reflection, in any community constituted by ‘common sense’?  
 For Kant, the reflective experience and judgement of beauty refers to a reflective capacity 
merely to communicate, and does not communicate any conceptual information.52 The judgement refers 
to a ‘feeling’, not to a concept (and is thus aesthetic).53 But this ‘feeling’ is, in fact, the subjective 
capacity to ‘judge’ itself. This reflecting judgement therefore communicates a faculty of 
communicability, rather than any determinate knowledge. This is, as suggested earlier, the first stage of 
Kant’s ‘reversal’ of cognition in reflecting judgement. There is no ‘objective’ basis for saying 
                                                      
52 Taste is ‘the faculty for judging [Beurtheilsvermögen] that which makes our feeling in a given 
representation universally communicable without the mediation of a concept’ [175/5: 295]; and ‘the faculty 
for judging a priori the communicability of the feelings that are combined with a given representation 
(without the mediation of a concept)’ [176/5: 296]. 
53 Alison Ross compares this ‘structural dislocation’ of aesthetic experience from practical ends in Kant to 
Adorno’s sense of ‘art’s dislocation from functional contexts’, in The Aesthetic Paths of Philosophy 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), p. 15 
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something is beautiful. And yet, for Kant, judgements of taste – saying something is beautiful – make 
a priori claims to validity, as if they were objective. Such judgements claim universal validity on a 
subjective basis. Considered logically, this means that Kant’s account of aesthetic experience has 
‘reversal’ at its centre. Kant differentiates between determining and reflecting modes of judgement. The 
former, the determining mode, is involved in cognition. The subject encounters an object and refers it 
to a concept. But it still does this by employing reflection. Reflection functions to refer intuition to the 
correct faculties. But in this way, reflection is not felt independently of this determination, and although 
its operations are effective a priori in judgement, it does not have its own normative ground. As Henry 
Allison points out, Kant’s task in the third Critique is to identify this ground of reflection.54 The latter, 
then, the reflecting mode, is the site of this possible experience, and is involved in aesthetic judgement. 
The subject encounters something that, aside from whatever conceptual determinations are employed 
(this is a tree, or a painting), leads her to judge that it is beautiful. The connection between the faculties 
of imagination and understanding is registered subjectively, and ‘constitutes the subjective, merely 
sensitive condition of the objective use of the power of judgment in general’.55 In reflecting judgement, 
the faculties are connected by judgement itself, not by any representation of objective agreement.56 So 
the aesthetic judgement employs reflection, but rather than reflectively referring the object to a concept, 
the reflecting judgement proceeds from the particular itself. The determining judgement, on the other 
hand, proceeds from a concept to the particular.57 The reflecting judgement, finding no concept, 
proceeds from the particular towards a concept.58 In the reflecting aesthetic judgement of taste, the 
structure of determining conceptual judgement is reversed. 
 The merely reflective operation of judgement in the aesthetic judgement of taste shows how 
the faculties are connected subjectively, and therefore a priori. This is felt as pleasure. But it also shows 
(or reflects) an intersubjective connection.59 If everyone, ‘every human being’ judges ‘by means of 
understanding and sense in combination’, then the pleasurable experience of the faculties’ subjective 
agreement also registers a shared capacity to judge.60 If I can communicate with other humans, then I 
can only do so on the basis of the shared forms of cognition in the faculties. The pleasure I feel in the 
                                                      
54 Allison, Henry E., Kant’s Theory of Taste: A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 13-18 
55 CPJ 26/20: 223-4 
56 CPJ 27/20: 225; see also 102-3/5: 216-7 
57 CPJ 26/20: 223-4 
58 Paul Guyer identifies here a regulative ‘possible concept’ in the aesthetic, which itself ‘connotes […] the 
general condition for the application of concepts, the harmony between the imagination and understanding.’ 
Kant and the Claims of Taste, 2nd ed. [orig. ed.: 1979] (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 
35-6 
59 Indeed, such pleasure ‘promotes the cultivation [Cultur] of the mental powers for sociable communication’ 
[CPJ 185/5: 305]; a form of communicability which is still distinct from actual communication.  
60 CPJ 104/5: 219. See Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, for an account of this connection between 
reflecting judgement and the ‘universal voice’: p. 106 
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aesthetic experience of beauty is not due to any representation of an object, but to the harmony of the 
faculties themselves. The experience of beauty demonstrates my own faculties, but also their 
communicability: it validates as communicable a subjective capacity that must otherwise, in 
determining judgement, merely be assumed as the basis of communication. Significantly, then, the 
reflective structure of aesthetic experience conditions the reflective structure of the intersubjective 
validity of that experience. Both the ‘experience’ of beauty and the ‘universal voice’ that communicates 
it are not determined in judgement, and the relation between the two is also indeterminately reflective. 
The validity of aesthetic judgement is constructed reflectively. Aesthetic judgement therefore marks a 
double indeterminacy: the ‘subjective’ indeterminacy of judgement itself, which has no end other than 
its own reflective activity; and the ‘objective’ indeterminacy of the aesthetic object or situation that 
provokes such judgement, without itself being the target of any conceptual determination. And further 
to this, aesthetic judgement also proposes an ‘intersubjective’ relation between subjects which is, 
likewise, constructed reflectively: ‘common sense’. There are three levels of indeterminacy invoked 
here: the indeterminate experience that provokes judgement, the indeterminate procedures of judgement 
itself, and the indeterminate end, common sense, which this judgement validates. 
The reflecting aesthetic judgement has its ‘end’ – Zweck: purpose, function, terminus – not in 
any objective determination, but in describing and validating a shared ‘common sense’. This is the 
communicability of aesthetic experience (without its objective communication) that marks the 
connection between subjects. Such reflective connection, though, must by definition not be something 
determined, otherwise it would deliver the experience of an object rather than of the conditions for 
objectivity, the free play of the faculties. The subjective free play of the faculties discloses a capacity 
merely to reflect. This shared, subjective, ‘common sense’ is a logically necessary consequence of 
Kant’s account of aesthetic experience. Because aesthetic judgement reflectively refers to the subject 
itself, it is a strictly subjective experience that cannot legislate any conceptually determinable objective 
quality to the object that provokes it. When I say ‘this rose is red’ I make an objective claim about the 
rose that must be true. And for this determination to be true it must be communicable. Any other person 
with the concept ‘rose’ and the concept ‘red’ would agree. And this agreement would result from a 
cognitive employment of reflection. This ‘someone else’ would see the rose and match it determinately 
with the concept red. But in order to do this, this ‘someone else’ would have to have the same cognitive 
forms as me (even if not the same concepts). So my aesthetic experience, in which I feel my faculties 
themselves in play, rather than using them to determine something else, confirms to me that I do indeed 
have such faculties. And if I have these faculties, then so should every ‘someone else’, otherwise 
nothing would be communicable. I cannot objectively say what ‘beauty’ is in a rose, only that my 
experience of it requires me to say that it is a rose ‘and it is beautiful (to me)’. But because that 
judgement also refers to a ‘supersensible’ alignment of the forms of nature and the forms of cognition, 
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because it refers to my reflective capacity to think at all, it must, for Kant, be universal.61 The a priori 
ground for reflecting judgements is the subject’s capacity to reflect.62  
This means that, for Kant, the indeterminacy of aesthetic experience is recruited by aesthetic 
judgement to validate the subject. And this also constitutes the ground for common sense. But it does 
so negatively, and any ‘determination’ of subjective power Kant finds here must refer to intersubjective 
connections for validation. For Kant, then, such aesthetic judgements do not remain subjective, but in 
fact ‘demand’63 universal assent on a subjective basis. The forms of the faculties of cognition must be 
communicable. Their communicability is registered by aesthetic experience. Judgements about such 
experience must therefore also be communicable and subjective. Aesthetic judgements refer at once to 
a subjective capacity to judge, and to a universal subjective capacity to judge that should be shared by 
all others. An aesthetic judgement is therefore both singular and plural. It is strictly singular – this is 
beautiful to me – and just as strictly plural – any ‘you’ should experience in this way too. Such 
judgement remains singular while inviting a community, a ‘shared sense’ of judgement.  
This reflective construction of a community of ‘common sense’ out of reflecting judgement 
itself marks another point of possible reversal of Kant’s thinking, and this can be signalled through 
Blanchot. The hinge of the reversal of Kant, here, is that any ‘community’ that shares this sense cannot 
be objectively determined. It is formed, and coloured, by the singularity of subjective experience. 
‘Common sense’ lets Kant distinguish between transcendentally valid aesthetic judgements and mere 
enthusiastic ravings (Schwärmerei), which in turn measures the difference between a free (and 
indeterminate) political arrangement in ‘sensus communis’ and more anarchic liberties. The 
indeterminacy of the non-conceptual is shepherded into the mandate of the aesthetic, and validated as 
common sense. But language’s indeterminate ‘babbling’, to use Novalis’s term of post-Kantian poetics, 
threatens the coherent way it is recruited.64 If the aesthetic reflectively grasps the indeterminacies of 
                                                      
61 For a general account of the relation between the ‘subjective universality’ of reflecting, aesthetic 
judgement and the objective validity of determining, cognitive judgement, see Wilson, Ross, Subjective 
Universality in Kant’s Aesthetics (Bern: Peter Lang, 2007). 
62 Registered in ‘pleasure’: ‘the subjective aspect in a representation which cannot become an element of 
cognition at all is the pleasure or displeasure connected with it; for through this I cognize nothing in the 
object of the representation’ [CPJ 75/5:189]. Pleasure, and not the object, is thought in this judgement. 
63 The judger ‘does not count on the agreement of others with his judgment of satisfaction because he has 
frequently found them to be agreeable with his own, but rather demands it from them’ [CPJ 98/5: 212]. 
64 Novalis, ‘Monologue’, in Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics, ed., trans. by J.M. Bernstein 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 214-15. In the essay ‘Athenæum’, Blanchot describes 
such babbling in a poetic: ‘that to write is made up (of) speech (a) work, but that this work is an unworking 
[désœuvrement]; that to speak poetically is to make possible a non-transitive speech whose task is not to say 
things (not to disappear in what it signifies), but to say (itself) in letting (itself) say’. But making this 
distinction constitutes ‘a major difficulty through which one comes to discern the strange lacuna at the 
interior of literary language that is its own difference, in a sense its night; a night somehow terrifying, and 
analogous to what Hegel believed he saw in gazing into men’s eyes’ [IC 357]. Poetry measures this 
difference between aesthetic indeterminacy and poetic babbling, which offers a measure between the 
political indeterminacy of ‘common sense’ and anarchy. 
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non-conceptual experience, then it concedes its structure to such indeterminacy. What is shared in 
aesthetic judgement, and what is demanded, is negative – a shared disconnection. Indeed, such 
disconnection is mandated by the structure of aesthetic experience outlined above. ‘You’ cannot 
experience this, because it does not refer to any objective quality but only to a subjective form; but 
‘you’ must experience like this, even if it means experiencing your strict disconnection from me 
consequent upon us both being undetermined. What I feel, in such universal subjective judgement, is 
the weird way such determinations of community are not just paralleled with but part of the contours 
of singular, subjective experience. Any ‘connection’ Kant establishes here is structured by this 
disconnection. The question of such ‘connectivity’ through disconnection will, we shall see, occupy 
both Blanchot’s political thinking about the ‘unavowability’ that is the only, indeterminate mark of 
being together in community, and his sense that writing disastrously undoes its own coherence, and 
writes disconnection through the way it leaves ‘marks’. For Kant, the ‘immediacy’ of the step from the 
taste of judgement to the ‘demand’ that everyone judge this way is transcendental. But this ‘immediacy’ 
also elides the full consequences of the disconnective experience now grounding our common sense of 
being undetermined. Blanchot makes us ask, then, after both the consequences of writing as a practice 
that ‘disconnects’ for our sense of the ‘community’ of that experience; and, reciprocally, after the 
consequences of a ‘disconnected’ community on writing as a practice. Again, this is a further ‘reversal’ 
of Kant’s account. The immediacy with which community is demanded by the aesthetic judgement is 
exposed to the indeterminacy of an art practice – writing – that resists, for Blanchot, all immediacy. 
What kind of community could be ‘demanded’ on the basis of art, like Blanchot’s writing, responding 
to the exigent fragmentation of the coherence of experience? If Kant’s account of ‘common sense’ has 
disconnection as its ground, then Blanchot makes this disconnection aesthetically legible as the 
(in)operative work of writing. 
For Kant, the reflective experience of beauty has a dual function. It firstly organises the 
subject’s own sense of the coherence of reflection. By giving form to the free way the subjective 
faculties can operate autonomously, it provides a reflective experience of the subject’s own capacities. 
But this recruitment of reflection also exposes the transcendental role of judgement to less secure 
operations. What role, indeed, does the object’s ‘giving form’ play in this experience? Secondly, this 
experience organises intersubjectivity by giving form to a ‘common sense’. The subject can reflectively 
have a sense of its connection to other subjects without any objective basis for that connection. People 
are thus connected subjectively, on the a priori ground, the ‘demand’, of reflection itself. But again, this 
turns against Kant’s transcendental account of the ground of such connection: if mere reflection forms 
a shared ground for community, then that community is also exposed to a shared disconnection. There 
is a shared lack of objective ground, here, just as there is a lack of objective form in the reflecting 





aesthetic judgement of taste. Such reflective experience is pitched negatively: it is reflective precisely 
because it lacks determination, and this lack of determination configures both the subjective reflecting 
judgement and the common sense it endorses. It therefore falls to us to examine what, precisely, this 
connection through reflection is. What kind of connection could reflection establish, organise, or merely 
describe? How can the aesthetic police the negativity (the lack of determination) which not only 
provokes this reflective experience, but also governs it? 
 
iii. Reflection: teleology, nature, and art 
We are in a way following the structure of Kant’s own third Critique, here, in moving from the 
experience of reflection, to the reflecting judgement, to the organisation of common sense. We follow 
reflection as it moves from the beautiful object, to the subject’s experience of beauty, to a proposed 
‘common sense’ of that experience. This is the subjectivisation of reflection through aesthetic 
judgement, and the dispersal of that subjective reflection intersubjectively. Such a ‘common sense’, 
however, is already figurative. Like the aesthetic judgement itself, there is no objective basis for it other 
than the reflective work of judgement. We might ‘demand’ assent, but that assent cannot be actualised 
or formalised in any concept. But Kant does also turn to the objective experience of reflection (though 
we should be conscious that we remain with experience and judgement, and not with objective 
actualisation) in the reflecting teleological judgement.  
Is it possible to track the indeterminacy reflection into such organisation, just as we did in the 
politics of community in common sense? Teleological judgement refers to the way natural forms can 
be conceived as self-organising. Such organisms are judged both as causes and ends, and as self-
generating and -organising forms. We might call this ‘backwards causation’ in Kant’s teleology, the 
idea that the cause is determined by its end.65 This is a reversal of causation. A limb, for example, is at 
once a discrete ‘member’ of the body, and has its functional life only in that body: a hand has its own 
independent function and ‘end’ (distinct from, say, a foot), but this end and function is not 
distinguishable from the body as a whole organism; and its ‘cause’ is not distinguishable from its ‘end’ 
in the body. A hand’s life is in the body. A dismembered limb is not only inoperative, it is dead. The 
subject’s capacity to think about such a reflective organisation of form endorses, again, its capacity to 
register mere reflection. But here that capacity explicitly recruits objective form itself for that 
judgement, validating a connection between the subjective form of judgement and the judged objective 
forms of nature. We might ask, however, with the sense of ‘disconnection’ organising common sense 
outlined above, what effect ‘dismemberment’ would have on such an organisation of reflection.  66 
                                                      
65 CPJ 244/5: 372: ‘a thing that is to be cognized as a natural product but yet at the same time as possible 
only as a natural end must be related to itself reciprocally as both cause and effect’  
66 The hinted pun here of ‘membership’ of a community is associative but significant. 
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Teleological judgement is a form of measure between singular and plural, between what is singular and 
what is common, through the objective form of the organism. So the dismemberment of the organism 
is the limit of the teleological judgement. The disconnection between the singular and the common 
would make teleological judgement impossible. We might ask, then, to what extent such 
dismemberment is also politically effective in the reflections that organise common sense – the 
‘dismemberment’ from an organically (which is to say reflectively) conceived society. If Kant 
constructs such connections through figuration, then they are exposed to the unpredictability and the 
provisionality of figures. And they are also exposed, as we shall see in the final section of this chapter, 
to the poetics of figuration. In turning to teleological judgement, I therefore want both to trace the way 
Kant uses such judgements to reinforce and validate the aesthetic experience of ‘connection’ through 
beauty, and to mark some of the ways such validation might not contain the reflection it seeks to 
organise. If the teleological judgement marks the shared organising principle of judgement and nature, 
of the subjective and the objective, then it does so through reflection. It is therefore also, despite 
appearances, susceptible to the indeterminacies of reflection uncovered in aesthetic judgement. 
 Firstly, what kind of connective work does reflecting aesthetic judgement undertake? Aesthetic 
judgements are structurally supposed, by Kant, to form a ‘bridge’ between the different aspects, 
phenomenal and nominal, cognitively determined or morally free, under which we can think 
ourselves.67 There are proliferating, unanticipated natural forms, which I am capable of experiencing. 
And in parallel, there are theoretical, moral ideas which are not manifest in the world but which must, 
according to the second Critique, be possibly effective in the world. There is a doubling of freedom 
here that mirrors the ambiguity of the word in German, ‘Freiheit’. The subject is free to reason not only 
about the world, but free from the world in unanticipated ways.68 And nature is free both as freely 
available to the subject, and free to be any other way.69 These freedoms, indeed, are collaborative: not 
only do subjects continually ‘know’ things about the world, they also continually construct new ways 
of being in the world, and hence newly effective moral stances in the world. If nature were not ‘free’, 
then reason could not ‘freely’ reason either. There must, then, be a connection between these twin 
freedoms. But freedom must itself constitute this connection. Just as ‘community’ must be constructed 
                                                      
67 CPJ 81/5: 195 
68 We might recall Hegel’s version of Kant, here (as outlined above), where the subject’s attitude to the 
object as beautiful is free from desire. This freedom, for Kant, endorses the subject’s moral capacity for 
freedom: through reason, the subject can think in ways not dictated by the finite forms of nature; and yet, 
this freedom from finitude parallels nature’s own freely generated forms. For Hegel, this corroborates the 
absolute freedom of the infinite to reform what it reconceives. But Kant’s connection is more negative: 
subject and object freely interact as free from each other. And such negativity, again, exceeds Kant’s control: 
it also endorses the subject’s moral freedom to assume new moral and social attitudes and forms in the world 
indeterminately, and in ways not necessarily cooperative with reason. On this collaboration see CPJ [192/5: 
314], on ‘aesthetic ideas’ as a ‘counterpart (pendant) to ideas of reason’. 
69 For an account of this conceptual ambiguity, see Krieger, Leonard, The German Idea of Freedom 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 86-124 
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through the strict singularity and strict universality of aesthetic experience, so must this ‘bridge’ 
between reason and nature be constructed in the teeth of their manifest disconnection. That is to say, 
reason is only free to the extent that our idea of nature is free from its ministrations, mediations 
(concepts) tailored to our capabilities for experience. This freedom also upholds Kant’s axiomatic 
assumption that there is no way to ‘think’ the noumenal ‘in itself’. This is a crucial ‘vice versa’ 
(reversal), in that nature is only free to the extent that reason can conceive of it as free from reason. The 
collaborative relation between the two is therefore negative. There cannot be a positive ‘bridge’ built 
between these two ‘worlds’,70 because that would violate the freedom of which it must be constituted. 
Aesthetic experience, then, that does not determine anything of any object, and yet in which the faculties 
of reason and understanding are nonetheless animated, is structurally apt to form such a bridge. In such 
experience, both the subjective forms of reason and the objective forms of nature are felt freely. To say 
a rose is beautiful might not tell me anything determinate about roses, but it does tell me that I am 
capable of experiencing roses in their freedom from determination, and simultaneously free from having 
to determine them. Aesthetic experience thus provides a form for registering ‘connection’ without 
determination. The ‘connection’ it forms with nature, the ‘bridge’, takes a negative form. 
How is this ‘negative’ experience of connection mediated by aesthetic experience, and how 
does that experience mediate, in turn, a connection with natural forms? Nature functions ‘as art’ in that 
there is a ‘technique of nature’,71 a productive principle; but fine art functions like nature in that, 
through genius, it ‘imitates’ this technique.72 How do we conceive this relation? We can return here to 
the idea of backwards causation, and look more closely at the link between aesthetic and teleological 
judgement. In the teleological judgement of them, the parts of an organism are at once cause and effect 
of an organism. An organism’s parts ‘reciprocally produce each other’, such that the ‘concept of [the 
whole], conversely, is in turn the cause.’73 Here we have the reflective reversal of reflecting judgement 
as the principle for natural organisation. Again, reflecting judgement is not positive, but provoked by 
the lack of a determinate concept. And like an organism, an artwork is an effect that has no cause except 
                                                      
70 CPJ 63/5:175-6: ‘as if they were so many different worlds, the first of which can have no influence on the 
second: yet the latter should have an influence on the former, namely the concept of freedom should make 
the end that is imposed by its laws real in the sensible world; and nature consequently also be able to be 
conceived in such a way that the lawfulness of its form is at least in agreement with the possibility of the 
ends that are realized in it in accordance with the laws of freedom.’ 
71 CPJ 10, 20: 204, not as ‘fine art’ but in a technical way. 
72 On genius, see CPJ 184-9/5: 304-9. Kant also distinguished art-beauty from natural-beauty by introducing 
the ‘ideal’. The ideal, unlike for Hegel, is for Kant merely regulative: art’s beauty is admixed with concepts 
because it is a ‘representation of a thing’, not merely a ‘thing’ in itself, and thus the idea of ‘perfection’ is 
introduced into the aesthetic judgement. But here, again, the aesthetic parallels the moral: the ideal is not 
obtainable (pace Hegel), and spurs more and more reflection, both in judgement and production [CPJ 189-
90/5: 311]. Art’s production of form therefore provokes this reflective thought of the ideal. Where for Kant 
the ‘ideal’ is the non-actual, regulative concept of beauty, for Hegel it is the manifestation and actualisation 
of the inner subject with external appearance [Hegel, 153-60]. 
73 CPJ 244-5/5: 373 
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itself. That is to say that, unlike other objects, like tools, fine art answers no purpose except the intention 
of its own production.74 A hammer answers a definable need. But a painting, to the extent that it is 
beautiful, serves no other purpose. Art is therefore experienced as an ‘effect’ that is its own ‘cause’. 
The ‘rule must be abstracted from the deed’.75 Now, we might accuse Kant of naivety here and say that 
art is produced for all sorts of reasons, more or less cynical. But the point Kant is making is that art is 
experienced as if it was its own cause. We might say that a poem, for example, has all sorts of 
historically identifiable causes and effects, but to the extent that we experience it aesthetically it is its 
own cause. To the extent that it is an object of aesthetic experience, it serves no purpose except to 
furnish that experience. Nature serves all sorts of purposes, and it is beautiful. Art serves all sorts of 
functions, and it is beautiful. And this experience also helps to show us the ways such causation is 
operative in natural objects. We might say that a leaf, for example, is produced in order to nourish the 
tree; but to the extent that it also nourishes itself qua tree, it is hard to distinguish this cause from the 
effect. The experience of beauty as backwards causation thus gives form to the teleological experience 
of purposiveness without purpose. And this reinforces Kant’s broader teleological idea that freedom is 
its own cause and effect, without which causation freedom would not be possible. It is only as such, 
free from determination, that aesthetic experience can invoke the kind of cognitive free play of which 
it is constituted. And it is only as such, free from prior determination, that natural forms can proliferate 
in unexpected but transcendentally lawful ways. 
Beauty’s purposiveness is teleological, not constitutive or determinate. Its judgement does not 
constitute or determine its object, because it remains subjective. But it is manifested teleologically. 
Thus ‘beauty in nature, i.e., its agreement with the free play of our cognitive faculties in the 
apprehension and judging of its appearance, can be considered in this way as an objective purposiveness 
of nature in its entirety, as a system of which the human being is a member’.76 Beauty thus marks the 
systematic agreement of subjective experience with objective, natural form, but only when that 
agreement is registered as teleological. The reflective non-manifestation of beauty as a determinate 
concept draws us to the teleological experience of the world. We are arranged teleologically towards 
beauty: the ‘end’ of aesthetic judgement is nothing other than the ‘cause’ of that judgement, the mere 
reflective experience of beauty itself. Aesthetic experience discloses a teleology of subjective form. The 
connection between aesthetic and teleological experience is thus, again, negative: a connection that is 
not posited or objectively manifest, but which is operative in its negative presentation. 
Aesthetic experience, and its realisation in aesthetic judgement, reflects the productivity of 
natural growth. Judgement is productive, but its productivity is negative. It does not posit any 
                                                      
74 CPJ 244-5/5: 373 
75 CPJ 188/5: 309 
76 CPJ 251/5: 380 
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objectively valid fact about any object. Instead, reflecting aesthetic judgement refers to a subjective 
fact: the subjective, indeterminate productivity of judgement itself in its reflective capacity. Its 
indeterminacy is therefore its strength. Precisely because the reflecting judgement, felt in aesthetic 
experience but translatable to teleological judgements, does not define any object, the undetermined, 
unexpected forms of nature can be met without anticipation of that form. The flexibility of the mind felt 
in aesthetic experience corresponds with the flexibility of the forms the mind encounters in teleological 
judgements about nature. The connection Kant establishes between the mind and nature in the reflecting 
power of judgement is therefore itself reflective. The mind’s capacity to reflect autonomously – without 
any determinate content – reflects nature’s proliferation in new forms. Both teleological and aesthetic 
judgement are therefore not just the declutching of judgment from its role in determining object of 
knowledge, and a relish for how aptly the faculties work in common to do this. The freedom raised to 
consciousness exceeds that purpose and is adequate to still unrealised or un-thought of purposes which 
nature or art may come up with. Such reflection, then, despite Kant, does not merely function 
subjectively to receive unexpected new forms. It also produces the conditions and forms by which new 
experience can be disclosed. The indeterminacy, and the freedom, that necessarily conditions reflecting 
judgement also conditions the production of new reflective forms in art. Kant recognises this in his 
account of the way that in poetry, as we saw earlier, concepts themselves are uncoupled from their 
determinate ends. The ends of judgement about poetry, then, are reflective, proliferating, just as natural 
forms proliferate, as Rodolphe Gasché puts it, ‘wildly’,77 indeterminately – indeed, reflectively. 
This figure of reversal therefore encodes the two ‘ends’ of Kantian aesthetics identified earlier: 
‘community’ and ‘connection’. Community, as the ‘common sense’ demanded by subjective universal 
judgement, can only be presented negatively in that judgement. And connection, as the teleological 
collaboration of aesthetic experience and nature’s forms, can only be presented negatively in that 
judgement. Kant’s aesthetics therefore provide a figure for negative presentation. And crucially, this 
figure is governed by indeterminacy: both the indeterminate ‘object’ of judgement (which is not, in fact, 
an object but the subject as a kind of negative object), and the indeterminate way such judgement 
proceeds without end. The ‘reversal’ of cognitive, determining judgement identified earlier therefore 
elaborates these two figurative ‘ends’ of judgement, neither of which, by necessity, can be positively or  
                                                      
77 Gasché, Rodolphe, The Idea of Form (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). Only ‘wild’, not yet 
determined nature can offer reflective experience [2]. Only in such indeterminacy can the imagination 
reflectively construct new conceptual harmonies for the understanding, and new ‘aesthetic’ meanings [32, 
49]. Gasché also links this with Adorno’s sense of the ‘myths’ of enlightenment and nature, in ‘The Theory 
of Natural Beauty and its Evil Star’, in Research in Phenomenology, 32 (2002), pp. 103-122, but we can 
press this claim more strongly, here, by linking the indeterminacy of aesthetic experience more directly with 
determinate conceptual judgement through Adorno – the precise move Kant dismisses by constraining 





objectively identified, but both of which ground, for Kant, our capacity to judge at all. Without this 
negative presentation of the supersensible – the common ground of freedom shared between subjects, 
and between the subject and object – there could be no communication of truths. 
 
 
3 – Reversal again: indeterminacy, figurability, and poetry 
 
i. Indeterminate aesthetics 
In his third Critique, Kant develops a model of reflecting judgement. Reflection is operative in all 
judgement, but in certain experiences – aesthetic or teleological – the work of reflection is interrupted. 
Its mandate, as we saw in the introduction to the last section, is to assign representations to the correct 
faculties. This work depends upon there being a concept to determine that representation. When it is 
absent – as in the aesthetic experience of beauty – reflection does not stop, but carries on as mere 
reflection. But this reflecting judgement serves, in fact, another purpose: it registers and endorses a 
subjective capacity to think. The encounter with reflection is negative, in the sense that it lacks 
determination. But Kant salvages this negativity to validate an a priori subjective capacity to judge that 
does not need to refer to the world of natural objects, and is thus subjectively free. In order to salvage 
negativity in this way, Kant must also salvage the indeterminacy of experience and judgement. The 
‘purposiveness without purpose’ of aesthetic judgement is thus used to confirm the innate capacity of 
the subject to judge. And the restriction of reflective indeterminacy to the subject serves to confirm an 
intersubjective and shared capacity for ‘communicability’, even without any actual objective 
communication. The aesthetic judgement turns a reflective encounter with an indeterminate negativity 
into an opportunity to endorse an indeterminate freedom of the subjective power to judge. 
Indeterminacy is recruited for the transcendental subject. However, in order to make this move, Kant 
has recourse to figuration. Because the ends of aesthetic judgement are indeterminate – ‘without 
purpose’ –, they have at once to be demanded and merely supposed. In the connections forged between 
the ‘different worlds’ of nature (as the sensible) and freedom (as the supersensible), ‘the latter should 
have an influence on the former’.78 And assent to the judgement of taste is ‘to be expected of everyone 
[jedermann zugemuthet] […] just as if it were a predicate associated with the cognition of the object.’79 
This reflecting judgement is not merely ‘not-conceptual’, it is a parody, or reflection, or imitation of 
conceptuality. It performs a semblance of conceptuality. So the ‘universal voice’ of the judgement of 
                                                      
78 CPJ 63/5:175-6 
79 CPJ 77/5: 191; and in 103/5: 218 the judgement of taste is ‘necessary, just as if it were to be regarded as 
a property of the object that is determined in it in accordance with concepts; but beauty is nothing by itself, 
without relation to the feeling of the subject’. 
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taste ‘only ascribes this agreement to everyone, as a case of the rule with regard to which it expects 
confirmation not from concepts but only from the consent of others’.80 Again, we ‘expect’ assent. But 
what this assent would actually be remains indeterminate; expected (looked out for), but unanticipated 
(not formed in advance).  
In order to recognise the independent power of judgement, Kant must establish not just its 
response to indeterminacy, but its own indeterminacy. The structure of aesthetic judgement encodes 
indeterminacy into its claims to universal validity. It is already torn. And its ends, therefore, cannot be 
manifest, because that would overwrite the indeterminacy which is, paradoxically, judgement’s source 
of validity. The ends of aesthetic judgement therefore must be figured, but not posited; they must be 
presented negatively, non-manifest, non-actual.81 Figurability is already written into the third Critique, 
and into reflecting judgement. The consequences of this figurability extend into his broader critical 
project, the effectiveness of which the third Critique was supposed to validate (if not complete). But 
such judgement is also susceptible to the reflection it thinks. It does not draw on conceptuality, nor on 
any objective validity. Its ends are to be supposed, and its activity is figurative, ‘as if’ it were a concept. 
The aesthetic proposes a reversal of experience, an experience coordinated by reflection and not 
determination. But that reversal is not contained by the aesthetic. Indeed, the aesthetic itself is 
constructed through reflection. Just as figurative ends are not determinate – the end of a metaphor must 
be interpreted, reflectively – so the aesthetic requires reflection. Kant’s aesthetic judgement remains 
reflective in the way that Hegel’s foreclosed. The ends of aesthetic experience are subject to reflection, 
and thus remain indeterminate. In this final section I will examine the implications of this figurability 
of reflection in the aesthetic, and of the reflective figurability of the aesthetic itself. In considering the 
consequences of conceiving negativity in Kant’s philosophy of experience, we can turn to an account 
of the poetics of figuration that might be invoked to structure these consequences. 
 
ii. Indeterminacy, figuration, and poetry 
The reflecting aesthetic judgement must remain, for Kant, regulative. In a late essay, ‘On a Newly 
Arisen Superior Tone in Philosophy’, Kant attacks the idea that one can simply ‘think’ intuitively, that 
any ‘intellectual intuition’ might be possible. One must think, always, conceptually.82 Pleasure cannot 
be a ‘surrogate of cognition’.83 This means that any ‘connection’ that might reflectively be established 
                                                      
80 CPJ 101/5: 216 
81 To re-emphasise, here, this is precisely the move Hegel resists in Kant: for Hegel, beauty, and art, is the 
manifestation and actualisation of the Concept in sensuous form, and therefore its precise determination. 
82 Kant, Immanuel, ‘On a Newly Arisen Superior Tone in Philosophy’, in Raising the Tone of Philosophy: 
Late Essays by Immanuel Kant, Transformative Critique by Jacques Derrida, ed., trans. by Peter Fenves 
(Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), pp. 51-81; n. 395 
83 Ibid., p. 62 
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in aesthetic or teleological judgement remains negative. The connections communicated in aesthetic 
judgement cannot become objective, because such objectification would violate not only the 
transcendental conditions of possible experience, but also the reflection of which such judgements are 
constituted. The task, then, is not one of making reflection ‘objective’,84 but of conceiving a form in 
which the negativity of reflection itself (its indeterminacy, its provisionality) could be negatively 
presented. Such negative presentation is the concern and task of Adorno’s aesthetics and Negative 
Dialectics, but also of Blanchot’s ‘fragmentary writing’, the ‘step/not beyond’ conceptual 
determination. We can find such a form for ‘negative presentation’ in Kant’s sense of reflecting 
judgement: in the ‘reversal’ such judgement responds to and undertakes.  
Such negative presentation is encoded in Kant’s aesthetic in the way he treats poetry. That 
treatment is put into relief when considered, again, against Hegel’s sense of poetry within the wider 
sphere of the aesthetic. My final claim in this chapter is that Kant’s aesthetic is readable through a 
figure, ‘reversal’, precisely because the aesthetic is already structured through figuration. The ‘ends’ of 
reflecting judgement are not determined by that judgement, because the aesthetic for Kant does not 
communicate any content, instead communicating the form of communicability. The ends, like figures, 
remain to be determined; the aesthetic judgement merely outlines the conditions of their visibility.  
There is, then, a poetic procedure at work in the aesthetic. Just as, for Kant, poetry is the 
reflective, playful deployment of concepts without determining their purpose or end, so the aesthetic 
itself is coordinated through its own reflectively indeterminate procedure, and the reflective way it 
configures its ends.85 For Hegel, poetry is the final stage of art, in the sense that poetry discloses the 
way that, finally, the Concept exhausts the possibilities of its embodiment and turns subjective again; 
and in the way that poetic form is not contained in the content of its words, but in the ‘poetic 
imagination’. 
Poetry is the universal art of the spirit which has become free in itself 
and which is not tied down for its realization to external sensuous 
material; instead, it launches out exclusively in the inner space and the 
inner time of ideas and feelings. Yet precisely, at this highest stage, art 
transcends itself, in that it forsakes the element of a reconciled 
embodiment of the spirit in sensuous form and passes over from the 
poetry of the imagination to the prose of thought.86 
                                                      
84 We might think here of the turn by the German Frühromantiker towards such objectification, such that 
poetry ‘embodies’ truth; but we might also think of Hegel, for whom art was (admittedly limited) thinking 
in sensuous form. Both threaten to posit the reflection Kant thought could only be negatively presented. 
85 This would provide the basis for the Frühromantiker reading of poetry as assuming the role of aesthetic 
critique itself. I do not want so hastily to make that same move, for reasons that I hope will become clear. 
The figurative work of the aesthetic is not extracted from the condition of reflective experience, but rather 
part of its own immanent work. Art does not ‘do’ philosophy, or make it happen, but rather offers critique 
of it; or rather philosophy has its own subterranean artistic procedures. 
86 HA, 89 
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With poetry, Hegel returns us to Kant. For Hegel art is the sensuous embodiment of thinking, and the 
manifest articulation of the way external matter can be reconciled with subjective spirit. But for Kant, 
art offers a negative presentation of the way reflection can be reconciled with the reflective work of the 
faculties. Kant’s art is thoroughly indeterminate, in the sense that it is only ‘art’ to the extent that it 
provokes the reflection of aesthetic experience. And so ‘beauty’, to reiterate the point, ‘is nothing by 
itself, without relation to the feeling of the subject’.87 For Kant, poetry also ‘claims the highest rank of 
all’88 the arts. Its work, however, is the ‘merely entertaining play with the imagination’.89 Poetry 
presents concepts without purpose, such that the imagination can play with them reflectively without 
needing to invoke any end of their determination. In this way, Kant’s characterisation of poetry most 
closely follows his characterisation of the faculties themselves in aesthetic judgement, and therefore 
claims the ‘highest place’ in the arts as the one most resembling the subject’s aesthetic attitude, and 
thus the one most conducive to pure cognitive play.  
But there is a fine line here between poetry provoking aesthetic experience and articulating it. 
If poetry ‘embodies’ the cognitive free play it also induces, then it is, in Hegel’s sense, the sensuous 
embodiment of the reconciliation that for Kant remains a subjective procedure. Hegel’s sense of 
poetry’s embodiments is therefore significant for us, here.  What, precisely, does poetry, as art, embody? 
For Hegel, this is ‘sound’ itself: 
the last external material which poetry keeps, is in poetry no longer the 
feeling of sonority itself, but a sign, by itself void of significance, a 
sign of the idea which has become concrete in itself, and not merely of 
indefinite feeling and its nuances and gradations. Sound in this way 
becomes a word as a voice inherently articulated, the meaning of which 
is to indicate ideas and thoughts. The inherently negative point to 
which music had moved forward now comes forth as the completely 
concrete point, as the point of the spirit, as the self-conscious individual 
who out of his own resources unites the infinite space of his ideas with 
the time of sound.90 
There is a Kantian reconciliation of transcendental faculties (here encapsulated in the a priori forms of 
space and time) made objective, here, in poetry. By making ‘sound’ itself, in its sensuousness (a voice) 
meaningful, poetry makes the mere form of signification itself significant: a sign, a symbol. The mere 
work of articulation becomes significant. The mere work of reflection Kant outlined in the aesthetic 
becomes significant, voiced, a sign, and not just ‘mere’ reflection. 
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 But as a final reversal – and I do want to invoke the poetic implications of verse, here, the turn 
that defines verse, the turn at the end of a line91 – does not the articulation of reflection as ‘sound’ in 
poetry, the way poetry makes sound itself articulate, expose a further reflective mutability in 
signification?92 I mean that poetry’s inclusion of sonic form into its patterns of signification makes 
legible a mere reflection at work in ordinary semantic signification. Sound is significant in poetry, and 
meaningful. And certainly, as Hegel points out, this is poetry’s alchemical work of reflectively making 
sensuous form meaningful. But it is also, in reverse, an exposure of semantic meaning to a more 
negative sense of reflection. We should recall the threat of ‘babbling’ indeterminacy that for Novalis, 
and Blanchot, poetry measures. If mere sound is possibly meaningful, then meaning is possibly just 
‘mere sound’. As Kant’s aesthetics emphasise, reflection is finally indeterminate. And the reflective 
way poetry invokes sound as ‘voice’ (we might ask, whose voice? Surely, to quote Blanchot again, the 
voice of the ‘third person who is not a third person’, the non-dialectical imposition of voice from 
outside, the exilic, fictional voice of poetry which is the concern of this thesis’s reading of Celan) 
exposes voice to its reflective indeterminacy. The way that even sound is ‘voiced’ in poetry exposes the 
subject to a negative indeterminacy. If sound is meaningful, its meaning is threatened by the 
indeterminate way signification is susceptible to unexpected reflection. Voiced sound discloses a 
negative, reflective work of presentation by which the subject establishes identity: in language which 
is intimately non-identical with itself, even in its voicing. 
 There are poetic implications to Kant’s aesthetics, just as there are aesthetic implications for 
poetics. What is the aesthetics’ reflective ‘work’? If cognitive work is the determination of what was 
indeterminate by thinking, or, for Hegel, by ‘negation’, then the reflecting judgement does not undertake 
any ‘work’ in this sense. And yet it is operative, or functional, in that something does happen. The ends 
of aesthetic, reflecting judgement are not ‘work’, then, but the mere reflective operativity of a persistent 
indeterminacy. In poetry, for Kant, the reading mind is presented with concepts of the understanding in 
such a form – intentionality without purpose – that the imagination plays with those concepts in 
unexpected, unanticipated ways. The ‘free play’ and ‘disinterest’ that characterise pure judgements are 
not dispensed with but re-deployed. Reading a poem, the imagination ‘freely’, reflectively plays with 
concepts. Concepts are reflectively indeterminate. The concept becomes the object of reflective free 
play. They are not determinately referred to an object. Instead, they are exposed to the free play of 
                                                      
91 See Agamben, Giorgio, The End of the Poem: Studies in Poetics, trans. by Daniel Heller-Roazan (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1999), 109 
92 We are anticipating, certainly, the structuralist and post-structuralist constructions and deconstructions of 
sound and speech, voice and signification, but I want to remain in the discourse of aesthetics here for a 
reason: there are aesthetic assumptions and implications that remain subterranean in structuralism, which 
are precisely concerned with the form and formation of meaning, and with the formal conditions of critical 
reading. Kant’s aesthetic concern with the conditions of meaning make these aesthetic structures legible 
where they might otherwise be occluded or passed over. 
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reflection that any more cognitively determinate, purposive or intentional use of words93 would 
suppress. Just as poetry inspires only more conceptual free play (without the determinate end of 
rhetorical meaning), so the aesthetic judgement provokes more reflection in its ends: ‘common sense’ 
marks a shared reflection, and not a determination, of community; and the ‘connections’ established 
between nature and reason are likewise reflective, not determinate. Aesthetic judgement takes on the 
characteristics of art. But these characteristics are indeterminate and reflective. Art does not determine 
the characteristics, constitution or structure of aesthetic experience and judgement. Nor does it become 
‘working’ (doing cognitive work, ‘intellectual intuition’) where the reflections of aesthetic judgement 
leave off. Art instead is a collaborative unworking, a Blanchotian ‘désœuvrement’, an Adornian 
‘negative’ presentation. Describing these readings of aesthetic ends will occupy the rest of this thesis. 
The point to emphasise here is that the form of these readings is established in Kant’s aesthetic itself. 
The form of the reversal of that aesthetic is a form of reading. Just as poetry, for Kant, both induces 
conceptual play and undertakes that play, while remaining persistently negative in its indeterminate 
presentation of the conceptuality, so the aesthetic itself is figurable into the context of art on this 
reflective, indeterminate ground. The kind of figurative work poetry undertakes – exactly this para-
conceptual play – makes legible the para-conceptual way aesthetic, reflecting judgement proceeds; and 
the way the identifiable ends of aesthetic judgement – the reflective connections of community and 
cognition – are structured through this indeterminacy. The aesthetic is not immunised from 
indeterminacy by the reflection it adopts and inscribes. 
 
 
4 – On Method 
 
There is an inevitably reflexive quality about an argument doing justice to the reversal of Kant and the 
problem it leaves his reader of getting on terms with indeterminacy and disconnection resistant by 
definition to conventional conceptual treatment. And the reversal seized on by Adorno and Blanchot 
not only has consequences for the way they think, but also for the way we are obliged to think about 
them. This is what I mean by an ‘aesthetic’ in their criticism: a form of the conditions of their reading, 
and a form of reading by which those conditions are legible. The model for this kind of aesthetic 
                                                      
93 Kant’s counter-form is ‘rhetoric’, in which ‘purpose’ does determine the apparent free play of the 
imagination. We might think about the contemporary importance of this for our understanding of aesthetics: 
art cannot simply be rhetoric, where the intention for meaning determines its formal work; it has instead, for 
Kant, only to have the strict intention of art itself [CPJ 204/5: 327]. Rhetoric, indeed, with its mobilisation 
of play for determinate purposes, precedes ‘ruin’ [CPJ 205/5: 328], in a way such that Kant closely resembles 
Adorno’s concern with the appropriation of aesthetic ‘purposeless’ form for determinate purpose in the 
culture industry, replacing aesthetic semblance with the determinations of exchange in the commodity.  
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thinking can be won from Kant’s aesthetic, but it is won reflexively through reading itself. The legibility 
such an aesthetic affords to the ends of reflective aesthetic experience and judgement is won through 
reflection – just as Kant suggests that any aesthetic judgement remains reflective. 
These ‘ends’ are organised by disconnection: a ‘community’ which is reflectively organised by 
a principle of shared indeterminacy; and a philosophy which is organised by a principle of collaborative 
indeterminacy. And these ends are likewise organised through their mutual disconnection: reflection 
does not instantiate either an objective basis for community, nor an objective (conceptual) procedure 
for philosophical thinking. The task of a post-Kantian aesthetic, then, would be to make this 
disconnection itself legible, and to explore the conditions of such legibility. This legibility is further 
afforded by poetry. That is to say, it has to be read. Reading Celan’s poetry offers a formal way such 
an aesthetic could be read. Poetry does not therefore legislate for a mode of writing, but offers formal 
opportunities by which reading can be configured and shaped. The three principle voices I discuss to 
develop this aesthetic of legibility – Adorno, Blanchot, and Celan – are therefore read through this 
‘reversal’ of engagement with Kantian aesthetics. And my method is in a sense to welcome 
disconnection. This has implications for the macro and micro level of my writing. On the macro level, 
I firstly want to attend to the ways that these writers are disconnected from one another. They do not, 
for the most part, write about one another. And the instances when they do – particularly about the 
crystalline, elegiac figure of Celan – are explicitly framed by their disconnection: Blanchot writes about 
Celan as an ‘anonymous friend’; Adorno writes about Celan as a fragmentary, undeveloped afterthought 
to his Aesthetic Theory; and Celan is a figure of elegy for the English language poets I look at in the 
final chapter.  
My point, structurally, is not, then, to impose a critical connection where one does not exist, 
but to think through exactly this disconnection This is firstly a task of understanding the significance of 
disconnection in their work, and in an aesthetics orientated by disconnection. Secondly, it is treating 
disconnection – according to the preceding reading of Kant – as a method of reading in itself, and as a 
method in which the kinds of reflection and indeterminacy that occupy Kantian aesthetics are legible. 
Disconnection is thematically integral to each of these projects. Celan’s poetry, in my reading, is more 
than anything a poetry of exile. But, if we are to take that exile at its word, then we cannot provide a 
critical ‘home’ for it meaningfully to reside in. We cannot ‘explain’ poetry that so forcefully resists 
explanation. Indeed, Celan’s poetry offers just this kind of resistance for the writers whose responses 
to Celan I explore. Such poetics compels a reading which is likewise exilic: which is orientated towards 
a future reading which it does not make manifest. There is no final reading, surely, of any poem; but 
this resistance to finality is exposed, in Celan’s poems, to the future as exilic itself: his work exacts a 
reading which is not one possible home among many in a series of other possible, future critical 
readings, but is rather exposed to its own futural indeterminacy. Reading is not just provisional, it is 
itself indeterminate. Celan’s poetry requires us to read indeterminately: not just without end (terminus), 
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but without determining, foreclosing any meaning. Kantian aesthetics, attuned to their own reflective 
indeterminacy, channel this poetic reading, just as they channel a philosophical reading counter-Hegel. 
Such a reading of poetry gives form by which we read other disconnections: poetic, 
philosophical, and political. If we are to recognise, register, and respond to the disconnections that are 
attendant upon each of these discourses – which they surely are – then we need to have a form to make 
this disconnection legible. This legibility is won from the difficult task of reading Celan’s poetry as 
exilic, but at the cost of ‘making connections’ in criticism. Reading Celan lets us read disconnectively, 
makes legible the disconnections between Adorno and Blanchot, between both of them and Kant, and 
crucially between poetic reading and poetic writing. And this turns, again, on the distinction poetry 
measures between language that is ‘voiced’ and language that ‘babble’s, and between a politics of 
‘common sense’ and the ravings of Schwärmerei. Thematically, then, and structurally, such reading lets 
us re-imagine the terms of Kantian aesthetics from the inside out: no longer orientated towards making 
connections, Kant’s aesthetic becomes the reversed site where disconnections are made legible. And 
the hope, the futurity which Celan’s poetry so fiercely reserves for itself, is the hope that in such 
disconnection there might be space where difference might be thought as lost without that loss being 
lost; where, in Adorno’s project, the negative might be dialectically registered without being negated, 
the nonidentity of thought registered without being identified; where, in Blanchot’s project, writing 
might compose a system of exchange marked by loss, an antisystematic writing open to what it loses 
without recompense in any figured ‘beyond’. These projects are open to disconnection, and 
disconnection must be welcomed into the system of reading itself if we are to hope to register it. No 
systematic account of each thinker could be (will be) given. Instead, each functions as a lens through 
which a disconnective reading can be glimpsed. 
And, to repeat myself, this has methodological implications on a micro level, too, of my writing. 
The rhetorical figure guiding my work here is, in one sense, zeugma: I am yoking together, across this 
gulf of disconnection, intrinsically different conceptual registers, vocabularies, and, indeed, languages. 
When Kant writes ‘sensus communis’ he does not do so with the same historical weight as Adorno’s 
Gemein, Blanchot’s communauté, or English ‘community’. Each refers, indeed, to radically different 
political and historical situations: the rational community Kant invokes from Königsberg is not the 
radical collapse of community into sociability in Paris in May 1968; or the disintegrated Kultur of the 
culture industry that emerges with Adorno’s account of the Dialectic of Enlightenment. This seems 
obvious, but I want to reclaim its significance for reading. I track, trace, words deployed in very 
different contexts, not to advocate their consistency, but to expose the word, like a crystal, to exactly 
this radical difference over time and space. I want these words – words I repeat, words that intrude into 
my writing, words that I do not define – to remain, despite this, singular. I want these words, in their 
singularity, to trace their radical exposure to different signification, not just to ‘yoke together’ by 
association very different contexts (Adorno’s trepidations over student protest in post-war Germany; 
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Blanchot’s vexed ‘unavowal’ of community in ’68; Celan’s fearful mistrust of the aestheticisation of 
politics in the same context), but to expose those singular words and concepts to the way history 
pluralises them. 
Again, this is thematic. I am concerned with this conceptual exile: with the way Kantian 
aesthetics are not adequate to the context of late twentieth-century protest and artistic practice, and the 
way that such inadequacy still makes legible otherwise negative structures of thinking and 
conceptualising in that new context. Most importantly, perhaps, when Kant writes ‘aesthetics’, it refers 
to a field of experience to which Adorno’s ‘aesthetics’ are alien and yet, crucially, involved. Adorno’s 
thinking radicalises aesthetics by retaining the original sense and transporting it, as exile, into a new 
territory. And this attends a whole host of concepts: Kant’s ‘nature’ is both inherent to and radically 
inadequate to Adorno’s ‘nature’; Kant’s ‘subject’ and ‘present’ are both inherent to and radically 
antagonised by Blanchot’s ‘subject’ and ‘present’. But this inadequacy is only legible through the 
word’s singularity. We do not invent new words for new experiences. We should not, to quote Celan, 
‘split off No from Yes.94 Any account of the crucial but difficult role of negation in Adorno’s and 
Blanchot’s projects would have to respond to the way negation does not negate its object.  
The guiding concepts of the thesis are therefore not conceptually determinable, but rather 
describe the ways conceptuality can be exposed to an indeterminacy. Disorientation, negation that does 
not negate, exile, reversal: each of these describes a method or an approach to systematic conceptual 
thinking that encounters its own reversal: stepping not beyond what it thinks, not negating its object, 
exilically orientated by the no-man’s land of its own exile. Each models a non-transcendent negation 
that I trace through the aesthetic. And in order to think such disconnection, we must attend to the ways 
conceptuality resists determination, and in such resistance remains legibly indeterminate: without 
terminus, end, or meaning. We do not, finally, ‘make sense’ of disconnected relations, we do not, 
critically, find a way to ‘connect’ what is otherwise disconnected. The poem that is exiled from meaning 
does not find its home in criticism. Criticism does not resolve the hermeneutic problems that such poetry 
presents. But in order to think this, we must have forms for disconnection itself. The question this thesis 
finally addresses, then, is what form could such disconnection take? The tentative, always provisional 
answer is reversal: a descriptor for local, specific situations that do not resolve into conceptual clarity 
or determinacy. How else do we respond to these singular situations – political, poetic, or philosophical 
– that reverse our capacity to conceptualise them, that demand of us (as Kant’s aesthetic judgement 
does) that we register this reversal as the only ground and expression of our capacities to experience 
them?  
In the rest of this thesis, I will trace some of these situations: the political situation of May ’68, 
the poetic situation of Paul Celan as exilic and elegiac figure of criticism, and the philosophical situation 
                                                      
94 Celan, Selected Poems and Prose, Felstiner, 76|77 
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of a re-reading of Kant’s aesthetics in a context to which they are inadequate. In doing so I trace in 
parallel what Adorno describes as a ‘negative dialectic’ and Blanchot as writing the ‘disaster’. My claim 
is that these situations are not ‘connected’, but offer ‘forms’ for reading each other’s disconnection. 
Each situation describes a nonencounter. Such nonencounters stand as what Blanchot calls, repeatedly, 
a ‘relation without relation’.95 They describe a negation without negation, a step not beyond, a yes not 
separated from its no. These nonencounters structure my thesis: in chapter two I look at politics through 
each writers’ ‘nonencounter’ with the political, focused in May ’68; in chapter three I look at philosophy 
through the structures of dialectical ‘nonencounter’ Blanchot and Adorno develop in response to such 
politics, placed in dialogue with Celan’s exilic poetic; in chapter four I look at poetics through Celan as 
both elegist and figure of elegy, poetic and critical, in which ‘nonencounter’ both organises and 
interrupts – disorganises – poetic figuration. It is in Kant’s aesthetics, with its model for singular, 
subjective, non-objective legitimation of judgements of taste as universal, that we find the site for 
playing out each of these themes of reversal. The ends of Kantian judgement are reversed: it no longer 
secures ‘community’, in chapter two; nor does it secure self-presence, in chapter three; nor does it 
secure a bridge with nature, in chapter four. But the terms and form of this reversal are enacted through 
the form of Kant’s aesthetic judgement of taste. By insisting on the objectivity that Kant has to jettison 
from such judgement, and by insisting on historicising those judgements in artworks, Kant’s aesthetic 
is set into ‘reverse’. But, I insist, the form of this reversal of Kant is found inside Kant’s account of the 
aesthetic itself.
                                                      
95 Not just the asymmetrical relation to otherness, found in Levinas, but a doubled asymmetry where the self 





Saying We: Community from aesthetics to exile 
 





This chapter pursues the first of the ‘ends’ of reflecting judgement in Kant’s third Critique: ‘common 
sense’ and community. ‘Community’ is a reflective site in which the reflection Kant identified with 
aesthetic judgement is played out. In chapter one, we saw how the aesthetic judgement is reflective. Its 
validity does not, for Kant, derive from any objective fact or determinate concept, but from its own 
reflecting work. In order to establish its validity as reflective, Kant has recourse to what he calls 
‘common sense’: because an aesthetic judgement refers to the subjective faculties of cognition, rather 
than predicating anything of an object, its validity rests on the supposition that every other person must, 
if they have the same cognitive faculties, judge in the same way. ‘Common sense’ thus legitimises a 
judgement that merely reflects on a subject’s own cognitive powers. But it also means that aesthetic 
judgements outline the conditions for intersubjective agreement, and therefore for sociability itself. In 
the aesthetic, then, Kant finds a non-objective basis for sociability. 
 The question I now want to examine is to what extent such sociability shapes political 
community. What is the difference between a reflective ‘common sense’ and a political ‘community’? 
Further to this, if the experience of politics is, like that of beauty, a reflective experience, then is political 
judgement also a reflecting judgement? The consequences of this would play out the ‘reversal’ I 
identified in chapter one. Aesthetic judgement affords the conditions for a subjective comportment to 
sociability. But sociability is itself a reflective experience. The ‘common sense’ which for Kant 
endorses a capacity for reflecting judgement is itself susceptible to reflective experience. The 
‘indeterminate’ procedures of aesthetic judgement, explored in chapter one, are also operative in 
political judgement. But what would a reflective, indeterminate political organisation be like? What 
happens to the aesthetic judgement when its validation in ‘common sense’ is reflectively referred to 
historical and political events, when it is a ‘community’ and not just posed as a regulative transcendental 
mark of ‘communicability’? 
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 We can turn to a specific event, the student-worker uprising of May ’68, to pose these questions. 
This has a double effect. Firstly, May ‘68 is the subject of this kind of indeterminate political thinking. 
In such thinking, ‘Community’ marks a provisional organisation of sociability and politics. And this 
political indeterminacy is historically discontinuous. ’68 marks a historical rupture. The indeterminate 
political organisation in the event is mirrored by an indeterminate historical organisation of the event. 
That is to say, secondly, that ’68 is reflective: it is experienced reflectively, in politics, and judged 
reflectively, in history; and in this it mirrors Kant’s version of the aesthetic, which responds to a 
reflective experience of beauty with a reflecting judgement of taste. The task of thinking about a 
discontinuous event historically is a reflective task, which invokes the terms of the aesthetic. Finally, 
’68 is a ‘common’ point itself, around which three writers – Adorno, Blanchot, and Celan – meet. But 
their relationship to the event is not continuous. Blanchot and Celan lived through it, but their relation 
to it is explicitly written, in a way that resists a simple or continuous identification of them with the 
event. And Adorno’s position is less continuous still: the German student uprising was famously, 
tragically given his death the next year, focused on his own Frankfurt school at the Institute of Social 
Research. None of these writers endorse the idea that the reflective work of art can be simply translated 
into the reflective organisation of politics. But for each the idea of ‘community’ marks the difficult 
transaction and exchange between the indeterminate experience of the aesthetic and the indeterminate 
production (or not) of politics. My contention in this chapter is that this relation can be marked through 
an engagement with Kant. Just as Kant insisted on the merely formal relation between aesthetics and 
politics, so each of these writers describes a politics invested with aesthetic procedures that resists, 
perhaps paradoxically, political investment. By tracing Kant’s own move from the reflecting aesthetic 
judgement to ‘common sense’, we can see how those procedures are transformed or translated in 
response to politics.  
And as a final move, the historical specificity of this event is important. Kant’s aesthetics 
exclude historical change by channelling reflection into the transcendental scope of the subject. But if 
politics and history are also experienced reflectively, then the historical and social material Kant 
excludes from aesthetic experience might also, in an aesthetic attentive to them, be reflectively visible. 
In reading Adorno, Blanchot, and Celan here, I attempt to develop such an aesthetic. There are four 
parts to the chapter. Firstly, I outline the historical and political questions arising from May ’68. Then 
I trace Adorno’s intervention into Kant’s aesthetics through the idea of ‘common sense’, followed by 
plotting this version of ‘community’ against Blanchot’s idea of ‘unavowable’ community. Finally, I 
explore these aesthetics and politics through the idea of ‘exile’ in Celan, in order to develop the idea 





1 – Framing community: May ’68, politics, and history  
The events of the student-worker uprising frame the question of community for Blanchot, and frame 
Celan’s poetics in his late poetry. Thinking about community in ’68 means thinking about the 
indeterminate organisation of politics. That means responding reflectively to politics. We can therefore 
use ’68 to frame questions about Kantian aesthetics, because, as we saw in chapter one, Kant develops 
the aesthetic in response to an experience of reflective organisation. By looking at May as an exemplary 
event, we can frame the way Adorno’s, Blanchot’s, and Celan’s sense of the relation between politics 
and aesthetics can be channelled through my reading of Kantian aesthetic indeterminacy. 
The questions raised by the events of May ’68 are historical, as well as political. The question 
of what ‘political’ conditions (le politique) constitute the activity of ‘politics’ (la politique) is a primary 
question of the republic. What are the political conditions that frame the practice of politics? Exactly 
this question is exercised in historical thinking about May, and the fifth Republic instituted in 1958. 1 
Kristin Ross argues that retrospective, historical, accounts of the events have elided the question of 
equality with a valorisation of individuality. There are consequences of this elision on the form of 
history itself. May ‘contributed to creating a timeless and eternal era where even the idea of 
discontinuity and historical change has been evacuated […]. Completely deterritorialized, May 
becomes one with a stage of capitalism that denies any succeeding historical stages.’2 In such histories 
of the event, the discontinuities that mark it are elided. May marks both a political rupture and a rupture 
in historicisation. If we are to make sense of the discontinuities of experience in May’s politics, then 
we need a historical form of the visibility of discontinuity itself. But this poses the problem of paradox. 
In what form can discontinuity be thought, if discontinuity marks a rupture of exactly the kind of 
communication and continuity that is the condition for thinking historically? The question, here, is how 
to think of a historical equality, and not just a political manifestation of equality. This is an aesthetic 
problem. In what form can the indeterminacy of such reflection (the reflective way an event is 
‘discontinuous’ with thinking about it) be thinkable? We might think, here, of Christoph Menke’s 
account of politics and aesthetics. For Menke, ‘[p]olitical equality is an aesthetic thought’.3 Equality 
has to be made to appear. But it also has to be experienced. This means that equality is something we 
spectate. ‘Equality [Gleichheit] is an aesthetic effect, an effect of aestheticisation in spectatorship 
[Zuschauen]. And if aesthetic spectatorship is an activity, then we make ourselves aesthetically equal. 
                                                      
1 See Reynolds, Chris, Memories of May ’68 (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2011) for the contemporary 
response to unres. For a history of the event’s interpretation, see Reader, Keith, The May 1968 Events in 
France (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1993); and Bourg, Julian, From Revolution to Ethics (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007), who, through a reading of Deleuze that parallels this history, argues 
that ’68 grounded an orientation to ‘ethics’ in the social sciences and philosophy of the 1970s. 
2 Ross, Kristin, May ’68 and its Afterlives (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 183 
3 Menke, Christoph, Die Kraft der Kunst (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2013), 175 (my trans.) 
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Or: in the aesthetic activity of spectatorship we make ourselves equal.’4 We are spectators to the equality 
we make in spectating. Political equality is spectated. Any history, then, would ‘spectate’ the event it 
would make itself equal to, or continuous with. The equality which, as Ross argues, is at stake in the 
events of May, would only be visible to a historical form equal to its presentation. Presentation itself 
raises political questions of equality. 
Thinking about ‘68 involves two concepts we can examine here: equality and history. If writing 
examines this question of political equality, then it reproduces the form of that political question. What 
history, and what writing, would be adequate to thinking equality? What are the aesthetic conditions of 
equality? The writing of ’68 shows that the usual authorities where decisions are made no longer explain 
what is happening. Writing offers an alternative explanation of what happens when authority is 
suspended. But this is manifested as a displacement, and not an inversion, of authority. Politics that 
depends upon a sovereign capacity to suspend politics leaves the political terms of that decision 
unconceptualised. The juristic conception of sovereignty as a capacity to decide on suspension is 
developed by Carl Schmitt as a ‘borderline concept’.5 This decision might refer to present politics, but 
it is discontinuous from that present: ‘to produce law it need not be based on law.’6 Sovereignty thus 
opens politics to other discourses, precisely through sovereign claims to supremacy, absoluteness, 
indivisibility, perpetuity.7 Conceptions of literature at this time focus on the way writing divests exactly 
these kinds of authority. A dissolution of political authority parallels a dissolution of literary authority.  
8 Sovereignty here shifts from a juristic into a literary question. But when sovereignty is not 
conceptualised legally, or when legal conceptualisation becomes inadequate, writing does not become 
a more adequate way to conceptualise sovereignty.9 Writing inhabits this dissolution of sovereignty. 
                                                      
4 Ibid., 172 
5 Schmitt, Carl, Political Theology, trans. by George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 
5 
6 Ibid., 14 
7 These are what Jean Bodin identifies as the characteristics of sovereignty in The Six Books of the 
Commonwealth (1576), and they inform the subsequent tradition of political thought that can be charted 
through Hobbes, Rousseau, Benjamin, Schmitt, and Agamben. Agamben provides a useful account of the 
more recent history in Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. by Daniel Heller-Roazan 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), especially on the ‘paradox’ of sovereignty (15-27), and on force 
(63-7).  
8 We can think here as much of Adorno’s concern to distinguish the truth content dialectically operative 
through the complex of form and material in the artwork against meaningful subjective intention, whereby 
intentions are objectively as well as subjectively situated, [AT, 196-9/223-7] as of the broader strokes of 
Roland Barthes’s 1967 ‘The Death of the Author’, and of Blanchot’s concerted separation of the writer from 
the written in The Space of Literature, and ‘Literature and the Right to Death’ in the 1950s. 
9 See Leslie Hill, '‘Not In Our Name’: Blanchot, Politics, the Neuter’, in Paragraph, 30:3 (2007), pp. 141-
159, for an account of Blanchot’s counter-reading of sovereignty in the ‘30s and ‘40s. Hill argues that 
Blanchot reads sovereignty and the law as akin to writing in its radically neutral groundlessness. I want to 
focus on this connection in Blanchot’s later works. See also Opelz, Hannes, ‘The Political Share of 
Literature: Maurice Blanchot, 1931-1937’, in Paragraph, 33:1 (2010), pp. 70-89, for an account of how in 
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Writing can inhabit this kind of dissolution. Writing dissolves the kinds of authority associated with 
sovereignty in such a way that it is exposed to this dissolution, rather than crediting it.  By looking at 
this suspension through writing, not politics, we can register the way the political is worked out 
reflectively outside politics. 
To make sense of suspension of authority, we must recognise the context of ‘68 from the 
Algerian war through the 1960s. The war in Algeria precipitated the end of the Fourth Republic in 1958. 
In a quasi-coup, the military established de Gaulle in power to constitute the Fifth Republic, in which 
he remodelled the parliamentary system by introducing a presidential executive branch. De Gaulle 
employed these executive powers in response to successive crises. The prolonged ‘state of emergency’ 
which he declared in the wake of an attempted military coup in 1961 amounted to a ‘state of exception’, 
temporarily assigning extraordinary powers to the president, which was repeated in ‘68. So the events 
of the Algerian war were a preliminary rupture reproduced in ’68, at the end of which de Gaulle fled 
the country, dissolved the national assembly, and threatened military intervention to restore order. The 
period is thus framed by moments of political crisis threatening rupture of politics. The conceptual re-
configuration of republicanism was carried out in the context of political suspension and renegotiation. 
The triumph of de Gaulle meant that, in 1958, this leftist contestation was submerged. Mark Lazar 
frames this as a conflict between two polar, but parallel, conceptions of historical time.10 
A man [de Gaulle] against a party; some essential, cast-iron ideas of 
nationalism and Catholicism set against a rigid Marxist doctrine; two 
conceptions of history, one which emphasises the continuity of a 
country and a people, another which wants to break [césure] 
fundamentally with these; two languages, one written and spoken in a 
classical prose which sometimes lapses into lyricism, another wooden 
with cumbersome formulations […].11 
Different politics are here articulated, for Lazar, in different forms of historical time. The events play 
out in possibly contradictory forms. For Todd Sheppard, the most immediate context of this paralleling 
of histories is played out in 1958, in Algeria. There, he argues, the ‘primary clash’ was not between the 
‘left’ and the ‘right’, but ‘between those who relied on historical determinism and others who looked 
on republican legalism’.12 The present ‘consensus’ was ‘late-blooming’, but ‘has ever since served as 
fact: Algeria was not France but a colony, and thus it deserved and would obtain independence’.13 Those 
                                                      
the 1930s Blanchot moved towards situating the political as negation of empirical experience, which sets the 
ground for the later turn I am concerned with towards the non-negated negative as a political relation. 
10 Lazar, Marc, Le Communisme, une passion française (Paris: Éditions Perrin, 2002). Lazar points out (79-
80) that this subterranean paralleling of history emerges from the paralleled communist and Gaullist 
resistance movements in the war. 
11 Ibid., 77-8 (my trans.) 
12 Sheppard, Todd, The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France (Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press, 2006), 83 
13 Ibid., 89 
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who resisted Algerian independence (chiefly the paramilitary OAS) did so on the grounds that Algeria 
was, in fact, already part of the constitutively indivisible French republic. If Algeria was allowed to 
secede, the Republic would not be legally coherent as a republic. Algerian independence threatened 
French sovereignty. 
In the context of the war for Algerian independence, the concept of the ‘republic’ and its law 
thus becomes the conceptual territory in which sovereignty is argued out, however much it was ignored 
by contemporary politicians. The question of legality figured in this ‘republicanism’ could, Sheppard 
implies, re-write the grounds of history on which the Algerian appeal is mounted: the silence with which 
historical determinism was accepted came at the expense of legal conceptualisation.14 Contemporary 
politics did not work out the terms by which it established historical determinism, and so this 
conceptualisation was left to other discourses to work out. Because this fragmentation or suspension of 
law was not conceptualised politically, it emerges in writing. The prolonged crisis of Algeria resulted 
not in a triumphal left-wing revolution of the political status quo, but to the manifestation of an 
occluded, internalised legal suspension. May ’68 was not, therefore, the spontaneous affirmation of 
individual liberty, but the vexed return of an un-conceptualised legal suspension. In retroactively 
ascribing necessity to these events, the contingency that constitutes them is obscured. And so is the 
future which that contingency made possible. In saying that Algerian independence was historically 
necessary, we might avoid the problem of a legally enforced unity, but we also avoid responding to the 
discontinuity of that event as indeterminate – on which indeterminacy a future autonomy depends. This 
requires us to think of the discontinuity of these events. But thinking such discontinuity means 
developing a form of writing adequate to discontinuity. This implies an aesthetic, even if that aesthetic 
remains subterranean. What are the conditions of visibility of political indeterminacy, and of historical 
discontinuity?  
The discontinuous arrangement of people in politics might mirror an indeterminate play of ideas 
in aesthetics. But if it does so, then such political judgements would function like Kant’s aesthetic 
judgement. For Kristin Ross, the displacement of political conceptualisation emerges in new forms of 
historicism.15 But I want to argue that it is also felt in writing, in the way writing (and art) is theorised 
by Adorno, Blanchot and Celan as developing procedures responsive to its own fragmentary, 
discontinuous operations. That is to say, the questions raised by politics in ‘68 are continuous with 
questions raised by writing itself, as becomes clear when we consider them through Kant’s aesthetic. 
Ross suggests that this displacement is registered in historical writing, and that this leads to the ‘real 
question’: ‘the question of equality’ ‘as something that emerges in the course of the struggle and is 
verified subjectively, declared and experienced in the here and now as what is, and what should not 
                                                      
14 Ibid., 95-7 
15 Ibid., 85-90, 113-124 
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be.’16 These are exactly the terms of Kant’s reflecting aesthetic judgement. These political questions 
are worked out like aesthetic questions. In the history of ’68, writing is exposed, like politics, to the 
indeterminacy of experience that is marked by aesthetic judgement. But this ‘coincidence’ of political 
indeterminacy with aesthetic indeterminacy exposes aesthetic experience, too, to the radical 
displacements at work both in the ‘present’ of attempted equality of relations, and in the retroactive 
‘history’ that tries to account for that equality. Because the fragmentation of law was not conceptualised 
by politics, other discourses were left to conceptualise it, like writing. Aesthetics can make clear why 
politics cannot work out its own political, the conditions of politics: because the relation between them 
is indeterminate and reflective. When the political conditions do not determine what happens in politics, 
then they are related indeterminately. Could such an ‘aesthetic’ judgement account for the ‘rupture’ that 
marks equality? This would allow us to read the temporal re-orientation of the aesthetic in the 1960s as 
a historically, materially inflected response to a crisis in the kind of thinking-in-common that Kant 
thought aesthetics could initiate. This would be to resituate Kant’s ‘common sense’ according to the 
politics of ‘community’. In this discontinuity, a political crisis focuses an aesthetic crisis. We can now 
turn to the way this crisis transforms aesthetic experience. 
 
 
2 – No-man’s land: judgement from Kant to Adorno 
 
Given the version of Kant’s aesthetic established in chapter one, in which aesthetic judgement is 
coordinated by a reflection that remains indeterminate, what happens to the ‘end’ of aesthetic 
judgement, the validation of judgement in ‘common sense,’ when read through these indeterminate 
politics and history? If this political crisis focuses an aesthetic crisis, then it does so through the radically 
discontinuous form of the thought of equality: equality as a reflective experience of otherness, of an 
otherness not continuous or identical with the self, which provokes a reflecting judgement. Adorno’s 
reconfiguration of the parameters of Kantian aesthetics follows these lines. The reflection that Kant 
mandates to transcendental subjective experience in the aesthetic is, for Adorno, threaded through 
material and historical coordinates. We can track the way Kant threads reflection into the form of 
‘communicability’ in common sense, and then track this against Adorno’s reading of this Kantian move, 
in order to develop the terms of this Adornian reconfiguration of reflective common sense. In this 
section I will look at the ways Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory develops the reflective relation between art 
and society out of Kant’s version of aesthetic reflection. 
 
                                                      
16 Ibid., 73-4 
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Kant and reflection 
As we saw in chapter one, for Kant, aesthetic judgement is a reflecting judgement because in aesthetic 
experience there is no conceptualisation of an object. Rather, the subjective form of judgement becomes 
the quasi-‘object’ of judgement itself. And rather than predicating anything of an object, aesthetic 
judgement refers to a subjective feeling – pleasure. Aesthetic judgements claim validity on a non-
conceptual basis. Aesthetic judgement refers to a ‘representation which, though singular and without 
comparison to others, nevertheless is in agreement with the conditions of universality, an agreement 
that constitutes the business of the understanding in general’.17 Because a concept has objective content, 
it can be repeated, but also communicated to any subject who also has the same concept. Lacking such 
a ground, the aesthetic judgement is nonetheless experienced as true. Its pleasure is not derived from 
anything merely ‘agreeable’ about the object, but from the reflection of cognitive powers that – finding 
no concept – are working reflectively. The pleasure is taken in these subjective powers. But this 
apparently subjective experience also ‘demands’18 others’ assent. It speaks in a ‘universal voice’.19 
This is ‘common sense’, a ‘communal sense [gemeinschaftlichen Sinnes]’, a sense shared by all: 
a faculty for judging that in its reflection takes account (a priori) of 
everyone else’s way of representing in thought, in order as it were to 
hold [zu halten] its judgment up to human reason as a whole […].20 
The ‘commonality’ adequate to this ‘common sense’ has to be reflective, and therefore indeterminate 
itself. So we can define ‘taste as the faculty for judging that which makes our feeling in a given 
representation universally communicable without the mediation of a concept.’21 The claims of taste 
mirror those of conceptuality, but are grounded in subjective feeling rather than in an objectively 
verifiable concept. Aesthetic judgement communicates ‘the necessary condition of the universal 
communicability of our cognition’.22 This judgement communicates ‘communicability’, rather than any 
objective information. And ‘it is the universal capacity for the communication [Mittheilungsfähigkeit] 
of the state of mind in the given representation which, as the subjective condition of the judgment of 
taste, must serve as its ground’.23 The aesthetic judgement is therefore grounded in the very ‘common 
sense’ it produces. One can only judge according to the common sense that verifies that capacity to 
judge, which emerges with the very pleasure it registers. The common sense that validates the reflecting 
capacity to judge is itself organised by reflection. 
                                                      
17 CJ 104, 5: 219 
18 CJ 98, 5: 212 
19 CJ 101, 5: 216 
20 CJ 173, 5: 293 
21 CJ 175, 5: 295 
22 CJ 123, 5: 239 
23 CJ 102, 5: 217 
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 This common sense works through figuration, because it is reflective. It supposes assent, as 
well as demanding it, expecting it without anticipating the details of its content. Assent is not 
communicated; the form of assent is supposed: ‘this happens by one holding his judgment up not so 
much to the actual as to the merely possible judgment of others, and putting himself in the position of 
everyone else’.24 ‘Common sense’, like the aesthetic judgement and experience it verifies, is organised 
reflectively. In the reflecting, aesthetic judgement of an aesthetic experience, there is a non-conceptual 
claim to universality. This claim is grounded in a feeling, ‘pleasure’. But the possibility of ‘pleasure’ 
forming the ground for such non-conceptual judgement makes possible the indeterminate proliferation 
of such grounding. If pleasure grounds judgement, it does so without determining its coordinates. 
Indeed, this freedom is what constitutes such pleasure. This inscribes a certain ‘incommunicability’ into 
the aesthetic judgement: the taxonomy of judgement might be communicable, but the form of its 
representation cannot be determined. ‘Any relation of representations, however, even that of sensations, 
can be objective […]; but not the relation to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure’.25 Kant at once 
restricts the communication of pleasure (judgement ‘merely connects its constitution together with the 
feeling of pleasure and displeasure’)26 and claims that, as judgers, we ‘have grounds for expecting a 
similar pleasure in everyone’.27 The judgement therefore establishes communicability at the expense of 
communication. We can only expect such pleasure if the pleasure expected is reflective. ‘Common 
sense’ is not only supposed from aesthetic judgement, its constitution is necessarily reflective. The 
pleasure it expects depends upon that pleasure not being determinately tied to a certain representation.  
A ‘critique’ of judgement is necessary, for Kant, because judgement claims its own a priori 
ground. But this ‘ground’ is reflectively held in the ‘appearance’ it experiences. And the appearance of 
assent in ‘common sense’ is only supposed, and figured, in the singular judgement itself. Judgement 
must provide its own ‘principle’, and must presuppose systematicity, or possible systematic harmony, 
in the teeth of indeterminately contingent empirical forms (forms which, indeed, proliferate). Judgement 
has a double function. Judgement ‘requires a principle that [judgement] cannot borrow from experience 
[…] [it] can only give itself such a transcendental principle as a law’.28 It acts according to the 
understanding, which provides conceptual laws for organising nature, and it also acts, according to the 
understanding, to reflectively link sensible intuition to those conceptual rules. But judgement also 
operates reflectively when there is no concept, and, following Béatrice Longeunesse, as ‘mere reflective 
judgement’, does not then produce any concept that could verify the judgement independently from that 
                                                      
24 CJ 174, 5: 294 
25 CJ 89, 5:203 
26 CJ 95, 5: 209 
27 CJ 97, 5: 211 
28 CJ 67, 5: 180 
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judgement.29 The ‘mere’ operations of reflection are verified in the reflective way they are coordinated 
through ‘common sense’, and therefore remain indeterminate. This claim, then, can only be grounded 
in the feeling of pleasure itself; and this means that its universality has to be presupposed in other 
subjects, rather than abstracted into a communicable concept. So the aesthetic judgement generates its 
own grounds by proposing ‘common sense’, but in doing so also generates the possibility of 
‘community’ or possible ‘communicability’ without recourse to conceptuality. 
 
Adorno, art, society and history 
‘Common sense’ is the externalisation of reflection, without its objectification in a verifiable concept. 
‘Common sense’ is external to the subject, but it is grounded in the merely supposed repeatability of a 
subjective feeling, pleasure. That pleasure is not abstracted from or objectified. But what are the 
consequences of this externalisation for Kant’s attempts to channel reflection through the transcendental 
experience of the subject in the aesthetic? In reflecting, judgement works autonomously (without 
determining anything else). It is possible here to carve an objectively orientated aesthetics from Kant’s 
subjectivism. As a reflecting judgement, the aesthetic judgement is concerned not with determining any 
particular object, but with uncovering in reflection an indeterminate, which is to say non-conceptual, 
relation to an object: the object and the relation remain particular. Likewise, on encountering a work of 
art, one does not reflectively develop a concept which can exhaust its indeterminacy. So if we think of 
aesthetic experience as responding not just to the discrete, subjective feeling of pleasure or displeasure, 
but to art, to artwork’s objectivity, then the reflecting work of responding to indeterminacy can be 
registered externally to the subject, in the art object itself. This is the effect of internally displacing 
Kant’s judgement of subjective ‘feeling’ (in response to nature) with the objectification of that same 
indeterminacy in the work of art. So while Kant is concerned with the connecting objective but 
proliferating, ‘wild’30 nature with subjectivity through the subject’s indeterminate feeling of pleasure, 
in thinking about art we are concerned with how this ‘connection’ might be made objectively, in the 
proliferating but produced instances of art. And with this question we are still within Kantian pleasure. 
As Paul Guyer puts it, pleasure is not merely felt in response to the subject’s autonomy, but is 
autonomous itself, such that aesthetics asks, ‘how we can be pleased with an object independently of 
                                                      
29 Longuenesse, Béatrice, Kant and the Capacity to Judge, trans. by Charles T. Wolfe (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1998), 163-4 
30 Gasché, The Idea of Form, 2: ‘Given that nature is defined by Kant as the domain of objectivity, and hence 
of what can possibly be known, nature in the wild stands as cognitively undomesticated nature. Vice versa, 
things — including artifacts — for which no determinate concepts are available, and whose purpose cannot 
be made out, are similar to things found in uncharted nature.’ This ‘domestication’ is an important metaphor: 
what mental or representative ‘domus’ could ‘house’ nature’s wildness? 
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its subsumption under a concept’.31 In the artwork, the reflective work (and the pleasure) associated 
with subjective pleasure is, by reflection, externalised. For Adorno, this amounts to the historicisation 
of aesthetic judgement by the externalisation of reflection in the artwork. If, for Kant, reflection is both 
the ‘work’ and ‘end’ of judgement, if it is both to secure a transcendental capacity of the subject to 
reflect and to describe ‘mere’ reflection, then there is a ‘gulf’ internal to reflection itself. The artwork 
radicalises this gulf, which for Kant is felt subjectively, by externalising it. Externalising it, in the 
artwork, means making that ‘gulf’ into a history: it traces the different ways it is manifest in individual 
artworks. But what is traced, in this history, is the indeterminate way such reflection is externalised in 
aesthetic experience. 
Art is itself a discontinuous concept, in that it traces a non-continuous, ‘inhomogenous’32 
history. Aesthetic experience does not proceed determinately. As a reflective concept, art is organised 
discontinuously.33  For Adorno, art ‘cannot fulfill its concept’.34 It does not propose conceptual 
universality, but rather the reflectively supposed universality of Kantian ‘common sense’. For Adorno, 
this constitutes a ‘history’ of art, and not just its transcendental experience. No singular artwork is 
identical with any concept of art, but that means also that each artwork exceeds any aesthetically derived 
concept of what art is. The history of art, like the history of aesthetic experience, is not deterministic. 
‘The artwork’s autonomy is, indeed, not a priori but the sedimentation of a historical process that 
constitutes its concept’:35 it is the sedimentation of the history of forms that have been called art. Art is 
a concept that integrates its own history as reflective.  
There is a contradiction in ‘common sense’ as history, then, that is reproduced, for Adorno, in 
art’s relation to its material. Art is positioned not only towards the Kantian ‘genius’ subject who 
mediates nature’s law, but also towards the society that constitutes the material of its production and 
experience. As Kant suggests of the ‘genius’, ‘the rule must be abstracted from the deed’,36 in that the 
‘cause’ of art is not distinguishable from its ‘end’. But for Adorno, this means that any artwork stands 
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in contradiction with its material, which is thoroughly determined. However, we can reintroduce Kant’s 
transcendental judgement to its material history. This requires us to rethink the reflective relation 
between art and aesthetic experience. Adorno is suggesting that the transcendental critique of aesthetic 
judgement includes the history of the forms of art that Kant excludes as merely ‘the formation and 
culture of taste’, undertaking only to criticise judgement ‘from a transcendental point of view’.37 For 
Adorno, art is an externalisation of the ‘sensus communis’ into the sedimented historical forms of 
society. And yet this externalisation is encountered aesthetically or not at all. ‘Art does not exist as the 
putative lived experience of the subject who encounters it as a tabula rasa but only within an already 
developed language of art’.38  The reintroduction of ‘common sense’ to the historical ‘community’ it 
models must take place through the reflective aesthetic experience itself. Art is neither outside 
conceptuality and history, nor society. It marks the ways concepts are reflectively contradicted by their 
social material. Art only contradicts society and conceptuality as autonomous. And this autonomy is 
derived from aesthetic experience.  
So art’s relation to society is indeterminate and oppositional. It is contradictory. Art’s reflection 
of its material is also a contradiction of that material. 
[…] art becomes social by its opposition [Gegenposition] to society, 
and it occupies this position only as autonomous art. By crystallizing 
in itself as something unique to itself, rather than complying with 
existing social norms and qualifying as “socially useful,” it criticizes 
society by merely existing […]. Art’s asociality is the determinate 
negation of a determinate society […].39  
If we are to think of aesthetic experience generating, and not just confirming, autonomous, free social 
relations, we have to do so through the way art opposes and contradicts society. The community 
indicated by aesthetic experience is therefore not the resolved or reconciled community of ‘common 
sense’ projected from a harmonious feeling of internal free play, but neither does art merely reproduce 
its social material. Society instead marks the externalisation of this free play in contradiction, not 
reconciliation. In art, we experience the autonomy of art, and not necessarily the reflective autonomy 
and harmony of our own subjectivity. Under art’s autonomy, judgement is experienced indeterminately. 
We ask whether this is art, and not whether I feel if this is beautiful. The felt indeterminacy of our own 
capacity to judge, felt in the same reflective form of aesthetic experience, puts our relationship to 
judgement under reflection. The relationship between aesthetic experience and other cognitive 
experience is therefore reversible, but not identical. Aesthetic judgement is not like the judgements of 
understanding. It is autonomous. But its autonomy is won in relation to cognitive, conceptual 
judgement. It therefore contradicts the determining procedures of cognition, just as it stands in 
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contradiction to the determinate social material it mediates reflectively. The transcendental relation 
between reflection’s work in determining judgement and its autonomous work in aesthetic judgement 
can be reproduced in art as a relation between the ‘aesthetic’ and the ‘deterministic’ use of social 
material. The community vouched for or indicated (supposed) by aesthetic judgement is indeterminately 
organised, just as art is. 
 
Aesthetic jurisdiction 
The ‘autonomy’ which Adorno identifies with art is a social autonomy. But it mirrors and draws upon 
the transcendental autonomy of reflecting judgement indicated by Kant. Adorno agrees with Kant that 
in aesthetic judgement, the subject is orientated toward its object without desire, it is ‘disinterested’: 
this is ‘Kant’s insight […] that aesthetic comportment is free from immediate desire’.40 But this 
autonomy from desire relations is also socially mediated. 
The separation of the aesthetic sphere from the empirical constitutes 
art. Yet Kant transcendentally arrested this constitution, which is a 
historical process, and simplistically equated it with the essence of the 
artistic, unconcerned that the subjective, instinctual components of art 
return metamorphosed even in art’s matured form, which negates them 
[…].41 
The apparently ‘subjective’ autonomy of art is actually ‘social’. But equally, that ‘social’ autonomy is 
mediated by ‘subjective’ experience. The ‘metamorphosed’ ‘return’ of the subject in art is the return to 
aesthetic comportment of exactly the ‘objective’ features that Kant excludes from it. For Kant, reflection 
is provoked when the subject does not find a concept that can determine the ‘beauty’ it experiences. 
Adorno suggests that this judgement is itself subject to reflection: to the historical and mutable features 
that structure it. The autonomy aesthetic judgement describes becomes ‘negated’ in art that contradicts 
it. There is a complex amplification of reflection, here. If the subject is reflectively related to the object 
in aesthetic experience, then that aesthetic experience is itself reflectively related to the historical 
features of society. Art can contradict these features, and negate them, just as it assumes social and 
historical material into the artwork. Simon Jarvis suggests that Kant’s detachment of aesthetics from 
morality is a diminishment, or narrowing, of aesthetic judgments, a claim that ‘they are not cognitive 
but are analogous to cognition; that they are not moral but analogous to morality’.42 For Jarvis, this 
leads to an inversion of Kant’s own claim that in the judgement of taste, ‘pleasure’, a feeling, claims 
universal validity. ‘The problem lies […] in the decision that has already been taken here — […] by 
means of a legal “deduction” of categories — about the radical separateness of thinking and feeling 
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and, accordingly, about the expulsion of all affectivity into an object for a thinking which is presumed, 
insofar as it is thinking, to treat affectivity as what it thinks about’.43 Pleasure is separated from its 
manifestation, and channelled into the transcendental through the aesthetic. But pleasure is mediated, 
first, be social, historical, and bodily experience. Criticism must reclaim the pleasure of judgement, 
which amounts to a reversal of the idea of subjectivity, in which ‘the subject is no longer to be 
understood as defined by being what affectivity and substance are given to’.44 Such an aesthetic theory 
could think art’s historical displacement from cognition, through the feeling of displacement in art. And 
such a re-conception of ‘displacement’ would also concern how subjective cognition internally 
displaces the subject from ‘feeling’ what it ‘feels’. By thinking through these displacements, we might 
arrive at the broader displacements of the subject from intersubjective relations, precisely in the way 
Kant proposes them in a deferred, subjectively felt, ‘common sense’. The distribution of reflection in 
common sense is not determined by that distribution. Aesthetics can register this ‘reflective’ common 
sense when it recognises its own displacing activity. If aesthetic experience is coordinated through 
displacement, then so is any ‘common sense’ it endorses and is validated by. 
 But what do I mean here by ‘displacement’? I want to develop this into the idea of exile 
with Paul Celan (in section four). My contention here is that Adorno develops a ‘no-man’s land’ out of 
the territory of aesthetic judgement and experience, which developed out of Kant’s own account of the 
place of judgement, but which exposes a neutrality within it. Kant describes the ‘legality’, the proper 
terrain, of the different modes of cognition in spatial terms. If nature is understood as a field of 
experience, then the different modes by which it is experienced by a subject have different, but 
overlapping, legal jurisdictions (juris+dictio, where the law is ‘spoken’). Judgement’s terrain overlaps 
with the realms of understanding and reason, which are operatively distinct, legislating in different 
ways, but on ‘one and the same territory of experience’.45 This territory is externally coherent but 
internally, legally divided. 
Concepts, insofar as they are related to objects, regardless of whether 
a cognition of the latter is possible or not, have their field, which is 
determined merely in accordance with the relation which their object 
has to our faculty of cognition in general. – The part of this field within 
which cognition is possible for us is a territory [Boden] (territorium) 
for these concepts and the requisite faculty of cognition. The part of the 
territory in which these are legislative is the domain [Gebiet] (ditio) of 
these concepts and of the corresponding faculty of cognition.46 
The distinction here between ‘territory’ and ‘field’ is instructive. ‘Boden’ refers to an area, to soil or 
ground, but ‘Gebiet’ refers to a domain. The difference here is between a neutral territory and a land 
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under legislative control. Where concepts are legislative, the field of experience is a ‘domain’; where 
they are not, it is merely a ‘territory’. Concepts are still active in this field, even when cognition is not 
possible. We can think of things we cannot cognise, and this distinction holds to separate the ‘field’ of 
experience according to the faculties of understanding and reason. Outside this field there is the 
‘unlimited but also inaccessible field […] namely the field of the supersensible’.47 But there is a peculiar 
intrusion of this neutral inaccessibility into the ‘field’ of experience which it limits. The ‘supersensible’ 
is autonomous from the field of experience, but it ‘should have an influence’ on it, ‘namely the concept 
of freedom should make the end that is imposed by its laws real [wirklich] in the sensible world’.48 If 
commerce must be possible between these two worlds, across this ‘incalculable gulf [unübersehbare 
Kluft]’,49 it is because judgement functions in both realms without legislating in either. Judgement is 
strangely neutral with regard to cognition. In order to operate in both ‘fields’ of experience, and to 
reconcile them, it cannot be identical with either but must be coincident with both. The operations of 
judgement are therefore neutral. It works upon the world neutrally. 
  In Adorno’s reading, Kant establishes a neutral field and not a workable territory for 
aesthetic judgement. And this inoperativity has consequences for the ends Kant seeks to develop 
through aesthetics. What is ‘incalculable’ is too numerous for measure, or exceeds the conditions of 
measurement. Aesthetic judgement operates within this incalculability, and this indeterminacy. And 
this means that it operates neutrally on the field of experience, without any conceptual legislation, a 
‘no-man’s land’. Rather than bridging, such neutrality breaches the two separate fields. For Adorno, 
this breaching constitutes a ‘no-man’s land’ internal to reason. The ‘transcendental’ conditions for 
experience are already outside themselves, conditioned by experience. As Adorno says in his lectures 
on The Critique of Pure Reason, ‘these conditions can only be held to be valid if they do in fact relate 
to experience’.50 The transcendental conditions for experience are not abstracted from experience, they 
have an objective basis. Adorno continues, ‘the sphere of the transcendental is neither one of logic — 
because it is concerned with the possible knowledge of objects — nor is it a sphere concerned with the 
contents of knowledge — because it does not presuppose such contents, but only the possibility of 
possessing such contents. It is, then, a curious no man’s land of knowledge positioned somewhere 
between psychology and logic’.51 In this neutral way, thinking threatens to transcend itself. In aesthetic 
experience, pleasure is felt at the suspension, and then supposed reconciliation, of this neutral gulf, 
when, in aesthetic experience, judgement is operative reflectively, without determining any content. 
But this means that pleasure is felt neutrally, is felt as the threat to ‘transcend’ its ‘transcendental’ 
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function. It threatens, in Adorno’s words, to become a ‘no-man’s land’. We can relate this Kluft to 
Adorno’s vision of utopia from his childhood, where ‘The land […] that I occupied when playing on 
my own was a no man’s land.’52 The subject, here, ‘occupies’ a ‘no man’s land’, subjectivity inhabiting 
the land as neutral. So when Adorno uses the same expression to describe the ‘gulf’ in reason as to 
describe the ‘gulf’ between borders, I think he is parodying the Kantian narrative of aesthetic 
judgement. The subjective ‘autonomy’ of aesthetic judgement becomes social and political autonomy. 
As a child, he is literally between political borders, and he is socially isolated, playing ‘alone’. Like the 
aesthetic judgement itself, he ‘plays’ between two spheres of experience. Adorno is describing the 
aesthetic actualising the community that, for Kant, aesthetics can only suppose. But what he experiences 
is not the ‘transcendental’ connection of these two spheres. It is rather the ‘no man’s land’ of their 
separation, the ‘gulf’ between the two. But here, in this ‘no man’s land’, Adorno the child experiences 
pleasure, freedom, play. Pleasure is not in reconciliation; it is in the feeling of being between borders. 
The aesthetic experience, this pleasure, is an experience of exile. Adorno collapses the distinction that 
Kant tries to make in order to secure the validity of aesthetic judgement, between its ‘present’ in 
experience and its ‘future’ in community. Play is internal to reason, and so, therefore, is borderlessness. 
Community is articulated in this collapse of borders: the collapse of the territorial distinctions which 
Kant establishes in reason. ‘Community’ does not secure the relation between the subject and the world 
of objects. Rather, it exposes this relation as already exilic, already displacing its object, even if that 
object is subjective feeling, pleasure. 
 
Contradiction 
There is, for Kant, a discrepancy between judgement’s epistemological and moral functions. Judgement 
is supposed to secure, as a bridge, the connection between autonomous understanding and reason. But 
in order to do this, it must be able to function autonomously from both. Judgement is located in and 
locates the ‘Kluft’ that distinguishes the realms of understanding and reason. Judgement operates 
internally to this distinction, hoping to bridge the gulf of the faculties’ necessary separation. 
Judgement’s displacement from an operative territory allows it to place those cognitively functional 
uses of judgement by understanding and reason. For Kant, the ‘power’ of judgement is in reconciling 
these distinct territories by showing how they both operate on a common field. Judgement is necessarily 
cognitively neutral. But this means that the ‘common’ judgement measures is not just neutral, but 
negative. Because judgements make non-conceptual claims for universality, they are able to mediate 
between understanding and reason without violating their respective legal claims for validity. But this 
capacity to mediate requires that judgement have its own autonomy, its own a priori ground. So the 
ground on which judgements operate is the ‘field’ [Gebiet] of experience as such, not a ‘territory’ nor, 
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certainly, a ‘domain’. And this para-legal ‘space’ constitutes the ‘space’ where aesthetic judgement’s 
validity is claimed; in other words, the space of the ‘common sense’ where those judgements find their 
ground and validity. ‘Common sense’, then, is a mere ‘field’, a ‘no man’s land’. 
 This neutral functionality structures the aesthetic. We can relate this to what Bernstein calls the 
‘antinomy of aesthetic autonomy’, where ‘what constitutes the autonomy of taste necessarily makes the 
value of beauty contingent, external, and instrumental’.53 However, this internal division is also the 
source of judgement’s autonomy. It might not operatively provide a ‘bridge’, but it can work 
inoperatively in the space of the ‘bridge’. For Peter Dews, indeed, Kant’s structure discloses how 
‘human freedom [is] divided against itself’: ‘the realization that the human self is freedom, rather than 
merely possessing ‘free-will’ as a capacity, was precisely what opened up the possibility of this inner 
diremption’.54 Again, for Adorno, this is a reversal of Kant’s aesthetics staged within the structure of 
the aesthetics itself. 
The relation of subjectivity to art is not, as Kant has it, that of a form 
of reaction to artworks; rather, that relation is in the first place the 
element of art’s own objectivity, through which art objects are 
distinguished from other things. The subject inheres in their form and 
content [Gehalt] and only secondarily, and in a radically contingent 
fashion, insofar as people respond to them.55 
In this reversal, subjectivity is registered in its objective form in the artwork. Subjective pleasure is not, 
as Kant suggests, felt by the subject in response to its own free play, but felt ‘primarily’ in the way that 
freedom can be objectified externally in art. If there is ‘subjectivity’, as this freedom to play, then it is 
located in the object. It is displaced from subjective experience. Such experience is henceforth negative. 
The ‘bridge’ of judgement does not hold internally, does not reconcile anything, but it does open up the 
distance, the gulf, which constitutes freedom, and therefore subjectivity, only in the object itself. 
Aesthetic experience distances the subjective freedom of experience from its social manifestation. But 
this ‘distancing’ is an experience of autonomy that, in not reconciling experience, allows for experience.  
 Pleasure is here displaced from the internal work of subjective faculties to the reflective work 
of art itself. This reflects the fate of aesthetic experience in historically changing social contexts. 
Aesthetic experience, orientated by the contingent historical forms of society, is displaced from its 
transcendental role. But because the artwork’s material is social, the aesthetic experience of the artwork 
offers a way to read this social material according to aesthetic reversal. Rather than securing the 
subject’s relation with nature, aesthetic experience radicalises the subject’s social distance from the 
natural. But in doing so, in opening up rather than reconciling the ‘gulf’ it works through, the aesthetic 
potentially becomes the condition for a relation to that sundered subjectivity. Pleasure is preserved as 
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the feeling of a harmonic indeterminacy lost in exchange society, lost by the freedom to think 
conceptually that the subject historically won from indeterminacy. Pleasure is a lost indeterminacy in a 
context of manifest determination. The indeterminate ‘principle’ that guides Kant’s transcendental 
aesthetic experience becomes the social and historical principle of exchange. 
If in monopoly capitalism it is primarily exchange value, not use value, 
that is consumed, in the modern artwork it is abstractness, that irritating 
indeterminateness of what it is and to what purpose it is, that becomes 
a cipher of what the work is. This abstractness has nothing in common 
with the formal character of older aesthetic norms such as Kant’s. On 
the contrary, it is a provocation, it challenges the illusion that life goes 
on, and at the same time it is a means for that aesthetic distancing that 
traditional fantasy no longer achieves. From the outset, aesthetic 
abstraction […] was foremost a prohibition on graven images 
[Bildverboten]. This prohibition falls on what provincials ultimately 
hoped to salvage under the name “message”: appearance as 
meaningful; after the catastrophe of meaning, appearance becomes 
abstract.56 
The subjective autonomy of aesthetic experience lives on in the artwork that contradicts it. The 
experience of this contradiction in artworks is a ‘catastrophe’ for aesthetics as the locus of art’s 
meaning. The ‘ban on images’ is upheld aesthetically. In Adorno’s reading, the aesthetic experience of 
art, which objectifies the reflection that in Kant’s description is strictly subjective, externalises the work 
of judgement. Aesthetic judgement can be turned against its transcendental terms to expose the subject 
to the history Kant excludes from such judgement. But it does this through the work of judgement itself. 
The power of abstraction by which reflection is externalised as art is the power of judgement. The 
externalisation of judgement happens by its own reflective work. This exposes a neutrality in 
judgement. The cognitively neutral aesthetic experience is matched with its own reflective work. As 
externalised, as art, judgement is no longer the immanent terrain of the subject, but sedimented social 
material. So art can ‘think’ that material, reflectively. And the neutral relations by which art undoes the 
relation between aesthetic experience and aesthetic judgement are exposed in precisely this 
contradictory social material. As negative, art can make manifest the contradictions that form social 
relations. But art’s autonomy from society, its opposition to it, is for Adorno already social. The ends 
of Kantian aesthetic thinking, marked as ‘common sense’, are therefore exposed in art to a neutrality. 
Society does not become the inverse location of aesthetic meaning. Rather, the ‘subjective’ ends of 
aesthetic judgement are reversed in their objective distance from society. Autonomy is distant from a 
society that has no forms for autonomy’s articulation. Art articulates this distance. Any community, 
then, would be in this contradiction, and not in Kantian reconciliation. 
It is useful here to think of Kant’s differentiation between images and schemata. The image 
works symbolically, invoking the imagination reflectively. The schema also invokes the imagination, 
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but determinately. So the ‘reflecting power of judgment’ works ‘not schematically, but technically, not 
as it were merely mechanically, like an instrument, but artistically, in accordance with the general but 
at the same time indeterminate principle of a purposive arrangement of nature in a system’. And without 
this ‘presupposition’ of the principle of systematicity, ‘we could not hope to find our way in a labyrinth 
of the multiplicity of possible empirical particular laws.’57 Schemata function according to ‘a hidden 
art in the depths of the human soul’.58 And in the ‘technique of nature’59 in the third Critique, Kant finds 
the analogue of this principle of connection. But he can only establish its validity reflectively, in a 
similarly reflective externalisation of reflection in the ‘common sense’. It is this reflective use of the 
image that inscribes indeterminacy into its uses and, despite Kant, into its ends, including the common 
sense. If common sense is governed by the image, that means its procedures are reflective. But it also 
means that any attempts critically to think it are governed by the indeterminacy of those reflective 
procedures. Common sense cannot substantiate any positive version of community. But this means it 
can outline a less substantial, reflective, negative organisation of community. This plays upon the 
question of whether ‘difference’ or ‘negativity’ can simply be harnessed for a positive political 
community. And it draws upon the Kantian question of common sense: if the foundation of common 
sense is the merely reflective supposition that demands assent, then how can such a reflective structure 
be distinguished from Schwärmerei, babbling, enthusiasm? How could reflection in its indeterminacy 
be recruited for politics, without either that politics missing the negative by grasping it, or that negativity 
slipping politics altogether? The aesthetic question of how to mediate reflection plays directly upon this 
question of political constitution. But its relation to such constitution is insistently negative. It becomes 
the task of aesthetics not only to identify reflection, but to articulate the reflective ways such reflection 
is connected to politics. In demonstrating the way social and historical material is reflected negatively 
in art works and aesthetic experience (in contradiction), Adorno gives form to this task. And we shall 
now see how Blanchot establishes this negativity as a relation, not only between otherwise disconnected 
subjects in a revived reflective common sense, but in the ‘aesthetic’ work of writing which measures 
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3 – The ‘unavowable’ common sense: community from Kant to Blanchot 
Nous parlons, nous parlons 
 
Proceeding from Kant’s ‘indeterminate’ version of aesthetic judgement, Adorno develops a structure 
of art and aesthetic experience that also bears an ‘indeterminate’ relation to its social and historical 
material. The reflective structure of Kantian aesthetic judgement shapes the reflective relation art and 
aesthetic experience bear, for Adorno, to social and historical material. This has consequences for the 
kind of ‘common sense’ to which such art and aesthetic experience can attest. Not a transcendental 
‘common sense’, but the social experience of ‘community’ itself colours and shapes the forms of art 
and aesthetic experience. But the negativity of this relation means that art does not simply, in its mimetic 
activity, reproduce or replicate social forms. The question I will address now, with Blanchot, is what 
such a ‘negative’ relation between art (writing) and society (community) would be like? If politics and 
political structures are not simply reproduced in art (whether in their coherence or incoherence), and 
yet art is, as Adorno insists, reflectively developed out of history and social material, then what would 
those ‘politics’ in art be like? If art simply reproduced politics, then it would not be reflective, nor 
provoke reflective experience. For Adorno, its reflection is therefore contradictory. What can art tell us 
about an ‘indeterminate’ politics, if its own procedures are themselves necessarily – if they are, that is, 
in Kant’s sense, to provoke the minimal kind of reflection that distinguishes art – negative? To say ‘we 
speak’ is to invoke a common ground for speaking which, in its negativity, recalls the reflective 
parameters of Kantian ‘common sense’. 
 The ‘fragmentary writing’ Blanchot develops in the 1960s is correlated to his response to an 
indeterminate arrangement of community in political writing. But the relation between the two is also 
worked out in writing, and is therefore negative. Blanchot’s specific response to ‘68 makes apparent 
this negative relation between aesthetic experience and community. There is contradiction, not 
verification, between art and politics; but this contradiction is coordinated through the discontinuities 
of those politics. How does one write the indeterminate relation shared in an unavowable community? 
For Blanchot, the neutrality of writing structures a neutral relation, with writing as a point in common; 
but this doubled neutrality compels us to reconfigure exactly that relation between writing and politics, 
much as the neutrality of reflection compels Adorno to re-think the relation between aesthetic 
experience and society. Thinking about the neutrality of this relation means thinking about how writing 
and politics are disconnected as something they have in common, share. Thinking about this neutrality 
means reconfiguring the stakes of Kantian ‘common sense’. In this section, I will examine Blanchot’s 
development of ‘fragmentary writing’ with ‘political’ writing in the 1960s, culminating in The 





In a letter to Roger Laporte in 1984, a year after publishing The Unavowable Community, Blanchot 
describes facing a ‘real dichotomy’ in the 1930s: writing journalism in the day, and at night writing 
without any ‘exigency but [writing] itself’. The division between the reality of political commitment 
and withdrawal from politics is registered as a division in writing, between committed and autonomous 
writing. ‘If there is fault on my part’, he continues, ‘it is in that division [partage].’60 But what does 
writing divide from, share with – partager ambiguously means both – politics? At this time, in The 
Unavowable Community, Blanchot turned back to May ‘68. Michel Surya argues that this conceals a 
‘metamorphosis’61 in Blanchot’s first turn to literature in the 1930s. For Surya, this second turn back to 
politics obscures Blanchot’s political commitments of the 1930s. The initial ‘passion’ for literature 
merely conceals a ‘political passion’. The claim is that Blanchot uses literature to aestheticise politics. 
David Amar likewise argues that Blanchot’s post-war politics, even if they do not exactly reproduce 
the pre-war politics, ‘act as a kind of impediment [empêchement]’ to understanding the political present. 
Any illumination of the political in writing ‘obscures at the same time a certain part of that engagement 
(of the 30s and beyond) and, by so doing, the political in general.’62 In these claims, writing corresponds 
with politics. Its negativity merely conceals an uncomfortable political commitment. The question here 
is whether such a ‘negative’ writing could bear this determinate relation with politics (even inversely).  
Political engagement is pitched for Blanchot through writing. The Unavowable Community 
responds to May ’68; but Blanchot’s response to those events is coordinated by writing’s anonymity. If 
there is a correspondence, it is between the anonymity of writing and the anonymity of political relation. 
That is to say, Blanchot’s political thinking, in common with his literary thinking, responds to the 
anonymity of its object, and takes on that anonymity as the groundless basis for relation ‘without 
relation’.63 This negativity structures relation. The anonymity of writing reflects a political anonymity. 
Nancy suggests that Blanchot’s turn to politics in writing marks a failure of what was called ‘“real 
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communism”’.64 It is only from such failure, however, Nancy argues, that the real question of 
community, of what is common, can be maintained. Community emerges at the point of failure of 
politics. Are we to equate this with the discussions of sovereignty, then, that I rehearsed at the start of 
this chapter? Do the phenomenological failures attending the experience of literature – the dispersal of 
authority, the doubling of that dispersal in the reader – ‘metamorphose’ into a formal, sovereign way to 
make sense of political failure? I think, rather, that the failures double upon one another. If real political 
failure is legible according to literature, it is only through the fragmenting dispersal to which literature 
is subject. If the unconceptualised political history of the 1960s (and perhaps even the 1930s) re-
emerges in literary discourse, then it does so as an interruption of that discourse, even as it does so 
through the interruptions literature might be able to make ‘legible’. As Martin Crowley argues, Blanchot 
is avoiding two kinds of messianism here: the presence of ‘Romantic messianism’ and the ‘gap, a 
messianic interruption or turning point which would, happily, have always already receded.’65 Instead, 
‘he finds a way to configure the revolutionary moment as a welcome void, exorbitant and ungraspable, 
which is also a possible site of collective, oppositional activity’.66 This rupture ‘also’ constitutes a 
relation.  And this rehearses the indeterminate relation between art and aesthetic judgement’s ‘common 
sense’ in Kant. 
Literature is interrupted by history; but its interruption gives us a minimal opportunity to think 
of the ways history is interrupted in turn. That is a ‘real dichotomy’. The two are disconnected, and yet 
we think through this relation to a possible politics of disconnection. If Blanchot’s passions 
metamorphose with his politics, then, they do so according to the exigency of the present, which is to 
say the exigent pressure on that present of a non-manifest future that we call politics. Passion, too, is 
subject to the neutral relations of writing: passion that declines, for Blanchot, to patience, to passivity, 
and not to power. We can think of present anonymity not, as Amar argues, as constituting an 
‘impediment’ to the present of politics if we think of the specific relation writing bears to anonymity. 
Community is the point of negotiation of this anonymity. And the anonymity of this community is 
legible when thought in the place of Kantian ‘common sense’. That means thinking about it through 
the indeterminate experience of writing and reading. The dispersal of the present of experience might 
obscure the present of politics, but it does so according to a reconfigured ‘common sense’: a sense that 
shares dispersal.  
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Blanchot’s sense of ‘community’ response can be framed by the Kantian communication of ‘common 
sense’. For Kant, aesthetic experience can be referred only to the subject. Its validity is worked out in 
‘sociability’. ‘All presentation of one’s own person or one’s art [Kunst] with taste presupposes a social 
condition (talking with others)’.67 He continues: 
in aesthetic power of judgment, it is not the sensation directly (the 
material of the representation of the object), but rather how the free 
(productive) power of the imagination joins it together through 
invention [Dichtung], that is, the form, which produces satisfaction in 
the object. For only form is capable of laying claim to a universal rule 
for the feeling of pleasure.68 
Sociability precedes any judgement, because the judgement has to be ‘shared’. But the ‘sensation’ of 
the judgement cannot be shared, only its form, its mere communicability. ‘Common sense’, then, is a 
shared negative experience. In it is shared the form of judgement without any communication of 
objective content.  
As we saw with Adorno, aesthetic experience places us in a neutral relation with society in 
which social relations are supposed but not determined by the experience of community. And this 
indeterminacy returns to condition the form of the subject’s aesthetic experience. Where concepts are 
connected internally by schemata, aesthetic judgements are connected externally (if the external is 
understood as a projection of the inside, that is) in society. Blanchot emphasises this transformation of 
experience in its externalisation. Whereas in Kantian ‘Dichtung’ the subject imaginatively arranges and 
connects with the form that provokes pleasure, for Blanchot, in writing, the subject is provoked by 
disconnection. There is no end to such sociability other than its formal reflection in ‘talk’, conversation; 
and there is no attached objectivity into which it could settle. For Blanchot, this is reproduced in the 
experience of community. But there the possibilities of communication are formally excessive, 
displaced into the sociability-without-end of ‘common sense’. So for Blanchot, ‘68 demonstrated that:  
explosive communication could affirm itself (affirm itself beyond the 
usual forms of affirmation) as the opening that gave permission to 
everyone, without distinction of class, age, sex, culture, to mix with the 
first comer as with an already loved being, precisely because he was 
the unknown familiar.69  
‘Explosive communication’ is communication that exceeds what it communicates. This reproduces the 
Kantian communicability without communication of aesthetic judgement. But where Kant’s ‘common 
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sense’ demands assent from the subjects it presupposes, Blanchot’s ‘community’ that generates 
‘explosive communication’ is wholly nonidentical: the ‘unknown familiar’ that remains ‘unknown’ in 
its ‘familiarity’; that is ‘familiar’ to what the subject does not know. Rather than judgement referring a 
present experience to a future community, Blanchot’s community is the already present ‘future’ 
unknown that provokes judgement.  
This affirmation of the present negativity of communication re-doubles into the equality by 
which such a community would be composed. 
Everybody had something to say, and, at times, to write (on the walls); 
what, exactly, mattered little. Saying it was more important than what 
was said. Poetry was an everyday affair.70 
‘What’ is communicated matters less than its communication. We are engaged in Kant’s aesthetic: the 
aesthetic judgement has no objective content, it is ‘merely’ subjective. But against Kant, that 
communication is not the confirmation of a harmonic response to the given world, but a radicalisation 
of communication as the displacement of aesthetic judgement in writing’s own reflections. Any such 
community would be ‘unavowable’ precisely because of its reflexivity. The externalisation of 
indeterminacy in ‘common sense’ comes back against the subject. Just so, art’s reflective work intrudes 
upon the everyday. And this reflective work, for Blanchot, welcomes an otherness that disarranges 
subjective unity. 
Such writing ‘(on the walls)’ displaces the transcendental suspension of aesthetic experience. 
It introduces the non-objective ‘common sense’ into a political present of society. Society does not here 
reflectively ratify judgement, but is the site and object of judgement’s reflection itself. The kind of 
connection through reflection that constitutes Kant’s ‘common sense’ is, for Blanchot, already an 
‘unavowable’ community in the sense that what it shares is disconnection. Blanchot thereby reverses 
the telos of Kantian aesthetics. Judgement is no longer orientated by the reconciliation of ‘common 
sense’. In the historical experience of non-relation as relation, aesthetic experience is transformed from 
an experience of reconciliation to an experience of displacement. But this is an experience, however, 
that for Blanchot marks the possibility of friendship: of a relation that does not identify as its other, but 
with the nonidentity of the other. But this returns also to Kant’s aesthetic ‘common sense’, that has 
interminably to be reconstituted in being ‘talked’ about through sociablility. Any ‘community’ is thus 
inscribed with provisionality: it is never, in the present, constituted. 
 
Sense 
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Speaking in ‘common sense’, with a ‘universal voice’, means speaking in common, saying ‘we’. Such 
a capacity depends upon a capacity to identify the plural in the singular. It depends, then, upon a capacity 
to ‘sense’ what is ‘common’. As Jean-Luc Nancy puts it, ‘Sense [sens] is already the least shared thing 
in the world. But the question of sense is already what we share, without any possibility of its being 
held in reserve or avoided.’71 How do I communicate my singularity when singularity is precisely what 
is incommunicable? How do I think of sense in ‘common’, when my experience of sense is singular? 
Kant’s aesthetic ‘common sense’ is in this reading both a community of sense and the question of 
sense’s commonality. The reflective navigation of judgement’s singularity towards communication in 
common disturbs that singularity. Kant argues that there can be no determinate concept of beauty, only 
its manifestation in reflecting judgement. Aesthetic judgements find their a priori ground, instead, in 
‘the feeling of the subject’.72 Yet, Kant maintains, this judgement finds communicability in a ‘common 
ground, deeply buried in all human beings’.73 This common ground is located inside, deeply buried, but 
also shared, outside, in an indeterminately plural ‘all human beings’. Faced with the ‘exemplary’ 
‘products of taste’, every human would judge in common; yet ‘taste must be a faculty of one’s own’. 
So taste cannot be derived conceptually, but neither can it be derived socially. The exemplary status of 
the product of taste is, instead, as ‘a mere idea, which everyone must produce in himself, and in 
accordance with which he must judge everything that is an object of taste’.74 So, ‘it would better be 
called the ideal of the beautiful, something that we strive to produce in ourselves even if we are not in 
possession of it’.75 Because it has no objective basis, its objectivity must be a merely regulative ‘ideal’, 
and so always futural, awaited. This experience of the loss of objective validity returns to the subject as 
an experience of its own finitude, its limits. 
Only that which has the end of existence in itself, the human being, 
who determines his ends himself through reason, or, where he must 
derive them from external perception can nevertheless compare them 
to essential and universal ends and in that case also aesthetically judge 
their agreement with them: this human being alone is capable of an 
ideal of beauty, just as the humanity in this person, as intelligence, is 
alone among all the objects in the world capable of the ideal of 
perfection.76 
Because human experience is conditioned by its end, human ‘purpose’ is limited by ‘purposeless’ 
experience. It is human finitude, as the experience of self-conscious limitation in time, that allows the 
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particular human to determine ends, or purposiveness. So, as Peter de Bolla puts it, we should ‘speak 
of aesthetic experience as something to be lived through’.77 In aesthetic experience, ‘finitude’ is tied to 
‘purposiveness’. The ‘purposiveness’ of beauty is bound to the provisional way it merely appears, 
aesthetically. And for Kant this twinning is confirmed by the capacity to judge these ends aesthetically 
– which is to say reflectively. Attempts to universalise such experience would have to proceed 
reflectively. 
Like Kant, Blanchot takes this reflection as the ground for communication. But he insists upon 
its provisionality. In The Unavowable Community, this is articulated by the provisional relation of love. 
There, writing’s ephemerality is tied to its ‘explosiveness’. Writing is provisional, ordinary, even as it 
displaces the ordinary, is ‘beyond utilitarian gain’.78 This written relation is, again, like ‘love’. This love 
‘is not the moral fusion of hearts dear to romantic myth, but rather the strange relation that attracts 
lovers into an intimacy that makes them even more foreign to each other’.79 Equality can be thought 
through this ‘love’ of the ‘unknown familiar’, but it is thereby organised by a dissymmetry of power. 
Love, stronger than death. Love which does not suppress death but 
which oversteps the limit death represents and thus renders it powerless 
in regard to helping someone else (that infinite movement that carries 
towards him and, in that tension, leaves no time to come back and 
worry about “oneself”). Not so as to glorify death by glorifying love, 
but, perhaps on the contrary, to give to life a transcendency without 
glory that puts it endlessly at the service of the other.80 
A ‘transcendency without glory’ is a relation to the other that does not know anything of its other 
(unknown familiar), and yet still attests to it, bears that relation. Love ‘oversteps the limit death 
represents’ (think of Le Pas au-delà of ten years earlier, the ‘step/not beyond’) precisely by not 
overstepping it, by finding only its own weakness there. Thinking equality in writing means thinking 
of writing’s weakness, its provisionality, but at the same time thinking through the form of that 
weakness as a relation that can bear weakness, provisionality, in its indeterminacy. Thinking equality 
means re-orientating the ‘sense’ in ‘common sense’, and not just changing the parameters of what is 
‘common’.  This redefinition of sense returns us to Adorno’s attempt to re-orientate the aesthetic 
towards the social and bodily material it excludes. The political is an excess of communication, an 
‘explosive’ communication, whereby relations exceed the content of what is communicated. Writing, 
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uncoupled from the unity of presence in speech, is always located outside itself, outside its present, in 
the various possible presents where it might be read – ‘on the walls’ of its scattering generic forms. And 
the ‘sense’ of ‘common sense’ exceeds the unitary ‘common’ it supposes: the aesthetic judgement is, 
from its inception, located outside itself. Kant’s focus on the ‘common’ neglects the formal work of 
what is ‘sensed’ in this common. ‘Community’ is located outside a unitary commonality. It is marked 
by excess. 
 
Friendship and fragmentary writing 
If writing marks in such excess of communication a possible communicability beyond determinate 
identity, then it does so in the constrained form of its articulation in writing itself. In writing community, 
writing is exposed to its own indeterminate organisation. Writing and critical reading constitute a point 
of community, whose point in common is the book or literature itself. But the book is always absent, in 
the sense that it is only present in the displaced experience of reading. So while literature indicates an 
‘other’, at the same time it displaces it. Writing and community here meet through ‘friendship’. As 
Patrick ffrench argues, in relating Blanchot to Bataille, ‘the work may serve an end (‘telle fin’) exterior 
to itself, in which case it may be exchanged. But if the work serves no end it constitutes a scandal in 
the context of exchange and of human relations founded on commensurate exchange.’81 This, of course, 
is also the scandal of aesthetic indeterminacy. Here the indeterminacy of what is not exchanged, 
friendship, is a relation to the other that is ‘purposeless’. Friendship is traced as an anonymous relation, 
as a non-relation, as an anonymity to which we nonetheless bear relation, an anonymity which 
constitutes, in fact, any ‘we’ who speak as what Blanchot calls the ‘last to speak’.82 The ‘other’ is an 
‘end’ of literature, to use Kant’s vocabulary, but that ‘end’ remains indeterminate. And it also marks a 
‘purposeless’ relation. The ‘friend’ is the purposeless other whose relation interrupts thinking’s 
systematicity by drawing it towards this indeterminate end. Writing of Bataille, in turn, Blanchot 
describes friendship as ‘this relation without dependence, without episode, yet into which all of the 
simplicity of life enters, passes by way of the recognition of the common strangeness that does not 
allow us to speak of our friends but only speak to them’.83 The relation is coordinated by strangeness, 
but also by the provisionality of a conversation as the only provisional mark of there being a ‘friend’ to 
speak to. So this a mutual repetition of anonymity. ‘Friendship: friendship for the unknown without 
friends.’84 Lars Iyer suggests that ‘Blanchot underlines the fact that words were not so much exchanged 
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by the friends, but repeated, as if it were the sheer fact of the address that is important, not its content.’85 
For Iyer, this community emerges from a failed communicability: the failure of surrealism to constitute 
an immediate ‘politics’. But this failure makes another communicability legible. Friendship is the 
witness to this failure of legibility – the failure to make anonymity legible in the real world. For 
Blanchot, this negativity constitutes the basis of community, and this anonymity constitutes Blanchot’s 
response to the political events of France in the 1960s, which can therefore be read as attempts to ‘trace’ 
the ‘anonymity’ of friendship as community. 
Responding to ’68 means responding to the form of that response, and that means responding 
to the anonymity of writing. The difficulty of identifying a community in its anonymity reproduces the 
strain of anonymity in friendship. As I suggested in the opening section, this interruption of legal 
universality is not answered in subsequent political history, and so resurfaces in other discourses in May 
‘68. And for Kant, the interruption of such universality is what prompts reflective experience. For 
Blanchot, the strain of identifying with what is not just politically nonidentical (the oppressed other), 
but nonidentical with politics itself (outside the territory of law), is a strain felt by the writing I. Writing 
registers the tension of reflection in politics. A failure of politics to organise its reflective relations is 
reproduced as a written incapacity to identify its singularity with the plural ‘community’ it writes 
towards in friendship. We can see this tension in the series of political events to which Blanchot 
responded in the 1960s. As a signatory of the ‘Manifesto of the 121’, the ‘Declaration of the Right to 
Insubordination in the Algerian War in 1960’, Blanchot attests that ‘[t]his is a war of national 
independence. But what is it for the French? It is not a foreign war. French territory has never been 
threatened. Moreover, it is being waged against a people whom the State ostensibly considers French, 
but who are fighting precisely to stop being considered so.’86 ‘Community’ here describes an extra-
legal formulation. The state might consider the Algerians French (as did the OAS), and therefore subject 
to Republican law, but for Blanchot Algeria is outside French territory, and therefore outside 
Republican law. Blanchot is attesting to a non-relation, or to a relation without relation, a relation to the 
Algerians as outside the ‘jurisdiction’, the territory of law. The formulation of community as 
‘impossible’ (outside possible experience) has to be understood in its historical iterations. Fragmentary 
writing develops as a practice coordinated according to this relation without relation. Thinking, in such 
writing, this ‘impossible’ history invokes indeterminacy in a way that is recognisably aesthetic when 
considered alongside Kant, but it also compels us to adjust the terms of that aesthetic according to the 
way this reflection manifests in a specific history. Making this declaration, Blanchot later attested that 
‘each one of the signatories needs to be considered equally its unique author; I assume this responsibility 
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globally, in its entirety’.87 This is what Blanchot calls ‘speaking as if anonymously’88 (note that we are 
in the figurative here: speaking ‘as if’ we could speak anonymously). The form of refusal of universal 
Republican community also forms a kind of community, one orientated by ‘equality’. This equality is 
negotiated in writing between the singularity and the multiplicity of ‘I’. Speaking together, equally, ‘I 
assume this responsibility globally’: ‘I’ assume, in this form, the equal anonymity of each of its singular 
authors. ‘I’ is overwritten with a displacing equality of the numerousness with which it identifies, 
attempts to incorporate. And this becomes ‘global’, a spatial figuration, a mapping of equality. In 
identifying with the nonidentity of Algeria, ‘I’ am distended, fragmented; in identifying with the friend, 
‘I’ am refused the coherence of a symmetrical relation. Writing community means responding to the 
ways community fragments writing, just as writing is organised by its possible interruption and 
fragmentation. In the collectively authored Comité issue, to which Blanchot largely, anonymously 
contributed during May ‘68, writing becomes ‘a power of refusal that we believe is capable of opening 
up a future’.89 ‘We’ believe in, attest to, the incapacitation of singularity by anonymity, in which 
separation (nous parlons, nous parlons), in which nonidentity marked by ‘we’, a ‘future’ opens up. The 
‘future’ here is the potential change opened up in the suspension of the self-identity of the I, the self-
identity of the law. Just as Algeria is not French territory, so ‘Here (in the French world), where we can 
say everything, almost everything, we can only speak in enemy territory’.90 This ‘we’ marks an 
identification with the extra-territorial: as in the USA, ‘we must feel (behave) like blacks in a white 
society’.91 ‘The texts will be anonymous. […] to constitute collective or plural speech: a communism 
of writing’. 
Thus the texts will be fragmentary: precisely to make plurality possible 
(a nonunitary plurality) […] in order to find their meaning not in 
themselves but in their conjunction-disjunction, their being placed 
together and in common [mise en commun]92 
Writing ‘places in common’ a ‘conjunction-disjunction’ of fragmentation. Speaking in a ‘universal 
voice’ displaces the unity of the I. This is felt historically in the displacements of identity involved in 
political identification with otherness. Community is thought through this fragmentation of unity. In 
writing, I give up my identity as anonymous. And the disjunction of this anonymity constitutes a 
commonality to which politics negatively attests. Any community is organised by a dispersal of 
singularity, just as writing displaces the singularity of its voice into the third person, the fragmentary. 
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This anonymisation of identity passes through writing. Writing disarranges the conditions for 
thinking in common. Writing ‘passes through the advent [l’avènement] of communism […] 
communism being still always beyond communism’.93 Writing passes through the failure of 
communism to be present, in which failure of presence there still remains the possibility of communism. 
Like communism, writing displaces itself as present. If writing is not simply to take the place of a 
suspended legality, but rather to write into and place in common its displacement, then it has to affirm 
its ‘necessary insufficiency’,94 ‘the political incarnated in the detour’95 of writing. There is a reversal 
implied in this detour (and a reversibility in the ‘communism of writing’), where political framing of 
writing becomes a literary framing of the political. The reversibility of the two is collaborative. But this 
reversibility also undoes any reference to framing, becomes a ‘detour’ and not just a ‘retour’, return. In 
an essay on Sade written in 1965,96 collected in The Infinite Conversation, Blanchot describes ‘the way 
in which writing, the freedom to write, can coincide with the movement of true freedom [la liberté 
réelle], when the latter enters into crisis and gives rise to [provoque] a vacancy in history. A coincidence 
that is not an identification.’97 Indeed, it is the coincidence of these two freedoms, the freedom of writing 
and political liberty, that provokes the rupture between them. We cannot expect writing to reconcile the 
breach it provokes. Instead, writing and politics constitute a ‘coincidence’ but not an ‘identification’. 
This dissymmetrical relation suspends politics’ continuity. Like revolution, like conversation, writing 
‘is the time of the between-times [l’entre-temps] where, between the old laws and the new, there reigns 
the silence of the absence of laws, an interval that corresponds precisely to the suspension of speech 
[l’entre-dire]’.98 Writing is ‘between times’ in the sense of coinciding with two parallel times which 
reverse into one another: the present and the future, the future felt as the dissipation of presence; the 
possible and the impossible, writing as ‘naming the possible, responding to the impossible’.99 The 
‘communism of writing’ is the present impossibility of community, then, experienced in the present: it 
is a response to the possible that responds to the impossibility of that present possible being the future, 
being any future. 
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When Blanchot names community ‘unavowable’, he is saying that it cannot be attested to. The 
experience of community interrupts the unity of the subject who could attest to it. And yet, like aesthetic 
experience, community is experienced in the singular, by the subject: it does not resolve into a 
conceptually determinacy. It has to be shared in its singularity, even if it exceeds or disturbs that 
singularity. ‘Unavowing’, we are still ‘saying we’, but that ‘we’ does not mark any distinct ‘us’. Saying 
‘art’, we are saying the Kluft that aesthetic experience was supposed to bridge. For Blanchot, community 
names the uncoupling of the determination of relations by identity. Community names the collapse of 
these relations, not some positively located ‘other’ dimension of experience. So, 
if the relation of man with man ceases to be that of the Same with the 
Same, but rather introduces the Other as irreducible and — given the 
equality between them — always in a situation of dissymmetry in 
relation to the one looking at the Other, then a completely different 
relationship imposes itself and imposes another form of society which 
one would hardly dare call a “community.” Or else one accepts the idea 
of naming it thus, while asking oneself what is at stake in the concept 
of a community and whether the community, no matter if it has existed 
or not, does not in the end always posit the absence of community.100 
‘Given the equality between them’, we have to think in this way: we have to name this community, 
knowing that community does not name anything present, but rather the loss of presence that would be 
the condition for such relations. However, in this way community ‘responds to the impossible’ in the 
present, responds to a future hope (love) that would (impossibly; would not) be able to think in this 
communal way. The present, indeed, ‘demands’ this kind of community. ‘The existence of every being 
thus summons the other or a plurality of others. […] It therefore summons a community: a finite 
community, for it in turn has its principle in the finitude of the beings which form it’.101 The ‘finitude’ 
that conditions aesthetic experience for Kant, the provisional way it is provoked by a reflection that 
cannot be determined, is here displaced into the ‘finitude’ of human beings in their singularity. 
Singularity finds its objectivity in others, even as those ‘others’ displace the experience of singularity. 
Community names this displacement. 
As aesthetic experience marks the incompletion of the concept of art, community marks an 
incompletion of the presence of singularity. And this makes possible a response to ‘impossibility’ – to 
the future that a politically motivated sense of community would depend upon. 
If, as a principle of community, we had the unfinishedness or 
incompleteness of existence, now as the mark of that which raises it up 
so high it risks disappearance in “ecstasy,” we have the 
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accomplishment of community in that which, precisely, limits it, we 
have sovereignty in that which makes it absent and null, its 
prolongation in the only communication which henceforth suits it and 
which passes through literary unsuitability, when the latter inscribes 
itself in works only to affirm the unworking that haunts them, even if 
they cannot not reach it. The absence of community puts an end to the 
hopes of the groups; the absence of a work which, on the contrary, 
needs and presupposes works so as to let them write themselves under 
the charm of unworking, is the turning point which, corresponding to 
the devastation of the war, will close an era.102 
Blanchot employs the form of sovereignty, of a neutral excess of law that suspends the law,103 as the 
formulation of what is lost. From this perspective, Blanchot’s interventions into Algeria and ’68 do not 
refer to any determinable, though marginal, community. Rather, Blanchot refers to community as 
ineluctably present, but also ineluctably displacing presence. It is the experience of ‘closing an era’ – 
an intervention into precisely those arguments about historical necessity that we saw conditioned the 
response to Algeria, Vietnam, and May ’68. Community resists exactly this historical continuity. The 
‘communism of writing’ is the response of writing to a demand for equality, which responds to the 
temporal experience of self-displacement in community. As Jean-Pol Madou describes it, Blanchot’s is 
a community ‘that does not allow itself to be circumscribed by any form of sociality and is not taken 
up in any dialectical process […] emptied of all transcendence, [community] is abandoned to an 
immanence just as impossible’.104 And yet, it is precisely in its exposure to the ‘outside’ of experience 
that the experience of community invokes and parallels the philosophy of aesthetic experience. The 
community that writing ends with is not, however, founded by any aesthetic experience. Rather, the 
experience of community exposes in aesthetics a neutrality that Kant’s aesthetic tries to resolve. If in 
community the subject feels its dispersal and not its reconciliation with a dispersed world, then that 
dispersal is felt throughout aesthetic experience. Perhaps we might not call this aesthetic anymore; and 
yet it traces over and marks with this dispersal the territory and map that we could, with Adorno, call 
aesthetic, a no-man’s land of experience. In this way, the aesthetic is restored – by its reversal – to the 
temporality of hope: it preserves in its dispersal of presence a possible future for the indeterminacy it 
would otherwise coopt for its own collaborative, grounding work. We shall return to this in chapter 
three, but the question remains: how do we think this dispersal of writing that disperses thinking, in 
what ‘form’ is this dispersal registered in its neutrality? 
 
                                                      
102 Ibid., 20 
103 See Balibar, Étienne, ‘Blanchot l’insoumis’, in Blanchot dans son siècle, ed. by Monique Antelme et al. 
(Lyon: Parangon, 2009), pp. 288-314 — who describes the Schmittian right to call the legal system to 
account in the name of a more demanding counter-law in a way that for use slips into other discursive 
transgressions, and in slipping makes possible a response to this other ‘demand’; even, perhaps, Kant’s 
‘demand’ for intersubjective assent to aesthetic judgement. 




Writing is reflective to the extent that it is coordinated through its own indeterminate procedures. Such 
writing is the ‘exile’ of experience – coming from outside experience – in Kant’s sense of the 
transcendental, positing experience constantly outside its own conditions. Writing is coordinated by 
exile, and in ’68 this exile is the objective suspension of politics in the city, in Paris. For Blanchot, 
finally, this amounts to ‘fear’, and not pleasure. 
This fear is something we witnessed, fear— that cannot be shared —
was given to us that we might share it, and that we might master it in 
the very rejection of all mastery. || But it implies the discretion that 
culminates in silence, even as it turns us aside from it.105 
‘Fear’ coordinates peoples’ disconnection, just as pleasure registered their connection. ‘We’ ‘witness’ 
what was supposed to be shared, human relations of finitude, ‘that cannot be shared’. An incapacity to 
share is inscribed into experience, as in the city in The Madness of the Day (another retrospective 
publication in 1973, this time from 1949), in which ‘sight was a wound’.106 This is the neutrality of 
experience. And it is replicated in the neutrality of relations between people, the ‘fear’ in the city. ‘Don’t 
think you can use others to free yourself from yourself: you are condemned to yourself in order for there 
still to be someone to welcome others.’107 ‘I’ am disengaged from myself; subjectivity exilicly placed 
outside experience. ‘Think about others in such a way that it is no longer you who comes back from this 
thought and that it is not in a thought that you dispose yourself towards them.’108 Disposing yourself 
towards ‘them’ means disposing yourself towards a multiplicity, a numerousness, in which singularity 
becomes anonymous. Just as the ‘I’ is displaced by the ‘we’, not ‘you’ but ‘them’. And finally, ‘you’ 
are displaced by ‘him’: the third person. ‘You’ are ‘il’, he/it, the ‘third person who is not a third person 
[troisième personne qui n’est pas une troisième personne]’.109 Because in community you are 
indeterminate, this neutral third person, the person outside witness, who is not a (dialectical or 
witnessing) third, displaces the second-person you. 
If it were enough for him to be fragile, patient, passive, if the fear (the 
fear provoked by nothing), the ancient fear that reigns over the city 
pushing the figures in front of it, that passes in him like the past of his 
fear, the fear he does not feel, were enough to make him even more 
fragile, well beyond the consciousness of fragility in which he always 
holds himself back, but, even though the sentence, in interrupting itself, 
gives him only the interruption of a sentence that does not end, even 
so, fragile patience, in the horizon of fear that besieges it, testifies only 
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to a resort to fragility, even there where it makes thought mad in 
making it fragile, thoughtless [inconsiderée].110 
We are exiled in the city: it is the place of displacement that we nonetheless share. We are exiled there 
in the sense that, fearfully, we lose identity in order to credit a community. But for Blanchot, there is 
another, more obscure identity here, the ‘silhouette’ behind the determinate, fusional community. This 
is the community of losing identity, the ‘we’ who lose our identity in becoming us. And we feel this 
community, it takes its form, in writing where ‘fear is never overcome’.111 
When Sarah Kofman refers to ‘the foreignness of that which can never be held in common’,112 
she is referring to the foreignness of ‘thinking in common’ itself, but also of thinking in common with 
Blanchot. If Blanchot writes towards foreignness, then that writing is itself exilicly displaced from our 
reading. We are engaged with neutrality. But Blanchot calls this relation friendship. As well as his letter 
to Laporte, and The Unavowable Community in 1983, in 1984 Blanchot published The Last To Speak, 
another retrospective work: an elegiac essay written for Celan in 1972. If we are to think about 
Blanchot’s retrospective politics, we have at the same time to address how those politics are framed and 
mediated by his thinking about literature. Thinking the political means responding to the anonymous 
form by which it is thought. Celan, as much as ’68, is a point of orientation here, of community. 
Engaging with the history of ’68, like engaging with Celan, means engaging with anonymity. Writing 
is linked to politics by its anonymity, the displacement of identity that makes space for what is other to 
identity. Such an indeterminate ‘end’ of aesthetics makes legible the contradictions of reflection that 
inflect Kant’s aesthetic. But it also makes legible a possible politics coordinated by such indeterminacy. 
Thinking between writing and politics means thinking the anonymity of their relation. In The Step Not 
Beyond (1973), ‘“We speak, we speak, two immobile men whom immobility maintains facing one 
another, the only ones to speak, the last to speak [les derniers à parler].”’113 ‘We’ speak, but only 
anonymously; ‘we’ converse, speak together, only to interrupt one another’s presence, to speak as ‘the 
last to speak’, expecting no answer, no ‘we’ to hold us together in common. The interruption that 
constitutes conversation is here conversation itself. The ‘last to speak’, for Blanchot, is both 
‘anonymous’ and, as Christophe Bident points out, the ‘anonymous’ friend Celan.114 By using the 
phrase as a title for his essay on Celan, ‘the last to speak’ is named, Celan (it becomes singular, ‘le 
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dernier’) but Celan is also named anonymous, plural (‘les derniers’). Celan is un-named. ‘Friendship 
attests only to the absence of testimony for death (or madness), and it is this absence which does not 
accompany it, which dictates the law of its separation, of its gap.’115 If there is a relation founded by 
reflection in writing, then it is to the extent that writing is interrupted by that relation. A writing that 
could allow for such interruption would have, reflectively, to interrupt its own determining procedures. 
Kant outlines the possibility of such an aesthetic use of reflection in judgement, and outlines the moves 
Blanchot makes in relating fragmentary writing to a fragmentation of politics in community. But for 
Blanchot, this relation itself is thoroughly negative. And crucially, the form of such writing is negative. 
It is, as we shall see with Celan himself, a writing of exile.116 
 
 
4 – Celan, exile, disorientation 
(Betrinkt dich | und nenn sie | Paris)117 
 
Kant offers a model of reflecting judgement coordinated by indeterminacy, but uses this indeterminacy 
as a ‘common sense’ to ratify the transcendental validity of reflecting judgement. Common sense is 
validated by the sociability aesthetic judgement both provokes and is validated by. But this 
indeterminacy of reflection in community can be exposed, for Adorno, to the kinds of ‘history’ of art 
such judgement excludes (including society and the body); and by Blanchot to the kind inscription of 
reflection that writing negatively ‘shares’ with politics. This gives form to ‘art’ as a history of 
reflectively organised objects; and to politics as a reflexively shared indeterminacy. So we can track the 
way reflection moves from an aesthetic experience to a political experience back into Kant through 
Adorno and Blanchot. This depends, however, upon there being a formal visibility and reflexivity of 
this relation itself. that these are all exilic connections. Celan’s poetic relation to ’68 shows the kinds of 
indeterminate relations explored aesthetically (in Adorno) and politically (in Blanchot) to be part of 
how writing functions itself, and thus shows how the indeterminacy Kant reserves for aesthetic 
experience is part of how art works. This intervention into aesthetics by the reflection aesthetics thinks 
can inform a reading of Celan’s poetics. Poetry bears the responsibility to witness for a presence that it 
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cannot present. It is in this way reflective. For community, as for Kant’s aesthetic judgement, a ‘witness’ 
is necessary for validation. But, as Blanchot suggests, this witness is necessarily ‘unavowing’. For 
Celan, poetic witness, and any poetic response to the present of politics, is coordinated through the way 
writing is displaced from the present of witnessing. If poetry affords any kind of community, it does so 
either by its own displacement (aesthetics becoming politics), or by exposing a displacement already at 
work in politics. In this final section, I will develop these poetics through some key figures in Celan’s 
work: ‘displacement’, ‘disorientation’, ‘exile’, and ‘polarity’. Each can be read as a figure for the kind 
of reflective, but indeterminate, relation aesthetics bears to politics. 
 
Displacement 
We can think of Celan’s presence in Paris in ’68 – living on Rue Tournefort, near the Place de la 
Contrescarpe, working in the École normale supérieur: all central spaces for les évènements of ‘68 – 
through the various ‘displacements’ that organise Celan’s poetics in this period. These are visible 
through the indeterminate aesthetics developed in chapter one which, we can now see in reading Celan, 
are exilic aesthetics to the extent that they inscribe their own disorientation. The historical coordinates 
of Celan’s poems at this time – Dutschke and the student uprisings in Germany, the Prague Spring, and 
the ambiguous socialism of the student-worker uprising – are reconfigured through these poetics. Just 
as Kant coordinates aesthetic indeterminacy through the ‘image’ (not a conceptual schema), in Celan’s 
poetry, history is figured. But this procedure of figuration is itself reflectively unstable, and reflexively 
concerned with the terms of its own coordination of what it reflects. 
 We can see this through a specific example: the ‘moor’. The ‘moor’ that marks the ‘moorsoldier 
from Masada’ in the poem ‘Imagine’ (June 1967) returns in one of Celan’s ’68 poems from Schneepart, 
‘The Runic one’ (May 3-4 1968). These images reflect historical indeterminacies, and play through the 
way history is articulated in figures. In the first poem, the mass suicide of Jews in resistance to Rome 
in Masada returns as a non-encounter, an ‘imaginary’ encounter: 
Imagine: 
that came toward me, 
awake to name, awake to the hand, 
forever, 
from what cannot be buried.118 
This soldier ‘cannot be buried’, ambiguously both because he returns to the imagination now (in the 
aftermath of the Six-Day War),119 but also because there is an essential absence of the past in the poem’s 
present. The poem can only perform its own imaginative activity. The soldier, indeed, is again un-buried 
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by the way resistance can be figured and reproduced in different contexts. The ambiguity of this is 
focused in the way the image returns, again, ‘changing paths [Fahrbahn]’, in ’68. 
The Runic one too changes lanes: 
amidst 
the arrest-squad 
he scrapes him- 
self, arresting-arrested, red, 
 
carrot, sister, 
with your peels 








sich Greifend-Gegriffenen rot 
 
Mohrrübe, Schwester, 
mit deinen Schalen 
pflanz mich Moorigen los 
aus seinem 
Morgen, 121 
The image, indeed, ‘changes lanes’ with apparent ease. The image of the protestor discloses an 
ambiguous violence: he is ‘arresting-arrested’, his ‘arrest’ hard to distinguish in the crude ‘CRS=SS’ 
slogan that would collapse two histories into one image. Singularity is at stake here. The protestor 
transforms into the image of the ‘runic’ SS he would apparently resist precisely because of the way that 
protest collapses historical distinctions into one image. The poem interrupts this imaginative suspension 
by imagining its interruptions. Celan notes how protestors “ironically” simulate nazi salutes ‘behind 
[hinter] the red and black flag’.122 The socialist ‘red’ is in the grip, here, of a more sinister Nazi ‘black’. 
The ‘moor soldier’ interrupts this elision: the ‘red’ turns into the ‘carrot [Mohrrübe], rhyming into 
‘Moorigen’ and ‘Morgen’. The ‘forever’ ‘un-buried’ moor soldier is un-buried again by this collapse 
of imagery, this time into the ‘morning’ of the future. The poem, in this way, discloses through images 
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the history that images otherwise might conceal. But this leaves the poem open, too, to the problem of 
‘changing lanes’: how can the poem address what is historically singular without ‘un-burying’ it again? 
 The image reappears again, in Schneepart’s fourth cycle. 
From the moorfloor to 
climb into the sans-image, 
a hemo 
in the gun barrel hope, 
the aim, like impatience, of age, 
in it. 
 
Village air, rue Tournefort. 
 
 
Aus dem Moorboden ins 
Ohnebild steigen, 
ein Häm 
im Flintenlauf Hoffnung, 
das Ziel, wie Ungeduld mündig, 
darin. 
 
Dorfluft, rue Tournefort.123 
The poem climbs out of its own ‘image’ bed, in the ‘moor floor’. The poem is this climbing (Steigen) 
from imagery, the imaginary, in which we see the distance from imagery, the ‘no-image’ that grounds 
it, in the climbing. Finally, then, we are back in Paris, in the rue Tournefort, the real without image 
where, paradoxically, images are turned – on the streets and in the street-name, the ‘strong turn’. But in 
the poem, these places are ambiguous subject to displacement. 
The image is ambiguous. Its ambiguity performs the reversal that Kant’s aesthetics encode 
without making manifest: it shows how reflection cannot be determined by the aesthetic, and how its 
indeterminacy disperses its judgements. It proliferates without determinate end, because there is no 
object identical with the image. The ‘image’ of the object is the object to the extent that it is figurable, 
displaceable. Aesthetics is exposed to this crisis when the image no longer merely recouples the object 
with the subject, but proliferates its reflections. The provisionality of the image means that it cannot 
endorse any determinate politics. The image plays out the indeterminate way the aesthetic bears a 
figurative relation to politics: it signals its shape but doesn’t control its outcomes. Celan risks this 
ambiguity by serialising the image. A serial, dialogic image could chart the history an apparently object-
less, doubled image elides. But it also risks the disorientation of ambiguity, and ambivalence. There is 
no eventual security here, even in the ‘Ohnebild’ and its imagined ‘hopes’. The simulate-protest can 
only be simulated, presented in its simulation. The aesthetic contradiction that characterised our account 
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of Adorno’s reflection is reproduced, poetically, in the image. This is articulated in Celan’s major 
speech on poetics, The Meridian. 
And then, what would the images be? | What is perceived and is to be 
perceived once and always again once, and only here and now. Hence 
the poem would be the place [der Ort] where all tropes and metaphors 
want to be carried ad absurdum.124 
Any presence in the poem is always this simulate-presence of ‘images’. As an image, this presence is 
exposed to repetition: its singularity becomes repetitive singularity because there is not, in the image, a 
final determinate under which that singularity could be sublated. In the image, one encounters, over and 
over, the place of a singularity that does not resolve into any commonality. 
 
Disorientation 
The image disturbs, rather than resolves, the relation between ‘I’ and ‘you’. For Werner Hamacher, 
dialogue in Celan’s poetry is coordinated by the mutual suspension of each of its poles: 
the absence of the You suspends the I and the absence of the I suspends 
the You and, accordingly, suspends discourse itself – this unsublatable 
ambiguity realizes on the level of composition what the apostrophe 
says about the You when it links up with the terminology of 
dialogistics125  
Hamacher reads Celan’s lyric dialogue through critical dialogistics. This becomes another kind of 
dialogue. And this dialogue is ‘unsublatable’: neither pole is identical with the other. As Yves Bonnefoy 
recalls Celan saying, ‘you (meaning French or Western poets) are at home, inside your reference points 
and language. But I’m outside’.126 ‘You’ are at home, but I am ‘outside’. Bonnefoy continues: 
‘doubtless, the most harshly felt form of his exile was that as a Jew, i.e. inhabited by a founding word 
from the other, moving outward from I to thou, he had to live in the essential impersonality of the 
Western languages’. Celan, in other words, felt his exile in language; not just in living his daily life in 
Parisian French but writing in his mother’s High German, but immanently in language, in language 
always thought of as an exile of the ‘I’ from the ‘you’.127 The poem’s incapacity to present the ‘you’ it 
addresses means that it bears that ‘you’ as a promise of presence. For Christopher Fynsk, the poem is 
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in this way orientated by death. The poem is ‘reaching through time’, ‘enriched’ by time.  128 ‘You’ give 
the poem time by interrupting it. ‘Language now offers itself in its historicity and as the ground of a 
relation that is radically finite.’129 The poem is open to a futurity which it does not manifest, just as 
‘you’ orientates the poem without being manifest there. This suspension of orientation, that is to say, 
takes the place of orientation. It coordinates and shapes the poem, which is, in this way, constructed 
through a reflection not of ‘I’ to ‘you’, but of ‘I’ to the non-manifestation of ‘you’. 
In The Meridian, Celan describes poetry as, in this way, ‘like art’. 
Perhaps – I am only asking – perhaps poetry [Dichtung], like art 
[Kunst], moves with a self-forgotten I toward the uncanny and the 
strange [jeden Unheimlichen und Fremden], and sets itself free again – 
but where? but in what place? but with what? but as what? || Then art 
would be the route [Weg] poetry has to cover – nothing less, nothing 
more. I know, there are other, shorter routes. But poetry too does hurry 
ahead of us at times. La poésie, elle aussi, brûle nos étapes.130 
The ‘étapes’, the ‘steps’ or ‘stations’, are burnt, stepped out before us, in poetry; but to where? ‘Who 
knows, perhaps poetry follows its path — also the path of art — for the sake of such a breathturn 
[Atemwende]’. To ‘brûler les étapes’ means, idiomatically, to ‘jump the gun’, to ‘cut corners’. Here 
poetry is outside the present, not just a present yet to come. Poetry is not time reconstituting in the future 
a present to which we can turn, not ‘going home’, but going towards the ‘Unheimlichen und Fremden’, 
the un-homely and foreign.  
In this formulation, poetry ‘covers’ art, passes through it, but does not offer a final 
reconciliation. This is its ‘meridian’. In the OED, a meridian is ‘the ‘circle of the celestial sphere which 
passes through the poles’, as well as the line crossed by the sun at noon, both a circle (which returns to 
itself) and a limit. It is also midday, noon; as well as a separate place, a place of separation. It is derived 
(in German and English) from the middle-French meridien, meaning the south. So: a line, a border to 
be crossed, that turns out to be a circle; and a highpoint, noon, that is also a point of division, and a 
polar reversal of orientation – the south, not the north.131 This is a reversal of orientation, not its 
inversion. The poem does not ‘lack’ orientation, chaotically or meaninglessly signifying nothing. The 
poem is instead orientated precisely by the disorientation it registers. Celan figures this disorientation 
into his poetry as exile: ‘(the place you come from, | it talks itself dark, southward)’, ‘(der Ort, wo du 
herkommst, | er redet sich finster, südwärts)’.132 Homeland is talked into darkness, the noon meridian 
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signalling its reversal into a southern, dark ‘place’ (recall the ‘Ort’ of the image). ‘You’ come from this 
reversal. So, in an earlier poem, ‘Speak You Too’: 
Speak you too, 
speak as the last, 
say out your say. 
 
Speak- 
But don’t split off No from Yes. 
Give your say this meaning too: 
Give it the shadow. 
 
Give it shadow enough, 
Give it as much 
As you know is spread round you from 
Midnight to midday and midnight.133 
‘You’ speak from this reversed meridian, the circle from darkness to darkness.  This is a ‘reversed’ 
meridian, a reversed orientation, which is not just an inversion of orientation (looking the other way), 
but a reversal of the idea of orientation: we speak towards the other who is not there, the anonymous 
friend. We speak indeterminately. This circular, reversed, shadow speech does not, however, affirm 
‘your’ presence. It is instead neutral, the ‘No’ not split off (schiede nicht) from the ‘yes’, neither one 
nor the other. Meaning, that would positively determine language, is neutralised. This remains the 
language of the image: repetitive, objectless, indeterminate. For Roger Laporte, with the meridian Celan 
is thinking, alongside Blanchot, of ‘non-presence’: ‘or better, as Blanchot says, the experience of non-
experience, is capable of speaking the poetic “experience” without sublimating it into a MEANING, of 
speaking it, then, in its enigma which gives us to infinite thinking.’134 The Meridian speech itself marks 
this ‘meridian’ point of transgression: ‘for in this work, by means of this work, the border – the distance 
– separating prose and poetry was destroyed for good’,135 and writing passes over ‘into a frightening 
territory’.136 We do not pass from poetry, as we saw Hegel claimed, nor return to poetry, but trace a 
poetics of the meridian, the border, the non-place, the ‘no-man’s land’ of reflection, ‘explosive 
communication’. We do not pass beyond art; art shows how we do not pass beyond it. Celan’s poetry 
marks a point of generic transgression. Critical witness to this poetry, as it resists meaning, forms a way 
to think through the ‘non-presence’ that this transgression announces. The aesthetic is not to be salvaged 
from this repetitive, indeterminate work of the image. But the image does offer an interruption of 
reflection as the work of identity, by which interruption reflection remains reflective. The exilic image 
might transgress borders, might work out its own ‘space’ as a no-man’s land, but this disorientation 
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becomes the point of orientation for poetry that would remain open to its future interruption of meaning, 
and to the image’s future ‘un-burying’ by the poem. This openness to futurity coordinates a response to 
the image of the political, a ‘non-presence’. 
 
‘From | the east’ – Hölderlin and Celan 
Turning to the east becomes an indeterminate turn: the poem is open to the ‘other’ as negative, and this 
becomes a figure in Celan, just as the figures of ’68 are unmoored. The east, the ‘orient’ of orientation, 
is present as a negative and reflective coordinate for the poetry’s figurative work, ‘unmoored’ from a 
stable polarity. It also becomes a figure of reading: reading, in this case, the exilic into Hölderlin, who 
is ‘unmoored’. This disorientation – this exilic turn to the east, the orient, this non-present orient – can 
be thought through Celan’s re-configurative reading of Hölderlin. Celan’s own turn to the east plays 
out the contradictory temporality, as well as spatiality, of disorientation. The east marks, for him, the 
lost homeland of Czernowitz in the now defunct Bukowina. But as a Jew, the east is also Jerusalem, the 
city always anterior to its messianic promise. The ‘east’ is ambiguously both a lost past and a non-
manifest future.  
We can read this ambiguity through Atemwende’s ‘Ashglory’ by reading it, in turn, through 
Hölderlin. What is present, in ‘Ashglory’, what is ‘cast-in-front-of-you [Hin- | gewürfelte]’, like a die, 
comes ‘from | the East’.137 The east, specifically, is the Romanian coast of the black sea, from which 
Hölderlin’s Danube returns to Germany in ‘Der Ister’. 
Yet almost this river seems 
To travel backwards and 
I think it must come from 
The East. 138 
The river ‘appears’ (scheinet) to travel ‘backwards’ (Rükwärts zu gehen). The river might go east, but 
its appearance comes back, to Germany, and to German. The east is a point of reversal, of appearance. 
In ‘Die Wanderung’, Hölderlin declares, ‘But I am bound for the Caucasus!’: for this east. 
That time out of mind our parents, 
The German people, had quietly 
Departed from the waves of the Danube 
One summer day, and when those 
Were looking for shade, had met 
With children of the Sun 
Not far from the Black Sea’s beaches; 
And not for nothing that sea 
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Was called the hospitable139 
The east is not just a site of reversal, but of exchange, where Germans ‘Vertauschten das Word’, 
exchanged words. This is its hospitality (gastfreundliche). The river’s backwards movement is an 
exchange. It is a figurative movement of words, appearance. It is in the hospitable ‘east’ that German 
is conceived, not against another language but in translation with it. The east, then, is Germany’s 
nomadic home. The ‘black’ sea is the sea of ‘shade’ (Schatten), of rest but also of differentiation (shade 
being marked by the sun), a meridian point in which hospitable difference exchange can take place. 
Hölderlin translates the Greek πόντος εύξεινοσ (póntos euxeinos) as ‘gastfreundliche’. This translation 
‘names’ the Greek meaning in German. In ‘Ashglory’, Celan mirrors this naming, but also cuts it in 
half: naming the sea merely ‘Pontisches’, ‘pontic’, and cutting off the ‘hospitable’. This eastern sea was 
hospitable, once.140 This hospitality was a hospitality to difference, which was capable of framing that 
difference as a productive exchange.141 
This hospitality is the ‘reversal’ of transaction that corresponds with the ‘reversals’ of reflection 
in the aesthetically mandated common sense, where reflection does not substantiate the community it 
outlines. The poetry stages the figurative nature of such transaction. The first poem from the first cycle 
(‘Aschenglorie’ is from the third) opens thus: ‘Du darfst mich getrost | mist Schnee bewirten’, which 
Joris renders as, ‘You may comfortably | serve me snow’.142 ‘You’, here, are being welcomed, but 
welcomed as a ‘host’, welcomed to ‘host’ ‘me’. ‘Bewirten’ means to host, as well as to serve, as a 
landlord hosts guests; or, as Felstiner renders it, ‘You may safely | regale me with snow’.143 This is to 
say, ‘you’ are not a guest. The poem demands hospitality from you, the strange hospitality of an image, 
‘snow’. The poem does not host you; it demands that ‘you’ host it. So while Hölderlin’s river is both 
the site of exchange and the inscription of meaning through exchange – ‘But the rock needs incisions | 
And the earth needs furrows, | Would be desolate else, unabiding’144 – writing for Celan needs to be 
                                                      
139 Ibid., 184|185 
140 Tomis, now Constantja in Romania, where Celan holidayed, was the Black Sea site of Ovid’s exile, from 
which he wrote his elegiac poem Tristia and his Letters from the Black Sea (Epistulae ex Ponto); here again 
the locus of poetic exile. In Tristia, III. II: ‘Pontus, seared by perpetual frost, holds me’ (l.8). 
141 This, at least, is his argument in the short essay ‘Being Judgement Possibility’, in Friedrich Hölderlin: 
Essays and Letters, trans. and ed. by Jeremy Adler and Charlie Louth (London: Penguin, 2009), where 
‘judgement’ (‘Ur-teil’) describes an ‘original division’, ‘that separation, by which object and subject first 
become possible’ (231). This is the hope, at least, of ‘intellectual intuition’ which underwrites much post-
Kantian aesthetic thinking: that aesthetic judgement might be ‘cognitive’ precisely by its separation from 
cognition because of its immediate intellectual intuition of phenomena. The startling thesis proposed here 
by Hölderlin, however, is that this kind of unity can be intuited only because of separation, division, or, in 
‘Der Ister’, ‘incision’, ‘furrowing’, an initial separation which makes any subjectivity possible: ‘the I is only 
possible by virtue of this separation [Theilung] of the I from the I’ (231). There is no hoped for reconciliation 
of the subject with the object, then, because it is only by separation that there is any subjectivity at all. One 
proceeds, then, from and by this separation, this division. 
142 Ibid., 2|3 
143 Celan, Selected Poems and Prose, 222-3 
144 Ibid., 256|257 
 
105 
hosted itself. For Jeremy Tambling, Hölderlin’s inscriptive poetry conceals in that inscription a 
violence, ‘Hölderlin’s violent inversion of inscription’, in which ‘[a]rt forces a way, creating a ‘Bahn’, 
a track. […] consciousness, producing art, like Achilles playing the lyre, comes from a violent 
inscription creating memory, which precedes it’.145 Hölderlin’s poetry produces the conditions for its 
own inscription retroactively. The capacity to ‘host’ is internalised by poetic reflection that takes 
reflection for its own ground. But this identification of capacity and ground is disturbed, by Celan, in 
precisely the poetic image that should accommodate it. The ‘east’, in ‘Ashglory’, is also where ‘while | 
the glossy [blanke] | Tartarmoon climbed up to us, | I dug myself into you and into you’. Again, ‘you’ 
are created as a host by the demands of the ‘I’. And again, the ‘east’ is something that comes to you – 
the moon rising above us – but comes violently, the Tartars intruding from the east, like Georg Trakl’s 
wolves in ‘Im Osten’ who ‘break through the doors’.146 The demands for hosting are violent, in that 
they ask for spacing, a place, in you where I can be. The poem navigates these demands by registering 
the violence in what might be called love, and exposing it, like Blanchot, to the less certain relation 
through fear. The moon rises to ‘us’ – you and I together.  And the ‘fearful’, ‘terrible’ (furchtbar, not 
Hölderlin’s Furchen, furrows) east is cast in front of you, plural (euch). The poem is orientated towards 




For Celan, poetry ‘climbs out’ from such retroactive grounding by the work of exchange of figuration 
itself. Reading Hölderlin, writing Hölderlin, Hölderlin becomes an exemplary figure in that being re-
written into Celan’s poetry. His figures become the terms of his exile. His poetics of ‘originary-
separation’ are radicalised into a separation of origin. Poetry works to disorientate, working with the 
‘appearance’ of the river coming ‘from the east’ and not with the ‘furrowing’, grounding work of the 
river. This distinction is worked out through witnessing. ‘Ashglory’ ends by disturbing the terms of 
witness through its reflective distribution. 
No one 




zeugt für den 
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and Benjamin (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2014), 8 
146 Trakl, Georg, Georg Trakl: The Last Gold of Expired Stars, trans. by Jim Doss and Werner Schmitt 
(Skyesville: Loch Raven Press, 2010), 179 




Celan’s ‘witness’ to Hölderlin’s east is framed lyrically by the suspension of the possibility of 
witnessing. If for Hölderlin subjectivity proceeds according to an original separation, according to 
exchange and figuration, then its guarantee is always outside itself. And this means that the process or 
work of ‘witnessing’ is always, impossibly, outside witnessability, unattestable, and, as we saw with 
Blanchot, unavowable. In order to testify, I must place myself outside that to which I testify. If I testify 
for myself, I must place myself outside myself. The structure of witness is internally divided because 
in order to be a ‘witness’ I have to separate myself from what I ‘witness’. Derrida proposes in ‘Poetics 
and Politics of Witnessing’148 that this is the ‘triangulation’ of witness, where the witness attests to 
having been present, and bears that presence in memory to another who witnesses that attestation: 
‘presence, as presently re-presented in memory’.149 But we can also refer this to Kant. If, for Kant, 
aesthetic judgement testifies to the validity of non-conceptual experience (including the non-conceptual, 
reflective organisation of community), then here poetry testifies for the way such testimony undoes 
itself through the ‘impossibility’ of reflection. Rather than securing the self-presence of the subject 
(through the play of cognitive faculties), this reflection testifies to the ways the subject is displaced 
from itself. Reflection is not secured to the subject, it is – as Kant himself saw – indeterminate. Writing 
cannot make up for a lack in experience itself, it can only testify (avow to) to the disconnections it 
reflectively exposes there. 
Poetic figuration, the image, becomes a kind of deferred witness, a serial witness. The only 
thing that is irrevocable about witness is this impossibility. The first cycle from Atemwende, 
‘Atemkristall’, ends with three variations of witness. In poem 19, ‘der herz- | förmige Krater | nackt für 
die Anfänge zeugt, | die Königs- | geburten’, ‘the heart- | shaped crater | testifies naked for the 
beginnings, | the kings- | births’.150 In poem 20, in parentheses, ‘Wo flammt ein Wort, das für uns beide 
zeugte?’ | Du – ganz, ganz wirklich. Ich – ganz Wahn’, ‘Where flames a word, would testify for us 
both? | You – all, all real. I – all delusion’.151 And in poem 21, which closes the cycle,  
Deep 
in the timecrevasse, 
in the 
honeycomb-ice 
waits, a breathcrystal, 
                                                      
148 See also his essay on witnessing in Blanchot, ‘Demeure’, in Blanchot, Maurice, and Derrida, Jacques, 
The Instant of My Death/Demeure, trans. by Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2000). See also Pierre Joris, ‘Paul Celan’s Counterword: Who Witnesses for the Witness?’ in Justifying the 
Margins, (Cambridge: Salt, 2009), pp. 79-86 
149 Derrida, Jacques, ‘Poetics and Politics of Witnessing’ [2000/2004], trans. by Outi Pasanen, in 
Sovereignties in Question: The Poetics of Paul Celan, ed. by Thomas Dutoit and Outi Pasanen (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2005), pp. 65-96, 77 
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in der Zeitenschrunde, 
beim 
Wabeneis 
wartet, ein Atemkristall, 
dein unumstößliches 
Zeugnis. 152 
We have a modulation here from ‘zeugt’, to ‘zeugte’, to ‘Zeugnis’.153 In 19, there is a ‘crater’, heart 
shaped but not a heart, which testifies that something had begun. This is messianic, again: a king’s birth. 
In 20, there is a similar absent testimony: the poem asks for a word which could testify for a relation. 
Rather than an event, then, here there is a missing relation, in the plural. In 21, the testimony is to come, 
or itself to be arrived at; a noun, not a verb. By this modulation, the process of witnessing is separated 
from the witness. We await witness, not a witness. We await testimony for a relation which could tell 
us in the retroactive way a crater tells of something that happened, that is done with. We await, then, in 
the future, the arrival of something that could attest to the possibility to attest to something that 
happened, in the past. We await a past, the confirmation of its absence. The stakes of Kantian inter-
subjectivity are thus here bound to the stakes of temporality in witness. The word that would ‘witness’ 
our relation would have to testify to ‘my’ incapacity to witness (my ‘Wahn’), but my capacity to witness 
is precisely what is missing, what must be attested to. If poetry is to attest to some future, then, it must 
first of all attest to its own capacity to attest. Its ‘orientation’, its path, is opened up onto this 
impossibility. So, at the close of ‘Ashglory’, the ‘witness’ (Zeugen) is separated both from ‘witnessing’ 
(Zeugnis) and from his or her own name: he or she is named, as witness, ‘Niemand’, no one. We are 
opened here to the ‘no-man’s land’, the neutral terrain of experience where reflection is played out. 
Witness cannot testify to its own conditions. Poems are orientated by a displaced east. So in the 
poem ‘Solve’ from the fourth cycle of Atemwende, witness, numbering or naming names and people, is 
bound to this dis-orientation, ‘Entoster’, ‘De-easterned’.154 The ‘tomb- | tree’ which is ‘de-easterned’ in 
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153 There is a further modulation at work in ‘unumstößliches’, which picks up on ‘Stoß’ in poem 14, meaning 
‘shock’. Thus, ‘Dein vom Wachen stößiger Traum’, ‘Your dream, butting from the watch’ (12-3), turns into 
a ‘horn’ which ‘Der letzte Stoß, den er führt’, ‘The last butt it delivers’. So, in 21, your ‘witness’ does not 
fail to impact, like a ram’s horn, to deliver, to arrive. Witnessing’s serial quality, its self-deferral and 
interruption of presence, is structured by Celan’s serial poetics here: witnessing occurs through poetic 
borders, singularly but in the poems’ seriality. We will return to the significance of this ram in chapter three. 
154 BIT 76|77. Hamburger has it ‘De-Eastered’, in Poems of Paul Celan, Michael Hamburger trans., 4th 
edition, trans. by Michael Hamburger (New York: Persea Books, 2002), 240|1. Felstiner, as Joris, ‘De-
easterned’ (268|9). The word oscillates between ‘east’ as a compass point and ‘Easter’ as a temporal, 
messianic – as well as geographic and historical – orientation. 
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the poem, is set ‘stromaufwärts, strom | abwärts’, ‘upsteam, down- | stream’. Again, we can recall 
Hölderlin’s ‘Der Ister’ here, with Celan invoking, behind these streams, the ‘no one’ of witness: ‘Yet 
what that one does, the river, | Nobody knows [Weis neimand].155 In ‘Solve’, this tree ‘splits’, in this 
movement,  
by the tiny flaring, by the 
free 
punctuation mark of the 
script salvaged and dis- 






vom winzig-lodernden, vom 
freien 
Satzzeichen der 







The names are not countable in their numerousness, are only said as a ‘punctuation mark’156 that 
connects as it separates. The ‘scripts’ are ‘salvaged’ (Geborgenen), but salvage is itself split in the 
German to uncover ‘borgenen’ inside it, which means to lend, to loan. What would be salvaged, then, 
is this ‘loan’, and here I want explicitly to recall the system of exchange Hölderlin establishes in 
translation as/of origin and its reconfiguration by Celan in ‘Aschenglorie’. So the ‘names’ which are 
‘de-easterned’ are both ‘to-be-named’ and ‘unpronounceable’, unsayable. Naming is both a loan (a 
finite gift) and irreversible. The impossible structure of witness here witnesses its own impossibility, 
the ‘Nieman’ behind the stream of witness. In doing so, it testifies to a community of people ‘to be 
named’ that does not, with false hope, hope also to ‘name’ or say those names. So the names are 
‘fugitive’ (geflohenen) from one another, not witness in words to ‘us’. 
 
The Poles: ‘we’ and ‘us’ 
                                                      
155 Hölderlin, Selected Poems and Fragments, 256|257 
156 We might think of the trait (trace or mark) that haunts Blanchot’s connection-disconnection in le pas au-
delà: the hyphen that marks the (not) beyond. 
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This resolves, in Celan’s poetic, in the question, again, of ‘saying we’. the conditions of saying we are 
the conditions for attesting to a community. But as Kant saw, they are reflective conditions that cannot 
be determined. So ‘common sense’ is always threatened by enthusiasm, mere raving, because its ground 
is necessarily indeterminate. This indeterminacy infects writing’s capacity to ‘say we’, to write ‘in 
common’, which is, as Celan shows, henceforth figurative. It also infects the capacity for which such a 
writing should testify: a capacity to be, politically, in common through sociability. This undoing of 
testimony is therefore an exposure to the reflective indeterminacy that is the condition of such 
sociability. To mark such a community would be to say ‘us’. To attest to any ‘us’ would be to stand 
outside that ‘us’. And that ‘us’, outside, would in turn be lost to witness. So the question of naming the 
community, of naming the relations between people, modulates, according to the detailed modulations 
of ‘witness’, into a question of saying ‘we’. 
Orientation, as witness, as witness both as a relation and to a relation which therefore cannot 
name who it witnesses or who witnesses, is dis-located from the east of ‘us’ to become dis-orientation. 
This is not, however, simply a chaotic dislocation of poetic orientation. Rather, this ‘without direction’ 
of a negated East – a lost, already separated direction – becomes a kind of orientation, a meridian: the 
pull of the ‘other’ he describes in the Meridian speech as a ‘figure’: ‘[t]he poem wants to head toward 
some other, it needs this other, it needs an opposite. It seeks it out, it bespeaks itself to it. || Each thing, 
each human is, for the poem heading toward this other, a figure [Gestalt] of this.’157 This is all to say 
that ‘orientation’ becomes polar. This ‘polarity’ is in play in the poetry’s working over of the problem 
of saying ‘we’. All the threads of the discussion thus far become entangled in the later poem ‘Die Pole’, 
written in Paris in 1969, but composed as part of the Jerusalem cycle, responding to a trip to 
Jerusalem.158 Already the poem is exilic, writing towards Jerusalem from Paris; but also writing back 
into Paris. Jerusalem is historically divided: between the messianic Christianity as the site of the ‘King’s 
birth’, and the nomadic Jewish terminus of Exodus, the to-be-reached place. The specifics of history 
are therefore significant in locating the poem’s present, dating it, but also slip between these two 
contradictory temporal dimensions, and these two cities.159 The circumstantial fact of Celan’s writing 
in German in Paris is historically far from circumstantial, and poetically it is significant. So Celan’s 
work is fastidiously dated because it is re-figuring the landscape of history itself, which is to say, the 
                                                      
157 Celan, Meridian, 9/9 
158 In a letter to Ilana Shmueli, Celan says ‘That Jerusalem would be a turning point [Wende], a caesura in 
my life’, quoted in Lyon, Heidegger and Celan, 174 
159 On the significance of ‘dating’ a poem see Celan, Meridian, 8/8, where he asks whether ‘each poem has 
its own “20th January” inscribed’, the date that Büchner’s Lenz departed for the mountains. See also 
Derrida’s essay on ‘dating’ as ‘numbering’ in Celan’s poetics, ‘Shibboleth: For Paul Celan’ [1986], trans. 
by Joshua Weider (revised by Thomas Dutoit), in Sovereignties in Question: The Poetics of Paul Celan, ed. 
by Thomas Dutoit and Outi Pasanen (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), pp. 2-64 in which what 
‘takes place only once’ (1), what is singular, of a date, is set into repetition by poetry, such that the poem is 
‘this “not” passage [ce pas de “ne pas”]’ (31), the passage of ‘pas’ to what cannot be attested to because it 
only happened ‘one time’. 
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conceptual space by which we are inducted into historical time: the ‘east’. History is a way to 
conceptualise time, but it works figuratively, which is to say indeterminately and reflectively. Celan’s 
poetry thinks through the conceptual and theoretical transactions and coordinates that made up the 
philosophical response to political crisis in 1960s. This amounts to saying that theoretical and 
philosophical work in this period, by Blanchot and Adorno, works across these coordinates. The stakes 
of this coordination are laid out by these thinkers as a kind of reversed Kantian aesthetic field. The 
aesthetics of thinking an objectivity that is incompatible with subjective experience, and therefore of 
thinking through the incompletion of aesthetic judgement, is here framed as a poetic question; 
specifically, it is framed as ‘polarity’ that doubles, as an image, into other ‘polar’ images. 
The poles 
are in us, 
insurmountable 
while awake, 
we sleep across, to the Gate 
of Mercy, 
 
I lose you to you, that 
is my snowcomfort, 
 
say that Jerusalem is, 
say it, as if I was this 
your Whiteness 
as if you were 
mine, 
 
as if without us we could be we, 
 
I leaf you open, forever, 
 





sind in uns, 
unübersteigbar 
im Wachen, 
wir schlafen hinüber, vors Tor 
des Erbarmens, 
 
ich veliere dich an dich, das 
ist mein Schneetrost, 
 
sag, daß Jerusalem i s t, 
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sags, als wäre ich dieses 
dein Weiß, 
als wärst du 
meins, 
 
als könnten wir ohne uns wir sein, 
 
ich blättre dich auf, für immer, 
 
du betest, du bettest 
uns frei.160 
The figurative stakes I have been tracing are here laid out: this orientation to the East, specifically to 
Jerusalem and to the Gate of Mercy in the temple; the conditions for speaking ‘together’, for saying the 
relation between ‘I’ and an addressed, hosting ‘you’; finally, the coordinates of figuration by which this 
relation is put into the poem – polarity itself. The poem advances in a series of polar stakes. Firstly, ‘us’ 
is orientated towards the messianic ‘Gate | of Mercy’ which it cannot cross, which interruption occurs 
in the line break dividing it. Then, that ‘us’ is unfolded into a series of possible constellated relations: 
where ‘you’ are lost to ‘you’, as if ‘Jerusalem is’, ‘as if I was this | your Whiteness | as if you were | 
mine’. Each of these stations unfolds into the loss of bond in ‘us’: that ‘you’ remain separate, that 
Jerusalem could be but is not necessarily ‘named’ as present, that ‘I’ could be ‘Whiteness’, an abstract 
space that we shared but that was not identical with either of us. This culminates in the decisive 
distinction (although still speculative, in the subjunctive) between naming ‘we’ and naming ‘us’: ‘als 
könnten wir ohne uns wir sein’. This line marks its own temporality: ‘as if could we without us we be’, 
‘as if we could without us be we’.161 The ‘we’ is doubly framed. Firstly, it is set into the subjunctive, 
into a possible future: ‘als könnten wir’. Then, it is negated, or has ‘us’ negated from it: ‘ohne uns’ 
(recall the Ohnebild). Only then is it positively posed: ‘wir sein’. The second ‘wir’ contains the history 
of both subjunctive and negation within it, as well as being a repetition of that first, framed ‘wir’ in the 
clause’s subject position. What is explicitly at stake here is a history of saying ‘we’. Celan is tracing 
the conditions by which this kind of communal naming is possible. The rest of the poem stages these 
conditions. We can read the poem deploying a ‘polar’ relation or constellation of concepts, which is 
itself conditioned on reading Celan’s de-easterning of orientation in Atemwende. Saying ‘we’ is thus 
configured by this reflective, polar history that interrupts it with an ‘us’.  
This polarity is staged in the first stanza. We (us) only go as far as the ‘Gate | of Mercy’, itself 
polar, an empty, framed space. ‘Our’ passage is ‘unübersteigbar’ (again, recall the ‘moor floor’ ‘ins | 
Ohnebild steigen’). What is ‘unübersteigbar’ is, as Joris suggests, ‘insurmountable’. But we can dissect 
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161 Hamburger has it: ‘as though without us we could be we’ (333); Felstiner, like Joris, has: ‘as if without 
us we could be we’ (363).  
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Celan’s word further. We can read steigen out of it. ‘Steigen’ means to climb, but also to increase; what 
is ‘steigbar’ is therefore both climbable, but also increasable; and what is ‘übersteigbar’ is both 
surmountable and excessive, increasing beyond itself. There is an excess of numerousness here under 
negation. This excess ‘figures’ the excess of reflection I have been naming in this chapter. We cannot 
increase beyond these poles, just as we cannot climb over them, or the gate. There is a limit here, 
invoked through a negated increase. Celan is imposing a frame of finitude to ‘us’. ‘We’ increase, we 
are numerous, ‘us’, but that numerousness is contained, limited. ‘Us’ marks the limit of what we can 
name. The concern for naming, which we identified with the modulations of witnessing, becomes a 
concern for naming the possible. Naming a community in ‘us’ imposes two kinds of polarity: polarity 
as what contains opposition within itself, and polarity as a terrestrial or spatial polarity, marking the 
extreme limits by which space is delimited and oriented. This figurative delimitation of ‘us’ is a spatial 
delimitation (‘in us’, ‘across, to’), but it is also temporal: the ‘Gate of Mercy’, the Sha'ar HaRachamim, 
is the gate through which the messiah will enter Jerusalem. The gate remains a threshold. As a threshold, 
it marks the border of the city, the political border of the community.162 The Gate of Mercy thus stands 
for an entrance to the city, to the community, and an end to nomadism (the end, literally, of the Jewish 
Exodus, and therefore of history). Here this is marked by the possibility of naming ‘Jerusalem’: ‘say, 
that Jerusalem is’. If Jerusalem ‘is’, then we ‘are’, are a community, in a place, a city. But if ‘we’ are, 
then it is without us: ‘As if without us we could be we’. The self-identity of ‘we’, the matching of the 
first ‘we’ with the second ‘we’, would be the identification of this city. The ‘us’ is still nomadic, in 
nomadic space, outside. The definition of ‘we’ is opposed to the delimitation of ‘us’. We can pose a 
‘we’ as a future community, as an active first person plural, but that means losing ‘us’, losing ‘you to 
you’, losing the opposition that characterises the polar space of ‘us’ which the poem delimits. So where 
does poetry intervene in this polar nomadism? For Celan poetic language:  
does not transfigure or render, it names, it posits, it tries to measure the 
area of the given and the possible. True, this is never the working of 
language itself, language as such, but always of an ‘I’ who speaks for 
the particular angle of reflection which is his existence and who is 
concerned with the outlines and orientation. Reality is not simply there, 
it must be searched and won.163 
 As Blanchot puts it, poetry, like community, means ‘naming the possible, responding to the 
impossible’, ‘each time it is poetry’. Here, Celan is disclosing how the formation of political 
‘community’ is framed through figuration, through a concealed work of imagination, just as the 
protestors of ’68 elided the contradictory history of images they invoke. 
                                                      
162 Think of the modulation between the Aristotelian ‘zoon politikon’ and Heraclitean language ‘outside’ the 
city: between language as an articulation of identity and of exile. 
163 Celan, Collected Prose, 16 
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These poles are ‘in us’. They measure between an interior ‘common’ and an exterior 
‘community’, between a subjective capacity to share experience and an objective experience of sharing 
in the political, reproducing the Kantian move from the subjective reflection of aesthetic judgement to 
its external validation in common sense. And this is measured figuratively in the image of the ‘poles’: 
at once ‘in us’ and what we ‘approach’. Just so, the pole is a point of turning (either astral or terrestrial, 
on an axle). And as turning, it measures its own poetic capacity. And so ‘I lose you to you’: I turn to 
you turning to you. ‘We’ turns figuratively to ‘us’. The pole is no longer a single north, a point of astral 
orientation, but a numerous ‘us’, a plural ‘you’. The specifically figurative model of polarity elaborated 
with Celan’s poem, here, is polarity as a relation which is realised ‘in us’. Polarity is realised as a social, 
intersubjective relation, objectified in ‘us’. But this realisation attests to an impossibility of objective 
social relations. If we think of this within the Parisian context delineated above, we can re-think equality 
through this figural/polar relation. Equality, as what is shared between us, is in Celan’s poem polar; and 
in addition, it is ‘insurmountable’. ‘I lose you to you’, and that is the minimum of equality as singularity. 
The polarity which characterises ‘us’, which is ‘in us’, cannot be overcome because it is the minimal 
distance required to distinguish ‘us’ as a collection of differentiated individuals. In the poem, the 
concept of polarity as a distinct relation of suspended opposition contagiously bleeds in to its figural 
partner, the relation between us. These two conceptually discreet relations are related, become poles 
themselves, so that, in the local economy of the poem, what is ‘insurmountable’ is the polar relation 




The reflection that distinguishes the aesthetic, reflecting judgement refers, for Kant, at once to the 
transcendental interior of subjective judgement, and to the exterior of intersubjective validation in 
common sense. But measuring between these two reflective ends means, we now see with Celan, that 
we are measuring their nonidentity. For Adorno, aesthetic judgement is displaced through the way it 
employs reflection without registering the objective material which that reflection substantiates. Such 
judgement is therefore, for Adorno, not restricted to the subject, but something that is negatively, 
reflectively played out in art works. And for Blanchot, this ‘measurement’ of nonidentity mirrors a 
political measurement. The fragmentation of writing mirrors, without identifying, a fragmentation of 
community. Reflection, again, is indeterminately operative in the community it should substantiate. So 
while for Kant aesthetic experience offers opportunities for thinking about non-conceptual experience 
as connective, the disconnection from determinate judgement on which this is grounded returns to 
aesthetic experience. There cannot, for Celan, be any ‘we’ without ‘us’; and yet poetry proceeds ‘as if’ 
this could happen, as if there could be subjective experience without any object, as if I did not ‘lose you 
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to you’. Such art is conditioned by its present impossibility. Kant’s connecting aesthetics are here 
exposed to the objectivity – the indeterminate, the futural objectivity – that they think but also conceal. 
The aesthetic is turned towards thinking disconnection, and so is poetic form. As Blanchot puts it, this 
is neutrality. ‘The Neuter, the gentle prohibition against dying, there where, from threshold to threshold, 
eye without gaze, silence carries us into the proximity of the distant. Word still to be spoken beyond 
the living and the dead, testifying to the absence of testimony.’164 Such testimony testifies to poetry’s 
neutral continuity through its suspended poles, the suspended ‘I’ and ‘you’, their turning meridian. 
On both poles 
of the cleftrose, legible: 
your outlawed word. 
Northtrue. Southbright.165 
The gulf, the cleft (Kluftrose), of aesthetic experience becomes legible (lesbar) in this meridian, outside 
legal jurisdiction. There are ‘still songs to be sung beyond | mankind’, ‘es sind | noch Lieder zu singen 
jenseits | der Menschen’.166 But this is also, I will now argue, a neutral, not-beyond mankind, a present 
neutrality which aesthetic experience has to think, a no-man’s land, experience (ex-perience, ex+perius, 
‘from out of peril, risk’) of exile.
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Towards a non-transcendent aesthetic: dialogue, presence, dialectic 
 
Your reversals, incessantly 




In chapter two, I explored the way that the reflective verification of aesthetic judgement in ‘common 
sense’ could be related to thinking about political ‘community’. I suggested that this engagement with 
political ‘community’ frames Blanchot’s explorations of ‘fragmentary writing’. The political context of 
Blanchot’s fragmentary writing forms a reflective relationship with that writing. This relation could 
itself be thought of as ‘fragmentary’. And this exposes a ‘fragmentation’ at work in Kant’s reflective 
aesthetics. I also suggested that Adorno’s intervention into Kantian aesthetics is motivated by a turn to 
the ‘sense’ in ‘common sense’: by the social and historical features of aesthetic experience. Kant’s 
version of reflective aesthetics is thus, in Adorno’s and Blanchot’s reading, one of negative 
presentation. It presents the negativity of reflection, and not its final determination.  
I will now turn to this idea of presentation, and to the idea of presence and the present. This 
develops from a reading of Celan’s poetry. Celan characterises poetry as constituted by a dialogic 
response to a ‘you’ which the poem cannot present. My argument is that this also characterises critical 
reading of poetry as ‘dialogic’. And it therefore carries over into the reflection that characterises 
aesthetic experience. What kind of ‘presence’ could reflection afford, given its indeterminacy? And in 
what kind of ‘present’ would such a reflecting judgement occur? The answer turns upon dialectical 
questions. What kind of dialectics could be orientated by the negative without negating it? What 
‘presence’ could be afforded, by what dialectical ‘present’, for the negative? Finally, this leads us to the 
idea of a ‘non-transcendent aesthetic’: a version of reflective experience that is organised by its own 
indeterminacy, and therefore resists a dialectical movement of negation into a transcendent ‘beyond’. 
In the way it exposes dialectics to a reflective indeterminacy registered in aesthetic experience, this is 
also a ‘reversal’ of dialectics, which ‘reverses’ the procedures of negation that characterise dialectics 
by insisting on the negativity of reflection in place of the ‘negations’ of determination.  
Having looked at the fragmentary writing of Infinite Conversation and the political writing up 
to The Unavowable Community, I now focus on the developed fragmentary texts themselves: 
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Awaiting/Forgetting, The Step Not Beyond and The Writing of the Disaster, as interventions into 
dialectics, and not just aesthetics (though coordinated by reflection mandated to aesthetic experience); 
and having looked at Aesthetic Theory and Adorno’s version of Kant, I now look at how Aesthetic 
Theory is linked to the philosophical dialectics of Negative Dialectics. In both readings, I am looking 
at how aesthetic questions intervene in dialectics, by exposing dialectics to the kinds of ‘negative 
presentation’ by reflection found in Kantian aesthetic experience. The task here is to read a kind of 
writing, and a kind of aesthetic, which is not merely ‘about’ disorientation, but which is thoroughly 
responsive to, and structured by, disorientation. That means we do not reach a conceptual terminus. 
Rather, these texts are read according to the disorientation which coordinates them. My contention is 
that this contradiction is the motor for thinking aesthetics in Adorno, and writing in Blanchot, but that 
it also lets us think formally how these two projects might make each other legible. 
This chapter has three sections. In the first, I look at Celan’s poetic dialogues as configuring 
dialectical suspension. In section two, I follow this suspension through Blanchot’s thinking about the 
present of writing. Finally, I look at how Adorno traces this movement from dialectics to aesthetics. In 
this way, I want to explore how ‘futurity’ is coordinated by an experience of the dispersal of presence, 
and to demonstrate the connection – by disconnection – with the political and aesthetic suspensions 
explored in chapter two, and the reading of Kantian aesthetics as proposing a ‘negative presentation’ of 
reflection in chapter one. 
 
 
1 – Dialogue to dialectics  
 
Lingering ‘with you’ 
Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht characterises aesthetics an ‘oscillation’ between ‘presence effects’ and 
‘meaning effects’.1 In poetry, these two effects are simultaneous: meaning inheres in its presentation.2 
For Gumbrecht, interpretation historically seeks to transcend the artwork’s ‘presence’ in order to reach 
its ‘meaning’. But I want to suggest that such ‘oscillation’ is subject to dialectical, and not just 
‘metaphysical’, pressures.3 ‘Presence’, as well as interpretative ‘meaning’, is ‘produced’ for 
Gumbrecht. But presence is subject to interpretation as much as meaning is. The ‘visibility’ of an object 
as an object of interpretation depends upon its presence. So the conditions of presentation – aesthetics 
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– also mark the conditions of interpretation. The question here is of accounting for the way poetry 
produces such presence as an aesthetic; dialogically, reflectively, establishing the conditions of its 
reading. 
What form of dialogue is possible when the terms of dialogue suspend ‘you’, when, as in ‘Die 
Pole’, ‘I lose you to you’? We are asked to think of a dialogue that loses you. Such dialogue is neutral, 
because there is no presence of ‘you’ to drive it. For Blanchot, neutrality, when heard in the singular, 
sounds strange. ‘The neutral, the neutral, how strangely this sounds [cela sonne étrangement] to me.’4 
Responding to neutrality means responding to the way neutrality displaces the ‘singularity’ of ‘me’. As 
Hugo Monteiro argues, this ‘estrangement’ is only legible if it is ‘sounded’, and heard. Criticism is 
dialogic in that it listens. But listening, criticism can no longer ‘talk’ to its object. It is neutralised, 
suspended. Monteiro reads this Blanchotian interruption through Celan’s ‘counter-word’: 
‘intromission’, meaning both an introduction and a bodily intrusion. Blanchot, like Celan, is ‘submitting 
the tradition of seeing [regard] to its untimely tear’. Poetry ‘collides’ with philosophy, and this 
‘constitutes a space of “intromission” in opposition to the course of discourse’.5 But this interruption is 
part of discourse, dialogue, dialectic. ‘As neutral, therefore, appears (or sounds) the limit of reception 
itself.’6 Dialectic, like dialogue, is constituted by such interruption. In The Writing of the Disaster, 
‘Something rings false in the dialectic [Quelque chose cloche dans la dialectique], but only the 
dialectical process, in its inexhaustible demand, in its ever-maintained completion, allows us to think 
what is excluded from it’.7 ‘Something’ ‘sounds’ contradictory, but it is only ‘sounded’ in dialectics. If 
poetry sounds an interruption with philosophy, then the two constitute another dialogue. But this 
dialogue neutral, not productive. Blanchot’s condition of dialogue is the demand that you, ‘[a]ct in such 
a way that I could speak to you’.8 ‘You’ must be addressable. But if you are to be ‘sounded’, then you 
must be interrupted.  
This interruption of dialogue that drives dialogue recalls the role reflection plays for Kant. The 
neuter (ne-uter, neither one nor the other, not-either) has to be thought in its suspension. It is an 
‘operation that is inoperative’, ‘effect of non-effect’.9 Thinking this dialogue requires a different form 
of reflection, however. In what form does one ‘reflect’ on a neutral presence? As neutral, presence is 
not negated. But neither is it affirmed. For Daiana Manoury, it is figured, imagined, an image. Neutral 
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writing is ‘a transitive space within which language and the subject metamorphose unrelentingly’.10 To 
think presence in this neutral ‘common’, to make a ‘common sense’ of it, means thinking in images, 
‘from which the neutral emerges’.11 This neutrality emerges ‘by our indiscreet reading’ which ‘tears’ 
the image into visibility.12 ‘You’ are legible only in this neutral tearing. With this neutral reflection 
emerges, for Blanchot, a torn poetry. ‘Poetry: dispersion that, as such, finds its form. […] It is as though 
language were torn from itself’.13 Poetry is a form of dispersion. This dispersal is the condition of 
reading poetry as poetry. And if any ‘you’ is to be constituted in these interruptions – sounding, 
imagining – it is in this tearing dispersal. 
For Celan, dialogue is sounded through ‘you’. Celan’s poem ‘Vaporband-, Banderole-uprising’ 
from Atemwende opens its last three stanzas by repeating ‘Mit dir’, ‘With you’.14 The poem speaks 
‘with you’, not ‘to you’. Such dialogue is tentative. If you are present ‘with’ the poem, then how can 
you remain ‘you’, separate, addressable? Political responsibility for singularity is reproduced 
figuratively, on the level of the image. In a letter Celan wrote to his wife, Celan describes this tension 
between the political and the figurative in this poem as ‘insurrectional’. It occurs in the ‘redder than 
red’ banners of revolution, but in the ‘[i]nsurrection of other things too, geological, scriptural ones, 
matters of the heart.’15 The poem imagines, hosts insurrection. The poem is a figurative site where other 
discourse intrude, precisely because of the way it ‘hosts’ them reflectively, in figures, without 
determining their ends. In the aesthetic work of the poem these discourses are reflective, not 
determinate. In another letter, Celan links poetry with Eisenstein’s October, suggesting that in the film 
he saw, ‘the brother of poetry’. ‘Then, at the moment when the insurgents occupy the Winter Palace, it 
began to desert poetry and to become Cinema, motion-picture shots, tendentious and overdone, the 
intertexts became propaganda’.16 The ‘moving image’ posits continuity. But this is the sequential 
continuity of filmic montage. The ‘poetic’ image shifting to the ‘cinematic’ is a shift in temporality. 
Eisenstein’s film uses that shift, or modulation, to ‘enact’ the political as politics, as propaganda. If 
images are the basis for montage, construction, then continuity is being imposed on them. Does the 
‘poetic’ image, then, endorse interruption as mere interruption, in which the ‘insurrection of other 
things’ can appear? 
This ‘poetic image’ interrupts its own ‘imaginary’ work. 
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outward- and away- 
burrowing black-constellation swarm: 
 
into the silicified forehead of a ram 
I burn this image 
 
 
mit dem sich 
hinaus- und hinweg- 
wühlenden Schwarzgestirn-Schwarm: 
 
der verkieselten Stirn eines Widders 
brenn ich dies Bild ein17 
The ‘Schwarzgestirn-Schwarm’, might also be translated the ‘blackstar-swarm’. It is significant that 
these stars, Gestirn, transform into the ‘pebble’ brow of the ram, its ‘Stirn’ The adjective ‘verkieselten’ 
might be literally translated as ‘turned to a pebble (Kiesel)’. The ‘burrowing’ motion of the stars is both 
out of the stars and into the pebbled brow. The image of the ‘Great, glowing vault’ which ‘I’ burn into 
the ram’s forehead is ‘burnt in’ through this constellation of inverted stars. The stars’ blackness is their 
presence in absence of light, an impossibly swarming, numerous presence. The ram’s brow is also 
produced in a reverse history: bone mineralised into stone, rather than minerals organically becoming 
bone. Both of these figures go backwards: stars to darkness, bone to stone. The ram’s skull is ‘burnt 
into’, with the swarming black stars. The image is burned in to you, but also exposed to the history of 
its imagination, much like the political image we looked at in chapter two. 
This ‘with’ brings us back to ‘‘Vaporband-, Banderole-uprising’, and to ‘you’. 
The beam hammered all 
the way through you, 
that writes here, 
redder than red. 
 
 
Der durch dich hindurch- 
gehämmerte Strahl, 
der hier schreibt, 
röter als rot. 18 
This beam, a beam of light, ‘writes’ here through you, with you, but also transcending you: writes here 
through you. It passes through you. It also, for the Celan whose daily language was French, visually 
‘yesterday’ (hier). The space ‘here’ is displaced into ‘yesterday’. This ‘with you/through you writing’ 
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then leads each of the next stanzas: ‘With its words’; ‘With you to coin gold, now,’; ‘With you to assist 
the banderoles’; ‘With you to moor the glasshard leaflet | to the blood-bollard [Blutpoller]’. This is 
nailing a leaflet to a bollard, perhaps, political dissemination, writing, but the nailing is accompanied 
each time ‘with you’. The leaflets are nailed to the bollards with you. Any image, any light, any politics 
must also pass through you. But this means that you are also weighed down with all this figurative 
freighting. The poem is demanding, even as it nails ‘you’ down, your presence. The space of the 
political is excessive, redder than red, because of this excessive ‘you’. 
With you to moor the glasshard leaflet 
to the blood-bollard, that 
the earth pushed out 
through this step-pole. 
 
 
Mit dir das glasharte Flugblatt vertäuen 
am lesenden Bluttpoller, den 
die Erde durch diesen 
Stiefpol hinausstieß. 
The ‘blood-pole’ turns into a ‘step-pole’, the ‘Poller’ proliferations of this detached ‘Pol’. The polar 
relation between ‘you’ and the ‘leaflets’ (both are hammered in) is picked up in the poetic ‘polarity’ 
between the ‘Bluttpoller’ and the ‘Stiefpol’. But the poem also interrupts this polarity. A polar relation 
is of opposites, but here there is one pole, detached. A ‘step-pole’ is a slant polarity, like slant familiarity 
with a step-brother. It is an assumed pole, taken on. Just so, the literal space of the political, the bollard, 
must be ‘hammered through’. And just so, ‘you’ must be hammered through; indeed, you are ‘moored’ 
here, grafted to this detachable pole. 
The poem addresses you by freighting you with this figurative weight. Writing you means 
writing you into an image. Elsewhere in cycle V, ‘you’ is ‘threaded’, but this threading also undoes the 
images it threads. ‘You’ passes through a needle’s eye. 
You, the hair taken from 
the lip with the bright- 
seeing highsleep: 
threaded through the goldeye 
of the sung-aright ash- 
needle. 
 
You, the knot torn out 
of the throat with 
the One Light: 
run through by needle and hair, 
under way, under way. 
 








Du, das mit dem hell- 
sehenden Hochschlaf von 




Du, der mit dem Einen 
Licht aus dem Hals 
gerissene Knoten: 
durchstoßen von Nadel und Haar, 
unterwegs, unterwegs. 
 
Eure Unschwünge, immerzu, um 
die sieben- 
fingrige Kußhand hinterm 
Glück. 19 
The ‘hair’ which ‘you’ takes from the lip (a mouth’s edge open like a needle’s eye, another figurative 
modulation) is threaded in the first stanza, and then ‘run through by needle and hair’ in the second. 
‘You’ are both the threaded hair and the ‘knotted’ thread. These are ‘Your reversals, incessantly’, where 
‘you’ makes up both the threading and the tearing/knotting of that thread. Figures reverse, repeatedly, 
immerzu. The throat is the medium of breath, and itself a place of transformations. Breath comes silently 
inside and outside through the throat (reversals or turns of breath), but it might also be transformed into 
speech through the opening lips, speech ‘threaded’ through the breath in the throat. ‘You’ are both the 
silently threading breath and the speech ‘torn out’ from the throat. The pole (neck) you are moored to 













                                                      




auf der Stimmbänderbrücke, im 
Großen Dazwischen, 
nachtüber. 20 
The ‘Bänder’ of poem six, the leaflets or flags of political movement, are here the ‘Stimmbänder’, the 
vocal-cords. Political writing is transfigured into speech – not yet speech, rather, but the cord, bridge, 
that joins breath with voice. And again, this is ‘with you’, you are threaded in. And both leaflet and 
vocal cord are ‘Inbetween’ spaces, spaces of figuration and bridging. The poem therefore stages the 
‘threading’ of two different kinds of ‘threading’ work: the internal bridging between inanimate breath 
and speech, the breathturn to speech which identifies ‘you’, and the external bridging possibilities of 
the political, in which a space is made, again, for ‘you’ to be recognised, moored. Internal identification 
is posed against external identification.  
Celan’s poems hold these two kinds of work in a sort of ‘step’ polarity, a polarity which does 
not reconcile the relation between the two poles but holds them discontinuously together. In the cycle’s 
final poem, this ‘political’ external space is set in ‘quasistellar’ constellation with the internal needle-
threading, self-threading, you. 
Ohne Licht rollts, ohne 
Farbe – du 
stich die Elfenbeinnadel hindurch 
 – wer  weiß nicht, 
daß der getigerte Stein, der dich ansprang, 
an ihr zerklang? – 
und so – wohin fiel die Erde? – 
laß es sich drehen zeitauf, 
mit zehn Nagelmonden im Schlepptau, 




Without light it rolls, without 
color – you, 
stick the ivory needle through it 
– who doesn’t know 
that the tigered stone, that jumped you, 
rang out on it? –, 
and so – whither fell earth? – 
let it turn time-up, 
with ten nailmoons on the towrope, 
in serpent-nearness, at yellow-flood, 
                                                      




Without colour, the blackstars; the bone-needle running through; the pebble or stone that turns against 
you; the earth falling without direction, non-polar; the mooring place: in this final stanza the figurative 
work of the whole cycle collapses together. The figures constellate, or quasi-constellate. They ‘rotate’ 
or ‘spin’, ‘es sich drehen’, ‘time-up’, into time. The complex falling together of the figurative work of 
these poems turns around this rotation, and it does so ‘with you’. In this way we are returned to the 
cycle’s first poem, which ends: ‘The world is gone, I have to carry you.’, ‘Die Welt ist fort, ich muß 
dich tragen.’22 All the ‘mooring’ work the poems do for ‘you’, tying ‘you’ onto directional poles, 
threading you figuratively into the world as if with a needle, is only, finally, poetic work. ‘The world is 
gone, I have to carry you.’ This could mean two things. The world is gone and so I must stand in and 
bear you in its place. Or else there is no world, and in its place I must carry you, wear you, to bear me. 
You are either borne in the poem, despite everything, or else you become the real orientation of the 
poem after the world is gone; in which case this figurative weight is loaded onto ‘you’, the ‘you’ the 
poem creates itself, spins out of itself. 
 What does the poem do ‘with you’? Does the poem ‘thread’ you back together, provide the 
figurative transformations necessary to describe sundered relations? The poem does not carry out the 
work of politics, but rather provides the figurative space where the political can take form. The poetic 
ambiguity about that spatiality, about whether it bridges or threads anything together, opens up the 
question of whether the politic space, the ‘community’ we discussed in chapter two, is finally, possibly, 
moored to any ‘real’ articulation. Celan’s poetry is painfully orientated by the ‘you’ it addresses.  
 Any presence of you, and meaning for you, cannot be ‘produced’ as poetic effects. The 
suspension of ‘you’ in Celan’s poems opens that space, marked by ‘you’, to other ‘insurrections’. This 
poetic dialogue ‘with you’ can be read through philosophical dialectics. Poetry’s negative presentation 
of dialogue, and of presence, gives form to a philosophical problem with presenting negativity. Hegel’s 
dialectic proceeds by negation. The subject negates what it experiences as negative by disclosing a self-
consciousness of identity with it. But in the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel famously characterises this 
negation as life ‘enduring’ the negative and ‘tarrying’, ‘lingering with it [bei ihm verweilt]’.23 In 
common with Celan’s poetry, Blanchot’s and Adorno’s writing tries to account for how ‘negation’ 
might be returned to this ‘negative’. And in this way, Blanchot and Adorno work towards thinking non-
transcendently, thinking in such a way that does not transcend its object by negating it. For Blanchot,  
this is writing in the time of ‘waiting’. For Adorno, this is dialectics responding to the ‘suffering’ of 
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objectivity in order to ‘linger’ with its object. By reading them with Celan, we can see how both 
accounts work towards ‘community’ as dialogue that can respond to the way it loses its object, loses 
objectivity in a way that returns us to the initial Kantian question of aesthetics: how can one think 
reflectively, when reflection is provoked by an incapacity to think conceptually? 
 
Waiting 
For Adorno, a ‘negative’ dialectic would respond to the way dialects suspends its negative. But this 
response would be dialectical, a dialectical reversal of the priority of the object. ‘If thought really 
yielded to the object, if its attention were on the object, not on its category, the very objects would start 
talking under thinking’s lingering glance [verweilenden Blick].’24 Such dialogue would be structured 
by the negative, not by its negation. This dialogue would be orientated by reflecting on particularity. ‘It 
compels our thinking to linger with minutiae [vorm Kleinsten zu verweilen]. We are not to philosophize 
about concrete things; we are to philosophize, rather, out of those these things.’25 Only as part of a 
dialectical system are objects legible in their objectivity. The point is to reverse the force of this 
systematicity. This reversal, however, can only be effected through the subject thinking particularity. 
The conception of the system recalls, in reverse form [in verkehrter 
Gestalt], the coherence of the nonidentical, that which is 
breached/wounded [verletzt] by deductive systems. Criticism of the 
system and asystematic thinking is superficial so long as it is not able 
to release the force of coherence which the idealist system signs over 
to the transcendental subject.26 
In this ‘reversed form’, the system would disclose its objectivity rather than reproducing ‘transcendental 
subjectivity’ in the place where it forgets that objectivity. The system should unlock the coherence 
granted by systematic thinking for the priority of the object, rather than repeating subjective coherence 
in the form of the object. This is a reversal of he role Kant mandates to reflection. Here, reflection 
substantiates the way it loses its object as negative, rather than relocating that reflection in the 
transcendental subject. 
For Blanchot, writing ‘awaits’ presence. This waiting is configured through the thought of 
community: one awaits the other so that one can speak. Rather than marking the presence of something 
else, reflection becomes waiting. This waiting is dialogic. The interlocutors of Awaiting Oblivion decide 
that they are not alone, but not quite together, because ‘We’re only together if we could be separated’, 
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so that they are ‘“United: separated [Réunis : séparés].”’27 The condition for being together is separation 
– partager meaning both to divide and to share. 
“Everything would change if we waited together.” – “If the waiting 
were common to us [était commune]? If we belonged to it in common? 
But isn’t that what we are waiting for, to be together [d’être 
ensemble]?” – “Yes, together.” – “But in waiting.” – “Together, 
waiting and without waiting.”28 
Between being ‘common’ and being ‘together’, there is an interval: waiting. ‘Waiting’ is what is in 
common, awaiting commonality. Waiting is a passivity, an incapacity actually to be in common, 
together; and it is this passivity, this inoperativity, which is shared. The two speakers are awaiting 
together the capacity to speak in common because conversation structurally always takes turns, waits 
to speak while the other speaks. Speaking becomes waiting, because speaking is structured by its 
intervals of interruption. I must interrupt you in order to speak. ‘Interruption is necessary to any 
succession of words; intermittence makes their becoming possible, discontinuity ensures the continuity 
of understanding.’29 Speaking is discontinuous, and the continuity of being ‘together’ is this common 
discontinuity. In this interval, awaiting ‘waiting’, the interlocutors are differentiated, singular.  
This singularity is felt as discontinuity. This spacing, where waiting is exterior, is registered 
socially, in a ‘crowd a crowd [une foule] that was not a true crowd of people but something uncountable 
and indefinite, a kind of abstract weakness, incapable of presenting itself in any other way than in the 
empty form of a very large number.’30 This crowd, however, ‘made her more present’.31 The ‘crowd’ 
waits in the anonymous space of her singular presence, because her singularity depends on being 
interrupted by this numerousness: counting depends on an uncountable numerousness. Her singular 
presence, then, is registered as the non-presence of the crowd which interrupts her. Beyond her, there 
is a non-manifest crowd. This ‘beyond’ is the non-countable that determines singularity.  
He who lives in a state of waiting sees life come to him as the emptiness 
of waiting and waiting as the emptiness of the beyond of life [de l’au-
delà de la vie]. The unstable indeterminateness of these two 
movements is henceforth the space of waiting. At every step [pas], one 
is here, and yet beyond. But as this beyond is reached without being 
reached through death, it is awaited and not reached [on l’attend et on 
ne l’atteint pas]; without knowing that its essential characteristic is to 
be able to be reached only in waiting.32 
Waiting is neutral time. ‘He’ waits – another, not I. In this indeterminate waiting (awaiting itself has no 
end, no termination, because it would terminate if what it awaited arrived) what is awaited is waiting. 
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He awaits something to wait for. This is the pas au-delà, the step/not beyond. Nothing is negated, and 
so there is nothing beyond waiting; and yet waiting is structured by the neutrality of this ‘not beyond’ 
that is not reached. In not reaching, in not ‘going beyond’ the present, the present is only waiting, 
neutral. Being in common means being together in this waiting, which is waiting for each other. 
Community is thought through this neutrality. What is ‘sensed’ in ‘common’ here is only the neutrality 
of this waiting that places me outside myself. 
In Awaiting Oblivion, writing is always awaiting the other it addresses. But it also has to forget 
this other in order to speak, because the other is an unbearable pressure on speech’s unity. Waiting 
undoes the identity of dialogue. ‘“This is indeed proof that I am addressing you.” – “I am not asking 
you to speak: to hear, only to hear.”’33 The ‘sounding’ insurrection of dialogue has to be awaited. 
Dialogue does not mark presence, but the lack of presence. ‘It was as if he had introduced inside his 
thought a form of suffering that, as soon as it was awakened, forced him not to think about it.’34 ‘As if 
pain’s proper dimension [espace] were thought.’35 ‘Waiting’ intrudes as suffering into thought. In this 
intrusion, it is as if ‘pain’ was a part of ‘thought’, as if it was possible to think pain. But that would 
mean thinking the separation that pain marks. Dialogue is sharing pain, shared dissimilarity, shared 
alienation from sharing or communication itself. But pain is what resists thinking. What dialogue could 
be organised by pain? How could it be ‘sensed’? 
 
Suffering 
In The Body in Pain, Elaine Scarry describes the experience of pain as a kind of maximum or excess of 
sense that also dismantles our capacity to make sense of it. Only I can experience my pain, but the 
isolation of that experience is also felt, or matched by, my alienation from it. Pain is unavailable to 
experience precisely because it is so experientially singular. It is the experience of the conditions of 
experience being dismantled. So pain is both a most singular experience – indeed, the experience of 
mere singularity – and an experience that exceeds my singular capacity to respond to it. For Scarry, this 
provokes a linguistic crisis and reversal. 
To witness the moment when pain causes a reversion to the pre-
language of cries and groans is to witness the destruction of language; 
but conversely, to be present when a person moves up out of that pre-
language and projects the facts of sentience into speech is almost to 
have been permitted to be present at the birth of language.36 
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This pain cannot be experienced. In pain, sense intuition exceeds the conceptual categories by which it 
might be thought. Pain invokes the imagination only to have it fail. In ‘some peculiar way […] it is 
appropriate to think of pain as the imagination’s intentional state, and to identify the imagination as 
pain’s intentional object.’37 Pain is sublime here. And as for Kant’s sublime, Scarry invokes symbolism 
to make sense of it. The subject is exposed to the experience of the ‘presence’ of pain as deeply, 
affectively felt, and yet not available to experience, and it makes from that affect a symbol. But this 
pain is a feeling of the faculties’ exteriority to the body. In this way, the aesthetic experience it provokes 
doubles against the resolution marked by the sublime. The imagination fails to present this most singular 
feeling of self-presence because, as pain, that self-presence is made external.  
In Negative Dialectics, Adorno suggests that, rather than recovering the body for the subject, 
suffering marks freedom – but this freedom is felt at once by a subject and against subjectivity, inside 
and outside. The freedom of thinking painfully exceeds itself, and exceeds the body from which (with 
which) it thinks. 
Where thinking goes beyond the bonds it tied in resistance — there is 
its freedom. Freedom follows the subject’s urge to express 
[Ausdrucksdrang] itself. The need to let suffering speak is the condition 
of all truth. Suffering is objectivity that weighs upon the subject; its 
most subjective experience, its expression [Ausdruck], is objectively 
mediated.38 
It is painful that to think means to dis-identify oneself from one’s own body. The most private, 
subjective experience, precisely because of its subjective privacy, must be communicated even to the 
subject itself before it can be experienced. The subject is deprived of the suffering that weighs upon it. 
Subjective experience, the most subjective experience, is an objectivity which interrupts the self-
presence of subjectivity – but that objectivity is precisely subjectivity itself. The ‘expressive’ movement 
from inside to outside (‘Ausdruck’ – ‘pressing out’) marks a transition from subjectivity to objectivity. 
The expression of suffering is the failure of expression, but it is also the expression of this failure, the 
objectification of suffering as a failure to communicate. Adorno continues:  
This may help explain why the presentation of philosophy is not a 
matter of indifference to it but immanent to its idea. Its integral moment 
of expression, nonconceptual-mimetic, is only objectified through 
presentation — language. The freedom of philosophy is nothing but the 
capacity to sound its unfreedom.39 
The expression of suffering, the ‘pressure’ (Druck) which suffering applies from within (aus) 
subjectivity, is the subjective expression of ‘something’ objective: the subject. It parallels Kant’s 
aesthetic experience, but also reverses it by orientating it to its suppressed objectivity. In expression, 
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the subject itself becomes, mimetically, objective: outside itself, unavailable to itself. The concept is 
not adequate to express its own undoing. But for Adorno this is thought’s ‘freedom’. It is pain which is 
to be expressed, not pleasure. The free, nonconceptual communication with which Kant establishes the 
possibility of ‘common sense’ is for Adorno the freedom experienced in pain: the freedom from 
thinking that suppresses its own objectivity as outside experience. The pain of the ‘most subjective 
experience’ is its objectivity, and this objectivity salvages experience for communication, expression. 
Pain is at once most internal and the condition for externality.  
 
Something 
This expression of suffering is the expression of an objectivity of the subject that subjectivity is not 
adequate to think. For Adorno, this ‘suffering’ is immanent to conceptual form. To think is to think 
something. But, conversely, neither is this ‘something’ available without thought. ‘The nonidentical is 
not to be obtained immediately, as positive on its part, and neither by a negation of the negative. This 
is not itself, as for Hegel, affirmation.’40 Materiality is only material, only ‘something’, dialectically. 
Dialectics both negates this something and, in this abstraction, makes it something. 
To think means to think something [etwas]. By itself, the logically 
abstract form of “something,” something that is meant or judged, does 
not claim to posit a being; and yet, surviving in it — indelible for a 
thinking that would delete it — is that which is not identical with 
thinking, which is not thinking at all. The ratio becomes irrational 
where it forgets this, where it runs counter to the meaning of thought 
by hypostasizing its products [Erzeugnisse], the abstractions.41 
‘Something’, as a substrate necessary to thinking of concepts, 
including the concept of Being, is the utmost abstraction – not to be 
abolished by any further thinking process – of subject matter not 
identical with thinking; without that ‘something’ formal logic cannot 
be thought.42 
Concepts cannot be divested of the specific materiality they think. This is the ‘something’ they think. 
Negation is always the negation of something, but that does mean that such negation posits anything. 
Concepts cannot move beyond this material, cannot ‘abolish’ it with any ‘further thought process’. The 
concept seems to be dialectically beyond the ‘something’ it abstracts. The concept of materiality is 
already an abstraction; but abstraction is also the site of vestigial materiality, where the nonidentity of 
the matter with conceptuality is exposed. We encounter such matter ‘in the interior of supposedly pure 
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concepts and of their truth content’.43 We cannot think without identifying, even if that identification 
misses something of its object. ‘To think is to identify [Denken heißt identifizieren].44 […] The 
semblance and the truth of thought entwine. This entanglement cannot be overcome by decree, as for 
instance by an assertion of being-in-itself outside the totality of thinking’s determinations.’45 Without 
abstraction nonidentity would not only not be apparent, it would not be material, objective. We can 
think of the way capital is divested of any appearance of the residual labour for which it was exchanged. 
Thinking that labour back means thinking back through the process by which capital obscured it, 
otherwise it would not be visible as labour. So abstraction potentially turns against itself, here, by 
registering the ‘weight of objectivity’ it abstracts. ‘Something’ is suffered, not divestable. Consistent 
consciousness of such a nonidentity, as Adorno says in his lectures, is the speculative truth of identity. 
‘A truly achieved identity would have to be the consciousness of non-identity, or, more accurately 
perhaps, it would have to be the creation of a reconciled non-identity’.46 The reconciliations of identity 
have to be ‘achieved’, ‘created’, manifest, presented. A ‘reconciled non-identity’ is therefore not just 
inverted identity, but the ‘consciousness of non-identity’. Such ‘consciousness’ is suffered. In suffering, 
consciousness is exposed to its outside. This is abstraction. But it is also the reversal of abstraction. In 
suffering, the place of abstraction is occupied by the ‘something’ abstracted, the ‘something’ that 
remains nonidentical with abstraction. It is experienced as something consciousness lacks. The 
experience of this gap not only speaks truly about the nonidentity of the ‘something’ with thinking but 
establishes in this utopian space (no man’s land) the possibility of such nonidentity becoming a relation 
in itself. Consciousness of nonidentity becomes utopian when it becomes a way of thinking external as 
well as internal relations.  
For Kant, felt pleasurably, such indeterminacy becomes the spur to cognitive ‘free play’. Rather 
than disabling thinking, as Scarry argues, the pleasurable experience of indeterminacy provokes 
reflection. By thinking aesthetically, then, we might utilise the negativity of ‘something’ pleasurably. 
If aesthetics were adequate to the indeterminacy experienced, the nonconceptual would be a pleasure. 
Negative dialectics is therefore necessary because other epistemological models do not adequately 
reflect their complicity with concealing this ‘something’. A negative dialectic would stage this 
reflection. Thinking beyond conceptual domination, thinking what ‘suffers’, must come from within. 
Matter and materiality are not objectively available except through the concept that negates them. 
Materialism would require a changed conceptual procedure. The obligation to go beyond conceptual 
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determination comes from within, dialectically. So if, for Kant, matter is not conceptually available to 
thinking, that is because concepts are not sufficiently provisional to think of matter’s provisionality.  
Sensations, the Kantian matter, without which the forms would not 
even be imaginable, which therefore are also for their part conditions 
of the possibility of knowledge, have the character of the transitory. 
The nonconceptual, indispensable from the concept, disavows the 
concept’s being-for-itself and changes it. The concept of the 
nonconceptual cannot linger [verweilen] with itself, with 
epistemology; it obliges philosophy to material-substantiality 
[Sachhaltigkeit].47 
Philosophy is obliged to think the indeterminacy of its object, obliged to think ‘something’, because 
abstraction always comes from ‘something’. This is impossible, however, because nonconceptual. 
Suffering is the failure of thinking to think the nonconceptual. Aesthetic experience does not remedy 
this lack, but it does offer a way to think of it as more than just a sublimely empty space.48 Experienced 
aesthetically, precisely this ‘something’ cannot be divested from experience. Nonconceptuality is thus 
reflectively transfigured, reconfigured, as the negative – mobile, dialectical, not negated.  
If we are to salvage Kant’s sense of aesthetic universal, but subjective, validity, tied to the 
analytic of the beautiful, we need to be attentive to the suffering, the weight of objectivity, attendant 
upon that subject in the first place. It is the weight of objectivity, the ‘something’ which concepts think, 
that resists conceptualisation, not some sublime but ineffective failure of the imagination to dislocate 
itself conceptually or reflectively from matter. We can link suffering, as the objectification of subjective 
experience, to common sense, which externalises subjective experience. M. J. Bowles suggests that this 
disjointed experience is, for Kant, how synthetic understanding proceeds,49 as Hegel’s dialectic 
demonstrates. This excess of sense is what Bowles calls ‘matter’, Adorno the suffering of objectivity – 
‘something’. Bowles argues that matter marks the point of resistance of what cannot be synthesised by 
understanding. But understanding proceeds by negating this resistance. Synthesis proceeds 
discontinuously towards to the negative it fails to synthesise. Matter marks the excess of experience 
that is also the condition of experience, its indeterminate ‘future’: understanding has to synthesise 
something, some matter, or else it would be ‘empty’.50 In this reading, matter is what is painful. It 
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provokes the failure of experience even as it conditions experience. So the question of sense becomes 
a question about the conditions of experience, and this question is felt, painfully, as an excess of sense’s 
singularity. Thinking ‘common sense’ means attending to the way ‘you’ might be sensed – sounded, 
imagined.  
Poetic dialogue ‘interrupts’ dialectical progress with this ‘you’. But thinking this interruption 
means interrupting dialectical presence. If there is a reversal of priority towards this ‘something’, then 
that reversal is already dialectical. The ‘danger’, as Blanchot puts it, is ‘that the disaster acquire a 
meaning instead of a body.’51 The danger is that the negative, the indeterminate, the something that 
orientates thinking would, indeed, orientate it: give it direction, meaning, and thereby be forgotten in 
negation. Giving this indeterminacy a body does not mean, however, making it present. As Kant knew, 
the indeterminacy of reflection cannot be sublated into a concept without ceasing to be reflective. It 
would rather be ‘a subjectivity without any subject: the wounded space, the hurt of the dying, the already 
dead body which no one could ever own, or ever say of it, I, my body’.52 If we are to think of this ‘body’, 
it is in this neutral non-presence, and the displacement this non-presence subjects us to, bodily, enjoins 
us to, dialogically –  enjoins us to our incapacity to host it. 
 
 
2 – Blanchot: the fragmented present of writing between le pas au-delà and désastre  
write in the thrall of the impossible real, that share of disaster wherein every reality, safe and sound, 
sinks53 
 
In this section, I want to look at how Blanchot’s concept of non-transcendent writing – the ‘step/not 
beyond’ – helps us think of the neutralisation of experience as ‘disaster’. I want to explore the ways this 
non-transcendence and this neutrality can make legible the displacement of experience in aesthetics. 
This lets us think Blanchot’s reversal of Kant. Kant establishes the way that an experience of reflection 
structures, as reflecting judgement, the form of experience. But for Blanchot, this second reflection 
displaces judgement’s transcendental security. Writing reflectively shows that such reflection is 
actually neutral, in a way that displaces subjective experience. It is not ‘possible’, in Kant’s sense of 
the transcendental, to ‘experience’ writing. Instead, we have an ‘experience’ of the impossibility of 
securing reflection.  
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 In The Infinite Conversation, Blanchot characterises poetry as ‘naming the possible, responding 
to the impossible’.54 What dialogue is there, here, between possibility and impossibility? Poetry 
responds, ‘each time it is poetry’, to impossibility by not naming it. The name poetry henceforth names 
this refusal of poetry to name the possible. Poetry is possible writing that responds to an impossibility 
of writing. Kant wants to name the possibility of reflective experience, but Blanchot suggests any such 
‘naming’ inscribes the impossibility of that experience. The motto is, itself, dispersed through 
Blanchot’s text: firstly in the subtitle; then as ‘naming the possible, responding to the impossible’; and 
a third time without any emphasis. How could a poem make ‘impossibility’ a ‘possible’ experience? 
How does poetry navigate this paradox? This poetic problem of repetition reflects a problem with 
presence. As we saw in the last section, ‘you’ are only awaited, not present in writing. We can connect 
this with disaster. 
The disaster: break with the star, break with every form of totality, 
never denying, however, the dialectical necessity of a fulfilment; the 
disaster: prophecy which announces nothing but the refusal of the 
prophetic as simply an event to come, but which nonetheless discovers 
the patience of vigilant language. The disaster, touch of the powerless 
infinite: it does not come to pass under a sidereal sky, but here – here 
in the excess of all presence. Here: where, then? “Voice of no one, once 
more.”’55 
Such a dialectic is not subject to totality, but still operates as if towards some future presence.  Its 
operations are figurative, because the fulfilment of this future is impossible. Any futurity is not 
prophetic, in the sense that it is never ‘present’, never merely a future proceeding from the present. And 
neither does this futurity ‘take place here’: its space, its presence, exceeds space. And so it is not spoken 
by anyone. It is the repetition of this ‘no one, once more’. This occurs within dialectics, just as, for 
Adorno, the ‘something’ that concepts think is only thinkable through the dialectical thinking that 
negates it. Thinking ‘something’, presently, is impossible. Dialectics proceeds in the consciousness of 
this impossibility. This disables dialectical history from within. It presents a history of dispersal. 
‘“Already” or “always already” marks the disaster [la marque du désastre], which is outside history, 
but historically so: before undergoing it, we (who is not included in this we?) will undergo it. […] a 
remainder which is neither a result (as in subtraction), nor a quantity left over (as in division). Patience 
again – the passive. The Aufhebung turns [devenue] inoperable, ceases.’56 And, again, this history 
includes a dialogic history of saying ‘we’. This is ‘friendship’, a connection by radical incompatibility 
that articulates a radical incompletion of dialogue: ‘to die in common through separation’.57 Three kinds 
of dialogue are constellated here in disaster: poetry, dialectics, and community. This constellation is 
                                                      
54 IC 48/68-9 
55 WD 75/121 
56 WD 40/68-9 
57 WD 29/50 
 
133 
articulated, however, through the ‘step/not beyond’ of writing which disconnects. And this 
disconnection is legible through a reversal of the orientation of reflection in Kant’s aesthetic. 
 
 
i. Time, disaster, identity 
 
The time of judgement: Kant, figuration, and time 
The reflection that characterises aesthetic experience for Kant is translated by Blanchot into the 
repetition of writing. For Adorno, the subject feels its own objectivity as a ‘weight’; and the subject 
awaits, for Blanchot, a form by which it could account for the painful separation from the other that 
constitutes being ‘together’ but not ‘in common’. Writing is thus stretched between two separate kinds 
of autonomy: the subject’s felt singularity, and the nonidentical singularity of the other. In attempting 
to account for this doubling, writing is fragmented. Rather than providing a space where the ‘presence’ 
of the object can be ‘presented’, writing is interrupted by this coincidence. This doubles back into 
aesthetics. Art becomes autonomous at the same time as aesthetics, in the sense that both condition one 
another. But both also resist one another. The autonomy of art is also autonomy from theoretically 
framed meaning. If an aesthetic theory thoroughly conditioned the internal meaning of the artwork, then 
the artwork would no longer be autonomous. But at the same time, if the artwork resisted all 
conditioning from any exteriority, any theory, then it would dissipate and no longer be recognisably art. 
The relation between aesthetics and art is therefore not only reflective, it is negative. If we are to find 
an ‘aesthetic’ theory in Blanchot’s sense of writing, it would be in the fragmentation such a theory 
undergoes in being written, the dissipation and neutralisation of a theoretical relation that could be 
‘outside’ its object. The futurity that coordinates the present of aesthetic judgement is not merely yet-
to-be determined. It is felt as the loss of the present. Any futurity that writing makes legible is subject 
to this reversal. Any figuration of the future as something ‘beyond’ the present betrays the 
indeterminacy by which the future is legible as such. But any thought of the future necessarily 
transcends the present. The two coordinates reverse into one another. So the future is located in this 
reversal, a reversal between being transcendental and transcendent, outside and inside, ‘presence’ and 
‘present’. In interrupting these dualities, writing exposes them to the impossibility that constitutes 
futurity. It is precisely by not writing about ‘aesthetics’, then, that Blanchot marks out a possible future 
for aesthetic experience, which is to say a possible future for an experience of the present not determined 
by presence. For Leslie Hill, this is anti-aesthetic, and an anti-aesthetic that becomes visible in 
Blanchot’s reading of Celan’s poetry. Each share in writing as a ‘turning point, a caesura, a disjunction, 
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an interruption’: a ‘breathturn’ or ‘reversal’. 58 But I want to retain this nonconceptual reflection for the 
aesthetic, as a reflective, indeterminate account of the conditions of reading – this shared ‘impossibility’ 
of disaster. This aesthetic would, however, have to account for the non-manifestation of its object. 
Poetry would then signal this reversal of objectivity as a secure or determining point of orientation for 
thinking. But that would then be pitched through the non-manifest futurity of presence in the present. 
As I have repeatedly described it, Kant’s aesthetic judgement reflectively recuperates objective 
indeterminacy for subjective experience by withdrawing itself from objectivity. Aesthetic experience 
might refer to an objective reality, but aesthetic judgement refers to the subjective feeling prompted by 
that reality. The subject reflects on its own indeterminate response to an object. Judgement remains in 
this way provisional. It is not coordinated by any object, but rather coordinates its own pseudo-
objectivity in a future sociability of judgement’s ‘common sense’. This experience is therefore 
coordinated by futurity. So while it refers to an object and a subject, an outside and an inside, and 
therefore to space and time, presence and a present, in aesthetic ‘free play’ these coordinates are not 
securely separate. Pitched through this futurity, they are exposed to one another in indeterminate ways. 
This refers us back to Kant’s account of the transcendental: the formal conditions for experience. In the 
Critique of Pure Reason, Kant describes the distinction between space and time. ‘Time can no more be 
intuited externally than space can be intuited as something in us’.59 Just as I cannot ‘intuit’ time 
externally, I cannot ‘intuit’ space internally. Time and space are separated by comparison. Space works 
in the way time does not, and vice versa. They are defined negatively against one another. Time is not, 
here, ‘inner sense’, but also ‘not externally’ intuited; space is, likewise, ‘not internally’ intuited. Time 
is not outside. ‘Space is a necessary representation, a priori, that is the ground of all other intuitions’;60 
‘Time is a necessary representation that grounds all intuitions’.61 Space is a ‘ground’ for intuition; time 
‘grounds’ intuition. Space is a representation of the outside from the inside: space is defined negatively 
as ‘not internally’ intuited because it is a representation from the inside into appearance. Space, as a 
form, is therefore the ‘not inside’ of intuition: it is a projection turned outwards. Time is more complex. 
Time is nothing other than the form of inner sense, i.e., of the intuition 
of our self and our inner state. For time cannot be a determination of 
outer appearances; it belongs neither to a shape or a position, etc., but 
on the contrary determines the relation of representation in our inner 
state. And just because this inner intuition yields no shape we also 
attempt to remedy this lack through analogies, and represent the 
temporal sequence through a line progressing to infinity, in which the 
manifold constitutes a series that is of only one dimension, and infer 
from the properties of this line to all the properties of time, with the 
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sole difference that the parts of the former are simultaneous but those 
of the latter always exist successively.62  
Because it is an ‘inner sense’, time ‘lacks’ objectivity. It therefore has to be figured. But it has to be 
figured negatively. We imagine an infinite line that has no space, and is therefore simultaneous; and in 
translating this line into objective space it becomes serial. Time might be a ‘grounding’ of inner 
representation, but we make ‘analogies’ for time: we find its equivalence outside, in appearance. Time, 
in the way it is a ‘turning’ inwards of appearance, provokes determinations outside itself: we are 
tempted to think of it as something else, figuratively. Kant’s initial description of time as ‘not external’ 
and space as ‘not internal’ turns out to be a characterisation of the way space and time function. That is 
to say, time’s function provokes analogy, provokes its own spacing in appearance, precisely by the way 
it is ‘not externally’ determined.  
In a way, this is an error of reflection in judgement. Reflection should refer intuitions to their 
corresponding categories. But already, in the transcendentally pure intuition of time, we have to make 
recourse to space. In his description of such error, Kant again makes recourse to the image of a line, a 
figure, a diagram of lines: 
error is effected only through the unnoticed influence of sensibility on 
understanding, through which it happens that the subjective grounds of 
the judgment join with the objective ones, and make the latter deviate 
from their destination, just as a moved body would of itself always stay 
in a straight line in the same direction, but starts off on a curved line if 
at the same time another force influences it in another direction. In 
order to distinguish the proper action of the understanding from the 
force that meddles in, it will thus be necessary to regard the erroneous 
judgement of the understanding as a diagonal between two forces that 
determine the judgement in two different directions, enclosing an 
angle, so to speak63 
The subjective influence on objectivity is the origin of error. Judgement would be a continuous, truthful 
straight line between intuition and understanding, except that ‘another force’ influences it, the 
‘unnoticed influence of sensibility’. The sensible is a force of error. This intrusive influence (‘influence’ 
being the force of the stars, fate flowing down) comes, again, as a doubling: the erroneous judgement 
is determined ‘in two different directions’, an ‘angle’ between two forces. The judgement in error is a 
diagonal step aside. The force that causes this mis-step is ‘transcendental illusion’: the misuse of 
categories of experience outside of their territory, ‘a mere mistake of the faculty of judgement when it 
is not properly checked by criticism, and thus does not attend enough to the boundaries of the territory 
in which alone the pure understanding is allowed to play’.64 We can here explicitly recall Adorno’s 
account of the ‘territorialisation’ of reflection in aesthetics as a neutral ‘no man’s land’. This erroneous 
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judgement can be properly checked by referring understanding back to its own territory. But we have 
seen how, like a line in diagonal, time itself — the pure intuition which ‘grounds’ understanding — 
from the moment it is in play turns its own ‘inside’ out in analogy. Time works in analogy, crossing its 
own boundary as the ‘inner sense’ into the world of appearance by a doubling in analogy. Time is 
‘transcendental’, a condition for experience, but it seems also to function in a way similar to Kant’s 
following description of the ‘transcendent’: ‘I mean here principles that actually incite us to tear down 
all those boundary posts and to lay claim to a wholly new territory that recognizes no demarcations 
anywhere’.65 Time also, as we have seen, ‘incites’ to analogy, to unlawful ‘appearance’. Time, as a 
category of sensibility, is itself under the influence of time, is historical — which is to say that it doubles 
itself in crossing over itself, that it becomes ‘temporal’ in the sense of appearing as itself, despite itself. 
So the transcendental aesthetic of the pure intuition of time, while remaining structurally transcendental 
(i.e., the condition for the possibility of ‘spacing’ appearance), is itself ‘aesthetically’ spaced and acts 
as if transcendent: it doubles back on its own boundaries even in its ‘grounding’ work. As if it was 
under the influence of the outside that it marks, time is subject to time.  
 
Identification 
The ‘outside’ that characterises writing for Blanchot redoubles on these transcendental conditions. ‘♦ 
There would be a separation of time, like a separation of place, belonging neither to time nor to place. 
In this separation, we would come to the point of writing.’66 Writing traces how time becomes historical 
in being separated from itself. Historical experience is in this way conditioned by what is outside 
experience. Thinking historically means being outside history. But temporally, history is already 
‘outside’ itself. This is important for thinking about community as a site of identification. If time 
becomes an ‘event’ when it identifies a present with spatial presence, an exterior location with an 
interior experience, then the experience of community interrupts this correspondence. The question of 
the political identification of a community turns around the question of the identity of time. And like 
the identity of time, political identification is worked out figuratively. As Fynsk puts it, 
identification […] remains identification with no identity, and we are 
given to think its movement only with that of others, by figure or simile 
(“ainsi que le ‘pas au-delà’”; “comme si mourir”), the basis of 
comparison being the manner in which it gives itself as its own 
transgression and thus a becoming other that is held in its self-loss. 
What carries this disappropriating movement is perhaps still thought, 
but it is indeed a disaster for thought.67 
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Identification is ‘a disaster for thought’ because of the way it is internally divided. Part of the ‘double’ 
work of writing is the way it responds to identity both as something internal to language and thought, 
and as something social and intersubjective. Identification, of course, is not merely something one 
‘does’, let alone possesses, but something that happens to ‘you’. It is an experience of objectification. 
Social relations are always in this way double: both opportunities for self-identification and the passive 
reception of identity from outside. Just as apparently internal self-identity is interrupted, and thereby 
produced, by acts of identification from outside to which ‘you’ are passive, so writing works through a 
double relation: it both figures and is figured by what it writes.  
The displacements of self-identity experienced in community are also the displacements of a 
capacity to identify. As The Step Not Beyond has it, ‘we’, an identifiable community, are always 
coming, to come, a-venir, never present. So ‘we’ is separated from ‘them’, as being ‘together’ is from 
being in ‘common’. 
♦ Coming towards us [venant vers nous], as they [ils] came 
towards one another through this plurality that unifies them [les] 
without showing unity: their young return. 
  He thought: saving the we [sauvant le nous], like he believed 
he saved thought in identifying it with the fragile fall, that their young 
return would allow him, even in their no longer being together [tout en 
cessant être ensemble] (for a long time he had no longer heard 
anything, not even an echo, that could have passed for an approbation, 
a confirmation of the daily meeting), to fall in community [de tomber 
en communauté]. Fragile fall – common fall [Chute fragil – chute 
commun]; words always skirting one another. 
  And he knew, thanks to the too ancient knowledge, effaced by 
the ages, that the young names, naming twice, an infinity of times, one 
in the past, the other in the future, that which is found only on this side, 
that which is found only beyond, named hope, deception. Hand in hand, 
from threshold to threshold [de seuil en seuil], like immortals, one of 
whom was dying, the other saying: “would I be with whom I die?”68 
The distance between the past and the future, between this side and beyond, is felt as ‘common’, the 
common of writing where words ‘skirt’ one another. This ‘coming’ is both ‘on this side’ and ‘beyond’, 
‘hope’ and ‘deception’: Celan’s ‘from threshold to threshold’.69 Thinking of ‘we’ to whom ‘they’, the 
anonymous crowd, come, is paralleled with ‘saving thought in identifying’. The ‘thresholds’ between 
which thought thinks are these two ‘wes’: thought’s self-identity and the individual’s identification with 
a crowd. Both fail: ‘we’ does not become identical with ‘they’; ‘thinking’ identifies with the ‘fall’ of 
thinking. Between these two nondientities, however, there is a ‘common fall’, a falling together, ‘as 
one’ (comme-un). And like dying, which combines the power of negation (death) with the non-power 
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of displacement (dying), the experience of this ‘common fall’ is always displaced, never present. It is 
torn between the past and future. But in this way identity is saved from itself by its exposure to the ‘not 
beyond’ of suspended negation. And in this way too writing sketches out the parameters of a double 
movement, a torn movement, of a non-transcendent writing. 
 
Negation, disaster 
Writing’s future is incoherent, not reconciled with the present. Without any principle but this 
incoherence, writing only marks its own dispersal in fragmentation. But this echoes Kantian aesthetics. 
Aesthetics deals with an indeterminacy it cannot negate. Unable to negate the object, it negates (judges) 
the subjective experience of that object. The negative is merely displaced. For Blanchot, writing 
registers this displacement as ‘disaster’, as in the final fragment from The Writing of the Disaster. ‘♦ 
Shining solitude, the void of the sky, a deferred death: disaster. [Solitude qui rayonne, vide du ciel, 
mort différée : désastre.]’.70 The sentence is in reverse: ‘désastre’, which should predicate the clauses 
it follows, instead turns into a pseudo-subject. It fails to resolve in meaning the clauses it describes. 
Disaster here acts as ‘the key word that opens and does not open [le mot clé qui ouvre et n’ouvre pas]’;71 
by wordplay neither ‘opening’ (ouvrir) nor ‘working’ (œuvrer). Playfulness becomes literal here. 
Opening and working also do not work, in that the word opens itself up to an internal deferral of 
meaning, not to any resolved ‘work’. The ‘key word’ both opens and does not open, works and does 
not work. The sentence is organised syntactically around this negative. The colon opens it up to 
‘désastre’, only for that key word not to make sense of the clauses it follows. There is solitude which 
‘brightens’ in rays of light; solitude which opens up, turning against the clotted sky, ‘vide’, ‘empty’, 
which should otherwise be opened up at the same time as it is filled with rays of light. This solitary 
space is therefore one which is not timed by light. The death which conditions the present as possible 
is not distinguishable from the nonperson who dies. In this collapse of distinction, the possible futurity 
(open sky) opened by death is not distinguishable from an impossible futurity (clotted sky). The collapse 
of this distinction is a suspension of the negation by which time proceeds, by which the present is 
secured by an open future. Disastrously, in the present we await death as indeterminate, a negative into 
which a future might be opened; but this future is always the displacement of the present, just as in 
dying I am displaced by the other I who dies, who exceeds my experience, who is nonetheless me. The 
future displaces the present, repeatedly. Negation is set aside. Light is set aside. Instead, solitude 
radiates. This is the radiation of fragmentation: of singular, discrete, solitary things which do not 
connect, which do not work together, but which are related by this disconnection, this unworking. 
Singularity is characterised by this displacement, not by a reciprocal reflexivity. 
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Disaster cannot be incorporated into any singular experience even as it conditions that 
singularity of experience. That, indeed, is the insight hidden in Kant’s aesthetic: that the indeterminate 
is at once the motor and block to coherent subjective experience, and that experience of the 
indeterminate at once founds the subject’s capacity to reflect and to judge (to think subjectively), and 
resists precisely that subjective experience. Any attempt to harness this ‘indeterminacy’ for the 
subjective system would incapacitate that system. 
♦ If the break with the star [la rupture avec l’astre] could be 
accomplished in the manner of an event,  if we could, if only through 
the violence that operates in our bruised space, depart from the cosmic 
order (the world), where whatever the visible disorder, order still 
dominates [l’arrangement l’emporte toujours], the thought of the 
disaster, in its adjourned imminence, would still lend itself to an 
experience of discovery whereby we could only be recuperated [qu’à 
nous laisser ressaisir], not exposed to that which slips away in 
motionless flight, in the separation of living and dying; outside 
experience, outside the phenomenal [à l’écart du vivant et du mourant; 
hors expérience, hors phénomène].72 
The point, then, is that we cannot escape from the ‘disaster’ (the ‘break with the star) of disarrangement 
because the very mechanism of our subjective experience of the world is already conditioned by this 
disarrangement. Disaster does not signal some external event, some exit. Yet at the same time it is the 
intimate ground of experience that resists all experience. In writing, negation does not proceed. It is 
neutral: the experience of the ‘step’ (pas) which ‘negates’ (pas), but which does not affirm that negation, 
which is not transcendent. Rather than the Kantian arrangement of indeterminacy into an aesthetic 
experience, for Blanchot we have the disarrangement of experience by its own reflective indeterminacy. 
Where Kant defers that reflective work by supposing a ‘third’ objectivity, the ‘common sense’, to secure 
subjective experience which is otherwise cut off from the object it responds to, Blanchot insists on the 
continued reflection of that indeterminacy. There is no third, here, and no dialectical step beyond the 
indeterminacy of the negative. There is no event of this experience. 
 
ii. The present and the return 
 
Experience, responsibility 
The sociality that might secure aesthetic experience for the subject is reserved by Blanchot as a limit to 
subjective experience. The disaster does not mark an affirmative rupture from the world. It is immanent 
in the world – and that includes the actualised ‘social’ reality it apparently interrupts. In Last Steps, 
Fynsk argues that writing doubles in response to contradictory demands: to respond to the injustices of 
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social power, and at the same time to respond to the ethical grounds outside power that make written 
response possible. To respond to present injustice, writing must appeal beyond it. Yet those appeals 
transcend the present. By this contradiction, writing undergoes an ‘exilic movement’ that ‘carries 
beyond the order of representation, beyond the figural’.73 The task of writing is therefore to respond 
equally to each demand. But that means that writing must proceed by contradiction. 
The responsibility that presses on writing is to the world writing excludes. As Bertrand Renaud 
argues, writing does not make experience possible so much as enjoin language to a responsibility for 
the world. But this responsibility is to the world in its exclusion from responsibility.74 This is framed 
by Blanchot as an experience that refuses communication, without refusing the obligation to 
communicate. ‘The disaster – experience none can undergo [inéprouvée] – obliterates (while leaving 
perfectly intact) our relation to the world as presence or as absence; it does not thereby free us, however, 
from this obsession which burdens us: others.’75 Writing bears a responsibility to the neutrality it cannot 
experience. The experience of fragmentation fragments the form by which it is experienced. 
Fragmentary writing doubles the loss of transcendent presence rather than reconciling itself with that 
loss. Such writing does not make anything available to experience except the present of fragmentation. 
The disaster, unexperienced. It is the very possibility of experience — 
it is the limit of writing. It is necessary to repeat: the disaster de-scribes 
[de-crit]. Which does not mean that the disaster, as the force of the 
writing, is excluded from it, is outside writing, an outside-text [s’en 
exclue, soit hors écriture, un hors-texte].’76 
The disaster, non-experience, makes experience possible by marking its outside. But in writing, that 
‘force’ is radically included. If the concept proceeds by negating its object, writing is more precariously 
exposed to the negative which it does not negate, cannot exclude, and bears a responsibility to what it 
cannot exclude. Blanchot includes writing’s incapacity as a condition for writing. This is also framed 
as the force of ‘others’, of ‘you’. ‘The one who waits precisely does not wait for you. It is thus that you 
are however awaited, but not in the vocative mode: not called.’77 Writing calls you into presence, but 
also suspends dialogue. The only presence offered is the presence of exclusion. We are exposed in 
writing to a responsibility to this exclusion of presence as what makes present experience possible. And 
yet we are enjoined by writing to attend to the possibility, in this depleted present, of a future not yet 
present. Writing displaces the aesthetic as the site for experiencing indeterminacy (and thereby for 
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reconciling subjective judgements with their objective truths), but it also inhabits the loss of the 
aesthetic as a site for presenting the conditions of reconciliation. 
♦ The present, when heightened as successive instants [si s’exalte en 
instants] (appearing, disappearing), forgets that it cannot be 
contemporaneous with itself. This noncontemporaneity is a passage 
already passed over; it is the passive which, outside time, disarranges 
time as pure and empty form wherein all would order and distribute 
itself either equally or unequally. Time that is deranged and off its 
hinges still lets itself be drawn — if only through the experience of the 
crack — into a coherence which unifies and universalizes itself. But 
the experience of the disaster — the experience none can have, the 
retreat of the cosmic which it is too easy to unmask as utter collapse 
[effondrement] (the lack of foundation [fondement] where once and for 
all, without ambiguity or questions, everything we can conceive of and 
think would be immobilized) — obliges us to disengage ourselves from 
time as irreversible, without the Return’s assuring its reversibilty.78 
Fragmentary writing intervenes into the narrative temporality of writing. The seriality of fragmentation 
presents time as not exchangeable, or dialectical, where each moment proceeds into the next. The 
‘experience none can have’ fragments this dialectical procession, ‘immobilizes’ it. This disarrangement 
of time, as we have seen in Kant, is inherent to time’s form. Presence disarranges the present by which 
it is arranged, because it needs a present to be thought but is not compatible with the present. We are 
‘obliged’ to, responsible for this experience, because responsible for this presence. And we are obliged, 
therefore, to stop thinking of time as irreversible, continuous, and instead think of the discontinuities to 
which it is subject. Bearing this responsibility also means bearing the way it collapses experience. 
Writing thus works through, and not despite, the contradiction by which experience is conditioned. 
The problem is in affirming the contradictory movement immanent to conceptuality. It is not a 
matter of affirmatively producing some new dialectical concept that could ground other conceptual 
contradictions. The threshold concept, le pas au-delà, responds to the dispersal of time that should 
condition experience, and in doing so bears its responsibility to what is other to experience. Writing, le 
pas au-delà, is a concept of non-transcendence, but also a non-transcendent concept. As such it traces 
the contours of this disastrous non-experience: it is a concept that does not mediate an experiential 
outside into a conceptually determinate, systematically secure ‘inside’. Instead, it is exposed to 
neutrality. Concepts are already contradictory, acting at once transcendentally (conditioning 
experience) and transcendently (appealing beyond the objects they think). The concept of le pas au-
delà marks the failure of negation, this suspended negativity. And so conceptually, le pas au-delà fails 
itself, weakens itself. It is a threshold-concept for a limit experience. And that limit experience is the 
experience of the neutrality of conceptual contradiction. Looking at its various iterations in the 
eponymous book, Leslie Hill shows that the concept always plays at the border of conceptuality, 
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weakening its authority rather than imposing it.79 And Fynsk describes le pas au-delà as writing moving 
on this threshold between transcendence (as marking a reality outside it) and its own ‘outside’ (its 
autonomy, its non-power, neutrality). ‘Its role would not be that of a key or master signifier. […] the 
motif is really little more than a conduit.’80 Writing does not bridge in reconciliation or otherwise 
guarantee thought’s unity. In the place of this bridge it exposes thinking to its discontinuity. If we think 
of writing as the displacement, rather than the conduit, of presence, then we are thinking in this ‘non-
transcendent’ way. The aesthetic, as a way to organise the experience of the nonconceptual by its 
indeterminacy, is subject to the neutral displacements of writing, where that experience is configured 
by an exposure to displacement, and not by reconciliation. 
I think Kevin Hart is right, therefore, to characterise The Writing of the Disaster as ‘a book of 
experience, of what ‘experience’ of the disaster might be’.81 This usefully opens up Blanchot’s work to 
a Kantian reading, and to a post-Kantian history it radicalises as fragmentary. If experience is to be 
transcendentally justified, then disaster at once demands and refutes all justification. But this means, 
for Hart, disaster is,  
first of all, experience par excellence, exposure to peril, yet also, since 
it is not a lived event, non-experience, an attunement to the Outside 
that is suffered in a state of radical passivity in which one loses the 
power to say ‘I’.82 
Yet Hart identifies this ‘outside’ not with the Kantian transcendental, with the conditions of possibility 
of experience, but with the kind of historical event that we have just seen Blanchot dismiss: the 
Holocaust. Indeed, ‘we better understand what ‘disaster’ means, what the approach of the neutral 
Outside ‘means’, when we reflect on the Shoah’.83 Hart is certainly registering the irony of such a 
‘meaningful’ interpretation of the Shoah. And yet, however caesural, even in such an ironic reading, to 
locate meaning as ‘caesural’ is to figure and to orientate as meaningful, even negatively, what Blanchot 
insists is neutrally ‘outside’ meaning. Is it possible to read historically, attendant to the history of 
writing’s formation, but without locating ‘meaning’ where, historically, writing does not offer it? After 
all, the ‘relation without relation’ is both historically manifest and critically manifest; it is a relation 
both articulated by writing and borne to writing, witnessed in writing. The interruptions to thinking 
posed by ‘disaster’ are internal to thinking, cannot be associated with any historical event, even as they 
manifest, as writing does, historically. So I want to read the conditions of possibility that disaster 
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displaces.84 The disaster’s immanence is so thorough (it ‘ruins everything’),85 yet its depletions and 
reversals so provisional, that we are obliged (as if under transcendental law) to think of the disaster 
internal to thinking, if we are ever to think justly. ‘To think the disaster (if this is possible, and it is not 
possible inasmuch as we suspect that the disaster is thought) is to have no longer any future in which to 
think it.’86 Writing continues through its own dispersal; its future is this futureless procession. If we are 
to make sense of the disaster, of fragmentation, of ‘relation without relation’ transcendentally, which is 
to say in the place of disastrous displacement of transcendental security, then we have to read the 
experience it presents as an internalised repetition of the outside that displaces any history even as it 
installs it. It is a matter therefore of thinking time as ‘repetition’ rather than ‘procession’. My wider 
claim, here, is that the reflection Kant identifies as a free ‘ground’ for experience itself displaces 
experience. An aesthetics orientated by this negativity could register such displacement. 
 
The return of the present 
If ‘disaster’ bears a force upon experience, it is as a demand to take responsibility for the future. And 
yet, this demand and this responsibility are borne as an injunction against thinking the future. For the 
future, in the present, we have not to think the future, or the present as a conduit to the future. What 
would be the condition for such experience? For Leslie Hill, Blanchot was ‘endeavouring to think the 
challenge of a future that was radically irreducible to presence’. But for Hill, this does not constitute a 
‘transcendental enquiry with the aim of legislating for all possible experience or experiences, but an 
exploration of the impossibility that announces itself in thought […] as the limit and condition of 
thinking itself.87 The fragmentary displaces transcendental enquiry because such enquiry is limited to 
experience as presentation. But the future resists all presentation, and so constitutes what Blanchot calls 
a ‘limit experience’. 
Presence without anything present [Présence sans rien de present]. In 
this affirmation which has been released from all negation (and 
consequently from all meaning), which has relegated and deposed the 
world of values, which does not consist in affirming – i.e., bearing and 
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sustaining – that which is, but rather stands beyond it, outside of being, 
and no more belongs to ontology than it does to dialectics, man sees 
himself assigned, between being and nothingness, and starting from the 
infinity of this in-between [cet entre-deux], accepted as relation, the 
status of his new sovereignty: the sovereignty of a being without being 
in the becoming without end of a death impossible to die.88 
This experience requires us to think of a ‘present without any presence’, and yet also of a ‘present’ that 
is ‘beyond’ presence. This requires another form of reflexivity, which could reflect absence and still act 
as an ‘in-between’. This is the affirmation of the interval. It does not belong to dialectics because this 
affirmation is not positive but neutral, but it is still dialogic.  So ‘it called thought outside (not beyond) 
[au dehors (non pas au-delà)], designating to thought by its fissure that thought has already left itself, 
that it is already outside itself: in relation — without relation — with an outside from which it is 
excluded to the degree that thought believes itself able to include this outside’.89 The transactions 
between inside and outside, inclusion and exclusion, that characterise relation are here ‘without 
relation’. The ‘new condition of man’ is to affirm this non-relation. 
Fragmentary writing bears the injunction that it introduces: to think the futurity outside all 
presentation. For Blanchot, this doubling constitutes the history of the fragmentation of historical 
procession in the dialectic. This can be thought through Nietzsche’s ‘eternal return’. Nietzsche, for 
Blanchot, comes after Hegel, but also before him; the fragmentation Nietzsche symbolises is the effect 
of Hegelian dialectical history, but also the condition for it. History demands fragmentation. ‘And 
writing alone can respond to this demand […] mad writing.’90 Nietzsche’s thought of the ‘eternal 
recurrence of the same to the same’ is already excessive. It exceeds the rapturous disclosure on the 
Surlej Boulder, and its repetitions disarrange even Nietzsche’s affirmation of it in The Gay Science. 
Thinking the displacement of metaphysical presence by the recurrence of presence (in which circular 
infinity there is never any singular ‘present’ to which to return), the ‘eternal recurrence’ displaces 
identity internally. The ‘return’ of identity displaces the present where identity might return, because 
the present is nothing but ‘return’. Life’, which is what comes in time as experience, what arrives, ‘you 
will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every 
pain and every joy and every thought and every sigh and everything unutterably small or great in your 
life will have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence’.91 Time is no longer an ‘inner 
sense’. Time happens to ‘you’, it is objective. Time has already happened. Its return is identical, and 
this dis-identifies time as progressive unity. Succession and sequence become irreversibly reversible. 
So, as Manola Antonioli puts it, Blanchot does not read Nietzsche for content but for a ‘style’. 
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Nietzsche’s ‘philosophical fragments do not oppose themselves, do not contradict themselves, they 
juxtapose themselves in a non-dialectical experience of speech and writing that inaugurates a new 
experience of thinking.’ In this way Nietzsche marks ‘discontinuity, white space [l’espace blanc], 
caesura.’92 Reading Nietzsche enjoins Blanchot to fragmentary writing. Reading is fragmentary, and 
repeats in fragmentary writing – writing which repeats the inadequacy of reading, repeats the way 
reading displaces what it reads.  
Blanchot develops this reading in part from Pierre Klossowski, according to whom we 
‘identify’ with the eternal return, which requires us to identify our singular experience with multiple 
subject positions. In such identification, ‘I am no longer in the moment when the abrupt revelation of 
the Eternal Return reached me’.93 The circular form of time is ‘a transfiguration of existence which — 
because it has always been the Circle — wills its own reversibility, to the point where it relieves the 
individual from the weight of its own acts once and for all’.94 The subject enters into a reversible relation 
with its own individuality: willing individuality, singularity, it wills the circle of its multiplication. We 
encounter the social in the subject. Identity is identical over time by its relation to what is outside it — 
its other, which is its repetition in society. And this suspends negation. Negation, in the thought of the 
eternal recurrence, turns into the ‘step not beyond’, the pas au-delà, step/not beyond, that, passing, does 
not pass anywhere beyond that passing. The step by which time should proceed, negation, turns into 
recurrence, repetition. Identity requires discontinuity, however, in order to mark it as singular. In this 
repetition there is no internal discontinuity, only the exchangeability of the same for the same. So this 
identity becomes the discontinuity that disarranges time. Identity is felt to be outside itself. The ‘return’ 
of the same to the same displaces presence. If the same returns to itself, then it always exceeds itself. 
And if the present is constituted as singular, self-identical, then it is interrupted by precisely this 
‘identical’ return. It is therefore a nonidentical repetition precisely by the way it proposes self-identity. 
The “re” of the return inscribes like the “ex”, opening of every 
exteriority: as if the return, far from putting an end to it, marked the 
exile, the beginning in its rebeginning of the exodus. To come again 
would be to come to ex-center oneself anew, to wander [à errer]. Only 
the nomadic affirmation remains.95 
All that ‘lingers’, ‘remains’, in writing is the affirmation of ‘error’ as a wandering, nomadic exile. The 
fragmentary becomes an outside-not-beyond identity.  
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This can be figured, again, through aesthetics. Fragmentary writing interrupts art’s self-identity. 
As Levinas puts it, 
For Blanchot, the vocation of art is without equal [hors pair]. But most 
importantly, writing does not lead to the truth of being. It might even 
be said it leads to the error of being – to being as a place of errancy 
[lieu d’errance] and that which cannot be inhabited. So it might equally 
be argued that literature fails to lead anywhere at all, because any such 
place is impossible to reach. The error of being: further outside than 
truth.96 
Writing returns to art as exile. We should recall Celan’s Meridian, here, from chapter two. Writing is a 
return of an identity that is not identical with itself. Just so, any judgement about art depends on an 
exilic departure from any history of art. Art proceeds by discontinuity. And that means it proceeds by 
fragmenting continuity. The continuity experienced in art, where each time the artwork is singular but 
recognisably art, becomes the experience of the fragmentation of judgement. Judgement is subject to 
the discontinuity of the presence of law. 
(Even in the law of the Eternal Return, the past could not repeat the 
future as the future would repeat the past. The repetition of the past as 
future frees for a completely different modality – which one could call 
prophetic. In the past, what is given as repetition of the future does not 
give the future as repetition of the past. Dissymmetry is at work in 
repetition itself.97 
Repetition of the ‘past’ in the future is prophetic, but there is another ‘modality’ of repetition: the 
impossible repetition in the eternal return of the future in the past. The break from continuity does not 
propose another possible continuity (an ‘avant-garde’). It breaks from the experience of continuity. In 
writing, we experience this fragmentation of experience as the condition for any experience of writing. 
We can only recognise writing, like art, aesthetically, by its discontinuity from the transcendental 
conditions for experience: it is not present, it bears no presence, it withdraws from meaning coordinated 
by identity.  
 
iii. The trace, the future, reversibility 
Disastrously, the experience of presence is withdrawn from the present. How can writing refer to any 
future, when it marks this withdrawal? Writing’s work of marking and tracing what is other to it is, in 
this fragmentation of reflection, neutral. Writing at once bears a responsibility to what is ‘beyond’ it, 
and, orientated by this outside, cannot write anything other than ‘outside’. ‘Outside’ the present, it 
cannot ever ‘present’ presence. This is a temporal injunction. Writing is never self-present, and yet it 
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bears a responsibility for dialogue. This becomes legible when writing is tasked with responding to 
exactly this impossibility. It is legible, then, in its ‘tearing’: in Celan’s poetic image that ‘tears’ the 
imaginary, in writing the ‘unavowability’ of community. These do not trace further spaces into which 
writing passes. They mark a fragmentation internal to writing that enjoins it merely to repeat, and not 
to reflect, presence. 
 This marking is also a condition for legibility. This fragmented legibility can be followed 
through the temporality of the ‘trace’ in reading. But Blanchot’s fragmentation intervenes into this 
trace-work. The roots of neutrality in the Romantic fragment and ‘ironic’ reading, therefore, are, as 
Christophe Bident argues, ‘ironically’ apparent in the way they do not surface in Blanchot’s fragment 
writing. If ‘irony disjoints speech’, then this interruption also ‘emanates’ from fragmentation into 
reading.98 Reading repeats the dispersing work of writing. Reading Levinas for the ‘trace’, Blanchot’s 
writing is ‘grown aware of itself as response’.99 Writing internalises distance, grows distant from its 
powers of presentation, assumes in fragmentation the reflecting role of reading. Writing therefore 
repeats the distinction Kant draws between aesthetic experience and aesthetic judgement. The relation 
between reading and writing is fragmented as a temporal relation itself. There is no present in writing, 
and therefore no presence in reading. The trace for Derrida, according to Martin Hägglund’s reading of 
him through Kant, is ‘an ultratranscendental condition’: it thinks ‘a constitutive finitude that is 
absolutely without exception’.100 This time is not a transcendental law governing experience, but the 
necessary ‘undecideability’ of the future. ‘If law is essentially deconstructible, the undecidable coming 
of time is thus the undeconstructible condition of justice.’101 The ‘traced’ undecideability of time 
assumes the place of a transcendental condition that could legislate for such undecideability. This is a 
condition for reading. The trace retroactively installs its object’s presence. Synthesis marks what ‘will 
have happened’. This is what, in Writing and Difference, Derrida calls ‘original repetition’.102 Derrida 
is describing, as Bruce Baugh usefully demonstrates,103 how Hegel’s ‘synthetic’ dialectic presupposes 
the form of synthesis in the objects being synthesised. The logic of the trace, then, reverses this. 
Synthesis produces the presence of what it synthesises. This is not representation, but nevertheless 
appears as if from the past. Derrida extends this into a reading of Blanchot’s negation, a ‘double pas 
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(pace, not)’, in which ‘the other dislocates the opposition of near and far, without however confusing 
them’.104 The other’s ‘distance’ from the text saves it from the negations of ‘presentation’. Reading, we 
are displaced. But how can we connect this sense of retroactive, read negativity with the responsibility 
writing bears for what is beyond presence, beyond negation? 
Reading according to this ‘trace’ effects the kind of ‘irreversible reversibility’ experienced in 
Nietzsche’s eternal return. But for Blanchot, writing is not just a ‘trace’ but a ‘mark’. Writing marks, 
and the mark effaces itself. 
♦ Effaced before being written. If the word trace can be admitted, it is 
as the mark that would indicate as erased what was, however, never 
traced. All our writing — for everything and if it were ever writing of 
everyone — would be this: the anxious search for what was never 
written in the present, but in a past to come.105 
Writing marks the loss of presence of which it is a ‘non-effect’. Referring to no future presence, we 
well as no original presence, fragmentary writing effaces its own presence, rather than producing itself 
retroactively in the gap of the present it exposes. This is implicitly a ‘reversal’ of the Kantian aesthetic 
procedure: rather than validating the subject’s reflective activity in judgement, Blanchot’s fragment 
effaces its own possibility. 
♦ Writing is not destined to leave traces, but to erase, by traces, all 
traces, to disappear in the fragmentary space of writing, more 
definitively than one disappears in the tomb, or again, to destroy, to 
destroy invisibly, without the uproar of destruction […]. To write at the 
level of the incessant murmur is to expose oneself to the decision of a 
lack that marks itself only by a surplus without place, impossible to put 
in place, to distribute in the space of thoughts, words and books. To 
respond to this demand of writing is not only to oppose a lack to a lack 
or to play with the void to procure some privative effect, nor is it only 
to maintain or indicate a blank between two or several affirmative 
enunciations; what then? perhaps first to carry a space of language to 
the limit from which the irregularity of another speaking, nonspeaking, 
space comes back, which effaces it or interrupts it and which one 
approaches only through its alterity, marked by the effect of 
effacement.106 
Any ‘undecideability’ is here subject to erasure. Any future would be ‘erased before being written’. 
There is no symbolic recuperation of the negative in a writing that inhabits its loss. Writing instead 
enjoins us, over and over, to this limit of language which returns to disperse writing. If we recall the 
play of inside and outside that characterised Kantian judgement, the play of ‘presence’ as spacing and 
‘present’ as timing, where judgement reflectively provided a space for an experience that had no 
objective presence, here, for Blanchot, writing effaces this placement. Responding to a lack of 
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possibility, writing becomes a ‘surplus without place’, an effect without ground or presence. Exceeding 
all presence, however, it does not constitute in itself another (dialectical) presence ‘beyond’ that lack 
into which presence might proceed. It marks, rather, the alterity of effacement itself, the alterity of 
nonspeaking, which is not an absence of communication but the neutral dissipation of communication. 
Assuming critical reflection into its own work does not, therefore, mean providing a further dialectical 
step to mediate literature or writing. It is the suspension of writing for the sake of the ‘nonspeaking’. In 
this suspension, however, we are exposed to a different ‘modality’ of time: ‘there is no future [avenir] 
for disaster, just as there is no time or space in which it might fulfil itself’.107 The future does not ‘come’, 
there is no present adequate to it. It might only be preserved, then, by writing that responds to its alterity, 
its nonexperience. 
 However, the suggestion in The Step Not Beyond that writing is carried to the ‘limit’ of 
experience and exposed there to the ‘other’ of speaking is cautiously reconfigured in The Writing of the 
Disaster. 
But to travel to the end of thinking [aller au bout de la pensée] (in the 
form of thinking of the end, or the edge) – is this not possible only by 
exchanging one thought for another? Whence the injunction: do not 
change your thinking, repeat it, but only if you can.108 
The injunction here is against ‘exchange’ as a cipher for change, against which writing must be exposed 
to its own repetition. In order to think of the future in its indeterminacy – its refusal to end – writing 
must think beyond time as a form of succession, in which each moment is exchanged for the next. And 
so it must think in the serialism of fragmentation, in which fragmented interchangeability each fragment 
is reversible, and so therefore irreversible, not something we can read beyond. Fragments repeat, rather 
than exchange. There is no ‘limit’ or ‘edge’ to fragmentary writing. The ‘irreversibility’ of this law of 
‘reversal’ interrupts legal coherence. Writing legislates (thinks future coherence, in that laws legislate 
for the future) the continuing incoherence, the self-dispersal of the present. Writing is ‘the movement 
of irreversibility that, as such, is always reversible (the labyrinth)’.109 Again, this temporal dispersal is 
figured as a spatial displacement: time’s dispersal is a labyrinth. Again, time breaches its own secure 
boundaries. In being figured, time is displaced, space is dispersed. This ‘reversal’ – this turning back, 
this re-verse – reverses writing’s legislative claims, interrupts its futurity.  
In suspending presence and the present, and in figuring this suspension as a future dispersal 
that returns nonidentically to the present, Blanchot is displacing ‘hope’. Hope is installed into the 
dispersed future as a possible future dispersal. Hope, that future coordinate of presence, is there, like a 
star, a point of orientation, but its hope is that the present is dispersible. Writing is committed to, 
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attentive to the present precisely by being attentive to the way the present is not orientated by any future 
that might meaningfully secure it. So, Le Pas au-delà opens with this reversal of law: 
Do not hope, if there lies your hope — and one must suspect it — to 
unify your existence, to introduce into it, in the past, some coherence, 
by way of the writing that disunifies.110 
Writing is exposed to indeterminacy. But that does not mean that it fills that fissure with its own 
presence. Writing, like time, is already coordinated by this fissure. One cannot retroactively find 
meaning through writing that is orientated by the future as the dispersal of presence. This movement of 
reversibility that traverses the present, in the progressive exchange of present for present, in the 
continuing loss of presence that is felt as the present, is felt as suffering. ‘Listening, not to the words, 
but to the suffering that, from word to word, without end, traverses the words.’111 As Leslie Hill says, 
this is writing as disaster: 
In disaster […] language is not all. Something else, without ever 
appearing as such, unknown, unnamed, and unforeseen, traverses each 
word, effacing it and reinscribing it. It does so, however, not as the 
transcendent or transcendental, but ‘as’ (as without as) the neuter, the 
infinitely repetitive (re-)marking of difference prior to ontology.112 
This ‘something else’ opened our discussion in this chapter: the ‘something’ that rings false in the 
dialectic, the ‘something’ that concepts negate in order to think. But in this reading of Blanchot, this 
‘something else’ is nothing other than writing itself: writing which comes, as a mark, from the future  
of its own dispersal, writing which reverses from an ‘effect of non-effect’, the impossibility of 
experiencing the future as indeterminate. The possible loss of each fragment, which is precisely because 
of this possibility necessary, marks what a legally framed present would cover up in a falsely pitched 
future: that the present is already lost to itself. If Blanchot thinks dialectically, then, it is in this way: in 
exposing within the dialectic the loss that it calls progress. And the exposure of such loss, the exposure 
to such loss, we might call an aesthetic experience. The reflective aesthetic experience is prompted by 
the ‘negative presentation’ of an object in reflection: when it is not conceptually available to experience, 
experience ‘merely’ reflects. The crucial difference, however, is that in such an experience, experience 
is lost.  
The difficulty of conceiving such a task for writing is that it is double. It responds to the 
impossibility of the system by writing from within its impossibility. Fragmentary writing responds, as 
I have been claiming, to a double demand with a double voice: 
there must always be at least two languages, or two requirements: one 
dialectical, the other not; one where negativity is the task, the other 
where the neutral remains apart, cut off both from being and from not-
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being. In the same way each of us ought both to be a free and speaking 
subject, and to disappear as passive, patient113 
If writing is to found any political subjectivity, it is in the way it gives voice to this double and 
paradoxical exigency: to think of present suffering without transcending that suffering, and to think 
hopefully of a future without that future constituting a transcendent ‘third’ into which that suffering 
present would be negated. Writing inhabits the injunctions it responds to, and repeats them. 
The correct criticism of the System does not consist […] in finding 
fault with it, or in interpreting it insufficiently […] but rather in 
rendering it invincible, invulnerable to criticism or, as they say, 
inevitable. Then, since nothing escapes it because of its omnipresent 
unity and the perfect cohesion of everything, there remains no place for 
fragmentary writing unless it comes into focus as the impossible 
necessary: as that which is written in the time outside time, in the sheer 
suspense which without restraint breaks the seal of unity by, precisely, 
not breaking it, but by leaving it aside without this abandon’s ever 
being able to be known.114 
In this way any system of writing is provisional. And that means that it is coordinated by an experience 
of the indeterminacy of experience. The futurity that coordinates the present of aesthetic judgement is 
here not merely indeterminate, not merely yet-to-be determined. It is felt as the loss of the present. This 
is disaster. The indeterminacy, the future, that should make aesthetic, reflecting judgement possible is 
subject to a reversal. Just as the community that the aesthetic judgement supposed became, in chapter 
two, the present failure of community as the only possible communal end of aesthetic work, so the 
present failure of judgement – an incapacity to judge that this present moment is aesthetic – becomes 
the only possible aesthetic experience. If judgement is withdrawn from its future coordinate, then that 
is for the sake of the future indeterminacy that the aesthetic would think. The aesthetic is only possible, 
then, according to this disaster: that its present is impossible, that its future is promised, that its 
experience is not of any reconciliation of the present with the future (I judge as if any other subject 
would have to judge in this way) but of the dispersal of the present of experience. 
The disaster, the ‘break with the star’, is the break with a certain kind of fateful futurity. And 
yet, if it is the break with a determinate future, with prophecy, it is also not possible to accomplish this 
break. The disaster is precisely that we are stuck in this temporality. Writing does not break with it. 
Rather, it accomplishes le pas au-delà, the step/not beyond by which it does not break with anything, 
by which it lingers, conceptually, on the threshold of conceptuality. By not breaking with time, by not 
exceeding it, writing breaks with time as reversible, reverses it as irreversible. 
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3 – Adorno: ‘progressive impossibility’ – meaning and the future from Negative Dialectics to 
Aesthetic Theory  
 
The task mandated to writing by Blanchot is impossible: to think the future in a present that can only 
disperse the future. This is to think from a finite standpoint not the ‘infinite’, but the indeterminate and 
repeating finitude of presence that is always erased by the present. For Adorno, too, this impossibility 
attends thinking. And as with Blanchot, with Adorno the task is focused through a responsibility 
thinking reflectively bears to what it thinks. Experienced finitely by finite subjects, community, like art, 
is never conceptually complete. Like art, it proceeds by particular experiences. And like art, it must be 
reflectively constructed from experience. To what extent can the aesthetic experience of art shape or 
make legible the kind of reflective indeterminacy that characterises writing, for Blanchot, and not just 
the experience of it? We can now turn to Adorno’s intervention into dialectics through aesthetics by 
mapping these coordinates onto his own writing. 
How do we move from the question of ‘community’ to the question of dialectics? In the 
Critique of Pure Reason, Kant describes the ‘ambiguity’ of the word ‘community’ (Gemeinschaft) that 
describes how objects perceived sequentially – in different spaces – can be thought of as simultaneous. 
There must be ‘something through which A determines the position of B in time’. They must be 
‘represented as existing simultaneously’. ‘Thus it is necessary for all substances in appearance, insofar 
as they are simultaneous, to stand in thoroughgoing community of interaction with each other.’115 The 
interaction of these objects is a ‘commercium’ and not a ‘communio’. They are empirically related, and 
so interact with one another. A communio, however, as Kevin McGlaughlin puts it, would think ‘of a 
nonempirical simultaneity or of a community that exists “where perceptions do not reach”.’116 This is 
‘common sense’: thinking of a relation between subjects that is not empirically mediated. For 
McLaughlin, this task is delegated by post-Kantian reason to poets, who communicate language outside 
empirical relations. But this is not sequestered to aesthetic experience. These relations reflectively 
proliferate. Specifically, as I argued in chapter two, ‘common sense’ does not ratify transcendental 
continuity between subjective reason and objects, but interrupts it by ‘objectifying’ it in political 
relations. ‘Community’ interrupts ‘common sense’. So the reflection of aesthetic experience interrupts 
the terms of transcendental experience. If we are to say something like ‘community’ holds as a 
‘nonempirical simultaneity’ between subjects, then, as McLaughlin argues, we have to recognise the 
ways this simultaneity is founded on an incommunicability, a ‘poetic force’ that exceeds language’s 
empirical functions in poetry. My contention is that this interruption of ‘empirical simultaneity’ is not 
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discrete. The apparently subjective aesthetic judgement refers to an objective history of artworks. And 
the apparently subjective terms of political judgement about community also communicate a 
sedimented history of objective judgements, which structure the terms of political ‘society’. Aesthetic 
judgement is therefore subject to an objectivity which it does not determine. And in this failure, aesthetic 
experience returns us to the objectivity – the objective ‘simultaneity’ of perceptions – that Kant’s 
aesthetics seem to skirt. Thinking about art, in other words, means thinking about the ways objectivity 
is suppressed from judgement, precisely because of the way art thinks towards a ‘community’ – a 
present, a presence – of subjective experience. This means, for our purposes here, moving between the 
suspensions of conceptual progress thought in Adorno’s Negative Dialectic, to the coordination of 
experience as a promise – as a futurity felt in the present – by Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory. My argument 
is that this suspended negation works towards a non-transcendent aesthetic, in which critical reading 
cannot legislate its objects’ meaning, but in which failure a non-transcendent presence might be 
registered. I will now examine how ‘meaning’ coordinates ‘futurity’ in Adorno’s aesthetic. 
In Reality and its Dreams, Raymond Geuss gives a useful account of how thinking about the 
future is entangled in political utopianism. For Geuss, utopia responds both to present reality (and not 
just to normative moral value) and to demands impossible in the present of that reality.117 Blanchot’s 
concern for the future in writing is in this sense utopian. Thinking about the future as at once impossible 
in the present and yet pressing in the present means, for Blanchot, thinking through writing. Utopia is 
also the crucial question for Adorno’s aesthetics. For Adorno, art is faced with a present crisis that 
threatens its future possibility. 
The crisis of art, which has today reached the point of endangering its 
very possibility, affects both of its poles equally [ihre beiden Pole 
gleichermaßen]: On the one hand its meaning [Sinn] and thereby 
essentially its spiritual content [Gehalt]; and on the other its expression 
and thereby its mimetic element. One depends on the other. There is no 
expression without meaning, without the medium of spiritualization; 
no meaning without the mimetic element: without art’s eloquence 
[Sprachcharakter], which is now in the process of perishing.118 
We have seen how for Blanchot writing depletes presence in a non-transcendent configuration of 
writing as repetition. Here, for Adorno, this is a depletion of meaning. Blanchot’s ‘double voice’ of 
writing is doubled, by Adorno, into the aesthetic experience of art. Art’s capacity to mean is depleted 
by its incapacity to express; but expression also depends on that expression being meaningful. I will 
look at this problem from Negative Dialectics to Aesthetic Theory, by tracing how ‘polar’ dialectics 
work according to contradiction, then how that contradiction is not manifested but registered by art, and 
finally how this contradiction – contradictorily – makes a future legible. This occurs outside the 
principle of identity. But that means it also refuses the reconciliations mandated to aesthetics by Kant. 
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The question thus turns around what kind of aesthetics would be possible without this principle of 
reconciliation. And this opens onto other questions: can we retain, in aesthetics, reflecting judgement 
as a mode of identification? Can we think of identification, like identity, as provisional? Can we, finally, 
think of a ‘community’ outside reconciliation, outside identity, through the provisionality of reflection? 
This ‘crisis’ in art’s conditions is registered as a ‘disaster’ for critical aesthetics. ‘The more art 
is compelled to oppose the standardized life stamped out by the structure of domination, the more it 
evokes chaos. Chaos forgotten becomes disaster [Unheil].’119 If aesthetics is to say that the artwork is 
meaningful, then it has to ‘forget’ the incoherence, the indeterminacy, that it registers. But were it to 
give up on coherence, then it would merely reproduce incoherence. The problem is in thinking without 
either recuperating the object for determinate thought, nor merely reproducing the incoherence of 
objective indeterminacy. For Adorno, as for Blanchot, this problem is navigated by fragmentation. 
‘Only philosophy in fragment form would bring the monads, designed in illusion by Idealism, to their 
proper place. They would be representations in particular of the totality unrepresentable as such.’120 
Art’s fragmentation presents a negativity that characterises totality, which is unrepresentable in that 
totality. And in this way, criticism registers the ways truth ‘turns against’ objectivity in art.  
The truth content of art, whose organon was integration, turns against 
art and in this turn art has its emphatic moments. Artists discover the 
compulsion towards disintegration in their own works, in the surplus 
of organization and regimen […]. However, the truth of such 
disintegration is achieved by way of nothing less than the triumph and 
guilt of integration. The category of the fragmentary 
[Fragmentarischen] – which has its locus here – is not to be confused 
with the category of contingent particularity: The fragment 
[Bruchstück] is the part of the totality of the work that contradicts 
totality [welcher ihr widersteht].121 
Aesthetics has to register the ways the artwork objectively contradicts, ‘widersteht’, the kind of 
reconciliation, the ‘integration’, that is nonetheless its work. This contradiction reproduces an aesthetic 
crisis on a critical level. And this reproduces a contradiction that fuels philosophy: not between the 
particular object and conceptual universality, but between objective particularity and subjective 
particularity. This is worked out, for Adorno, between Negative Dialectics and Aesthetic Theory. In 
tracing the two projects together, we can find a critical relation between the need for a dialectics which 
prioritises objectivity, and an aesthetics which marks the form this kind of experience can historically 
take. The point is not, therefore, to suggest that Negative Dialectics morphs into Aesthetic Theory, 
philosophical lack supplemented by aesthetically felt plenitude, but rather that the two establish a 
mutual debt to experience: a philosophical debt to the object obscured by a subjectively orientated 
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theory of knowledge is calibrated by an aesthetic debt to the artwork.122 My concern is with this relation 
of debt, not with establishing any continuity between the two kinds of thinking. What subjective 
dialectics lose is not credited by an aesthetic experience which significantly loses its own object, art; 
art’s ‘irresolvable antithesis that is never brought to rest in the state of being’ which is paradoxically 
only ‘visible’ ‘at a standstill’.123 Rather, there is a collaboration between these losses. The ‘progressive 
impossibility’124 of negative dialectics lets us read a political significance into Adorno’s aesthetics that 
goes beyond art’s critique of the ‘wrong state of things [falschen Zustandes]’.125 
 
i. Polarity: the polar relation between subject and object in Negative Dialectics 
The ‘right state of things’ would ‘be neither a system nor a contradiction’.126 As J.M. Bernstein 
describes it, the negative dialectic is historically conditioned by exactly this ‘wrong state of things’, in 
which system the world appears contradictory. ‘Contradiction, when it occurs, points to the claim of 
the particular, the nonidentical, against its social identifications.’ Such contradiction is ‘bound to 
unreconciled experience’. 127 If dialectics proceeds by negating its object, then it proceeds by the way 
the object contradicts present concepts. The point of a ‘negative’ dialectics is to relocate truth from 
‘negation’ to ‘contradiction’. In a false world, reconciliation of contradiction is false. But that does not 
mean that contradiction is simply true – that the ‘real’ is an inversion of the ‘actual’. Rather, in 
contradiction, as Simon Jarvis suggests, this ‘real difference’ is speculatively treated as real. 
Speculative thinking […] does not treat contradiction as an accidental 
error, but as something real. […] negative dialectic seeks to make 
visible, as contradiction, the real antagonisms which are masked by 
philosophy’s striving for logical identity.128 
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We do not get past contradiction if contradiction is real, rather than just an unreconciled negative. For 
Josh Cohen, such suspension by contradiction opens thinking to the political. Contradiction has to be 
‘voiced’, sounded. 
Far from fulfilling its vocation of fidelity to non-contradiction, which 
would leave real – social – contradiction unacknowledged and 
unexamined, philosophy’s eminently political task is to refuse this 
vocation.129 
Contradiction does not mark an opportunity for negation, which would simply invert the ‘false’ as 
‘true’. Just so, the epistemological reproduction of the exchange society in the polar subject-object 
relation cannot be reversed by inverting that polarity. Just because ‘what we do in such reflections, 
without confessing to it, is to presuppose as mediating what we want to deduce as mediated, the subject, 
thinking’,130 and thereby hypostasize the subject, indeed ‘objectify’ the subject, does not mean that 
criticism can do away with such a polarity by inverting it, by replacing the subject with the object. 
Rather, ‘critical thinking’ should ‘eliminate this hierarchy’.131 The point, then, is that the reversal of 
polarity is not the same as a polar inversion. Adorno’s negative dialectics would think against polarity 
by posing critical thinking in contradiction to polar-identity. It is not enough simply to replace the 
hypostasized subject with a re-valorised object. That would be merely to reinforce the polar separation 
by which the subject is hypostasised. Such replacement, indeed, is precisely what the subject does: it 
places itself, as ‘mediator’, in the place of what it ‘mediates’. 
The objectifying subject contracts into a point of abstract reason, and 
finally into logical noncontradictoriness [Widerspruchlosigkeit], which 
in turn means nothing except to a determinate object132 
Without contradicting determinate experience, the subject cannot experience indeterminacy. Any 
‘contradictory’ polar relation between subject and object is impossible, even as this contradiction – the 
separation of subject and object – is what grounds and drives dialectical thinking. The point, then, is to 
expose this polarity to its contradictions.  
The polar relation between subject and object cannot be done away with, because to do away 
with it would be to reproduce the ideological step that would do away with such difference between 
thinking and what is thought for the sake of, and in the form of, identity. In identity, the object’s 
objectivity becomes the site for the subject to posit its own identity with that objectivity. A dialectics 
which could linger with its moment of negation, rather than proceeding by that negation beyond what 
is negated, a dialectics which would reverse through what is negated rather than taking that negation as 
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an opportunity to establish its own self-identity, would turn upon the priority of the object. This is a 
reversal of the polarity of dialectical relations, but it is not the inversion.  
The polarity of subject and object may appear to be an undialectical 
structure in which all dialectics should take place. But the two concepts 
are originating categories of reflection, formulas for an 
irreconcilability [nicht zu Vereinendes]; not positive, no primary states 
of fact, but negative throughout, expressing only nonidentity. Even so, 
the difference between subject and object is not easy to negate. […] 
They constitute one another just as, by virtue of such constitution, they 
diverge from each other [auseinandertreten].133 
This polarity is negative, not positive. The poles ‘auseinandertreten’, diverge, step away from one 
another. Polarity is itself subject to a dialectic. Each pole is the negative moment of its opposite. The 
subject is not-subject, the object not-object. And because of this, dialectically, the subject is also not-
object, the object not-subject. A polar dialectic proceeds by this reversal, not by the negation of 
difference. 
Nothing is possible but the determinate negation of the individual 
moments whereby subject and object are turned into absolute opposites 
and are precisely thus identified with each other. In truth, the subject is 
never wholly the subject, the object never wholly the object; and yet 
the two are not pieced out of [herausgestückt] any third that transcends 
them.134 
Each pole is negatively related to the other. There is no final third that secures their polar opposition 
other than this contradiction. And this movement is historical, capable of changing. The subject is only 
provisionally a subject, according to its negative relationship with its object, a relationship that might 
change. Adorno is presenting, in this ‘negative’ polarity, the possibility of a non-transcendent 
dialectical thinking, one that does not propose to solidify or secure as positive either the subject or the 
object, but rather to work through their divergence, their separation. The subject is the product of the 
objectivity it negates. A negative dialectic would recall this objectivity, not negate it.  
The subject is a negated objectivity. But objectivity is also a negated subjectivity. Thus, the 
subject constructs the object it negates. 
As through the crenels [Scharten] of a tower, the subject gazes upon a 
black sky in which the star of the idea, or of Being, rises. And yet it is 
the very wall around the subject that casts [wirft] its shadow on 
whatever the subject conjures: the shadow of reification, with which a 
subjective philosophy will then again impotently feud.135 
So the subject is trapped in the subjectivity by which it thinks. And yet, that does not mean there is any 
‘third’ beyond subjectivity that could release the subject from this trap. ‘What would lie in the beyond 
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[jenseits] makes its appearance only in the materials and categories within.’136 Polarity might well 
falsely collapse the distinctions between inside and outside in identification, but the outside is only 
conceivable in this collapse and this identification. The real is at once obscured by the subject and only 
minimally available through such subjective obscuration. Concepts make thinking possible. Yet they 
are not sufficient to think of the way thought can be orientated by the experience of indeterminacy. 
Adorno proposes that with dialectics, ‘we can think against our thought without abandoning it’.137 We 
cannot think outside thought, but we can think of the ways thought is outside itself. But if thinking is 
complicit with any injustice it might register, in what form could it think ‘beyond’ suffering? Can 
thinking move beyond its complicity with domination? 
This would require not just a polar reconfiguration – replacing the subject with the object, the 
concept with, for example, ‘the body’ – but a reconfiguration of polarity. Polarity would no longer mark 
opposition, but contradiction: the way it speaks against itself (contra+dictio), speaks out of this 
resistance. ‘Instead, the rigidly dichotomous structure disintegrates [zerfällt] by virtue of the 
determination of each of the poles as a moment of its own opposite.’138 Polarity no longer marks the 
continuous relation between subject and object, a relation which is abstracted into Kantian 
transcendental philosophy. This abstraction is the abstraction of both the subject and the object. The 
negative dialectic is the amplification of the nonidentical relation between each pole of this duality. 
Thus the play of contradiction, of opposition, of polarity, exposes the nonidentity of the polar relation. 
The discontinuity opened by such exposure, such play, the reflection identified by Kant with the 
aesthetic, in turn opens up polarity to a more speculative continuity, to a possible relation through such 
discontinuity. The free play of identification, in which each pole identifies as a ‘moment of its own 
opposite’, allows for this discontinuous relation. The ‘free play’ felt in Kantian aesthetics is translated 
into apparently secure epistemological relations. This is a radicalisation of Kant’s proposal that the 
subjective identity experienced in such aesthetic judgements should secure a priori validity for 
judgement as such, including determinate judgements. Here, determinate, and not just reflective, 
judgements are discontinuous, made of moments. And as Claudia Brodsky points out, the art object, 
‘an “object” made of “moments” may well be the only proper object of a subject that alternately 
perceives and fails to perceive it’.139 Art, the object of aesthetic experience, models the moment of a 
kind of subjectivity that can accommodate its alternations between subject and object. The subject in 
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aesthetic experience, experiencing an object as a moment of non-relation to it, itself becomes a moment 
of this polar non-relation. 
 
ii. Contradiction of reality in Aesthetic Theory 
The subject’s relation to the object it thinks is polar. But that polarity is the construction of subjectivity. 
Dialectically, that ‘polar’ subjectivity is submitted to a negative polarity, in which each pole – subject 
and object – is the provisional negative of its other. Accordingly, each moment of thinking in this 
dialectic is provisional, rather than determinate. Rather than proceeding from a determinate opposition 
between subject and object, thinking in this way would construct its polarity reflectively. But this means 
thinking through contradiction, rather than negating it. I want now to suggest that, with Adorno, we can 
think of this as an aesthetic experience, formed by the reflective way artworks construct polarity outside 
subjectivity. 
 When aesthetic experience is thought of dialectically, the autonomy it secured for Kant is 
disturbed. Aesthetic experience refers to a subjective capacity to experience. One’s capacity to judge 
the object as it is without purpose, autonomous from any ‘interest’, reflects one’s subjective capacity to 
be autonomous. That I can think about this object as being without any purpose reflects the autonomy 
of my thinking. But this autonomy also alienates me from the object. If I can think autonomously, apart 
any object, then the object is unnecessary. Aesthetic judgement marks the subject’s autonomy – that it 
can autonomously think without needing any purpose to that thought – but it also marks the subject’s 
alienation from objectivity; and this marks the subject’s capacity to dominate that object. Only a 
subjective experience of autonomy directed by the priority of the object, and by its specific formal work, 
could resist this domination. But this means reversing aesthetic experience into the artwork itself. If, 
instead, the artwork is autonomous from aesthetic experience then, rather than ratifying subjective 
autonomy, it would be experienced negatively, promising in an object the kind of autonomy and 
happiness that we do not yet have or feel subjectively. Only if the artwork’s objectivity resisted the 
subject’s attempts to recuperate it for experience would, paradoxically, the autonomy which aesthetic 
experience promises be possible.  
This moves us away from a characterisation of Adorno’s dialectical aesthetics as inverting 
polarity in favour of the object, as Tom Huhn suggests. For Huhn, whereas we can associate Kant with 
subjectivism, ‘Adorno’s negative dialectic instead favors the object at the expense of the subject’.140 
But if the negative dialectic employs a negative polarity, then this prioritisation of the object does not 
negate the subject as its opposite. Instead, thinking is coordinated through experience, exposing the 
apparently secure opposition between subject and object to the reflective ways each pole is constructed. 
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As Brian O’Connor stresses, the priority of the object is established within this relationship of reciprocal 
determination in experience.141 This reciprocity is visible ‘only when the priority of the object is a 
feature of the account.’142 In this negative dialectic, thinking is constituted by ‘the interdetermination 
of subject and object’.143 It is only through subjective experience that the object is constituted as an 
object. The point is to prioritise objectivity within subjectivism, such that it is thinkable. The aesthetic 
offers opportunities to do this precisely because its claims to truth are framed within mere subjective 
experience that, for Kant, makes no claim to objective validity. Lacking such objective validity, 
aesthetic judgement must construct its own grounds for truth as if they were objective. As Ross Wilson 
argues, ‘Kant’s attempt in the third Critique was already an attempt to elaborate an objective aesthetics, 
albeit one that would be subjectively mediated’.144 The difference of aesthetic from epistemological 
experience is that the object’s form, rather than the subject’s transcendental forms, coordinates that 
experience. And so the ‘separation of subjective universality from conceptual support is not a clean 
break’.145 There remains a recourse to conceptual objectivity, even if it remains incomplete. Aesthetic 
judgements are thus in an ‘unavoidably precarious position’146 between determination by the object and 
subjective self-legitimation. This precariousness is vital for our reading of Adorno. If, in Wilson’s 
characterisation of Kant, ‘[t]he subjective is in aesthetic judgement already held to be universal’,147 for 
Adorno, this objectively-derived subjective feeling characterises aesthetic claims to subjective truth. 
‘Kant envisioned a subjectively mediated but objective aesthetics.’148 In aesthetics, we experience 
subjectivity without reference to an object. But this lack is coordinated objectively by the artwork, once 
the pleasure aesthetics refers to is historicised in ‘art’. ‘The subjective detour [Abweg] may totally miss 
the mark, but without the detour no objectivity becomes evident.’149 In aesthetic experience, precisely 
because it refers to subjective experience for validation, we experience the way subjectivity is opposed 
to objectivity. There is no object to negate. Consequently, there is no end to aesthetic thinking, or 
reading. And so in aesthetics we experience the way subjectivity is negatively coordinated by 
objectivity; and crucially, we experience the way subjectivity is constructed from a lack of objectivity. 
 This ‘reversed polarity’ becomes visible in aesthetically experienced contradiction. Just as 
contradiction makes possible the positive dialectic that works by negating that contradiction, so the 
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negative dialectic by which art is experienced works by lingering with that contradiction as negative. 
There is no a priori ground for calling an object ‘art’ other than the history of provisional artworks with 
which it enters into constellation. The artwork bears a doubled, paradoxical relation to reality: it 
constitutes its own autonomous reality out of the provisional material of society and history, not from 
the finite but ontologically necessary reality of nature. 
Every artwork is in fact an oxymoron. Its own reality is for it unreal 
[…]. An artwork is real only to the extent that, as an artwork, it is 
unreal, self-sufficient, and differentiated from the empirical world, of 
which it nevertheless remains a part. But its unreality – its 
determination as spirit – only exists to the extent that it has become 
real.150 
The artwork is ‘really’ there, but ‘really’ semblance. ‘In aesthetic semblance the artwork takes up a 
stance toward reality, which it negates by becoming a reality sui generis. Art protests against reality by 
its own objectivation.’151 The artwork presents an objectification of reality that contradicts the positive 
constructions of reality in dialectics by reversing that process of negation. The artwork ‘negates’ the 
idea that reality is constructed by its own autonomous presentation. 
There is nothing in art, not even in the most sublime, that does not 
derive from the world; nothing that remains untransformed. All 
aesthetic categories must be defined both in terms of their relation to 
the world and in terms of art’s repudiation of that world. 152 
The categories of aesthetic experience, and its reflective work, are relocated from the subject to the 
object. And so art, as a way of reflecting the world, works autonomously from the subjective reflection 
that it nonetheless reproduces. 
The experiencing subject, from which aesthetic experience distances 
itself, returns in aesthetic experience as a transaesthetic subject. The 
aesthetic shudder once again cancels the distance held by the subject. 
[…] The moment of this transition is art’s highest. It rescues 
subjectivity, even subjective aesthetics, by the negation of subjectivity. 
The subject, convulsed by art, has real experiences […].153 
Art does not therefore simply reproduce reality; but neither does it repudiate it. Rather, it becomes the 
site of an experience of subjectivity made objective. Subjectivity becomes the object of this experience. 
But it is reflected negatively, as if the subject were an object. This contradiction allows for a subjective 
experience of reality as outside subjectively mandated polarity. This is a radicalisation, and not a 
renunciation, of Kantian aesthetics. The artwork provokes and claims validity outside its own 
objectivity, inside the subject’s experience, in what the subject feels. However, ‘[t]he feelings provoked 
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by artworks are real and to this extent extra-aesthetic [außerästhetisch].’154 Pleasure is registered 
outside the subject’s aesthetic experience. ‘The relation of the objectivity of the artwork to the primacy 
of the object is fractured [gebrochen].’ 155 The artwork’s claims to objectivity are themselves mediated 
by subjectivity: not only by the apprehending subject of aesthetic experience, but by the subjectivity 
dominated context of society which constitutes art’s material. 
 If the real exceeds experience, if it remains negative, then it has to be imagined, figured. The 
artwork reflectively provokes this figuration by its lack of objectivity.  
Both [art and philosophy] keep faith with their own substance through 
their opposites [Gegensatz]: art by making itself resistant to meaning; 
philosophy, by refusing to clutch at any immediate thing. What the 
philosophical concept will not abandon is the yearning that animates 
the nonconceptual side of art, and whose fulfilment shuns the 
immediate side of art as mere appearance. The concept — the organon 
of thinking, and yet the wall between thinking and the thought — 
negates that yearning. Philosophy can neither circumvent such 
negation nor submit to it. It must strive, by way of the concept, to 
transcend the concept.156 
Art refuses exterior meaning; philosophy refuses the immediacy of its object. Both, then, are configured 
by their opposites. Both are works of figuration. Art: towards the objectivity lacking in subjectively 
orientated dialectics; philosophy: towards the nonconceptual which it cannot conceptualise. Both, in 
other words, work critically, negatively, not positively generating any ‘meaning’. Only this self-
criticism can stop the subject from ‘building a wall [Wand] between itself and the object’.157 And yet, 
just as the subject builds the ‘tower’ of the real into which it is locked, the ‘real’ is only available as 
this wall. We must figure the way thinking is blocked from what it thinks, and that means figuring the 
way thought is blocked. The real must be figured in order to be critiqued. Criticism, like thinking, is 
always criticism of something, it is a negative procedure. This figure – the wall – constitutes the reality 
it critiques. It is contradictory. But this contradictory process models the way art exposes the apparently 
subjective work of aesthetic judgement to the objectivity it lacks. If art is to imagine itself into this gap, 
it does so only in contradiction. ‘The power of what exists erects the façades into which consciousness 
impacts/from which consciousness is repelled [auf welche das Bewußtsein aufprällt]. It must try to 
penetrate them.’158 Thinking is nothing other than this attempt to penetrate the limitation by which it is 
established. There is no ‘outside’ which the wall demarcates, because thinking is the wall and its 
penetration. Adorno figures this contradiction in the wall. 
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 Just like the ‘you’ ‘intruded’ as an image into Celan’s poetic dialogue, this process is 
internalised into Celan’s poetry. But we should firstly recall how, for Blanchot, the condition for 
‘explosive communication’ was that writing could, in fragmenting them, exceed its generic borders in 
its new medium: writing ‘(on the walls)’. Writing on ‘walls’ here means writing that is both provisional 
and excessive: temporally, it is written in a public present; spatially, it is written on any possible surface. 
In both modes it is both unnecessary and provisional: it should not be there and it might be erased. The 
‘wall’ here signals the condition for this provisional and excessive communicability. But such writing 
at once opens up a fragmented futurity in the wall and impossibly blocks the indeterminacy such a 
future might be constituted by. Such writing is ‘like’ a ‘wall’: it establishes a limit and blocks it. Once 
politics is established, the political which made such establishment possible dissipates. Writing ‘on the 
wall’ equivocates on exactly this limit. 
FROM FISTS, white 
from the truth hammered 
free of the wordwall, 
a new brain blooms for you. 
 
 
AUS FÄUSTEN, weiß 
von der aus der Wortwand 
freigehämmerten Wahrheit, 
erblüht dir ein neues Gehirn. 159 
This ‘new brain’ blooms organically from the ‘wordwall’. Words are here conceived as a wall 
themselves from which truth is worked. The new possibilities opened by such a truth are newly material 
possibilities: a new brain, a new configuration of thinking, newly material thoughts translate from the 
monolithic wall into the organic, blooming, brain. The ‘wordwall’ is violently worked out, hammered, 
into some newly ‘beautiful’ image. Such figurative violence is irrevocable. It traces the figurative heart 
of aesthetic experience: that the aesthetic judgement is as irrevocable as any determinate judgement, 
that the organicism of Kant’s ‘beauty’ infects its subsequent production in artworks, and that the 
production of such artworks –  and, crucially, such aesthetics that could frame the experience of those 
artworks – is organised by a kind of block. When Adorno says that suffering needs expression, but that 
expression occludes suffering, and then doubles the problem by tying the capacity for expression to its 
polar twin, meaning, he is similarly tracing this violent path the mute object takes towards meaning. 
The ‘ram’, Widder, into the forehead of which, we recall from the first section, an image was 
burned, becomes contradiction, Widerspruch. Contradictorily, the ‘ram’ literalises the Widder 
figuratively concealed in Widerspruch. Its work is framed negatively: ‘What | doesn’t he | butt against?’; 
and this ‘butting’ is framed by the negation of world in the you: ‘The world is gone, I have to carry 
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you’.160 Negation is a thing, a ram.161 In turning this negation into an object, Celan contradicts it, speaks 
against it; the ram speaks against (widerspruch) itself (Widder). Contradiction, speaking against, 
resisting, is paradoxically both forceful and powerless: it can only contradict its object by not negating 
it. Contradiction summons figuration. For Adorno, art works through such reversals of conceptual 
progress, reversals of negation. This is ‘form’: 
the nonviolent [gewaltlose, also ‘forceless’] synthesis of the diffuse 
that nevertheless preserves it as what it is in its divergences and 
contradictions, and for this reason form is actually an unfolding. A 
posited unity, it constantly suspends itself as such; essential to it is that 
it interrupts itself through its other just as the essence of its coherence 
is that it does not cohere.162 
In art, negation repeatedly contradicts itself; it inhabits the contradiction of a provisional polarity. And 
that synthesis-fragmentation paradox extends into the way that art, the history of art, forms its own 
material: artworks work on other artworks. The ‘history’ of these relations, art to art, forms a 
contradictory history, ‘inhomogenous’: a temporal synthesis constituted by points which contradict one 
another, rather than harmonising. ‘A noncontradictory [widerspruchslose] theory of the history art is 
not to be conceived: The essence of its history is contradictory in itself.’163 Adorno frames this 
‘contradiction’ negatively: we are asked, impossibly, to conceive of a noncontradictory theory that 
could frame the discontinuities of art. Aesthetics is essentially in this position of impossibility: it bears 
a relation to a history of discontinuity that, contradictorily, both presents and asks for synthesis. In a 
negative dialectic, art does not become some privileged discourse that can substitute for an otherwise 
compromised form of subjective identification. It does not propose meanings where other 
epistemologies cannot. It becomes, instead, the thoroughly negative site where the subject is repeatedly 
– over and over – exposed to its nonidentity with objectivity. Art remains a contradiction. But in this 
way, subjective experience is exposed to the contradiction of the future as promissory, to which we will 
now turn. 
 
iii. Utopia: thinking, hoping, promising the future between art and aesthetics  
For Kant, thinking is mediated by the subjective forms of the faculties. For Adorno, those forms are the 
sedimentation of objective, social, and historical forms. They are generated from a history of cognition, 
and the objective history of social conditions. They appear to be subjective precisely because that 
history is the history of negating objectivity. But in the aesthetic experience of art, one has to think 
reflectively from the objective forms art gives to experience. If art expresses anything, it is in form. 
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Aesthetics has therefore to be an aesthetics of form if it is to respond to art. And yet, aesthetics cannot 
merely repeat art’s form – there has to be some critical difference. But neither can aesthetics think of 
anything beyond what art gives in form. The contradiction that generates artistic form is reproduced 
differently, here, as an aesthetic contradiction. 
Because form is the central concept of aesthetics and is always 
presupposed by it in the givenness of art, aesthetics must gather all its 
forces to think the concept through. If aesthetics is not to be trapped in 
tautologies it must gain access to what is not simply immanent in the 
concept of form, yet the concept of form refuses to grant a voice to 
anything aesthetic that claims independence from it. An aesthetics of 
form is possible only if it breaks through [Durchbruch] aesthetics as 
the aesthetics of the totality of what stands under the spell [Bann] of 
form. Whether art is in any way still possible depends precisely on this. 
The concept of form marks out art’s sharp antithesis to an empirical 
world in which art’s right to exist is uncertain. Art has precisely the 
same chance of survival as form does, no better.164 
Aesthetics cannot recuperate anything distinct from that given in art’s form; and yet aesthetics cannot 
either merely repeat art formally. Yet in a curious reversal, Adorno says that the future possibility of 
art – and not just aesthetics – depends on the capacity of aesthetics to ‘break through’ its own 
dependence and conditionedness on ‘the totality of what stands under the spell of form’. Aesthetics has 
to go beyond what art presents, but at the same time cannot think outside art. If there is any ‘future’ to 
art, as well as to aesthetics, it has to be thought through this contradiction, and this double demand: to 
think of the future (not) beyond the artwork. Could we call this a negative dialectic of art, aesthetics ‘in 
reverse form’? 
 This deferral of meaning is implicit to Kantian aesthetics. Finding no concept adequate to the 
experience of beauty, the subject must reflectively construct newly adequate cognitive forms to think 
this indeterminacy. To validate these unanticipated reflections, the subject supposes some future 
subject’s assent in ‘common sense’. Just as no present concept is adequate to think ‘beauty’, so no 
present subjectivity is adequate to experience that beauty. There always has to be more possible future 
experience, otherwise the indeterminacy that characterises it would terminate. The legibility of the 
aesthetic experience is in the future. But that future legibility has to be present, now, in art’s form. The 
‘communication between objects’, is preserved by aesthetics in ‘communication as the affinity of 
elements that remain unidentified’,165 an indeterminate affinity communicated by an objective 
indeterminacy. Thinking through the concept of form means thinking through the present illegibility of 
form. The present of form is a promise. For Kant, the reconciliation felt within judgement promises 
future intersubjective reconciliation. But for Adorno, the failure of this to materialise means that the 
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promise persists negatively. The future imagined by art is not reconciled with the present of its 
imagination.  
This is the ‘promise of happiness’ that is scattered through Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory. As 
Christoph Menke observes, ‘[b]eauty is the illusory appearance [scheinhafte Erscheinung] of happiness 
[…], happiness that can only be made as appearance [Schein]: which remains a mere promise, of which 
one does not ever know whether it can be redeemed or is a lie.’166 In art, the subject is presented with 
an experience that cannot be reconciled with the present. Reconciliation is not deferred, it is ‘broken’. 
That is art’s promise. Thierry De Duve argues that the ‘reconciliation’ ‘as ‘“promise” is ceaselessly 
betrayed and yet still waiting to be fulfilled’.167 In art, we experience promise as  a negativity which is 
not negated. According to de Duve, Adorno sacrifices art to such future reconciliation, while de Duve 
himself does ‘not entertain, even remotely, the hope that some future day the world might be peaceful 
enough – harmonious, beautiful, reconciled enough – to allow for the vanishing of art into 
uselessness’.168 Art, here, promises a reconciliation in which it would disappear; de Duve holds on to 
the hope that it will not. But does the future function in this way for Adorno? I think Adorno’s 
characterisation of form as contradictory speaks against this. James Gordon Finlayson argues that the 
experience of the artwork does not prefigure any determinate future.169 Art anticipates happiness, ‘like 
a hope raised by the work itself’,170 in which anticipation the future is not manifest, but is made possible 
as different to the present. This hope is only possible if the artwork does not manifest it. For Adorno, 
this means that while art synthesises it does not identify its material. Art thinks against its own promised 
happiness. 
Stendhal’s dictum of art as the promesse du bonheur implies that art 
does its part for existence by accentuating what in it prefigures 
[vordeutet] utopia. But this utopic element is constantly decreasing, 
while existence increasingly becomes merely self-equivalent [gleicht 
immer mehr bloß sich selber]. For this reason art is ever less able to 
make itself like existence. Because all happiness found in the status 
quo is ersatz and false, art must break its promise in order to stay true 
to it.171 
Art wants to promise a reconciled form of the future, but that means it cannot merely make its material 
like itself, equal to itself, gleichen. As what is actual becomes historically more self-identical, art must 
refrain from its own synthetic work if it is to stay true to its ‘utopic’ syntheses. ‘Art is the ever broken 
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promise of happiness [Kunst ist das Versprechen des Glücks, das gebrochen wird].’172 We should note 
Adorno’s translation of Stendhal’s French. Versprechen is not equivalent to la promesse, promettre. 
Promettre, like to promise, derives from the Latin ‘to send forth’, pro (before) +mittere (to send). A 
promise prefigures some future occurrence. But while the German prefix ‘ver’ can refer to ‘before’, it 
can also more ambiguously describe the error of its verb’s action (verlesen – to misread), an error which 
is also errancy, to misguide, such that versprechen means to promise but sich versprechen means to 
mispronounce. What French and English ‘promise’, what they ‘send forth’, is in German open to the 
risk of error, of mistake, misleading: speaking-before but also mis-speaking; an errancy which is 
performed or risked in Adorno’s translation. Breaking the promise of happiness is also keeping to it as 
a promise. For Josh Cohen, this form of broken promise is pitched through Adorno’s ‘new categorical 
imperative’: to think after Auschwitz such that Auschwitz ‘will not repeat itself, so that nothing similar 
will happen’.173 We have to think against similarity, against repetition – but what can aesthetics do but 
repeat or represent its figurative object? For Cohen, this imperative ‘demands above all a vigilant 
resistance to alterity’s assimilation to knowledge’, and so ‘the judgement of its fulfilment belongs of 
necessity to an unachieved and unachievable future’.174 Not just unachieved: unachievable. The future 
is not prefigured but, for Cohen, interrupted. This ‘conjunction of necessity and impossibility’175 
constitutes art’s promise. ‘Art is not the fulfilment but the maintenance of its promise’.176 Art cannot 
present happiness, only promise it. We do not experience any presence in art, only its promise; indeed, 
the broken promise that does not ever manifest. And this is the promise of aesthetics, the promise that 
something like reflective experience, and therefore something like art, could be possible. The futurity 
of art’s present is non-transcendent: as futural, it does not go beyond what the artwork presents, even 
as it promises something else than what it presents. The future is promised as a non-manifest happiness. 
 An aesthetics responsive to this form of futurity as promise in art would have to think through 
exactly this form. We can relate this to Alexander García Düttmann’s characterisation of criticism that 
‘would be the critique of what exists in the name of what does not yet exist.’177 Aesthetics orientated 
by art’s promise would critique what is present ‘in the name’ of what is not yet present. What is 
presently possible is referred through a presently impossible futurity. By reflection, the future becomes 
a coordinate by which the present might be read. For Düttmann, this orientation is effected by language. 
Because ‘meanings’ are specific to ‘a particular use of language, a language game’,  178  they are 
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disclosed by a legibility that is not identical with their present. We read according to a ‘utopian trace’ 
at once present and futural; a depletion of what exists by what does not yet exist which does not, 
however, transcend what exists. Like language, in language, meaning in art is immanent to its form, 
and yet is necessarily read, and therefore re-read. This means, however, that any ‘utopian’ meaning 
cannot positively be located in language. Aesthetic experience does not amount to ‘non-identity 
thinking’.179 Rather, it is attendant to the temporal displacement of meaning, of reading, immanent to 
the way language functions. And this means being attendant to the way language does not positively 
mean, means being attendant to its indeterminacy. For Robert Kaufman, Adorno’s aesthetic is thus 
coordinated through Kant’s, which ‘weirdly projects the possibility of uncoerced social construction 
from the very absence of an object, general rule, norm, or standard of taste that would determine the 
process called the judgment of beauty.’180 In aesthetic experience, the subject is the exposed to ‘new’ 
possible social forms that ‘aesthetic experiment constructs’.181 Through Kaufman, we could say that 
aesthetic experience thus ‘projects’ new forms through the indeterminate forms presented by artworks. 
In responding to the experiential lack presented by artworks, the subject has to coordinate aesthetic 
experience through an indeterminate future. And for Anthony Cascardi, ‘while artworks are indeed 
objects, the truth-content of art is of the world while also offering critical reflections upon it’.182 Just as 
the concept of art is inadequate to the sensuous presence of the artwork, artworks are objects, but not 
just objects. They also make truth claims that exceed their ‘object’ status without transcending it. In 
other words, artworks can only function as art through this non-relation to aesthetic theory, a relation 
of non-transcendence. ‘If it is essential to artworks that they be things, it is no less essential that they 
negate their own status as things, and thus art turns against art.’183 And aesthetic theory must therefore 
assume, in this relation, a position of displacement. It is never adequate to the sensuous ‘embodied 
meaning’ of the artwork; and yet, its inadequacy exposes the ‘truth’ of this meaning by becoming the 
negative refusal to impose meaning or to transcend the artwork.  
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This does not mean that theory is just the aporetic repetition of its own conceptual inadequacy. 
Rather, theory’s decisive displacement by the artwork models a different condition for truth: the truth 
of promise, not correspondence; but only insofar as that promise is always displaced. Theory’s 
displacement lets us think of truth as displaced, exilic. But that means thinking through the form that 
truth critically takes: language, writing. In Negative Dialectics, ‘hope’ is in the form of the constellation: 
‘it is not to transfigure the existence of these elements, but to bring them to a configuration, in which 
the elements enter into a writing.’184 Just so, in Aesthetic Theory, the artwork’s written character is 
reproduced on a critical level by aesthetic experience. ‘Art transcends [tranzendiert] the nonexisting 
only by way of the existing; otherwise it becomes the helpless projection of what in any case already 
exists [was ohnehin ist].’185 ‘Through its own figuration [Komplexion], art brings the essence into 
appearance in opposition to its own semblance.’186 Art transcends its object status only in aesthetic 
experience, which it nonetheless contradicts. That does not just mean, as Kaufman suggests, that it 
projects a new, future subjective form in which it could be experienced. It means, rather, that the artwork 
undertakes what Gerhard Richter calls ‘a mimesis of what does not yet exist, the negative traces of 
futurity that can be neither predicted nor programmed in advance but that nevertheless inscribes itself 
into the artwork, and into the philosophy that enters a relation with that artwork, as a non-identical and 
negatively charged otherness.’187 Only in aesthetic experience is the present of the artwork unfolded 
into these ‘negative traces of futurity’, not new meanings but newly legible negativity, indeterminacy, 
futurity. 
In art, universals are strongest where art most closely approaches 
language: that is, when something speaks, that, by speaking, goes 
beyond [übersteigt] the here and now. Art succeeds at such 
transcendence, however, only by virtue of its tendency toward radical 
particularization; that is, only in that it says nothing but what it says by 
virtue of its own elaboration, through its immanent process. The 
element in art that resembles language [sprachähnliche] is its mimetic 
element; it only becomes universally eloquent in the specific impulse, 
by its opposition to the universal. The paradox that art says it and at the 
same time does not say it, is because the mimetic element by which it 
says it, the opaque and particular, at the same time resists [opponiert] 
speaking.188 
Art’s eloquence, like philosophy’s, is the eloquence of what art lacks. Aesthetics does not recompense 
for this lack. Aesthetics does not thereby transcend the artwork. ‘What speaks out of important artworks 
is opposed to subjective reason’s claim to totality. Its untruth becomes manifest in the objectivity of 
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artworks.’189 As Simon Jarvis puts it, ‘The ‘language’ invoked in Adorno’s account of ‘constellation’ 
is a language which still retains its double character, a language which has not yet wholly surrendered 
itself to sign or image, concept or intuition.’190 Art’s eloquence is therefore negative, just as the future 
into which it is read is negative. 
Just as the artwork is not determinate, is not ever complete – its promise never either redeemed 
nor falsified – so is aesthetics orientated by incompletion, ‘grasping theoretically its continually 
transforming object of reflection.’191 Aesthetics is provisional, yet it must, in a sense, think beyond the 
artwork. Here Adorno runs into the same problem as Blanchot. Aesthetic thinking about art must 
simultaneously respond to two polarising demands: that it not be identical with its object, and therefore 
in some sense exceed it; and yet that it not over-write it, or negate it. Adorno argues that meaning is not 
merely to be located with subjective intention. It is objectively mediated. But neither is that object 
meaningful in itself. The artwork has to enter into relation with a judging subject through aesthetic 
expeirence, because it is not sheer objectivity: it is the objectification, the sedimentation, of a subjective 
history of art. This reflects the ‘polar’ non-identity of subject and object, their mutual construction. And 
in the experience of art, the subject is also exposed to the way it is organised objectively. The critical 
disconnection registered with art by aesthetics reflects a disconnection between subjectivity and the 
subject’s objective moment.  
The supposed fundamental facts of consciousness are something other 
than merely that. In the dimension of pleasure and displeasure [Lust 
und Unlust] the bodily intrudes upon them. All pain and all negativity, 
motors of dialectical thinking, are the often mediated, sometimes 
unrecognisable forms of the physical, just as all happiness aims at 
sensuous fulfilment and obtains there its objectivity.192 
Happiness is felt in the body or it is not at all. Happiness needs to be articulated. But it is articulated, 
by art, according to the temporality of the promise. This means that happiness, in art, is a felt distance 
from objectivity, the suffering, the ‘weight’ of objectivity on the subject that needs ‘expression’. We 
cannot talk about meaning in art without recognising the way meaning depends on this negative 
expression. Suffering is not just negated happiness. Suffering is the weight, from the future, of an 
objectivity that has to be negated in order to be thought. Happiness is manifest or it is not at all. And 
yet, ‘[a]ny happiness is a fragment of the whole happiness’,193 just as the fragment in philosophy is 
‘representations in particular of the totality unrepresentable as such’, and in art is ‘the part of the totality 
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of the work that opposes totality’. Happiness is the contradiction of a futurity that opposes happiness 
now. Its singularity registers the multiple legibility which its non-manifestation makes possible. 
If art is supposed whole and unfragmented [bruchlos], it is bound from 
the outset to fail; if it is jettisoned in order to be won, there is no 
guarantee that it will return; it is lost insofar as the individuated does 
not on its own, without any deus ex machina, go over into the universal. 
The sole path of success that remains open to artworks is also that of 
their progressive impossibility [fortschreitender Unmöglichkeit].194 
The ‘steps’ of progress (fortschreitender) are impossible, reversed, because they promise an impossible, 
non-manifest futurity. Criticism, then, has to respond to this impossibility, and not to engage with art 
as so much figural ore to be mined. 
The more the emancipation of the subject demolished every idea of a 
preestablished order conferring meaning, the more dubious the concept 
of meaning became as the refuge of a fading theology. Even prior to 
Auschwitz it was an affirmative lie, given historical experience, to 
ascribe any positive meaning to existence. This has consequences that 
reach deep into aesthetic form. When artworks have nothing external 
to themselves to which they can cling without ideology, what they have 
lost cannot be restored by any subjective act.195 
No subjective act could positively pose the nonidentical. And subjective judgement cannot answer the 
debt to the negative by which it proceeds. The ‘body’, far from being the refuge of happiness, is already 
the site of multiple nonidentities which the subject occludes, even as it makes them available to 
experience. Kantian aesthetic ends are thereby reversed. Rather than obtaining for a transcendental 
system the nonconceptual truth of aesthetically felt pleasure, aesthetics responds to the suffering of that 
loss, which is not the loss of pleasure but the loss of pleasure’s identity with happiness. This loss 
vouches for the futurity of happiness, not for its present meaningfulness, as the feeling of present 
pleasure. Aesthetics suffers to lose its object because losing it is the only way to rescue it from meaning, 
a meaning that would occlude the indeterminate, futural happiness the artwork prefigures, figures into, 




The task of bringing Adorno and Blanchot together is not just complex, it means responding to 
incommensurable demands. On the one hand, Blanchot insists that writing affirms only its own 
dispersal. On the other, Adorno insists that any liberation from experience must be mediated through 
experience. Subjectivity is the only measure of autonomy by which the dominating practices of 
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subjectivity might be resisted. Both writers therefore themselves respond to incommensurability. 
Writing writes through the impossibility it both exposes and installs. Aesthetic experience persists in 
its interruption of transcendentally secure, possible, experience. To bring these two writers together, 
then, means responding to an incommensurability that connects them, means responding to their mutual 
disconnections. These are not just historical or circumstantial. Both insist on disconnection as part of 
the reflective procedure of ‘aesthetics’, however conceived. If we are to think of them together, it cannot 
just be through their connections. Rather, their disconnection provokes us to re-think the way reflection 
characterises a critical relation in itself. Both resist presence and meaning, and any criticism of both 
must respond in turn by not utilising their resistance to connection to impose or establish a ‘third’ critical 
presence. If the relation between these two writers is played out critically, then, it is through their mutual 
or collaborative resistance to any critical determination of their relation. Through relating them, through 
bringing them together, we are exposed to the kind of critical thinking they advocate. If the two work 
towards a ‘non-transcendent’ aesthetic, then this ‘non-transcendence’ holds also for critical 
interpretation. Indeed, this is articulated by a critical connection outside presence, outside meaning, that 
holds these two writers exilicly ‘outside’ each other. Blanchot’s fragmentation amplifies a 
fragmentation at the heart of this system, which in turn amplifies the fragmentations the aesthetic 
undergoes in Adorno’s reading of it. Aesthetic experience is not merely negative. It is the dispersal of 
experience, the expropriation of transcendental conditions, which exposes the transcendental unity of 
the subject implicated in that experience to the futural possibilities of dispersal. The aesthetic does not 
merely ‘undertake’ the work of a ‘negative’ dialectic; it is the site where a necessary futurity is felt at 
the limits of subjective unity, at the multiple, serial, dispersal of the unity of the present which 
nonetheless constitutes ‘another way’ of history. 
Hill’s characterisation of Blanchot’s sense of writing withdrawing presence, precisely the 
presence ‘gathered’ in Heidegerrian alétheia where an originary forgetting is un-forgotten,196 reflects 
the characterisation of Adorno’s negative dialectic I have been drawing. 
For Blanchot, to forget forgetting was not to accede, by dint of the 
positivity born of a double negative, to the foundational durability of 
memory. It was much rather to be exposed twice over to an erasure. 
But this erasure of an erasure did not culminate in anything present, but 
in the radicality of a redoubled deletion which, if it forcibly left a trace, 
was irreducible either to being or to non-being and might be addressed 
only under the auspices of what, Blanchot […] had begun calling: the 
neuter.197 
The kind of ‘truth’ afforded here is that of the self-dispersal of writing as a mere function of the present. 
Writing does not mimetically draw or gather any truth, however pitched through non-correspondence, 
which Heidegger attributed to poetic truth. Neither is there any Hegelian positive dialectically produced 
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from the process of negation. Rather, writing is exposed to that negation, such that it ‘radically’ 
‘redoubles’ the deletions effected by negation. As we have seen, Adorno’s negative dialectic also 
interrupts the procedures of dialectical progress; read through Adorno, Blanchot’s ‘fragmentary 
writing’ is the exposure of dialectics to its own process; read through Blanchot, Adorno’s ‘negative 
dialectic’ is the exposure of thinking to its non-originary relation to dispersal. Not only does the ‘erasure 
of erasure’ ‘not culminate in anything present’, it asks for a way to ‘address’ that non-culmination. Here 
we are brought back to poetry, and to Celan, and specifically to the figure. What kind of poetics could 
reflectively address its own neutralised capacity to address? What kind of figuration would govern this 
capacity, or not? What kind of figurative relation would afford to these radically incapacitated, but also 




The figure of snow: Celan, elegy, aesthetics 
 
the poet with the name in reverse 




Cixous, in my epigraph, is referring to Celan, specifically to the paronomasia (the punning, the 
‘naming-beside’) by which he got to that name from Ancel (An-cel, Cel-an). Celan ‘called 
himself contrarily’. And Cixous reads him from this point of contradiction. ‘Only thus are we 
able to advance, by beginning at the end’.1 I want to read this paranomasic reversal into Celan’s 
poetry itself. This kind of ‘contrary naming’, naming that does not present what it names, is 
felt in the elegy. We saw in chapter three how the kinds of reflective connection Kant sought 
to establish in his third Critique – the connections between subjective faculties registered in 
aesthetic experience, and the connections that organise nature in teleological judgements – are 
turned into relations by disconnection. Each of these writers reflect on disconnection; and that 
disconnection itself can be pitched, through Kant’s aesthetic, into an aesthetic of disconnection, 
an aesthetic coordinated by the reflective orientations of disconnection. We saw, in chapter 
two, how this disconnection reflectively organises ‘community’, and we saw in chapter three 
how this disconnection reflectively shapes ‘dialectics’ of presence and presentation. Now, we 
can turn explicitly to the poetics that have framed these accounts of disconnection. And we can 
see more specifically how these accounts are shaped by the figure ‘reversal’ which is also at 
once, I will now argue, a ‘reversal’ of thinking through figuration itself, and a figure for such 
figuration. This is an attempt to think of the future without presence, without the present: a 
promise, discontinuous with any present. Chapter three explores how the future does not just 
exceed the present, but disperses it. And if elegy looks back from the future to an absent subject, 
then it marks, in Celan’s elegists, the incompatibility of that absence with any poetic present. 
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Their subject does not arrive. They have to proceed, then, into this non-arrival, and then have 
to address something non-present. There is therefore a poetics of this non-manifestation. 
Now, in this concluding chapter, I want to look at how Celan’s poetics think through 
this reversal towards the kinds of futurity that are reserved for aesthetic experience. And I want 
to suggest that this reversal is legible in reading those poetics as ‘elegiac’, repeated in Celan’s 
elegists, critical and poetic. My claim is that figuration fragments into legibility through 
reading, and therefore into aesthetic experience. 
This chapter has two parts. In the first, I look at Celan’s poetics of figuration and the 
way they enjoin and resist reading the future. This reading is staged by Adorno and Blanchot, 
in their critical work on Celan. In the second, I look at this figuration through two of Celan’s 
English elegists: Geoffrey Hill and J.H. Prynne. Both sections trace the figure of ‘snow’ in its 




1 – Celan and figuration  
 
i. ‘detours from you to you’: Celan, figuration, snow  
 
‘Oversnowed | beauty’ 
In his translation of Shakespeare’s sonnet V, Celan finds a rhyme between ‘snow’ and ‘beauty’:  
Beauty o’er-snow’d, and bareness everywhere: 
Then were not summer’s distillation left 




die Schönheit. Und Entblösstes allerwegen. 
 
Dann, blieb der Sommer nicht als Sommers Geist 
im Glas zurück, verflüssigt und gefangen2 
 
 
    [Oversnowed 
beauty. And everywhere bareness. 
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So does not summer remain as summer’s spirit 
behind glass, liquefied and trapped] 
‘Überschneit | die Schönheit’. ‘Überschneit’, of course, is not quite snow but the verb form 
‘schneien’ turned into an adjective: ‘over-snowed’. And ‘Schönheit’ is not any beautiful thing, 
but abstract ‘beauty’. The verbal action of snowing is crystallised, suspended, into an adjective 
describing this abstract ‘beauty’. Not a literal landscape, then, but a concept that is snowed 
over. And no snowing, none of what W.S. Graham calls ‘The real unabstract snow’.3 So what 
is this snow, layered over this abstraction? The clue is perhaps given in its parallel image, the 
likewise crystal glass, glass which invisibly traps what it contains. Does snow contain beauty 
as glass contains summer’s spirit? And does Celan’s translation also contain what it translates? 
This is pitched  through two different metaphors for containment, for communication, for 
visibility – for metaphor itself. Snow buries what it covers, whereas glass transparently displays 
what it imprisons. But snow that covers beauty covers up something already invisible, not real, 
abstract. After all, what would beauty be that we could not experience? What kind of judgement 
could be made (and both Shakespeare’s and Celan’s poems propose this) that there is beauty 
covered up, not apparent? This is a negative aesthetic judgement. I attest to what I do not 
experience. 
If ‘presence’ is something the poem ‘translates’, then it is ‘negative’ in the sense 
developed in chapter three. What is the effect of this ‘negative’ presence for the poem’s 
capacity to figure presence?  The question here is to what extent, in such translation, is 
‘presence’ governed by ‘forgetting’? In this section, I want to trace figuration across this 
metaphor of a ‘landscape’ that is exiled, displaced, in being translated. We should recall Kant’s 
reflective ‘field’ of judgement, and Adorno’s ‘no-man’s land’, as well as the ‘neutrality’ of 
reflection for Blanchot. We can explore ‘snow’ and ‘glass’ as figurative points of contact within 
Celan’s poetics, and with critical readings of his poetry. This kind of dialogic figuration 
amounts to a translation itself. But the stakes of that translation are not clear. For Anne Carson, 
such dialogues form an ‘economy of the unlost’, a relation of exchange where what is 
exchanged is lost, but in being exchanged visible. ‘Celan is a poet who uses language as if he 
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were always translating’.4 We can characterise this exchange of loss as elegiac. Carson reads 
Celan through the Greek poet Simonides, finding in his Greek elegiac metre ‘the acoustic shape 
of perfect exchange’:5 where rhythmically, each half is perfectly reversible with the other. This 
reversibility of exchange lingers in Celan’s elegiac work, which ‘poems do not pretend to 
partake of happier process or positive change’,6 but rather reserve as this reversibility the 
possibility of a non-exchangeable loss. What is lost is never, to use Carson’s term, ‘unlost’, 
and the elegy does not pretend otherwise. Rather, it interrupts the exchangeability of mourning 
that would replace displaced loss with the material reversibility of language. This elegiac 
movement traces the reflective coordinates of community explored in chapter two, and of 
dialectics explored in chapter three. In this chapter, I want to demonstrate how this elegiac 
work translates into critical reading, and therefore makes legible the ‘loss’ of experience in 
aesthetic thinking, the objectivity – and the futurity – that aesthetic experience loses. 
 
Translating the future 
Such translations constitute a poetic dialogue. But dialogue, I have been arguing, is subject to 
suspensions. Joel Golb argues that temporally, Celan’s translations translate a destroyed past 
into an incompatible present.7 They always in this way trace loss. The poem presents this loss 
of a past. But translation is spatial: the transfer from one space to another. For Leonard 
Olschner, such translation witnesses the loss it enacts. Loss returns in the poetic present, 
‘visible markers left by the poetic visitations of other poets in his home territory’.8 This 
territorialisation of loss is a question of presence. For Ana Glazova, Celan’s translations are 
dialogic. Poetry translates the ‘presence’ of another. ‘The poet’s speech establishes a relation 
to the past – in other words, to the poetic tradition – and, in transforming it, makes the distance 
to the past perceptible.’9 Translation is thus characterised as an encounter with the past which 
configures the poetic present. But my contention is that such translation also responds to the 
present’s incompletion. In dialogue, a poem’s present is repeatedly displaced from the future 
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because it always supposes the possibility of another translation. If poems are translatable, then 
they are orientated by the future. Poetic dialogue with ‘you’ includes such translations. You 
are encountered in ‘detours [Umwege] from you to you’,10 detours that take place outside the 
poem’s present. The complex presentation of ‘you’ in the poem, as I have been arguing, 
interrupts any ‘presence’ in the poem. Yet this interruption also opens the poem towards a 
future coordinated by this ‘you’, this exteriorisation of poetic focus from its own singular 
utterance into a ‘you’. 
For Celan, the space of dialogic presence interrupts the poem’s present, and its capacity 
to present. ‘You’ are constituted in this dialogue, and ‘you’ interrupt the poem. 
Only in the space [Raum] of this conversation does the addressed 
constitute itself, as it gathers around the I addressing and naming 
it. But the addressed which through naming, as it were, become 
a you, brings its otherness into this present [Gegenwart]. Even in 
this here and now of the poem – for the poem itself, we know, 
has always only this one, unique, momentary present – even in 
this immediacy and nearness it lets the most essential aspect of 
the other speak: its time.11 
Time speaks, not ‘you’. Interruption speaks where you should. The poem presents this 
interruption. This is an interruption of ‘space’ (Raum) by ‘place’ (Ort). As we saw in chapter 
three, this is the ‘place’ of the repetition of the image. 
And then, what would the images be? | What is perceived and is 
to be perceived once and always again once, and only here and 
now. Hence the poem would be the place [Ort] where all tropes 
and metaphors want to be carried ad absurdum.12 
The other’s singularity is incompatible with the poem’s singularity. It is a time of repetition 
that interrupts the poem’s ‘here and now’. ‘You’ are always, therefore, figured into the poem, 
your presence is figurative. 
The poem wants to head toward some other, it needs this other, 
it needs an opposite. It seeks it out, it bespeaks itself to it. | Each 
thing, each human is, for the poem heading toward this other, a 
figure [Gestalt] of this.13 
This is a collaborative identification. The poem’s ‘present’ identity is constituted in distinction 
from the ‘other’, the ‘figure’ towards which the poem reaches. Such ‘reality’, we recall from 
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chapter one, ‘must be searched for and won’, is not ‘present’ in the poem. ‘You’ are a future 
coordinate which orientates the poem as present. The poem, then, can only repeat its non-
encounter with the other it figures, reaches towards. If the other were present, it would not be 
present as other; it can only be figured. The poem presents an absurd, repeating discontinuity, 
orientated by what it cannot reach. 
The figure charts across this repetition ‘ad absurdum’ – or at least wants to, intends to, 
hopes to. Decisively, the figure is hoped for, a hope for the singularity of presence repeated 
over and over and therefore never reconciled with any reality. The ‘next time’ of the present is 
constituted by this hope. In a draft of the Meridian, Celan notes: ‘[t]he poem is, also in terms 
of its semantic meaning, the place of the singular [der Ort des Einmaligen], the irreversible’.14 
So while ‘the present in the poem is the presence of a person’,15 ‘[t]he poet as person is given 
to the poem as its share [Dem Gedicht ist der Dichter als Person mitgegeben]’.16 The poem 
‘shares’ the presence of a poet. It ‘shares’ in its singularity a repetition of the singular in 
dialogue with ‘you’, the ‘future’. This is repetition of singularity. It does not pass over into 
something else. Absurdly, the poem must share this incompatibility because any singularity is 
‘irreversible’. Absurdly, we enter the image-time of repetition, reversal, precisely because the 
poem is irreversibly singular. So the poem’s identity is shared. And yet neither pole of this 
sharing can be fully present in the poem, because the poem remains irreversibly singular. The 
poem shares the loss of presence in identity. What the poem means is ‘irreversible’, singular, 
necessary to the poem; but what it means is the relation it bears presently, of loss, to the 
‘presence of a person’. Meaning does not exceed the poem. Meaning takes place in the poem. 
That meaning is non-transcendent: it is bound to the poem’s space, and therefore bound to be 
lost to the poem because it has no appeal for articulation outside it, even as it is outside it. ‘The 
poem is lonely. It is lonely and en route. Its author remains added to it.’17 Presence is the future 




                                                      
14 Ibid., 118/118 
15 Ibid., 113/113 
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Reading Osip Mandelstam (whose poetry he extensively translated while working on The 
Meridian), Celan characterises language in the poem as ‘actualisation’. We can link this with 
the figuration of presence. He discusses this in a radio essay on Mandelstam. In poetry, 
language is ‘neither “analogy” nor plain language, but language “actualized,” voiceful and 
voiceless simultaneously, set free under the sign of an indeed radical individuation which 
however also remains mindful of the limits imposed on it by language and of the possibilities 
language has opened up’.18 This characterisation is echoed in The Meridian, where this ‘radical 
individuation’ sets language free, but at the same time, ‘remains mindful of the borders 
language draws and of the possibilities language opens up for it’.19 This individuation occurs 
within the poem, even as it opens up ‘possibilities’ of thinking outside it. In an image translated 
by Celan from Mandelstam, a poem is a ‘message in a bottle’,20 a message whose referent is 
not yet determined, remains in the future. It is not, therefore, a figure without referent; it is a 
figure without-yet a referent. Presence is indeterminate. It is both the presence of writing, of 
language, and the presence of a referent-to-come. In this way it is utopian, spanning the 
distances between a political reality and a utopian demand impossible in the present of that 
reality. The figure does not draw between two different presences, metaphorically blending 
them into one image, but reverses between these two temporally distinct (and mutually 
conditioning) points of possible signification. 
Arching between these incommensurable temporalities, the poem measures out a 
figurative economy. The figure measures its own figuration. The bow, an image repeated 
throughout Celan’s poetry, acts as such a figure for figuration, spanning the distances between 
the poem’s ‘present’ and the ‘presence’ of another in the poem. The ambiguity of this 
measurement is apparent in the poem ‘Lyons, Les Archers’, collected in Fadensonnen. The 
image of the ‘archer’ draws on both Celan’s own birth sign as a Sagittarius (as Barbara 
Wiedemann notes) and, more specifically, on Pindar’s second Olympic ode.21 Mark Payne 
suggests that, through Pindar, this image becomes a meta-critical image for communication in 
Celan’s ‘dialogic’ address, in which the ‘strangeness’ of the poem, its distance from reference, 
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communicates the reader’s estrangement from the poem, allowing for an ‘encounter’ in its 
interruption of ordinary referential discourse as ‘the very thing that allows responsive contact 
with the other to occur’.22 The poem has to be interrupted to be read. In ‘Lyon, Les Archers’ 
the ‘bow’ also recalls Heraclitus’s punning fragment: ‘The name of the bow is life; its work is 
death’, ‘βιός τῷ τόξῳ ὄνομα βίος ἔργον δὲ θάνατος’23 ‘Biós’ puns between ‘bow’ and ‘life’, 
such that life is stretched like a bow into death, its work, and such that the bow’s work is both 
life and death. This figurative coincidence is repeated in the ‘coincidence’ of the girl reading 
Camus’s L’Étranger (Der Fremde), who recalls the poet’s absent wife, to whom the poem is 
addressed. To confuse the matter, Celan wrote this poem in Paris, 29-30.10.1965, two days 
after having returned from a quite nomadic trip around France, ending in Lyon. So the poem 
stages in recollection a presence that recalls the absence of (in the time of the writing-
recollection) the now present wife. ‘You’ are drawn, a bow, between the singular and the plural, 
doubled from ‘du’ to ‘euch’. 
you too, with all 






tenses its pain between you, 
 







Eingefremdeten in dir, 





                                                      
22 Payne, Mark, ‘Lyric Communication: Pindar and Paul Celan’, in Modern Philology, 105:1 (2007), pp. 5-
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23 Heraclitus, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus, ed., trans. by Charles H. Kahn (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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spannt ihren Schmerz unter euch 
 
das verschollene Ziel 
strahlt, Bogen.24 
The ‘bowstring’ spans between the singular and plural ‘you’. The image of the ‘one’ string 
imagines this doubling presence. The ‘life’ of the image, the desired but distant wife, is also its 
work towards ‘death’, its undoing, in that it can only be ‘alive’ in distance, in its presented 
absence. Without this distance, the figure collapses into the presence of the object which it 
would imagine. But in this poem, the coherence of the image of the ‘One string’ is already 
disturbed by its distribution, as if by arrow flight, towards the other. And this addressed other 
remains equivocally both and neither the girl and the wife. We can connect this with Aris 
Fioretos’s sense of poetic legibility. Fioretos suggests, reading the ‘Pfeilschrift’ | ‘arrowscript’ 
in ‘Beim Hagelkorn’ from Atemwende, that ‘Celan’s writing remains on the way toward a 
readability which can only coincide with a time coming. Its illocutionary mode is that of the 
promise’.25 Readability, figured, is always promised. And so are ‘you’, your presence in the 
poem. The poem’s figuration proposes the material condition by which, in the future, we can 
read it. History’s material inception is figured in the poem’s now of reading. The stakes 
invested in reading a poem also lay out its not-yet historical readability, a future ‘now’ where 
it might emerge into the discourse of critical interpretation; a possible readability afforded 
precisely by its resistance to readability now. The legibility of this encounter can only be 
figured through its present unreadability, its present distance from meaning, which preserves 
such legibility as a future possibility, reflective and not yet determined. 
 
Figurative presence 
The poem’s present appeals to a presence incompatible with that present, by which it is 
nonetheless grounded. There are complex transactions here between the poetic inside and 
outside, staged through the figure. Celan insists that the poem could host a particular human 
presence,26 and yet that presence is futural, not present, figured. For Peter Szondi, Celan’s 
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poetry ‘is ceasing to become mimesis, representation; it is becoming reality. To be sure, this is 
a poetic reality: The text no longer stands in the service of a predetermined reality, but rather 
it is projecting itself, constituting itself as a reality.’27 This ‘poetic reality’, for Szondi, eschews 
representation. We are presented with language ‘constituting a reality’, not mediating it in 
representation. Amir Eshel goes as far as to argue that ‘Celan’s poem does not wish to speak 
through comparisons and metaphors. His other is not figured, but rather is present in pauses, 
intervals, and muted breath coronas’.28 The other is the poem’s negative, and only negatively 
present in poetic silence. If the poem makes anything legible, it is through its immateriality, 
through what it does not write. But this runs against the internalisation of figuration that I have 
been tracing in Celan’s poetry. Celan’s describes a ‘doubling’ of the world’s unreadability in 
poetry. ‘Unreadability of this | world. Everything doubles’. ‘Unlesbarkeit dieser | Welt. Alles 
doppelt.’29 Poetry does not in this way disappear. It rather insists upon the objectivity of what 
it loses, doubles it, presents it, in the kind of ‘negative’ presentation I have been developing 
from Kant. And from this, ‘You [Du], wedged in your deepest, | climb out of yourself 
[entsteigst dir] | for ever.’ ‘You’ emerge in this doubling, not in vanishing. The problem of 
representation of absence is here more complex than a sublime symbolic non-representation. 
It is a matter of a poetic ‘us’, poetry’s capacity to stage dialogue. In another example of 
doubling from Schneepart, in ‘Largo’: 
the pair of blackbirds hangs 
out near us, under our 
together up there 






das Amselpaar hängt 
neben uns, unter 
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A metastasis is a rapid change, but etymologically a rapid change of place, a translation. This 
transference, however, is figural: ‘our’ being together (gemeinsam, common) is doubled into 
the ‘Amselpaar’,31 paired into one word. Not the world, the world ‘doubled’; but neither a 
negatively symbolic recuperation of loss. The transactions of such figuration are vital. And so 
the poems sing their own incapacity to represent, which means that they mark out the 
possibility of figuration, its outline or shape.  
If the poem merely presented the ‘unrepresentable’ as a negative space outside the 
poem’s figurative limit, then the poem would vanish, and so too would the possibly legibility 
of that negative. Instead, I want to suggest, we read in Celan’s poetry a vexed intrusion of this 
‘outside’ space into figuration itself through the reflections of ‘doubling’. Celan’s poems, as 
Rochelle Tobias argues, figure ‘spacing’ itself.32 ‘The absence of an original leads to the 
proliferation of figures in the text’.33 And, I would suggest, also leads to the proliferation of 
readings of the text. This is not the ‘presence’ of the other in the torn out gaps of figuration, 
not, then, the sublime ontologisation of this caesura, but a lingering with this gap as describing 
the limits of presence and presentation itself. This opens up poetics to the ‘political’ as I have 
been outlining it, the political which is not a ‘transfigured’ or ‘exchangeable’ absence or 
otherness, but a presentation of indeterminacy that is not exchanged, as presence and the 
present itself. This is not distant from Adorno’s description of aesthetic ‘stylization’ in 
‘Commitment’, where a certain ‘artfulness’, to use Celan’s word from The Meridian, 
‘transfigures’ an occurrence in order to invest it with meaning.34 Celan’s ‘simulation’ 
contradicts such ‘artifice’. In ‘Commitment’, Adorno repeatedly argues that artworks present 
non-exchange, not the unrepresentable. As outlined in chapter three, this is utopic, ‘[t]he 
minimal promise of happiness which [artworks] contain, which refuses to be traded for any 
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31 Recalling the ‘Simili- | dohle’, the ‘simulate’ Jackdaw from ‘Frankfurt, September’, the ‘simulate’ brother 
Kafka, the jackdaw (kavka); the title of which reflects Tübingen, Jänner’, where Hölderlin doubles into 
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poem present’s Celan’s own doubling of Kafka, one of his brothers-elect, the Kavka (jackdaw) ‘Ansel’, 
Anschel, Celan – Cixous’s ‘name in reverse’. 
32 Tobias, Rochelle, The Discourse of Nature in the Poetry of Paul Celan (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2006), 1-3 
33 Ibid., 9. Figuration does not mark language’s grasp of any reality; rather it constructs the space by which 
this incapacity to grasp might be marked by time. The poem voices this incapacity. 
34 Adorno, Notes to Literature Vol. II [Noten zur Literatur, GS 11, 1974], ed. by Rolf Tiedemann, trans. by 
Shierry Weber-Nicholsen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 88 
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consolation’.35 The artwork is the ‘determinate negation of empirical reality’36 which can be 
distinguished from ‘the mere positivity of a meaninglessness’.37 Making this distinction is 
crucial for how we understand the operations of ‘doubling’ figuration. But it is also crucial for 
any aesthetics, and reading, of such figuration. Celan’s figures double the world’s ‘illegibility’, 
rather than disappearing into illegibility themselves. Tobias continues: ‘[t]he poems push the 
figures they construct to the point of their collapse, so that they may be revealed as conceits 
that expose in space the poem’s vulnerability and exposure to time.’38 The exposure of figures 
to their ‘doubled’ spacing in the poem exposes that spacing to an internal vulnerability. This 
exposure is repeated critically in the legibility afforded by those figures. 
 
Snow and glass 
This ‘unreadable world’ modulates into the first poem of cycle II in Schneepart. 
The to-be-restuttered world, 
whose guest I 
will have been, a name, 
sweated down the wall, 
up which a wound licks. 
 
 
Die nachzustotternde Welt, 
bei der ich zu Gast 
gewesen sein werde, ein Name, 
herabgeschwitzt von der Mauer, 
an der eine Wunde hochleckt.39 
The illegibility of the world where ‘everything doubles’, whose doubling the poem inhabits, is 
here a ‘stuttering’ world after which we (the poem?) stutters. Far from constituting a reality, 
the poem lags behind it, repeats it in its own stuttering intervals. We should notice, too, the 
way the poem collapses other Celanian figures together. The ‘wound’ (Auch deine | Wunde, 
Rosa) that reaches up a ‘wall’ (the wall into which the ram impacts), and also the guest, the 
hosting snow, the Schneetrost where ‘I lose you to you’ in ‘Die Pole’. The poem stages the 
                                                      
35 Ibid., 90 
36 Ibid., 89 
37 Ibid., 91 
38 Tobias, Discourse of Nature, 12 
39 BIT 334|335 
 
186 
dissolution of its singularity. ‘I’ will have been a ‘name’ in this world, insubstantial, repeatable. 
As Hans-Michael Speier writes, this ‘is a lacerated and injured speech that marks/indicates 
[kennzeichnet] a damaged world, in which an “I” must be a guest.’40 ‘I’ am not compatible with 
this world, which incompatibility ‘I’ witness. The poem’s ‘I’ contradicts the world. The 
constraints placed on the ‘I’ are witness to a straitened communicability of the world. This 
displacement is futural. The world is marked in the future, as where ‘I will have been’ a guest. 
The poem is configured by this future displacement. 
The ‘I’, as a name, dissipates into other possible identities to come, other indeterminate 
names, you. This displacement is hosted by the poem. For Speier, by this displacement of self-
identity the poem reaches ‘outside’ the human. This is the world in its displacement. We read 
this displacement in the preceding, eponymous poem of the collection: ‘Schneepart’. 
‘Snowpart, arched [gebäumt], to the last, | in the updraft, before | the forever dewindowed | 
huts’.41 Here, ‘[o]ne can no longer see out of the dewindowed huts, the door- and windowless 
reality imparts the image of something not-human. The lyric I of this poem works in isolation, 
its activity must remain without testimony.’42 Isolated ‘behind glass’, the ‘I’ can only repeat 
the not-human outside, cannot construct it. In this reversal of subjective autonomy, the ‘I’, 
despite its incapacities, must host a stuttering it can only follow. In this it traces a decoupling 
of aesthetics from ‘nature’ by ‘art’. This ‘snowy’ outside is marked by the missing glass of the 
windows. There is no transparency, no medium, that could present this world. And yet, we can 
trace a figurative relation through this disconnection. Glass is a threshold metaphor, here, 
between the inside and outside. The snow outside, arched like a tree (gebäumt), is a crystal 
form that should be repeated by glass, which is also crystalline. Glass, however, is artful, made. 
Precisely that construction has been removed here, is lost, ‘dewindowed’ – precisely that 
visibility has been removed. And this acts as a meta-figure for figuration. Transparent 
communication is not adequate, here, to the ‘stuttering’ relation between ‘I’ and the ‘world’. 
So there is a negative relation, a repetition of crystallisation: from snow to glass. This repeats 
the modulation from the ‘outside’ to the ‘inside’. But it is incomplete, here. Glass does not give 
views on the outside. It does not, then, communicate anything but its own incapacity to 
communicate. But through this incapacity, there is a gap of legibility into which the poem 
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might be read, and into which, therefore, a ‘future’ and ‘you’ might enter. It is precisely the 
nonidentity of each pole of figuration, here, that allows for this entrance. Between ‘snow’ and 
‘glass’, then, there is a disconnection, a repetition, and yet a figuration. The poem opens up to 
critical legibility not by symbolically presenting what language otherwise negates (through 
silences, through gaps), but by proliferating figuration. In this way, the poem acts as a figure 
for the aesthetic legibility it affords. 
 
 
ii. ‘The passage into the inorganic’ – Adorno, Celan, nature 
 
White and green 
This figurative ‘non-encounter’ makes ‘un-encountered’ world legible to critical reading. This 
‘non-encounter’ organises Adorno’s reading of Celan. For Adorno, poetry – Celan’s poetry – 
marks the displacement of the natural world, not its symbolic embodiment or reconciliation 
with language.  Writing is structured by the way it does not encounter the world. This failure 
is the subject of Celan’s ‘Conversation in the Mountains’. 43 In the poems I just looked at, this 
figuration was through snow and glass. Here, those figures are abstracted: white and green. 
Up here the earth has folded over, it’s folded once and twice and 
three times, and opened up in the middle, and in the middle 
there’s some water, and the water is green, and the green is white, 
and the white comes from further, comes from the glaciers, now 
you could say but you shouldn’t, that that’s the kind of speech 
that counts here, the green with the white in it, a language not for 
you and not for me — because I’m asking, who is it meant for 
then, the earth, it’s not meant for you, I’m saying, and not for me 
—, well then, a language with no I and no Thou, pure He, pure 
It, d’you see, pure They, and nothing but that.44 
The earth’s ‘folding over’ of time becomes a folding over of pronouns at the end. This is finally 
no singular dialogue, but ‘pure they’. This folding is marked by colours. In water, green and 
white are confused. The white is from elsewhere, from some glacier, some glacial distance. 
This a missed conversation in the sense that it depends on a language that traces the past of 
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something, water. In conversation with something, language is not present to itself. Water takes 
on colour provisionally. It is green, but also white: not only is it the illusion of light 
prismatically splitting from white into colour that we call, in language, green, but the water 
was once, in these mountains, glacially white, ice and snow, suspended in crystals, and will 
become the organic green of the plants it feeds. Celan’s language articulates this history. To be 
able to call water at once green and white would be to name its history: the white glacier which 
is its origin and the green grass which is its terminus. This language does not refer to a 
subjective experience, but to the ‘earth’. Language unfolds, neutrally, in a history incompatible 
with subjective experience. Missed conversation makes possible language operating outside 
the temporal parameters of conversation. 
In ‘What sews’, from Schneepart, there is again this modulation from green to white, 
and again mediation through snow. 
What sews 






The chasms are 





As in chapter three, voice is here ‘sewn’ ’beyond’, in ‘chasms’ or ‘fissures’ (Abgründe). This 
sewing is traced back from ‘chasms’ to ‘White’ to ‘the snowneedle’. A snowneedle, of course, 
would melt after sewing, disappear, erase its origin. You are asked to swallow this, to become 
the passage of this snow and this erasure. This snow has ‘sworn’, testified for, ‘white’ in the 
‘chasms’. ‘You’ are asked by the poem to internalise, swallow, this witness to displacement, 
to let it thread/erase through you. This singular modulates into ‘euch’, ‘gewährt euch den 
Durchzug’ | ‘grants you passage through’, ‘you’ plural are granted passage, threaded by this 
neutral ground, just as the two ‘yous’ split in ‘Lyons, Les Archers’. Finally, 
a word with all its green 
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ein wort, mit all seinem Grün, 




The word returns to green from white. Snow is threaded ‘through you’ when you ‘swallow it’; 
you are instructed to ‘follow’ the green in its transplantation. This needle-passage has become 
a ‘word’, but the ‘white’ has also translated into ‘green’. Just as the glacial white passes into 
green in the water, the snowneedle passes into a tree in a word. But there is no product from 
this transplantation. This is a self-transplantation which ‘you’ are asked merely to follow. In 
other words, you are displaced by this activity; but by this displacement you have become a 
kind of witness to it. So the work of testimony (swearing on white) at the start of the poem is 
‘sewn’ by the poem into you as the displacement of you. And this is figured as the displacement 
of ‘du’ into ‘euch’, of the singular into the plural. In becoming witness, you become plural. 
Figuration is here a passage into this displacement of the world. 
 
Adorno – ‘inorganic’ 
As we saw in ‘Commitment’, Adorno is suspicious of the way aesthetic experience can be 
appropriated for the domination of nature, when the indeterminacy felt in aesthetic experience 
becomes an absence where ‘meaning’ can be determinately imposed. For Adorno, art both 
articulates and contradicts this aesthetic appropriation. 
The Kantian conception of a teleology of art modeled on that of 
organisms was rooted in the unity of reason, ultimately in the 
unity of divine reason as it is manifest in things-in-themselves. 
This idea had to go. […] The aesthetic concept of teleology has 
its objectivity in the language of art.46 
We can no longer connect the teleological experience of nature with the reflective experience 
of art, because nature is the site of the multiple displacements of the ‘natural’ by, firstly, 
                                                      
46 AT 185/210-11 
 
190 
expropriating capitalism and, secondly, mythic conceptions of ‘the natural’. Art’s 
indeterminate reflection contradicts these displacements, but in contradiction, such reflection 
is also complicit with those myths – of reason or of nature. It is only through the ‘negative 
dialectic’ of art that such myths can be contradicted. ‘By the force of their dialectic, artworks 
escape myth, the blind and abstractly dominating nexus of nature.’47 The radical expropriation 
of aesthetic experience from the subject to the artwork opens the possibility of reversing the 
subject’s domination of nature. And yet, this reversal remains a negative possibility. Art is 
inextricably bound with reason; its objectification is not just impossible, it is a myth, just as a 
nature without subjectivity is a myth. ‘The further real domination of nature progresses, the 
more painful it becomes for art to admit the necessity of that progress within itself.’48 
Art’s affirmative element and the affirmative element of the 
domination of nature are one in asserting that what was inflicted 
on nature was all for the good; by re-enacting it in the realm of 
the imagination, art makes it its own and becomes a song of 
triumph. […] In doing so, art finds itself in inextricable conflict 
with the idea of the redemption of suppressed nature.49 
Art is objectification, and as such is complicit with the procedures of objectification by which 
nature is dominated. But in art, this pain is legible as pain (the expression of suffering), and the 
semblance of objectivity is visible. 
 Art’s figurative role in representing nature must be abandoned when nature is exposed 
as a myth. Its figurative work, for Adorno, must become negative. Art thus relinquishes 
immediacy as a myth, and passes into ‘the world of imagery’. 
Art is mimesis of the world of imagery [Bilderwelt] and at the 
same time its enlightenment through forms of control. The world 
of imagery, itself thoroughly historical, is done an injustice by 
the fiction of a world of images that effaces the relations in which 
people live. […] any solution demands the authenticity of a form 
of experience that does not lay claim to an immediacy it has 
lost.50 
Rather than claim immediacy, this ‘form’ would lay claim to the ‘loss’ of immediacy. For 
Adorno, this is the non-presenting work of poetry; Celan’s ‘anorganic aspect’: 
It yearns neither for nature nor for industry, it is precisely the 
integration of the latter that leads to poeticization, which was 
already a dimension of impressionism, and contributes its part to 
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making peace with an unpeaceful world . Art, as an anticipatory 
form of reaction, is no longer able – if it ever was – to embody 
pristine nature or the industry that has scorched it; the 
impossibility of both is probably the hidden law of aesthetic 
nonrepresentationalism [Gegenstandlosigkeit]. The images of 
the postindustrial world are those of a corpse51 
Such art imagines the futurity of nature, a postindustrial nature. Imagery cannot mythically 
restore any forgotten nature (or the myths of unity that come with that), but neither can they 
imagine the postindustrial world that has negated that myth. Imagery, in the present, is 
impossible, because unity is impossible. The world is unfigurable. Images persist in imagining 
this ‘corpse’: not an impossible image, but a response to the impossibility of imagery. We can 
reconcile this, I think, with Adorno’s utopianism if we read it through Celan’s ‘presence of the 
nonpresent’ temporality of the poem. The present that must be imagined is the present that 
defies all imagining. Imagination cannot exceed its present impossibility. But the postindustrial 
situation must be imagined. The utopia, the future of possible imagination, like the poem’s 
present, is conditioned by impossibility. The image is only possible on this condition: the 
condition of the corpse, the already negated (and no longer negatable) world. 
 Discussing Celan’s apparently ‘hermetic’ poetry and its relation to social reality, 
Adorno describes this mimetic, imaginative work of representing an ‘inorganic’ topos. By 
Celan, 
the experiential content of the hermetic was inverted. His poetry 
is permeated by the shame of art in the face of suffering that 
escapes both experience and sublimation. Celan’s poems want to 
speak of the most extreme horror through silence. Their truth 
content itself becomes negative. They imitate a language beneath 
the helpless language of human beings, indeed beneath all 
organic language: It is that of the dead speaking of stones and 
stars. The last rudiments of the organic are liquidated52 
Here the ‘corpse’ that Adorno says art imagined ‘speaks’, speaks of an ‘inorganic’ landscape. 
Stars, points of orientation, are spoken to, but have been spoken apart (dés-astre). The 
landscape between this nonspeaking noise and the spoken-out stars is inorganic because it 
cannot be spoken to. This is a non-dialogue, with a corpse. But, by reversal, the dead address 
what does not speak. Adorno continues: 
The language of the lifeless becomes the last possible comfort 
[Trost] for a death that is deprived of all meaning. The passage 
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into the inorganic is to be followed not only in thematic motifs; 
rather, the trajectory from horror to silence is to be reconstructed 
in the hermetic works. […] Celan transposes into linguistic 
processes the increasing abstraction of the landscape, 
progressively approximating it to the inorganic.53 
We can recall, at the end of this passage, Adorno’s sense of art’s ‘progressive impossibility’ 
discussed in chapter three. The ‘passage’, the ‘steps’, language takes in Celan’s work are not 
towards some reconstructed nature, but towards a reconstructed abstraction of nature. Art here 
affirms its domination of nature rather than mythically obscuring it. The only exit is not towards 
an apparently meaningful (but actually exterior, mythical) construction of nature, but towards 
a reconstruction of the painful process by which nature has become imagined as a corpse, the 
corpse of unity, of meaning, in which depletion, however, the possibility of futurity, of hope, 
is minimally reserved. Adherence to the displacement of meaning, to its depletion, makes 
imagery impossible, but reserves in that impossibility the possibility of ‘another way of 
writing’. Just as snow ‘oversnows’ abstract beauty, not any landscape, so the figure 




iii. Blanchot – ‘unfigurable universe’ 
 
Figures behind glass 
In Blanchot’s The Step Not Beyond, like Celan’s Schneepart, ‘glass’ configures a relation to 
the outside which reverses a subjective capacity to positively think about what is outside 
subjectivity. And for Blanchot, too, this configuration exposes the ‘I’ to an objective plurality 
with which it is incompatible. 
On the threshold, coming from the outside perhaps, the two 
young names like two figures behind the glass about whom we 
could not say for sure whether they are inside or outside, since 
no one, except the two figures, who expect everything from us, 
could say where we are.55 
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Any location of ‘us’ is displaced from us, ‘coming from the outside’, from ‘two figures’ in 
dialogue. But like Celan’s ‘dewindowed | huts’, glass is a threshold space here, already in 
dialogue with itself. Figuration becomes a condition of reading, a threshold space which both 
enjoins and prohibits an ‘image’ and a ‘reading’. Images proliferate, indeterminately. By such 
proliferation of imagery, in 1966 Michel Foucault described Blanchot’s writing in similar 
terms: ‘one is outside the outside, which is never figured, only incessantly hinted at by the 
whiteness of its absence, the pallor of an abstract memory, or at most by the glint of snow 
through a window’.56 Yet, we have to be careful of such felicity. If we are to think of this 
proliferation, it has to be through the straitening conditions of interruption by which that 
proliferation is possible. This means responding to figuration as reflection. ‘To die: the 
reflection in the mirror perhaps, the mirroring of an absence of figure’.57 If there is 
responsiveness, reflection, it is coordinated by this exteriority: the exteriority of nature as a 
‘corpse’ that marked Adorno’s reading of nature. 
 This exteriority marks an injunction against ‘hopeful’ reading, which can be connected 
with Adorno’s prohibition on the ‘image’ of nature and Celan’s figural outside. 
Do not count on death – on your own or universal death – to 
found anything whatsoever, even the reality of this death. For it 
is so uncertain and so unreal that it always fades away ahead of 
time, and with it whatever declares it.58 
This fragment on Celan first appeared in 1977, later published in The Writing of the Disaster. 
As we saw in chapter two, Blanchot’s thinking here revolves around the suicide of this 
‘anonymous friend’, Celan, from ‘The Last to Speak’ (1972/1983) to The Step Not Beyond 
(1973) and The Writing of the Disaster (1980).59 Blanchot was also responding, ‘after 1971’,60 
as Leslie Hill writes, to the ‘impossibility’ and ‘necessity’ of remembering Auschwitz, a double 
relation made thinkable in the unavowable political relation without relation encountered in 
May ’68. But this is also a singular response to Celan’s singular death. And yet, Blanchot’s 
writing on Celan seems to enjoin us, like this fragment, not to make a meaning of ‘death’, not 
to elegise Celan. Responding to Celan means responding to death as ‘impossible’, as not 
present, depleted. As Christophe Bident puts it, this invokes translation, a ‘friendship 
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alternately convergent and divergent of two languages’61 – French, German and, here, a third, 
English. Celan’s death demands response, while precluding it; asks for response to the poetry, 
not the man, asks for an elegiac reading of the poetry, withdraws death from the experience. 
How might we respond to death ‘that fades away ahead of time’, that is ‘unreal’? 
This fragment from The Writing of the Disaster follows a quote from Celan’s Meridian 
speech: ‘“Poetry, ladies and gentlemen: an expression of infinitude, an expression of vain 
death and mere Nothing [La poésie, mesdames, messieurs: une parole d’infinie, parole de la 
mort vaine et du seul Rien].”’62 Celan: ‘Die Dichtung, meine Damen und Herren –: diese 
Unendlichsprechung von lauter Sterblichkeit und Umsonst!’, ‘Poetry, ladies and gentlemen: 
this infinity-speaking full of mortality and to no purpose!’.63 Interpreting Celan, elegising 
Celan, means translating Celan. And that means responding to the difficulties of ‘translating’ 
presence. Indeed, these difficulties are amplified in this critical elegy as translation. Blanchot 
responds to two demands: not to transcend what he reads, and yet still to interpret it in this 
suspension of transcendence. His injunction is against critical transcendence, against finding 
in the ‘image of the corpse’ any opportunity to transform that death for meaning. Death recedes, 
repeatedly displaces the future from which it approaches, and criticism – subject to this work 




This ‘expression of infinitude, expression of nothing’, Blanchot continues, go together, ‘but 
without agreement’.64 This is coincidence without identity, contradiction. Blanchot maintains 
the two poles together, but distinct, against their transcendence. So Celan relates ‘the final 
nothingness which nevertheless occupies the same plane (without either preceding or 
succeeding it), as the expression which comes from the infinite, wherein the infinite gives itself 
and resounds infinitely.’65 Death interrupts the present, interrupting negation. And the figure 
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interrupts presence, interrupting presentation. In his more substantial elegiac essay, ‘The Last 
to Speak’, Blanchot again reads this through snow in the earlier poem ‘Schneebett’, from 
Sprachgitter (1959). The poem’s words scatter through Blanchot’s essay, which offers facing 
pages of his own translations. The ‘we’ with which the poem ends – ‘We were. We are.’, ‘In 
the passages, passages’66 – is marked out as a critical measure by which the poem is read 
‘together’ with criticism. The fragmentation of imagery marks out this ‘we’ by which, 
displaced, the poem is read. This is the poem’s ‘snowy’ work of figuration, reflecting snow: 
‘crystal on crystal’, crystallisation repeated, reflecting itself, proliferating. Snow offers a form, 
internalises a form, for thinking its repetition in critical reading. It is not just snow but ‘we’ 
who fall, ‘crystal on crystal’, ‘time-deep’, ‘we fall’ and then fall again even as we stay, the 
‘snow-bed’ which is ‘under us’ but which is also us, falling through time’s deepening ‘mesh’. 
‘We’ are not only figured by snow, the figuration is the process by which we make a ‘bed’, a 
foundation, for ourselves; and this dual role of figuration means it also disrupts itself, so that 
‘we fall and lie there and fall’ at the same time. Or not precisely at the same time, but in the 
repetition of crystal on crystal, falling on falling. ‘And fall’. This is a relation between ‘us 
both’. And the poem finds its poetic repetition, too, in ‘Die Pole’. The ‘bed’ where, in that 
poem, we ‘lay’ together ‘free’ is like this ‘snow-bed’, ‘crystal on crystal’, the ‘we’ who fall on 
that foundation, in this poem, are the ‘we’ said ‘without us’, when ‘I lose you to you, that | is 
my snowcomfort’. 
The question remains of how this loss might configure futurity outside presence. If we 
adhere to Blanchot’s enjoinment in The Step Not Beyond ‘not to hope’ that we might find 
coherence in ‘writing that disunifies’, then we must understand his attention to poetry as itself 
a paradoxical intervention against ‘hope’ and thinking of the future by thought which is itself 
oriented by futurity. So Blanchot asks: 
Can one say then that poetic assertion, in Paul Celan (always 
perhaps distanced from hope as it is distanced from truth — but 
always in motion toward both) still leaves something, if not to 
hope for, then to think about, through brief phrases that suddenly 
illumine, even after everything has sunk into darkness […].67 
The reading circles around this response to assertion of what remains un-illuminated, non-
present. For Celan, this is a movement, something that happens over time: the poem 
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immediately moves us ‘towards’ blindness. Transcendence is turned outside into transgression. 
‘The outside: there where eyes are focused — eyes detached from the person, eyes one could 
think are solitary and impersonal’.68 This bodily transgression (eyes without any person to see) 
is a transgression of conceptual function. Eyes turned outside are turned towards this dispersal 
of function. Turning to the outside has to be imagined from behind this dispersal of 
imagination: 
would speaking be staying behind the bars — the bars of a prison 
— through which the freedom on the outside is promised (or 
refused) […] or might speaking instead be thinking oneself 
provided with these bars, which makes one hope there might be 
something to decipher and, thence, to enclose oneself again in the 
illusion that meaning or truth might be free, over there, in the 
landscape where the trace does not deceive? But, just as writing 
is read in the form of a thing, of the outside of a thing condensing 
into such or such a thing, not to designate it, but to be written 
there […] isn’t the outside also read as a writing, writing without 
a link, always already outside itself?69 
The disconnections of writing reflect back into reading. Reading is reversed: no longer 
responding to the ‘landscape where the trace does not deceive’, reading can, in reading writing, 
only respond to the disconnections to which it is subjected in this relation. Reading here does 
not secure the operations by which it can simultaneously construct the truth it finds ‘outside’ 
itself (recall here Adorno’s ‘tower’ of subjectivity, the wall of the real). Writing always 
displaces presence, its own first of all. Hope has to be drawn across this gap. In writing, the 
trace always deceives, always erases itself. But it is also always written in this outside, which 
for Blanchot is curiously material: writing is ‘in the form of a thing, of the outside of a thing’. 
Writing is material, therefore, outside the deception of presence, because radically inside its 
presentation: it inhabits the hope that language might not deceive by deceiving.  
The relationship with the outside, never already given, attempt at 
movement or progress, relationship without attachments and 
without roots — this is not just indicated by the empty 
transcendence of empty eyes, but asserted explicitly by Paul 
Celan in his prose fragments as his possibility: to speak with 
things70 
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The ‘possibility’ of speaking with things depends on this outside, this impossible space of 
identity. We cannot speak with things, only figure speaking with them. Illumination here 
fascinates, suspends, what it illumines. 
Come, even if it’s nowhere, only there where — in the fissures-
crevasses of dying — the incessant light (which does not 
illumine) fascinates.71 
An incessant, repetitive light; a negative landscape which is not just nowhere but the place of 
‘fascination’, of suspension of place. An ‘inorganic’ landscape, perhaps, not organised by unity 
but by ‘fissures’ of repetition, outside the transcendental surety of unity, but radically inside 
writing, not transcending it. 
Not one single rift or fissure, but an indefinite succession — 
series — of crevasses, something that opens up, always already 
closed again, and not the gaping of the abyss where one would 
only have to slide into the immense, unfathomable void, but 
rather those clefts or fissures whose narrow constraint, the 
narrowness of failing, seizes us, by an impossible breaking 
through, without allowing us to plummet in a freefall, even if it 
is eternal: that perhaps is dying, the hard growth in the heart of 
dying72 
Reading is exposed to this seriality of fissure, a seriality of loss. Reading responds not to death 
but to dying, to the disconnection from death as an experience. What is ‘experienced’ in writing 




As Anne-Lise Nordholt Schulste points out, Blanchot’s ‘outside’ of language is literature in so 
far as literature is the real, the world, under figuration. The ‘world’ is the ‘real in so far as it 
has become objectified, mediated, transformed in the dialectic of work, knowledge and 
discourse’.73 Literature ‘mediates’ the real into a world. ‘The world’ is not the same as ‘the 
real’ because the world is already mediated by language. Literature, then, presents another 
space: it presents mediation itself, the world in ‘figuration’. Literature is the movement of what 
is outside language. It is figurative because its ends are ‘outside’ the world and therefore 
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‘outside’ determination. They do not refer to the ‘real’, but to its mediation. But there is no 
world without mediation. And, in literature, there is therefore no world without figuration: 
without the uncertain, indeterminate mediation of a real which is necessarily ‘outside’ that 
mediation. Such figurative leaps are necessary for experience. Without mediation experience 
would be impossible. So literature establishes both the possibility of our ‘experience’ of the 
world and the impossibility of our ‘encountering’ it in language. 
 We are compelled then to respond to the world in its impossibility. Blanchot calls such 
a world the ‘unfigurable Universe (a term henceforth deceptive; a Universe escaping every 
optical exigency and also escaping consideration of the whole – essentially non-finite, 
disunited, discontinuous.’74 Will humanity, Blanchot asks, 
ever be ready to receive such a thought, a thought that, freeing 
him from the fascination with unity, for the first time risks 
summoning him to take the measure of an exteriority that is not 
divine, of a space entirely in question, and even excluding the 
possibility of an answer, since every response would necessarily 
fall anew under the jurisdiction of the figure of figures? […] That 
is, finally, is he capable of literature, if literature turns aside and 
toward [se detourne vers] this absence of a book? 
The world outside transcendent security, outside illumination, the world ‘fascinated’, 
suspended in its own non-transcendence: the world which resists address (resists questioning) 
as much as figuration. The question of the possibility of literature turns into a question of the 
possibility of the world as figurable; and so the question of the impossibility of literature turns 
into a question about the world as ‘unfigurable’. If, for Kant, ‘beauty’ marks the world’s final 
figurability, even as indeterminate, even as it escapes our understanding, then for Blanchot, 
writing marks the world’s unfigurability, and this marks its escape from legality, its reserve of 
futurity. Responding to the world as indeterminate, Blanchot suggests, means transfiguring the 
subject, changing what we call human, displacing our sense of subjectivity, not reinforcing it. 
The fate of aesthetic experience, here, is to be reversed, to mark unfigurability, but to preserve 
in that reversal the hopes that conditioned aesthetic judgement: the hopes for relation, for the 
political, for the future. 
 Reaching through Celan’s poems, serially, we find a serial relation of images that do 
not meet, or connect, but nonetheless repeat one another. Such writing hosts an experience of 
displacement. In ‘Die Pole’, in the compound ‘Schneetrost’, ‘snow’ does not meaningfully add 
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to ‘comfort’. They are thought together, in their polarity. Each word reaches for the other, just 
as ‘I lose you to you’. ‘Safety’, ‘confidence’, ‘comfort’ – trost – is brought together with snow. 
Snow is to host me, snow is to be my comfort. I am to reflectively put myself into snow, make 
myself into a snowfigure, a ‘Schneepart’, ‘Snowpart’,75 ‘Lösspuppen’, ‘Loessdolls’,76 naturally 
formed stone-figures that resemble people. Snow, stone, natural forms, form places to be, but 
places of displacement: apparently natural forms that crystallise independently of us, but which 
draw ‘us’ together, form places for hosting. In the ‘world to be stuttered after’, the ‘to-be-
restuttered world’, the world whose stuttering the poem imitates, follows, the ‘hosting’ which 
words can effect is like the ‘hosting’ of things by snow. It is crystalline, singular, but 
provisional. ‘Snow’ does not meet or disappear into ‘comfort’, then, but depletes it in matching 
it; no snow, no comfort, just a figure for how ‘I lose you to you’. The words remain outside 
one another, lost to one another. They are related like a guest to a host in their unfamiliarity 
and provisionality. Snow is a provisional form. Figures, like snow, hold that provisionality of 
meaning as their form. The figure, like snow, can hold to the seriality of this repetition in 
difference because it is formed by provisionality. Related not to the natural world, but to the 
world ‘oversnowed’, to the non-organic proliferation of the world in its snowy, crystalline 
form, repeated and serialised in the poem that mimics that snow, that serialisation, and not the 
world. A figure, then, which covers, like ‘oversnowed | beauty’, something uncertain, 
impossible to judge or to name, but nonetheless felt. This is the aesthetic that does not 
‘aestheticise’ nature, that does not take from nature a form of natural figuration, meaningful 
formation, but nonetheless relates to what is present as a form of displacement – and thereby a 
form of hope: a place where, in my displacement, ‘you’ might come, a place where the 
displacements of determinate meaning, of presence, become minimally hopeful sites of ‘my’ 
reversal for you. 
 
 
2 – Over and over: the elegiac aesthetic 
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Discussing Geoffrey Hill, Angela Leighton characterises elegy as a genre open to its 
fictiveness. Elegy 
may simply be a ‘fiction’, playing up, as all literature does, the 
disparities of form and content […]. Rather than a work of 
mourning […] elegy might be defined as a work of losing, in 
which language replicates the loss that gives rise to it.77 
For Hill himself, the question of ‘truth’ in elegy is pitched through faith, faithfulness. Because 
its object is missing, the elegy works at a threshold. It cannot affirm its object, yet it persists in 
affirming itself. Just as the elegy is open to the way it loses its object, ‘it is not faithless | to 
stand without faith’.78 Language replicates loss, and elegy affirms this replication. As Hill’s 
fictional poet Arrurruz writes, ‘I piece fragments together, past conjecture | establishing true 
sequences of pain’.79 These ‘true sequences’ are masks which offer a form in which pain can 
be felt. Faced with non-presence, elegy addresses a mask. The elegy is a form of repetition, 
then, and hopeful that it can sufficiently repeat what it loses – but it is exposed to losing 
repetition, too, to a repetition of loss in fragmentation. In this section, I do not want only to 
look at the ways elegy gives form to ‘loss’, but also at the ways elegy thinks through the loss 
experienced in aesthetics. And the specific elegies of Celan are also translations. As we saw in 
the last section, Celan’s ‘figures’ are configured by a future presence that is lost to a poetic 
present, but which nonetheless remains the displaced, futural condition for that poetic present. 
My claim is that we can read the reflective loss that characterises aesthetic experience through 
the way Celan’s figurative work is itself translated. Again, this is focused around the image of 
snow. The displacement to which such figuration is subject, in Celan, is translated (displaced) 
in his elegists. The elegy, however, thereby reserves the legibility of a non-manifest future that 
works through Celan’s figures. And the work of Blanchot’s and Adorno’s criticism becomes 
legibly elegiac, here, too, as a reflection not on loss, but on reflection’s losses. 
 
i. ‘And again I am too late. Too late’: Geoffrey Hill and elegy 
‘Tristia: 1891-1938, A Velediction to Osip Mandelstam’, in King Log (1968), from which I take 
my subtitle, is an elegy by Geoffrey Hill for the poet Celan elegised repeatedly in translations 
himself. The elegist is always ‘again too late’. But that does not mean that the elegy recuperates 
                                                      
77 Leighton, On Form, 222 
78 Hill, Geoffrey, Broken Hierarchies: Poems 1952-2012, ed. by Kenneth Haynes (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 179 
79 Ibid., 69 
 
201 
the loss it follows. Speaking from the ‘future’ beyond the elegised subject, the poem speaks 
backwards, addresses what it loses. But it also thereby loses the present from which it speaks. 
Hill’s elegies reproduce this question of ‘elegising elegy’, this exilic question that expropriates 
the mournful work of elegy from itself, makes it workless. In ‘Tristia’, ‘Images rear from 
desolation | like ruins upon a plain.’ Images ‘rear’ out of a desolate landscape, coming back 
out of it, in reverse: like ruins appearing, rather than degrading. Images appear, in this topos, 
‘again’ ‘too late’. After addressing the subject, ‘Difficult friend’, the poem addresses itself. 
The poem is ‘too late’ for Mandelstam, so what kind of friendship could it offer other than the 
image of friendship, and what would these images be but ready-made ruins? How can the poem 
elegise (never mind the elegist) its own form? 
Tragedy takes all under regard.  
It will not touch us but it is there – 
Flawless, insatiate – hard summer sky 
Feasting on this, reaching its own end.80 
‘Tragedy’ is, formally, ‘catastrophe’: the dramatic moment when narrative is vertiginously 
played back under the ‘regard’ of catastrophe, etymologically a ‘turning back’, a ‘down turn’, 
a reversal. And this reversal, felt ‘too late’, disrupts the poet’s address to the (poet) he elegises: 
it will not touch ‘us’, both elegist and dead; we are together under this ‘hard’ sky that gives us 
nothing, that goes on without us to ‘its own end’. This is to dramatise the way such 
transcendence can leave us behind: the way an elegy, which reaches so fitfully back to the past, 
can turn out to propose a future of its own transcendent capacity to ‘reach’. Hill resists this, but 
this resistance leaves the poem rather disabled. Under the tragic regard of the poem’s elegiac 
work, ‘I’ and the ‘friend’ are left behind. 
If elegy can only ever repeat a loss, and so only present a kind of absence, then this 
elegy elegises elegy itself, elegises that repetition of loss, that repetition from loss. In Hill’s 
elegy to Celan, ‘Two Chorale-Preludes: On Melodies by Paul Celan’, collected in Tenebrae 
(1978), this results in distancing, as well as a certain mimesis – which is to say, an elegiac 
mimetic activity, a repetition or reproduction of distancing. So, initially, the poem claims to 
modulate ‘melody’ rather than any material content, ‘Es ist ein Land verloren’81 in the first 
poem, ‘Wir gehen dir, Heimat, ins Garn’ in the second. But this melodic, formal repetition 
bleeds into the determinate content of the poems. ‘1 Ave Regina Coelorum’ opens thus: 
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There is a land called Lost 
at peace inside our heads. 
The moon, full on the frost, 
vivifies these stone heads. 
Hill’s translation of ‘Es ist ein Land Verloren’ differs from Hamburger’s ‘There is a country 
Lost’. Who ‘calls’ to this land, for Hill, and why interpolate this ‘calling’ into the translation? 
It departs, even, from Celan’s feminine ending by stressing the monosyllabic ‘Lost’ against 
Celan’s ‘Verloren’.  And Hill interpolates, too, ‘these stone heads’ into Celan’s frost, his 
‘Mond im Ried’, moon in the reeds. And more startlingly, Hill brings this landscape ‘inside 
our heads’. Celan’s poem continues by repeatedly claiming that this ‘Land’ ‘sees’: ‘It sees, it 
sees, we see, | I see you, you see me’. In all this reflective work, ‘we’ is both formed by ‘it’ 
seeing, and undone again into ‘I’ and ‘you’. This is finally ‘ice’ rising from the dead, a 
crystalline frost emerging from a dead landscape into the shapes of these pronouns. In Celan’s 
poem, the landscape withdraws from us, setting its own reflective work in our stead. In Hill’s 
elegiac translation, this work has been internalised, brought ‘inside our heads’, but also 
addressed, ‘called’ to, objectified, made into ‘stone heads’ like graves. Celan’s anonymous 
elegy, where anonymity is elegised in the landscape, is repeated in Hill’s attempt to mark that 
landscape, to bring it inside, to ‘vivify’ ‘these stone heads’ with the crystal forms of Celan’s 
words. Elegy becomes an opportunity to take on Celan’s poetic work, not just to memorialise 
it, or to repeat it faithfully: it is repeated but different, newly generative of a different relation, 
yet still elegiac. This is repeated, again, in the poem’s double: ‘2 Te Lucis Ante Terminum’, 
which opens: 
Centaury with your staunch bloom 
you there alder beech you fern, 
midsummer closeness my far home, 
fresh traces of lost origin. 
In both cases, the poem is resisting what it writes about, compacting it into condensed 
oppositions. But rather than staging progress, figurative transition from the sign of the 
metaphor to its referent, the poem stalls at precisely these points of movement. The moon 
‘vivifies’ stone, bringing stone to nocturnal life; and specifically vivifies ‘stone heads’, 
rhyming too fully with the ‘heads’ which this land ‘Lost’ is inside (and implying, in repetition, 
the absent rhyme: dead). The heads’ stony exterior, disclosed by an external landscape (moon 
on frost), discloses an empty landscape inside. The ‘loss’ is internal to the landscape, and this 
is what the ‘external’ moon shines upon: empty stone heads, loss brought to life. In the second 
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poem, the ‘Heimat’ to which we (you) thread (ins Garn) or go is biologically strange, strangely 
vivified: the ‘Centaury’ the centaur like flower, weirdly humanised, or the ‘you’ and ‘you’ of 
beech alder and fern. All this vivification discloses is an uncanny closeness of distance: 
‘midsummer closeness my far home, | fresh traces of lost origin.’ The poem, that is to say, 
brings loss to life, brings distance home, brings a ‘far home’ close (stickily, humidly, 
biologically close: too close, inside) only to disclose traces of that loss. We cannot trace back 
anywhere because home is already too close; and yet traces are disclosed, paths opened up only 
to the ‘land called Lost’ we are already in, which is already ‘inside our heads’.  
My contention here is that Celan does not here merely become the conveniently 
emptied (melodic) elegiac site for yet more peaceful elegiac work, but rather that Celan’s 
poetics infect Hill’s elegiac capabilities. If Celan’s poetics repeat repetition, moving only from 
outside to outside, here Hill’s elegy, with all of its classical elegiac markers (the decking 
flowers, the elegiac stanzas in long metre), is itself elegiacally reversed. Celan does not just 
provide one more empty prompt for monuments. Rather, repetition of that ‘loss’ interrupts the 
elegiac work, sending it off in tangents against itself, disorientating it. Flowers and plants do 
not deck the corpse; they bloom autonomously and must be addressed in place of any person. 
The homeland is not lost and to be returned to; it is lost but already here, and not just here but 
inside us, inside our heads. Stony monuments do not speak grave epitaphs of remembrance, 
bringing another’s memory to life; they are brought to life themselves, the stone heads full with 
no land, with loss. As John E. Jackson points out, Celan is himself engaged in this elegiac over-
determination of imagery. In ‘Huhebildu’, Jackson argues, Celan’s interpolation of Verlaine’s 
‘Ah, quand refleuriront les roses de septembre!’, as ‘O quant refleuriront, o roses, vos 
septembre’, radicalises the history of the quote. While Verlaine asks (ironically enough) when 
roses will have their time to bloom again, 
Celan’s permutation of september and of the roses inverts that 
natural order, or rather breaks it, and creates thereby a 
diachronical relation not only between the two quotations, but 
also between the two orders implied by these citations: we are 
thus invited to understand, I believe, that the historical order in 
which Celan is writing bears an inverted relationship to the order 
in which Verlaine wrote.82 
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Verlaine is memorialising Rimbaud, poet remembering poet. But we can also see Celan’s 
repetition with difference as elegiac: the ‘ah’ becoming an elegiac (and apostrophic) ‘o’,83 and 
no longer do we ask when the ‘roses of september’ will ‘re-flower’, but when will the roses’ 
‘September’ re-flower, when will their repeatability return, come back again? (Auch deine 
Wunde, Rosa). This is not an ‘inversion’ of natural order. The very repeatability of quotation 
disturbs its natural order, its temporal present. And this disturbance amplifies and exposes the 
disturbance of figuration, which connects one thing with another. Derrida attributes to this the 
‘madness’ of dates. ‘One awaits less the return of the flowers, their blossoming to come, than 
the re-flowering of returns. […] What counts, what is born, flowers, opens, is not the flower, 
it is the date. It counts, and September, moreover, includes a cipher, a number, rather, in its 
name.’84 Recall the simulation of ‘Frankfurt, September’. Flowers simulate their September. 
Flowers ‘mean’ September, which ‘means’ the return of flowers, the numerousness of flowers. 
The organic, ciphered in ‘September’, addressed in Verlaine’s ‘septembre’, is numbered but 
excessively repeats, returns in its organic loss. As Helmut Müller-Sievers argues, this time 
about the interpolation of Büchner’s ‘Es lebe der König!’, ‘Long live the King!’, from Danton’s 
Tod, as the ‘counter-word’ of Celan’s Meridian, quotation is, ‘at the same time, metaphor and 
metonymy, figurative and literal expression, and it thus disorients permanently the desire to 
identify meaning and intention’.85 Such disorientation, as Derrida might say, ‘madly’, resists 
interpretation. ‘The slogan is the opposite of a shibboleth: nothing in its utterance shows 
whether it “belongs” to the speaker, and no philology can tie it to a speaker’s intention.’86 And 
for Fynsk: ‘[t]he “step back” in and from Büchner’s text liberates the possibility of self-citation 
and the poetic naming of this movement of self-situation which the speech has described.’87 
Quotation exposes figuration to its disorientating work; and this disorientating work is, here, 
the work of elegy: a repetition of elegiac topes that interrupt the mournful work of elegy by 
disengaging them from the apparently determinate but actually indeterminate ‘you’ to whom 
they hope to refer. Figuration, like translation, like elegy, displaces its object, such that it 
becomes autonomously detached from the discourse it apparently secures. 
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We can see this literalised, again, by Hill in his elegy ‘September Song’. Again, this is 
mediated generically, through tradition. But again, it interpolates itself, interrupts, into the 
tradition it invokes. As he will later affirm in The Orchards of Syon, referring to Milton’s elegy 
‘Lycidas’, ‘Now there is no due season, do not | mourn unduly’.88 In ‘Lycidas’, ‘Yet once more’ 
Milton ‘plucks’ the berries before they are due to ‘disturb’ their ‘due season’,89 excessively 
returning, coming both too early and too late, coming again. Again, he returns to a pastoral 
idyll in which space he might figure Lycidas who is dead. Lycidas’s due season is interrupted 
by his death, and so the poet must interrupt the pastoral before it (and he) is ready; but by the 
poem’s close we are returned to the ‘due season’. The interruption is unseasonal, but due. The 
debt established by Lycidas’s death can be credited by returning it to that seasonal progress. 
Just so, even though: ‘Now thou art gone, and never must return!’, the dead friend King can be 
credited in the figure of Lycidas. The poem is the work of reconciling an absent future with the 
plenitude of a suddenly remembered past, in order to be able to imagine a Lycidas who ‘is not 
dead’. But for Hill, this ambivalence of ‘undueness’ is elegiac itself. We are enjoined, across 
the line break, both not to and to ‘mourn unduly’ because there is no proper time for mourning 
except all the time. And if there is no proper time for mourning, no ‘due season’, then, as in 
the elegies for Celan, there is no proper ‘Land’, no proper place. The dislocations of space in 
the ‘Chorale-Preludes’ are responsive to this dislocation of elegiac time, of the incapacity of 
elegy now to provide its own time for mourning as Milton once did. We are enjoined, by Hill, 
both to mourn and not to mourn this loss of ‘due season’: ‘do not | mourn’. Elegy must work 
this ambivalence, both mourning and refusing to mourn, and both mourning and refusing to 
mourn the blows to its memorial capacities that this ambivalence marks. This is the elegiac 
distinction between organic, cyclical, repetitive time and monumental, eternal time. But in 
Hill’s poem this distinction blurs: the monumental becomes repetitive, the organic weirdly 
eternal, revivified, fateful. We can read the ‘September’ (Celan’s and Verlaine’s, too) of the 
elegy ‘September Song’, from King Log, through this interruption of temporality, of ‘due 
season’. In the sonnet’s parenthetical centre, Hill interrupts his stringent refusal to name any 
victim by naming himself, the poet: 
(I have made 
an elegy for myself it 
                                                      
88 Hill, Broken Hierarchies, 351 
89 Milton, John, John Milton: The Major Works, ed. by Stephen Orgell and Jonathan Goldgern (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1991), 39 
 
206 
is true.) 90 
‘I’ am also ‘made’ here, tentatively, from this elegy. But Hill breaks the copula ‘is’ from ‘it’, 
a hesitation even to affirm the truth of this construction. It is true, I have made an elegy only 
for myself, but the truth of this interrupts even my capacity to affirm it. It is an elegiac truth, 
self-interrupting, self-displacing. Elegiac faithfulness is truth to the dead, lingering with loss. 
But this poem balks at lingering, even as it hesitates. The time of the elegy is manifestly 
separate from the time of the death it elegises, so why does that death keep coming back, why, 
if the elegy works truly to mourn, would ‘September fattens on vines. Roses | flake from the 
walls’? Here, as with Celan, the poem figures ‘September’, rather than the roses: September, 
not roses, ‘fattens on vines’. This is ‘plenty’ indeed, ‘more than enough’, an excessive return, 
the grossly repetitive consolation of ordinary continuity. The monumental elegy finally gives 
way to the organic flowers peeling away from life, and the elegy for ‘myself’ is in turn 
displaced. ‘I’ give way to ‘you’ in my hesitation to distance myself from you, to say that this 
elegy is for me.  
Here we might return to ‘Tristia’, the ‘valediction’ for a (signed but not named) Osip 
Mandelstam. 
Difficult friend, I would have preferred 
You to them. The dead keep their sealed lives 
And again I am too late. Too late 
The salutes, dust-clouds and brazen cries.91 
Like Milton, ‘I am too late’, but here this lateness is not succeeded by the poetic work of 
restoring due seasons, restoring time. Rather, lateness gives way to more lateness, ‘I am too 
late. Too late’. The problem is that ‘you’ do not poetically disappear enough. I am too late for 
you, but that means you exceed me, do not return, are not remembered (re-membered). ‘And 
again’, I am left in the repetition of elegy. In the ‘Chorale-Preludes’, elegy is a “kind | of 
otherness’, ‘self understood’, my self, my internal space, giving way not specifically to you, 
but to an outside in which the ‘truth’ of that internal spacing is under question even as it is 
externalised. I make an elegy, and surely it can only comfort me, but then where am I if I am 
elegised if not subsumed somehow into my own monument? Here we might recall the image 
of Shelley, the elegist, decked in flowers in ‘Adonais’92 as instructive for this internalisation of 
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dislocation: in place of any body to mourn, the elegist mourns himself; but this displacement 
replaces the re-membering work of elegiac identification with an internalisation of non-
identity. If I can only elegise myself, then I am suddenly, in the elegy, dismembered, not 
identical with myself, outside. 
This bleeding of dislocation also affects the ‘Chorale’ prayer form of the songs. Both 
are sung at Compline, in the last hours of the day. So the ‘Te Lucis Ante Terminum’, is the 
prayer ‘To you before the end of day’. ‘Terminum’ is at the same time any abstract limit, 
terminus, border. To you before the boundary, you, the light (Te lucis) before the boundary. 
This is a meridian. In Hill’s poem, as the title, it marks the limit between Celan’s melodic 
introduction and Hill’s poetic response. There is an equivocation here. On the one hand, with 
Celan, the poem hesitates after the work’s completion, hesitates to carry on working/writing 
after the day has happened; but on the other, after Celan, the poem hesitates at the boundary of 
Celan’s own poetry, the too-close ‘far home’ of his untranslatable (untranslated) verse. Hill 
hesitates either to affirm or to deny his elegiac capacities and responsibilities, but also hesitates 
even to affirm Celan’s presence in the poem. The poem, then, is at a kind of limit, of a kind of 
limit, and this threshold status carries into the poem itself: a homeland which is present/distant, 
the second stanza’s half-rhyme of ‘cleft’ with ‘graft’, working through a cleft, a separation, 
‘working’ as a repetition of ‘clefting’. This is perhaps the poem’s ‘immortal transience’, the 
repetition of transience, its immortal, eternal limit which repeats endlessly. Transience, in this 
anti-pastoral elegy, is immortal, vegetable life blooming and stifling at once. The hymn asks 
for protection in the night, after that boundary of the day is crossed, asks for protection in the 
unknown, and Hill’s poem closes with such rousing faithfulness, ‘BE FAITHFUL grows upon 
the mind | as lichen glimmers on the wood’. The poem seems to close with a resolution: the 
equivocations over how to be ‘faithful’ to the elegiac subject (Celan) resolve. The mind that 
was ‘peaceful’ but ‘lost’ inside now peacefully blooms with the vegetable life that seemed so 
threateningly ‘outside’ yet pressing. But this faithfulness, abstract-organic, is doubly distanced, 
doubly ‘other’ to the mind: both as something that exceeds the mind, grows upon it not in it, 
and in its figural relation to ‘lichen’, one organism growing infectiously upon another. 
Intellection becomes organic, the mind figuratively like wood. Faith is parasitic, grafted on.  
The poem challenges the organic connections it presents, much like Celan challenged 
the apparent organicism of nature and natural landscape by imagining a future, ‘postindustrial’ 
                                                      
the end of the poem assumes the place of Adonais, whose soul is henceforth ‘like a star’ l.494: eternal, 
transcended away but weirdly present in the mortal poet. 
 
208 
nature, Adorno’s ‘inorganic’. For Celan and Hill both, this is a process of crystallisation. Both 
can be read through, against, Kant’s account of crystallisation in nature as a point of connection 
between organic nature and organically orientated judgement, between the reflections of beauty 
and teleology: 
nature displays everywhere in its free formations so much 
mechanical tendency to the generation of forms that seem as if 
they have been made for the aesthetic use of our power of 
judgment without giving us the slightest ground to suspect that it 
requires for this anything more than its mechanism, merely as 
nature, by means of which it can be purposive for our judging 
even as without being based on any idea. By a free formation of 
nature, however, I understand that by which, from a fluid at rest, 
as a result of the evaporation or separation of a part of it 
(sometimes merely of the caloric), the rest assumes upon 
solidification a determinate shape or fabric (figure or texture) 
which, where there is a specific difference in the matter, is 
different, but if the matter is the same is exactly the same.93 
Kant finds a form of judgement in nature. But this crystallisation is the figurative proliferation 
of natural forms. This is natural transformation, where matter seems to form figures (ice 
crystals, for example) by a ‘leap’. This ‘leap’ is a separation. ‘Caloric’ is not, for eighteenth 
century science, simply ‘energy’ but a substance itself. Transformation marks a substantial 
loss. Crystallisation is here elegiac: it is a transformative separation. This is what happens to 
produce snow crystals. 
The formation in such a case takes place through precipitation, 
i.e., through a sudden solidification, not through a gradual 
transition from the fluid to the solid state, but as it were through 
a leap, which transition is also called crystallization. The most 
common example of this sort of formation is freezing water, in 
which straight raylets of ice form first, which then join together 
at angles of 60 degrees, to which others attach themselves at 
every point in exactly the same way, until everything has turned 
to ice […].94 
Ice, like elegy, is a crystalline autonomous production by separation. There is no objective 
cause but loss. There is no end ‘until everything has turned to ice’. The organic growths of 
Hill’s metaphors are crystalline. Where ‘BE FAITHFUL grows upon the mind | as lichen 
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glimmers on the wood’, we are in precisely this kind of crystallisation (notice the modulation 
from ‘growing’ to crystalline ‘glimmering’). If the elegy is a spontaneous crystallisation, an 
organic and productive leap, then it is a leap from loss, from separation. Elegy does not merely 
resolve this separation, it provokes it. Just as ice is provoked by the serial separation of water 
from (substantial) caloric, in Hill’s poem the organic elegy is provoked not from an original 
separation or loss of some person, but of the elegy’s own internal identity. The elegy is faithful 
to the loss of elegiac capacity which Celan’s poetics mark. We are in the time of repetition, 
mere repetition, even when we are in the organic: vegetable life does not figure the blooming 
afterlife of the elegy, but rather the crystalline repetition of separation. For Kant there is a leap 
where water crystallises, becoming solid, but this happens in a series ‘until everything has 
turned to ice’. The process is proliferating. It is not gradual but serial. It is not a continuous 
transformation but a series of discontinuous leaps. Rachel Jones links the possibilities of 
crystallisation, by analogy, to the possibilities of imagination in judgement. If by crystallisation 
nature is able autonomously, by a ‘leap’, to produce original forms, then ‘the ‘leap’ of 
crystallisation can be read as analogous to the leap of imagination in genius, where matter is 
restructured without following pre-given rules’.95 In this way, analogous to the productive, 
aesthetic imagination, ‘crystallisation continually generates ‘another nature’ out of nature’s 
sensible manifold, producing original objects which can be thought of as the discontinuous 
unfolding of a genealogy of active matter’,96 and is ‘a non organic mode of production, 
generating its figures and fabrics without reference to limits set by pre-conceived ideas of 
organic wholes’.97 And so ‘an imagination which functioned non-organically would generate 
a richness of thought surpassing limits and transforming the internal organisation of ideas, 
reworking the very fabric of our thought, and so allowing unforeseen ideas to emerge’.98 
Crystallisation, in this reading, is the ‘non-organic’ proliferation of natural forms, which might 
be read back into the aesthetically judging mind as possible aesthetic production. Hill’s elegiac 
poem, we can now see, unfolds an elegiac facet to this crystallisation process. The elegy is the 
symbolic proliferation of the world under the aspect of its loss. The elegy, mourning, marks 
the world’s loss. (Die Welt ist fort.) Crystallisation is the serial proliferation of precisely this 
loss: an un-growing, non-organic growth by separation. Hill’s poetic response to Celan’s 
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already present lost world is not the aesthetic reproduction of that lost world, but the repetition 
of its loss. It is a separation from an aesthetic capacity. The ‘crystalline’ form is already an art 
form, and this means that aesthetics unfolds in its own non-organic dimension, staged by the 
poem’s marks of external vegetable life and internal ‘stoniness’. The irresolution of the closing 
figure (‘BE FAITHFUL’ growing ‘as lichen’) marks this separation internally to figuration. 
Figuration is a separation, not a reconciliation. Figuration is non-organic, mourning organic 
wholeness, mourning which dislocates figured identity into elegiac nonidentity. 
This is a possible point of fracture in Kant’s aesthetics, a moment of possible reversal. 
If nature can autonomously generate its own crystalline, leaping forms, and if, by analogy, 
judgement can produce new forms of connection by its own leaps, then there emerges within 
aesthetic analogy the possibility of a crystalline relation. In the ‘Chorale-Preludes’, Hill, 
however, suggests that this process of crystallisation is at the same time an externalisation. Ice 
is not just what happens outside, ice is the point of contact between the inside and the outside. 
Crystallisation does not merely describe an analogically possible relation between judgement’s 
subjective inside and nature’s objective outside. That relation is already crystalline in 
language’s objective expression. 
Moods of the verb ‘to stare’, 
  split selfhoods, conjugate 
  ice-facets from the air, 
  the light glazing the light.99 
‘To stare’ is to observe something fixedly, with fascination. Why would such observation ‘split 
selfhoods’? This is speculation: it poses a future connection of what is presently split. The links 
to speculation are etymological, with ‘speculate’ deriving from ‘speculatus’, to observe, as if 
from a watchtower (not from ‘speculum’, a mirror). Speculation, isolated here as language, 
linguistically abstracted from an uttering ‘self’, ‘splits’ selfhood into the plurality of 
‘selfhoods’. Speculation, in the poem’s stare, is suspended, reversed, a speculative loss of 
future connection. To stare is to be removed from oneself. But it also has a peculiar effect on 
what is stared through, air. The word breathes like ice into the air. Staring, words become 
material, ‘facets’, crystalline, surfaced and with aspects: objective. The word, in being 
‘conjugated’, in being declined through its tenses, becomes materially different from the 
selfhood. But the word is also the selfhood. It is breathed out, a breathturn. The self is 
externalised as it is crystallised. The word turning to ice in the air is the ‘shadow’ of the self 
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which breathes it. The self is split like a verb, declining in its action through time, and its action 
is utterance itself. In speaking, both I am and the word is, the same and the same as other. So 
we are left with ‘light glazing the light’, light surfacing light like ice surfacing ice. Light has 
become crystalline, glazing the ‘light’ of the word, passing through its new medium, which is 
not just air but air that has been spoken, become material with the icy word spoken into it. 
Light is transformed even as it transforms the air it passes through. Language is prismatic, 
snowy. Light glazes that prism of ‘light’. The word, as prism, separates, splits the light, and 
the light comes out of it. Speculation is spoken. It happens linguistically before it happens in 
the world, in the air outside. The self breathes air in, and then speaks it out again, a ‘breathturn’. 
The ‘spoken out word’ would dissipate except for literature. Literature, then, is the word 
materialised outside the self, which might not be worked upon but which still works for itself, 
proliferating like ice, proliferating the elegiac work of self-separation: splitting itself off in 
order to witness for the one mourned, and then mourning in turn that separation from the self, 
witnessing that witness, the no-one who witnesses for the witness. 
 
ii. J.H. Prynne ‘out in the snow-fields’ 
We live under dark skies and – there are few human beings.100 
Hill’s prayer ‘Ave Regina Caelorum’ (Hail Queen in heaven) recalls how, in ‘Funeral Music’: 
  The sky gathers up darkness. When we chant 
  ‘Ora, ora pro nobis’ it is not 
  Seraphs who descend to pity but ourselves.101 
‘We’ chanting does not call the divine seraphs to pity but ‘ourselves’. We might pray, but 
praying is its own effect, here. When ‘we’ chant we end, finally, not with any sky, but with 
‘ourselves’. The sky reverses, gathering darkness not light. In these dark skies (recall 
Blanchot’s ‘void of sky, deferred death’, that closes The Writing of the Disaster102), there is no 
place to present death. They are also imagined by J.H. Prynne in his elegy for Celan, ‘Es Lebe 
Der König’, from Brass (1971), where finally ‘Forbearance comes into the | stormy sky and 
the water is not quiet’.103 Forbearance is restraint, but also legally not calling in a debt. Coming 
into the sky, arriving there, at the end of the poem is this restraint, and this acknowledged but 
sustained debt. The poem’s future is this suspension of debt. This reversed sky is also operative 
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in Celan’s The Meridian. Celan refers to Büchner’s Lenz, walking errantly in the mountains, 
who ‘has the sky beneath him as an abyss [hat den Himmel als Abgrund unter sich]’.104 This 
reversal of sky is also a reversal of the terminus of prayer, heaven. It marks a reversal of 
transcendence. Prynne takes his title, too, from a quotation: as we have already noted, Lucile 
in Büchner’s Dantons Tod utters what Celan calls a ‘counter-word’: ‘‘Lenz – or rather Büchner 
– has here gone a step further [einen Schritt weiter gegangen] than Lucile. His “Long live the 
king” is no longer a word, it is a terrifying falling silent, it takes away his – and our – breath 
and words.’105 This counter-word reverses, empties itself, is no longer a word with any meaning 
or presence (why would the widowed wife so absurdly enrage her husband’s killers, commit 
herself to death?), and this reversal infects us, too, reading, empties ‘us’ and ‘our’ ‘breath and 
words’. This, for Celan, is the ‘breathturn’. Charting between the Medusa and the abyss of art 
– between art which suspends its object and art which vertiginously dissipates – there is poetry. 
Poetry: that can mean an Atemwende, a breathturn. Who knows, 
perhaps poetry travels this route – also the route of art – for the 
sake of such a breathturn? Perhaps it will succeed, as the strange, 
I mean the abyss and the Medusa’s head, the abyss and the 
automatons, seem to lie in one direction – perhaps it will succeed 
here to differentiate between strange and strange, perhaps it is 
exactly here that the Medusa’s head shrinks, perhaps it is exactly 
here that the autonomatons break down – for this single short 
moment? Perhaps here, with the I – with the estranged I set free 
here and in this manner – perhaps here a further Other is set 
free?106 
Poetry interrupts aesthetic experience by ‘traveling the route’ of art. Neither suspending its 
object nor vanishing, poetry distinguishes (unterschieden) ‘strange from strange’, like the 
figure of the bow in ‘Lyons, Les Archers’. ‘Perhaps the poem is itself because of this […] and 
now can, in this art-less, art-free manner, walk its other routes, thus also the routes of art – time 
and again [wieder und wieder gehen]?’ Again and again, in repetition, art’s fate is stepped out 
by poetry which interrupts it. By poetry, then, art is not secured but set on a detour: the detour 
of this counter-word, the detour of this interruption, the interruption of the artless. So when 
Celan says that art ‘is the subject of a conversation that takes place in a room […] a 
conversation that, we sense, could be continued indefinitely, if nothing interfered’, he 
immediately then answers himself: ‘[s]omething does interfere [Es kommt etwas dazwischen]. 
                                                      





// Art returns.’107 In poetry, art returns to itself. Celan interrupts his speech, art interrupts itself, 
continues discontinuously, by returning. When Prynne quotes this already quoted counterword, 
then, he offers it as a counterword to his own artful work.108 I want to suggest that this can be 
read more than thematically about Celan’s exilic life, that instead it can be read, like Hill’s 
poem, as an elegy for the aesthetic. I have been arguing that the aesthetic is both spatialised, 
by Kant, and radically de-spatialised, dislocated by the subsequent reworkings of the aesthetic 
I have been exploring, radically dislocated, that is, by the aesthetic itself, by its own reflective 
work. Celan’s radical displacement from Germany, his exilic life, is repeated elegiacally as an 
incapacity properly to ‘locate’ elegiac work. Where, precisely, can this mourning find its place? 
Why does Celan ‘live on’, exiled, without any place to live? Prynne’s elegy for Celan 
(scrupulously dated and signed: ‘for Paul Celan, 1920-1970’), like Hill’s (indeed, can be read 
in dialogue with Hill’s ‘September Song’), works out this elegy for elegy, this incapacity 
properly to mourn, in a way which I am arguing also interrupts and elegises, makes elegiac, 
the aesthetic and aesthetic work.  
This ‘diachronic’ temporality is figured through colour – diachronic becomes 
‘dichroic’, split colour – just as it is for Celan in ‘Conversation in the Mountains’, and through 
‘snow’. Wound Response (1974) closes with ‘Again in the Black Cloud’,109 in which light 
fractures into colour, is ‘dichroic’: each light wave containing at once potentially all colours 
but only presenting one colour. This fracturing traverses the inside and outside of Celan’s snow 
and glass. In this poem, ‘the hour | is crazed by fracture’ too. Light’s ‘dichroism’ is worked out 
temporally. Just as light sustains in its fragmentation the potential for completeness within 
fragmentation, the particular ambiguity of language in the poem has the potential for plural 
communication into community. We can decide to speak together, to say ‘we’, only because 
of a separability, rather than a fungibility, of members. We can say ‘we’ only on the ground 
that there is no similarity. This is staged ‘out in the | snow-fields’, outside, in snow. 
 - out in the 
snow-fields the aimless beasts 
mean what they do, so completely the shout 
is dichroic in gratitude, 
half-silvered, the 
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gain control set for “rescue” at 
      negative echo line. 
The stakes of ‘communicability’ are here staged between poetic expression and inexpressive 
‘beasts’, purely somatic creatures. These ‘aimless beasts | mean what they do’ in their dichroic 
utterance. The beasts – the creatures of nature, not reason – have no end or purpose except what 
they do, except that they do. This is in a sense one end of aesthetic judgement, too. The 
purposelessness of gesture is meaning ‘completely’. And yet, the poem ‘rescues’ this ‘line’, it 
is ‘dichroic’, splitting colours, it is in grateful relation to something else. The beasts’ shout is 
returned to them at the ‘negative echo line’: the point at which there is no vocal return of echo, 
but also the line of the poem’s own utterance which is the ‘negative echo’ of the beasts’ calls. 
The poem’s ‘rescue’ of the aimless utterance is in its own dichroic setting of that utterance. So 
vocality is, indeed, aimless because it has plural aims; and it is exactly in this plurality that the 
poem releases that potential aimlessness which constitutes the plurality of community: plurality 
sustained in the poised ambiguity of a line. So, ironically: ‘Damage makes perfect’. Indeed, it 
is in the particular damage of language that it can sustain the whole, just as the light wave is 
damaged into its radiance of colour. 
 We can read this  ‘negative echo line’, as culture’s mediation by return to nature, which 
is also the inauguration of nature. Culture turns back on itself because nature and art are not 
dissolved yet. The poem sets the shout dichroically, and this setting allows the utterance to 
abide in simultaneity. And in that simultaneity that distance which Kant recognised as the gulf 
set within reason is maintained. But this is the point of ‘rescue’. Is this the rescue of the beasts 
from aimlessness, the intrusion of meaning into their mute-language? Or is it the poem that is 
rescued from the dichroic fragmentation of meaning, from the interpolation of distance into its 
discourse, before the interruptions of identity and control? This is a question of elegy. If, for 
Adorno reading Hegel, aesthetics has failed to overcome art, to complete that reflective 
judgement from objective particularity into subjective generality, then why does art return, and 
how? What is lost? The ‘negative echo’ is the place for echo, the inverse of any response, the 
space where there should be but is not (yet) response. A ‘wound response’ is similarly organic 
but crystalline, spontaneous, an autonomous leap; but here it is not creative, it leaps negatively, 
recoils, from pain, from loss, a movement marked by loss.  
We can trace this elegiac history of experience through the ‘diachronic’/‘dichroic’ 
modulation of snow to white in ‘Es Lebe der König’. The poem immediately establishes a 
divided terrain: ‘Fire and honey oozes from cracks in the earth’. We might recall here Kantian 
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crystallisation: fire (caloric) and honey (the promised substance of the land promised in exile 
in Exodus) simply emerge, oozing from the fractures in the earth, not called to or coaxed. This 
‘promise’ emerges in fractures, a fractured terrain, much as Hill’s song emerges at Compline, 
the boundary of the day. And like Hill’s elegy, Prynne’s evokes a vegetable landscape, ‘grassy 
slopes’, ‘trees’, ‘the plum’, ‘the alder’; but this is counterpointed by the ‘sky’, or the abstract 
‘azure’ of the sky, or by the ‘animals’, ‘the long-tailed bird’, which occupy the landscape. 
There is a shift, too, in the first stanza from ‘glass format’ to ‘new snow’, shifting figuration 
from which the ‘house becomes technical’ like Celan’s ‘dewindowed’ hut. The poem stages 
the land’s movement, the transformations the landscape undergoes: it is temporal, moving, 
alive with autonomous or at least spontaneous movement. Again, like the ‘Centaury’, ‘you 
alder beech you fern’ which Hill addresses in place of any time to mourn an absent body, 
Prynne evokes a landscape only to have that landscape not correspond with the evocation. Just 
as Hill must resolve merely to observe the ‘glimmer’ of lichen on wood as the only token of 
elegiac-pastoral faithfulness, so Prynne’s landscape undergoes constant transformations, 
resisting elegiac symbolic weight. The land is outside. 
     Sky divides 
as the flag once more becomes technical, the print 
divides also: starlight becomes negative. 
The ‘flag’ which marks territory becomes technical, a mere principle for dividing a territory 
which is not freighted with any symbolic weight, a no-man’s land. This is one fate of the 
aesthetic I am trying to trace: in the aesthetic no-man’s land of cognition there is no 
determination, division is technical; and when this bleeds into the transcendental ‘technic of 
nature’, the grounding orientation which aesthetic work should provide becomes negative, 
‘negative’ (polar) ‘starlight’, a disorientation as landscape itself. The flag merely maps out this 
reversal, which, by a pun, reverses into the elegising poet himself: ‘Prynne’ becomes ‘print’, 
and that ‘divides also’ on the page, the mourning poet separated as caloric from the poem, 
mapping out in elegy an aesthetic territory which has no ground. 
The pun, of course, repeats: ‘we too are numbered like | prints in the new snow’. The 
landscape is covered in new snow, which discloses prints, traces of human activity, in which 
traces we read back, number, a ‘we’, the numerous poetic sources (prints/Prynnes). In the 
numerousness of this source, there is no origin to mourn, no original loss, merely the repetition, 
in ‘we’, of loss, traced out in print(s). The poem’s material presence is sketched into its formal 
present. This bleeds into Prynne’s transformation of Celan’s famous ‘Deathfugue’: ‘It is not 
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possible to | drink this again’. Where Celan’s poem works from the camps’ necessary repetition 
(‘We drink and we drink’),110 a repetition which does not so much establish any communal 
‘we’ as disestablish it in repetitive and aimless labour, Prynne’s interrupts precisely that labour: 
we do not drink, ‘It is not possible to | drink this again’. So amidst all this reversibility of 
identification and materiality, time is figured as irreversible. Slyly, just as Hill enjoins us both 
to mourn and not to mourn by splitting the verb from its negation (‘do not | mourn unduly’), 
Prynne both exposes the impossibility of repetition and the repetition of labour within this 
impossibility by splitting the verb’s infinitive at the line break into an imperative: ‘to | drink 
this again’. We are enjoined both to ‘drink again’ and to see that it is not possible to ‘drink 
again’, to repeat this impossibility of ‘drinking again’. So, where Hill’s elegy was framed by 
the struggle, elegiacally, to ‘repeat’ the loss that it mourns, and by the way in which that 
struggle was transported into the elegiac capacity itself, here Prynne’s elegiac work 
(reproducing a lost land as a symbolically freighted monument to the lost poet, Celan) works 
from within repetition by exposing its impossibility. Repetition is unworking; it is 
unproductive. It is not the non-organic crystallisation of the ‘technic of nature’ in aesthetic 
judgement; rather, it is the unproductive and stark repetition of the failure of crystallisation. 
The ‘snow-fields’, outside. Prynne’s figures of the landscape overturn the landscape.  
It is significant that figuration, bound to the unworking of repetition, also establishes 
‘we’, ‘over and over’, ‘we’ who are in the position of Celan’s ‘you’: 
             going over and over to 
the landing-stage, where we are. We stand 
just long enough to see you, 
 
we hear your 
fearful groan and choose not to think of it. We 
 
Just so, ‘we too are numbered like | prints in the new snow’, we are the symbolic excess of this 
un-crystal figuration. Numbering us is the repetitive work by which we find a ground for 
communal identity. The aesthetic, which should guarantee the possibility of such ground, is 
here ‘unworking’. The aesthetic telos of guaranteeing political communicability from inside 
subjective experience is exposed as the work of repetition, as a crystalline fiction of figuration. 
We ‘go’ ‘over and over’, but ‘choose not to think of it’.  
                                                      
110 Celan, Poems of Paul Celan, 31 
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The problem, then, is that figures do not figure. The landscape does not stand in for 
either the mourning poet or the mourned poet. And yet this is precisely where ‘we’ are, this is 
the only ground which elegiac work establishes. There is a complex figurative weightlessness 
here that the poem traces out. The first image, of ‘honey’ oozing ‘from cracks in the earth’ is 
picked up at the end as ‘white honey’, an internal infection which spreads from a landscape of 
‘new snow’ to a ‘patchwork’ tablecloth of white, an exterior landscape made ordinary, inside 
the ‘small house’, interior. From outside to inside, from snow to white. 
   Take it away and set up 
the table ready for white honey, choking the 
white cloth spread openly for the most worthless 
accident. The whiteness is a patchwork of  
revenge too, open the window and the white fleecy 
clouds sail over the azure; 
    
    it is true. Over and 
over it is so, calm or vehement. You know 
the plum is a nick of pain, is so and is also 
certainly loved. Forbearance comes into the 
stormy sky and the water is not quiet. 
Honey, which is a product of natural crystallisation (nectar which is gathered and transformed 
by bees into crystalline honey, kept in the honeycomb’s cells, storing the bees’ labour), 
becomes ‘white honey’; or perhaps ‘snow’ becomes ‘white honey’, snow harvested and stored 
up, symbolising the hope for future plenty, storing up symbolic value of an untapped, naturally 
recurring surplus, the hope for symbolism itself as the possibility of a future, the possibility of 
future meaning. So, the table is ‘ready for white honey’, whiteness which is yet to come. Now 
it merely reflects, or infects, by ‘accident’, what is outside it. White proliferates: the white 
cloth, the abstract whiteness a ‘patchwork’, the ‘white fleecy | clouds’ outside the window. In 
spreading the table in hope for ‘white honey’, the field is opened up to accident, to the ‘revenge’ 
of crystalline whiteness not being stored but spreading, proliferating, ‘the most worthless | 
accident’, without any symbolic value. The clouds outside are the revenge of this 
‘worthlessness’: they ‘sail over the azure’. The problem staged here is that although the elegy 
might intend to reconcile its object, the dead poet, to the present by establishing a blank field 
in which he can be mourned, the blankness of this field only exposes the repetitive 
worklessness (désœuvrement) of this work of mourning. In a most striking echo of Hill’s 
‘September Song’, an echo of Hill’s struggle to affirm his elegiac work, to say ‘it | is true’, 
Prynne quite emphatically says: ‘it is true.’ The problem, here, is not whether the elegy is ‘true’ 
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or not (to its mourned object or to its mourning subject), but that the truth of it repeats. ‘Over 
and | over it is so’. We start mourning and cannot stop. Finally, the landscape offers restraint, 
in the sky, and unquiet, in the water. They do not mirror each other, are not identical, separated 
over and over by its elegiac truth. 
 We can read this anxiety over elegiac capacity, both Hill’s and Prynne’s, and the two 
poems’ focus on demarcating a landscape, back into Blanchot’s anxiety that presence is what 
displaces the possibility of the present. The elegiac attempt to recompense absence with 
aesthetic presence becomes, in these poems, precisely what discredits presence. The elegy, 
rather than reconciling or recompensing any loss, merely repeats the loss. Here, the way this 
repetition establishes the ground for itself is itself repeated as an elegiac trope: the catastrophe 
not of reversing an irreversible time, but of exposing the internal reversibility of time as 
repetition. If presence is already the time of repetition, then what presence could cope with 
loss? If the elegy tries to establish the monumental recompense to loss, its aesthetic reflection, 
then it does so from within the repetitive, un-presencing work of the aesthetic. 
We might link the kind of elegiac work of landscape, the delimiting of the inside and 
the outside, to Prynne’s commentary on Wordsworth’s ‘Tintern Abbey’, where the landscape 
doubles between the totally exterior (with no dwelling except the hermit’s nomadic home to 
mark any inside) and its repetition inside memory. In Wordsworth’s poem, this modulates into 
repetition. 
By such power of transformation the paradoxical vagrancy of local 
dwelling where no door-entrance offers a threshold between inner and 
outer space, natural unhoused wandering and its mimicry by the 
traveller on tour, enlarges into a mighty horizon of human 
remembrance hinting at closure, the light of setting suns; itself the 
dwelling or hermitage of vagrant being and presence beyond all simple 
locality, where the narrative of any one single sunset is subsumed into 
their constancy of recurrence.111 
The hints of exterior temporal limitation (the setting sun, Compline, last hours) reflect an 
interior horizon of hope, the limit of what we might hope for being a reversal of remembrance, 
a return, recurrence; but precisely this recurrence is also discontinuous, in the sense that each 
repetition is, exactly in its identity, not identical – the recurrence of the same to the same in 
proliferating excess of identity. This nonidentity of repetition bleeds into ‘Es Lebe der König’: 
                                                      
111 Prynne, J.H., ‘Tintern Abbey, Once Again’, Glossator, 1 (2009), pp. 81-8, 84 
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‘it is true. Over and | over it is so’, breaking its own assertion of repetition – the ‘stormy sky’ 




Elegy presents an address to loss. Here, elegising Celan means recapitulating Celan’s poetics 
of figuration, where the image presents loss in its incompatibility with the present. For Celan, 
this orientates experience towards the future. This non-present experience is exposed to ‘you’, 
outside, figured into the poem, who is a blank (white) coming which never arrives. The elegiac 
translations of imagery make these displacements legible. Finally, this traversal across 
displacement makes legible an aesthetic experience orientated, non-transcendently, by the 
provisionality of reflective experience. Aesthetic form, reading, that responds to the 
indeterminacy – borderlessness, endlessness – of its object constituted within the limit of poetic 
form responds, also, to the indeterminacy of a non-manifest future. In the elegy, we have 
dispersion, a divestment from the elegised object which speaks to the object’s dissipation, not 
to its lingering presence. The aesthetic lingers in this reversal, as reserving the form of 
experience of indeterminacy for these provisional elegies.  
The figure is here elegiac: it proposes a disconnection from its object, an indeterminate 
disconnection from which new reflections fragment. Elegiac work on Celan reproduces this 
reflexivity. Not proposing to ‘host’ the object (Celan) it loses, such elegy instead hosts its 
disconnection from that object. And when the object it is disconnected from is already the 
reflective dispersal of connection, then, contradictorily, it hosts this dispersal in repeating it. 
Aesthetic reversal – towards the dispersal and fragmentation of judgement registered in 
judgement itself – is in this way reproduced in the elegy. This reproduction, and this 
indeterminacy, however, are futural. Thinking the future in its indeterminacy means responding 
to it reflectively. The reflection that Kant mandated to aesthetic judgement can exceed that 
mandate. But that means reflectively marking the ways, historically, in which excess can be 
measured. If art effects a reversal on aesthetics, and contradictorily exposes experience in this 
reversal to the indeterminacy of the future, then it is through the way such reflection is already 
exposed to its own indeterminacy. 
Making reversal legible means reversing legibility. If legibility is encoded, artistically, 
in objectivity, then the form of that objectivity has to become legible through experience. The 
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paths of its legibility that I have been marking – through ‘community’, through ‘dialectics’, 
and through ‘poetics’ – proceed from the reflecting work of aesthetic judgement and its 
discontinuities with ‘aesthetic’ experience. The fate of the aesthetic here is to be exposed to the 
reversal of its operations. But this reversal is already encoded in aesthetic experience. The paths 
to objectification that make up this reversal are reflective, not determinate. The turns of 
experience to an indeterminate outside of experience are reflections. So the future that is 
exposed in this reversal is elegiacally aesthetic. But this does not mean that aesthetic work 
‘mourns’ its loss, recuperating in that mourning an art-symbol that can replace the objectivity 
it loses. Instead, it marks loss as a condition for thinking indeterminately of the future. Thinking 
futurally, then, and not mourning, marks this reversed aesthetic. 
Exposed to this discontinuous futurity, the aesthetic responds to form not by producing 
a symbol for its discontinuity but by exposing itself to its own repetitive work. When Adorno 
enjoins aesthetics to think through the concept of form, in order not to capitulate to it, I think 
we can take it in this way. Thinking through form means thinking through the repetitions, the 
losses, by which that form becomes legible. Adorno’s aesthetics are in this way exposed to a 
non-manifest future, a non-objective, promised future: an unprecedented happiness. And they 
are also exposed to the unprecedented repetitions of loss to which writing exposes us, as 
Blanchot suggests. This is how aesthetics lets us think through community: by giving form to 




The necessity of indeterminacy: from aesthetics to politics 
 
 
If ‘yes’ signals being or presence, then ‘no’ signals the negative or the negation of that presence. The 
movement between such affirmation and negation constitutes the dialectic. But as Celan suggests in 
‘Speak you too’, when we speak we should not ‘split off No from Yes’.1 We should not conceive of 
negation without any presence. There is always ‘something’ being negated. This ‘no’, this ‘not’ (pas), 
this ‘negative’ that drives dialectics is ‘something’. But conceiving it ‘as something’ is impossible, or 
at least impossible to determine: any positing of the ‘presence’ of ‘no’ would erase that negative. 
Adorno’s and Blanchot’s reorientations of dialectics revolve around this impossibility. Each, 
differently, conceive of aesthetics as a possible sphere for thinking or measuring this impossibility. And 
this is legibly an aesthetic procedure when read alongside Kant. It becomes a ‘presentation’ of the 
indeterminacy of ‘presentation’, a negative presentation. What are the consequences of conceiving, 
firstly, aesthetics in this way and, secondly, of orientating dialectical thinking in such a way that these 
aesthetics can be presented, present? The two I want to trace here, finally, are in thinking of the ‘future’, 
and in thinking of ‘politics’. Both are entwined, to the extent that politics is both constituted by 
‘presentation’ (in defining who or what can speak politically), and of the ‘futurity’ in which it is 
conceived: politics is always ‘to come’ in the sense that what it presents is the negotiation over how 
change will be shaped and happen. The ‘future’ of politics is the emergence of new forms of 
presentation, which, paradoxically, the present of politics shapes. 
 
Rosa Luxemburg: the necessity of indeterminacy 
In the introduction to this thesis, I looked briefly at Rosa Luxemburg as a point of orientation for Celan’s 
poetry. We can return to Luxemburg as tracing out more broadly the political context into which 
Adorno, Blanchot, and Celan write. Each of them respond, in a way, to the failure of revolution to 
become politically ‘present’; or for its presence (in May ’68) to match historical presence. Such politics 
is non-manifest. The ‘aesthetics’ of non-manifestation each trace makes this politics visible. 
Luxemburg, too, wrote in response to a revolutionary failure: the Russian revolution. For Luxemburg, 
advocating for ‘revolutionary’ politics means advocating for a political spontaneity which defies 
determination. There can be no prior political determination of what form any revolutionary politics 
would take. Instead, if it is to open politics to its potential mutability, a revolution must be 
                                                      
1 Celan, Selected Poems and Prose, 76|77 
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indeterminate. Revolutionary politics requires thinking of a future which is possibly different to the 
present, and which therefore cannot be pre-determined in the present. Such thinking is therefore 
required at once to think of the future, and not to determine it. Luxemburg’s attempts to give theoretical 
form to revolutionary praxis led her to the paradoxical idea of ‘spontaneity’: that revolution overturns, 
first of all, its theoretical conditions. This is because the political outcomes of revolution are not 
determined by either its material conditions or its political means. ‘Spontaneity’ thinks across this 
paradox: that the means of revolution are indeterminately related to their ends; that the ‘ends’ of 
revolution are strictly indeterminate – and in this way trace out a Kantian, indeterminate teleology. So, 
Luxemburg argues, ‘revolutions do not allow anyone to play the schoolmaster with them’.2 Class 
consciousness cannot be adequately taught by theory, but must be learned ‘by the living political school, 
by the fight and in the fight, in the continuous course of revolution’.3 Any dialectical self-consciousness 
of politics must be produced ‘in the middle of history, in the middle of progress, in the middle of the 
fight’.4 The relation of ‘mass strikes’ to the Russia revolution, to use her example, is indeterminate: ‘it 
is ceaselessly moving, a changing sea of phenomena’.5 Strikes do not always lead to the social and 
political reversals of revolution, so why might they sometimes? How could that transition be visible? 
In their mutable organisation, the revolution becomes a kind of organism, with strikes as its ‘living 
pulse-beat’.6 When we judge the historical relation between means and end, cause and effect, we are 
asked to judge as if the former does not simply (determinately) produce the other.7 The ‘spontaneous 
stirrings of exploited masses and the various socialist theories’8 are connected spontaneously, which we 
might translate as indeterminately: political praxis is connected with theory without that praxis offering 
a terminus for theory, or that theory determining the effects of that praxis. 
Hannah Arendt notes how, for Luxemburg, the expansion of capital into new territory was 
similarly ‘spontaneous’, in the sense that it was not a singular event but ‘expropriation’ that necessarily 
repeats ‘time and again’.9 There are two kinds of necessity in play here. There is the necessity that 
governs the expansion of capital in unanticipated ways. And there is the necessity that such expansion 
                                                      
2 Luxemburg, Rosa, The Rosa Luxemburg Reader, ed. by Peter Hudis and Kevin B. Anderson, (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 2004), 198 
3 Ibid., 182 
4 Ibid., 170 
5 Ibid., 191 
6 Ibid., 192 
7 ‘Cause and effect here continually change places’ in revolution [Ibid., 195]. As we shall see in detail in 
chapter one, we are asked to make what Kant calls a ‘teleological’ judgement: a judgement of relation in 
which parts are organised as if at once their own cause and effect. Here we can emphasise the reflective 
character of this judgement.  
8 Luxemburg, Rosa, The Complete Works of Rosa Luxemburg, Volume I: Economic Writings 1, ed. by Peter 
Hudis, trans. by David Fernbach, Joseph Fracchia and George Shriver (London and New York: Verso, 2013), 
437 
9 Arendt, Hannah, Men in Dark Times (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1968), 39 
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is, indeed, unanticipated, such that it is open to revolutionary intervention. The ‘necessity’ of revolution 
is the necessity of indeterminacy. Jacqueline Rose picks up on this spontaneity between Arendt and 
Luxemburg to describe the need of politics for a ‘poetics of revolution’10 which could account for such 
indeterminacy at the heart of spontaneity. Leading from Rose, we can suggest that such a poetics would 
have to account for the ways uncertainty configures not just the revolutionary situation – the repetitious 
expropriations of capital – but the political freedom invoked by revolution, too, ‘the fallibility already 
at the heart of the revolutionary moment itself’.11 There is no necessary connection between 
revolutionary contingency and progressive causes. There is no actionable political teleology where 
means and end are collaboratively aligned. 
The kind of reflective forms of judgement theorised in Kant’s aesthetic can give form to the 
political questions of judgement raised here. In the aesthetic, Kant provides model of judgement that 
lingers reflectively with contradiction, that can abide indeterminacy. This does not mean that aesthetics 
does politics. It means that the kinds of judgement and form operative in aesthetics can make visible 
reflective judgements and forms in political discourse. This rebounds against Hegel’s sense of 
dialectics, which, we saw, were driven by the kinds of reflection detected in aesthetics.  Hegel’s 
dialectical syntheses are the disclosure in speculation of a unity that pre-exists dialectical reconciliation. 
In actively reconciling it, the dialectic shows how its material was always unified. Marx’s dialectic 
envisions a future material liberation which will, in the dialectic’s future anterior, again be shown to 
have been inevitable.12 But in the ‘spontaneous’ version of the dialectic, the outcome must always 
remain indeterminate. There is nothing inevitable about liberation. The dialectic is motivated only by 
its own spontaneous negations. In order to think this negativity, however, we must have a form for its 
legibility. How could indeterminacy itself be thought, if any concept of it would only determine and 
therefore negate it? How could the dialectic be opened to a ‘negativity’ without negating it? This 
question of futurity – focused as a political futurity – therefore opens up to the question of the aesthetic. 
In what form could such indeterminacy be visible as such, as indeterminate, without determining it 
conceptually? Politics develops in unexpected forms. We therefore require a form for reading the 
unexpected, in which this indeterminacy – this unexpected end, this unanticipated purpose – is readable. 
The aesthetic conceived by Kant, responsive to the reflection that is its condition, can offer such a form. 
                                                      
10 Rose, Women in Dark Times, 40 
11 Ibid., 43 
12 As Simon Jarvis argues, ‘What is speculative thinking?’ in Revue International de Philosophie 227 (2004), 
pp. 69-83, with reference to Adorno, this opens the way to thought’s speculative embodiment. ‘A thought 
which did not wish for anything would not be like anything, would not be a thought. The bodily, because it 
is at the 'core' of thinking, in its 'innermost cell', is what allows thinking to interpret, without subsuming, the 
non-identical. Thinking's debt to the body allows it to own its debt to the object.’ Thinking thought’s debt to 
its material means thinking speculatively against the negation which constitutes thought. This paradoxical 
activity makes possible, however, the negative realisation that thought does not merely ‘embody’ itself, but 
is already ‘embodied’. 
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But it requires us to re-read Kant, and to re-read the aesthetic. And it requires us to develop a form for 
this aesthetic legibility, as well as this legibility of the aesthetic. By turning to Kant’s aesthetics, we can 
give form to the political necessity of indeterminacy, in which what is necessary is not the manifestation 
in politics of a determined outcome, but a politics which does not terminate in any given political form. 
Aesthetics can frame the visibility of this non-manifestation, this indeterminacy. Its operations are 
therefore indeterminately political. 
 
Aesthetic legibility and the politics of indeterminacy – Arendt, Rancière, Sartwell, Ngai 
It is possible to distinguish between ‘the political’ as the condition of politics, and ‘politics’ as the 
activity of politics. The political is the ‘happening’, and politics is what ‘happens’. This distinction is 
clear in autocracies: the monarch, the sovereign, forms the ‘political’ frame which legitimises the 
‘politics’ of political activity. But in democracy’s shared sovereignty, to the extent that equality is an 
aspiration and shared, this distinction is less clear. Democracy, then, would be the negotiation between 
the political and politics. This is particularly true in France, which makes this distinction between the 
political – le politique – and politics – la politique.13 If, after the revolution, the republican democracy 
must form its political out of its politics, then it is self-generating as it is self-constituting. It functions 
like a Kantian organism. It must constitute its own ends, without direction or terminus beyond the means 
of those ends. Such politics is organised indeterminately. Such politics is also organised through 
measurement. But the terms of such measurement are obscure. The conditions of politics – the political 
– are not identical with the manifestations of politics itself. The two are indeterminately related. 
Thinking such indeterminacy requires a form for indeterminacy, and therefore an aesthetics of 
indeterminacy. And indeed, this relation between an organism’s self-generating forms and the reflective 
activity of measuring such forms is precisely the topos of Kant’s aesthetic. We can explicitly think 
about politics as reflectively organised, and as organising the negotiation of its own reflexivity. And 
thinking such stakes is given form through Kant’s aesthetic.  
The legacy of Kant’s aesthetic is politically ambiguous, however. As we have seen, he 
explicitly did not use the aesthetic to say what a community should be, but merely to outline the 
conditions of communicability that underlie a conception of community. His political ‘kingdom of 
ends’ only formally matches this communicability. What those ‘ends’ are, just as what beauty ‘is’, lies 
beyond critical philosophy. So what are the consequences of thinking the indeterminacy of politics 
through the indeterminacy of the aesthetic, while maintaining that regulative ‘indeterminacy’ between 
the two? The relation between the aesthetic and the political is reflective in complex ways. If there is 
                                                      
13 We shall see in chapter two how this question is mediated through the question of sovereignty; here I want 




politics, that is because the practice of politics is visibly present. Establishing this visibility is the 
theoretical work of the political. Not only ‘what’ is politically possible, but ‘who’ counts in a political 
community must be rendered visible. Aesthetics therefore asks questions about visibility that parallel 
political questions. But politics also implies a kind of ‘aesthetics’ where this visibility is, as Jacques 
Rancière argues, apportioned or shared. Politics is already ‘aesthetic’ to the extent that it implies 
spectatorship: ‘who’ is visible, and ‘what’ is visible, implies a condition of possible visibility. As 
Hannah Arendt argues, any political praxis depends upon defining this ‘spectatorial’ aspect of political 
agency. And such praxis is derived, for her, from a reading of Kant’s aesthetics, with its focus on the 
judger as aesthetic spectator. In Arendt’s account, such aesthetic judgements make implicit appeals to 
‘communicability’, and thereby to an actual ‘community.  
The it-pleases-or-displeases-me, which as a feeling seems so utterly 
private and noncommunicative, is actually rooted in this community 
sense and is therefore open to communication once it has been 
transformed by reflection, which takes all others and their feelings into 
account […].14 
The aesthetic judgement is the transformative ‘reflection’ in which the private and inner turns out to be 
public, outer and ‘actual’. Aesthetics marks such transformation of private feeling into public actuality 
through the communications of reflection. Reflection is inherently public, because rather than 
measuring between a concept and intuition, it measures between the private judgement itself and the 
community of others who should judge in the subject’s place. The reflective structure of aesthetic 
judgement necessarily actualises its own community through this appeal to reflective, and not 
conceptual or objective, communication. Here Arendt adjusts Kant’s own sense that aesthetic 
judgements pave the way or set the stage through reflection for sociability. For Kant, aesthetic 
judgement indicates an inherent ‘communicability’ to judgements which must be shared, without that 
communicability being actualised or determined by the judgement itself. Aesthetic judgement shows 
the necessary form of communicability without communicating anything. Where for Arendt the act of 
judgement enacts community, for Kant judgement registers a communicability which prepares 
thinking for sociability. Community remains, in Kant’s reading, non-actualised; and thus still non-
determined, in the future. Kant’s account of aesthetics therefore opens the way to Arendt’s utilisation 
of reflection. But it also reserves (reflectively) that utilisation as a possibility for which reflection is the 
condition. The difference here is that for Kant, the ‘work’ of reflection in enacting community remains 
negative, in the sense that it is not actualised. But such reflection might also shape or give form to a 
certain political incommunicability: that is to say, to the indeterminate way the political is related to the 
actual praxis of politics; to the way the political is conditioned by its negative, indeterminate 
articulations in politics; to a shared indeterminacy.  
                                                      
14 Arendt, Hannah, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, ed. by Ronald Beiner (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1982), 72 
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An aesthetic is the form of visibility of the conditions of aesthetic experience. We might think 
here of Rancière’s sense of the ‘aesthetic regime of art’. For Rancière, aesthetics refers to an ‘aesthetic 
regime’ for the ‘distribution of the sensible’: aesthetics is one historical system of articulation by which 
artworks become visible as artworks. This distribution of the sensible is the way that things are made 
visible in a common space and time.15 There is a politics of visibility operative in aesthetics. ‘What’ is 
visibly art to ‘whom’ depends upon such a ‘distribution of the sensible’. And this visibility is not one 
way: artworks are not merely determined by their historical or political context, they also affect the 
distribution of visibility itself. Art’s visibility legislates for visibility as such by making new forms 
visible to a common people within a common context. This relation is dialectical, inasmuch as artworks 
propose their own specific conditions within a context of conditions. It is also social. And this means 
that there is, as well as this ‘politics of aesthetics’, an ‘aesthetics of politics’. Making something visible 
means making it visible to some person or people. The capacity to share in this common space thus 
determines the capacity to take part (to be visible) in politics. But politics also engages in aesthetic 
procedures to the extent that it functions through such ‘distribution’ of sensibility, apportioning 
visibility to certain members of society and to certain possibly political activities. The aesthetic, as a 
way of thinking about what is visible or not in this common, thus frames the entrance of people into 
community. This is perhaps why aesthetics terminates for Rancière in democracy, which says 
essentially that ‘there will never be, under the name of politics, a single principle of the community’.16 
As Luxemburg suggested that the revolution emerges both from and into a context of indeterminacy, 
so Rancière argues that aesthetics is a ‘regime’ in which political indeterminacy is organised. 
Democracy is visible as a political relation under the aesthetic conditions whereby art is progressively 
fragmented. If indeterminacy organises aesthetic experience, then through aesthetics we can experience 
the indeterminacy that also organises community. Democracy would then describe a specific political 
relation in which the political is distributed according to its indeterminacy. And that would mean that 
aesthetics could work out its serial but singular relation to art in common with this democratic relation. 
But it still remains to establish by what form this indeterminate relation between politics and 
art could be made aesthetically visible. The negotiations over visibility are played out internally to 
aesthetics itself. By what forms are things experienced aesthetically? For Kant this means as ‘beautiful’ 
or ‘sublime’, but the range of such experience is extendable. As Thierry de Duve argues, when ‘art’ and 
not ‘nature’ is the object of judgement, the Kantian question – ‘is this beautiful?’ – becomes the question 
‘is this art?’ This reorientation exposes Kantian judgement to history by introducing the changing and 
                                                      
15 Rancière, Jacques, The Politics of Aesthetics, trans. by Gabriel Rockhill (London and New York: 
Continuum, 2004), 12 et passim; and Aesthetics and its Discontents, trans. by Steven Corcoran (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2009), 13 et passim 




producible forms of art.17 But what are the consequences of this reorientation? Similarly, the relation 
between the forms of aesthetic experience and the forms of political experience is not simple, but 
historical. If we are to determine this relation, then we can look to the ways aesthetics responds to its 
own indeterminate relation with art. When we talk about an aesthetics ‘of’ politics, or a politics ‘of’ 
aesthetics, we have to be attentive to the indeterminate form in which aesthetics mediates its 
judgements. For Crispin Sartwell, art and aesthetics are not just a feature of politics. Politics functions 
aesthetically itself. For Sartwell, ‘an ideology is an aesthetic system’,18 not in the sense that its 
manifestations are artistic, but in the sense that politics operates through a range of objective features 
we might call aesthetic: through its aural, visual, and literary mediations. This is not a Kantian aesthetic 
concern with experience, but with material features. 19 This leads Sartwell to argue that politics is 
mediated through material. This expands the range of what might be considered ‘aesthetic’, but it also 
limits the possible range of experience of the aesthetic. A useful intervention is made here by Sianne 
Ngai,20 who explicitly deals with the politics implied by different accounts of aesthetic experience, and 
by the expansion of aesthetic experience into new cognitive and emotive spheres – what is ‘cute’, for 
example. But I think it is also useful to return to Kant here. With Kant, we locate reflective 
indeterminacy not merely with possible material features (what could palpably count as art, or at least 
beautiful), but with the account of experience itself. It is aesthetic experience, and not just the products 
of art, that is indeterminate, and in which reflection is active. For Sartwell, politics is ‘aesthetic’ in the 
sense that it is constituted of material, palpable, ‘aesthetic’ features. But we can also examine the way 
that such ‘palpability’ of aesthetic presence is mediated through aesthetic experience. The reflective 
capacity to recognise what counts as aesthetic is, as Rancière suggests, generated through the material 
of aesthetics. And we can further argue, following Kant, that the decision that shapes that recognition 
is conditioned by aesthetic forms of experience. Experience has a shape and a form – this is axiomatic 
for Kant. The reflective construction of the forms of experience is not just objective (the production of 
new things called ‘art’) but subjective: the construction through reflection of new forms of experience. 
We can therefore draw Ngai’s sense of the construction of aesthetic categories not only into 
conversation with Adorno (for whom this idea is important), but also with Kant, and finally with the 
‘politics’ of aesthetics and the ‘aesthetics’ of politics. The production of new aesthetic categories is the 
construction of new political visibility. But then we are left with the question, how do we reflect on this 
construction? What are these new forms, and what guides their formation? What kind of aesthetics is 
                                                      
17 de Duve, Thierry, Kant after Duchamp (Cambridge MA, London: MIT Press, 1996) 
18 Sartwell, Crispin, Political Aesthetics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), 1 
19 Ibid., 5: ‘a thing’s aesthetic features are the features of a thing that could be relevant to assessment of 
its beauty’. 
20 Ngai, Sianne, Our Aesthetic Categories (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2015) 
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possibly shared between subjective experience and objective product? And how might this shared 
relation speak to the relations that organise politics? 
We would do well to consider, again, the contestation in French between ‘politics’ and ‘the 
political’, la politique and le politique. The activity of ‘politics’ is framed by the conditions of its 
possible experience, which we might call ‘the political’. And the form of these conditions of experience 
requires, following Rancière, a certain visibility. And finally, accounting for this visibility itself requires 
an aesthetic: an account of the form of transaction by which subjective experience (this is beautiful, or 
this is art) is translated, if not into effective politics, into the formal condition for objective visibility. 
This, indeed, returns us to Kant’s project in his third Critique. If, Kant urges, moral ideas are effective, 
and not just regulative, in guiding our moral actions, then they must, paradoxically, be both free from 
the world (not merely derived from it) and equally effective in the world. Thinking this disconnection 
as effective means thinking of a way disconnection can be conditioned and organised. The aesthetic 
does exactly this work of organisation: it makes available for experience the reflective way such 
experience is itself organised. But the difficulty of presenting negativity is also a difficulty of the 
‘negativity’ of presence. If, Blanchot argues, there is presence, then it is other, in the sense that it is 
only ‘present’ through the negative procedures by which it is made visibly present. And this otherness 
interrupts any ‘presentation’ of it. And, Adorno argues, if there is ‘negativity’, then it is only felt as the 
‘negative’ of determining conceptual practices. There is no grasping of the negative, and therefore no 
presentation of negativity. An indeterminate politics cannot simply employ or utilise the negativity 
which motivates it. Such employment is reflectively indeterminate, and negative itself. It works, as we 
have seen with Celan, figuratively: towards no determinate end. And this reflective figuration is visible 
as an aesthetic, reflective, procedure. 
 
Thinking the future –  expectation, anticipation, hope 
My reading of the reflective work of the aesthetic, as it is channelled through Adorno, Blanchot, and 
Celan, is that it inscribes a kind of ‘indeterminate futurity’ into aesthetic experience, which responds to 
the indeterminate ways futurity is organised in politics and dialectics. But given the ‘indeterminate’ 
relation between aesthetic philosophy and the work of art, what form could such ‘inscription’ take? 
What kind of literature, and what kind of writing, could mediate this futurity, which extends beyond 
the politics of distribution that characterise Rancière’s version of political aesthetics, but also beyond 
the merely formal distribution of communicability that characterise Arendt’s aesthetic politics? 
There is a political equivocation between two versions of the logic of aesthetic judgement, and 
two twin versions of politics and the political. In the first, the reflection of aesthetic judgement is 
invested into a reflectively valid version of community. In the second, the indeterminate ways reflection 
operates in aesthetic judgement validates the reflective ways community is experienced, without any 
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actual communication. The political fate of the aesthetic equivocates thus, either instantiating 
community, or validating its reflective experience. A turn to a philosophy of fine art, rather than 
aesthetic experience, could be read as a turn to the objective instantiation of community through art. 
But a more reflective sense of the way the objective construction of art models experience – constructed 
both when made and, again, when experienced; constructed both by a subject and by the objective 
context which structures subjective experience – could show a third way for aesthetics between these 
two fates. The consequences of such a third way can be traced through re-reading Kant. But they also 
threaten to unwork Kant; unworking inscribed by the ‘re-reading’ to which he gives form in his 
aesthetics; a ‘reversal’. If reflection is not contained in the aesthetic experience, but neither perfectly 
recruitable for politics, then its work is uncertain, indeterminate. A third way would require an account 
of precisely this indeterminacy.  
In tracing, in a sense, one part of Kant’s reception (or translation, or transformation) in the late 
twentieth century, when questions of community and of the ends of dialectical history were explicitly 
under question, we can achieve several things. Firstly, we can see how Kant’s account of aesthetics 
might give form to these questions of community and history, and therefore become a way to read these 
questions from a perspective of Kantian aesthetics. Community here is a concept that organises social 
and political relations. History is a concept that organises happening and what happens. Both can be 
thought reflectively. Secondly, however, those questions also read back into Kant: by posing essentially 
alien questions to Kant’s aesthetics, those aesthetics are exposed to their possible transformation. So 
the reading is both ways, a ‘reversal’: Kant reads a historical and theoretical situation, and that situation 
offers a counter-reading of Kant. And this leads to a third end: that in establishing this relationship of 
legibility, we also propose a different kind of legibility. In what form could such a reflective reading be 
established? What are the aesthetic conditions of such a relationship? Reading Kant, reading history 
through Kant, prompts us to develop a further reflective turn to the aesthetic. Such aesthetic legibility 
can be found through reading. Reading poetry does not therefore offer either illustration or illumination 
of theoretical questions, but what Adorno calls a ‘thought-model’.21 It becomes the crystalline, 
‘figurative’ space in which a certain legibility is prompted, articulated, and, indeed, thought through 
poetry. Poetics is not thus a ‘master discourse’, but a reflection of theoretical questions. It is related 
indeterminately to theoretical aesthetics in a way that itself articulates the indeterminate relations those 
aesthetics think.  
                                                      
21 ND 29/39: ‘The call for binding statements without a system is a call for thought models [Denkmodellen], 
and these are not merely monadological in kind. A model covers the specific, and more than the specific, 
without letting it evaporate in its more general super-concept [allgemeineren Oberbegriff]. Philosophical 
thinking is the same as thinking in models; negative dialectics is an ensemble of analyses of models.’ This 
intervention of ‘thought-models’ into systematic conceptuality mirrors that of ‘figures’. This emphasis on 
specificity is essential. 
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Poetry acts in this way as a ‘measure’ of aesthetics, a terminus which remains reflectively 
indeterminate, and a point by which aesthetic questions are reflectively legible through the act of 
reading. Measurement is in this sense a relation.22 But what, exactly, does writing hope to measure 
here? If the ends of aesthetic judgement are reflective, then how are they measured? If the future remains 
non-determined by aesthetic judgement – if it does not, for Kant, make any legislative claims about its 
object – then what, exactly, is this future? We can focus this question by asking another. How do we 
measure the distance between ‘anticipating’ the future and ‘expecting’ it? 
We can speculate about some of the modal differences between ‘anticipating’ and ‘expecting’. 
To anticipate means to regard something as probable: it derives from anticipat, to act in advance of 
something. To anticipate is to think about what will happen. To expect means to defer action, to wait, 
to look out for something: ex+spectare. To expect is to linger, not to know what to await; merely to 
await. We can make a distinction, then. To anticipate: to think about what will happen. To expect: to 
think about happening. And this, indeed, is the difference measured by aesthetic judgement. An 
aesthetic judgement makes a valid claim without determining anything about its object. To make such 
a reflecting judgement is not to ‘anticipate’ a determination of the future, but to ‘expect’ its happening, 
its appearance as something to think about. To ‘expect’ is to think of the future without determining 
what will happen. The aesthetic judgement ‘expects’ in this sense: that it does not determine its object, 
but marks its present indeterminacy. The end to which reflection is employed is not determined by 
judgement, and so reflection as an activity becomes its own end. The ‘indeterminacy’ of aesthetic 
judgement is therefore negative: it is a future which is expected, without positive determination of the 
significance of judgement. 
And this also marks the distance between a determinately and an indeterminately orientated 
politics: between a praxis that effects change, and an expectation of the possibility of change for which 
thinking the future makes space. Aesthetics lets us measure this distance by giving form to judgement 
that is reflecting, indeterminate, and therefore expects assent, but does not necessarily anticipate its 
form or formation. We should assent to an aesthetic judgement, but whether or in what form that assent 
will take place is not decided by that judgement. We should expect community, but we cannot anticipate 
it. Expectation is the condition of community; anticipation its praxis.  
What about to hope? What kind of future can we hope for? And even, how do we hope for a 
future? For Kant, the third Critique was to ask what I should hope for – though the third Critique he 
wrote was not the theological treatise he anticipated to answer that question. So for what can we hope? 
What should we hope to anticipate? In what form can we expect hope?  Kant answers the last of these 
                                                      
22 The etymological link of ‘metre’ to μέτρον, métron, is active here: a defining feature of poetry is its 
capacity to ‘measure’ language through its patterning, through the work of verse but also through poetry’s 
employment of figuration as an operative linguistic end in itself. 
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questions, and therefore draws in the others. If I expect, then I hope, though I do not know for what.  If 
there is a political difference between expecting community and anticipating it, then such difference 
must be measured. In measuring aesthetic judgement against the possibility of reflective validity shared 
indeterminately between non-determined subjects as ‘common sense’, and in measuring aesthetic 
reflection against teleological reflection, and in measuring subjective reflection against its objective 
work in art, aesthetics gives form to reflection as its own measure. These three measurements are 
aligned with the three final chapters of this thesis: aesthetics as a measure of community; aesthetics as 
a measure of presence and the present; and aesthetics as a measure of poetry. Measuring these different 
aesthetic forms of reflection provides a measure for a political distinction that might otherwise remain 
illegible. The reflection registered in aesthetic experience is a condition for a capacity to hope, in that 
it registers a subjective capacity to think without determining the end of thinking. Even if writing cannot 








Augen, weltblind, im Sterbeklüft: Ich komm, 
Hartwuchs im Herzen. 
Ich Komm. 
 
Mondspiegel Steilwand. Hinab. 
(Atemgeflecktes Geleucht. Strichweise Blut. 
Wölkende Seele, noch einmal gestaltnah. 
Zehnfingerschatten – verklammert.) 
 
Augen weltblind, 
Augen im Sterbeklüft, 
Augen Augen: 
 
Das Schneebett unter uns beiden, das Schneebett. 
Kristall um Kristall, 
zeittief gegittert, wir fallen, 
wir fallen und liegen und fallen. 
 
Und fallen: 
Wir waren. Wir sind. 
Wir sind ein Fleisch mit der Nacht. 




Eyes, world-blind, in the fissure of dying: I come, 
callous growth in my heart. 
I come. 
 
Moon-mirror rock-face. Down. 
(Shine spotted with breath. Blood in streaks. 
Soul forming clouds, close to the true shape once more. 
Ten-finger shadow, clamped.) 
 
Eyes world-blind, 
eyes in the fissure of dying, 
eyes eyes: 
 
The snow-bed under us both, the snow-bed. 
Crystal on crystal, 
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meshed deep as time, we fall, 
we fall and lie there and fall. 
 
And fall: 
We were. We are. 
We are one flesh with the night. 
In the passages, passages. 
 






Händen am Dreiweg. 
 




dem ertrunkenen Ruderblatt, 
tief 
im versteinerten Schwur, 
rauscht es auf. 
 
(Auf dem senkrechten 
Atemseil, damals, 
höher also ben, 
zwischen zei Schmerzknoten, während 
der blanke 
Tatrenmond zu uns heraufklomm, 



















hands at the threeway. 
 




the drowned rudder blade, 
deep 
in the petrified oath, 
it roars up. 
 
(On the vertical 
breathrope, in those days, 
higher than above, 
between two painknots, while 
the glossy 
Tartarmoon climbed up to us, 







The cast-in-front-of-you, from 
the East, terrible. 
 
No one 






LYON, LES ARCHERS 
 
Der Eisenstachel, gebäumt, 
in der Ziegelsteinnische: 
das Neben-Jahrtausend 
fremdet sich ein, unbezwingbar, 
folgt 
deinen fahrenden Augen, 
 
jetzt, 
mit herbeigewürfelten Blicken, 
weckst du, die neben dir ist, 





auch du, mit allem 
Eingefremdeten in dir, 





spannt ihren Schmerz unter euch, 
 




LYON, LES ARCHERS 
 
The iron spike, reared, 
in the brickniche: 
the co-millenium 
instranges itself, unconquerable, 
follows 
your driving eyes, 
 
now, 
with glances cast here by dice 
you wake, who is beside you, 
she becomes heavier, 
heavier, 
 
you too, with all 






tenses its pain between you, 
 











sind in uns, 
unübersteigbar 
im Wachen, 
wir schlafen hinüber, vors Tor 
des Erbarmens, 
 
ich veliere dich an dich, das 
ist mein Schneetrost, 
 
sag, daß Jerusalem i s t, 
sags, als wäre ich dieses 
dein Weiß, 
als wärst du 
meins, 
 
als könnten wir ohne uns wir sein, 
 
ich blättre dich auf, für immer, 
 





are in us, 
insurmountable 
while awake, 
we sleep across, to the Gate 
of Mercy, 
 
I lose you to you, that 
is my snowcomfort, 
 
say that Jerusalem is, 
say it, as if I was this 
your Whiteness 
as if you were 
mine, 
 
as if without us we could be we, 
 
I leaf you open, forever, 
 









Two Chorale Preludes 
ON MELODIES BY PAUL CELAN 
 
1 Ave Regina Coelorum 
Es ist ein Land Verloren… 
There is a land called Lost 
at peace inside our heads. 
The moon, full on the frost, 
vivifies these stone heads. 
 
Moods of the verb ‘to stare’, 
split selfhoods, conjugate 
ice-facets from the air, 
the light glazing the light. 
 
Look at us, Queen of Heaven. 
Our solitudes drift by 
your solitudes, the seven 
dead stars in your sky. 
 
  2 Te Lucis Ante Terminum 
  Wir gehen dir, Heimat, ins Garn… 
Centaury with your staunch bloom 
you there alder beed you fern, 
midsummer closeness my far home, 
fresh traces of lost origin. 
 
Silvery the black cherries hang, 
the plum-tree oozes through each cleft 
and horse-flies siphon the green dung, 
glued to the sweetness of their graft: 
 
immortal transience, a ‘kind 
of otherness’, self-understood, 
BE FAITHFUL grows upon the mind 
as lichen glimmers on the wood. 







Es Lebe der König 
  (for Paul Celan, 1920-1970) 
 
Fire and honey oozes from cracks in the earth; 
the cloud eases up the Richter scale. Sky divides 
as the flag once more becomes technical, the print 
divides also: starlight becomes negative. If you 
are born to peaks in the wire, purple layers in the 
glass format, re-enter the small house with 
animals too delicate and cruel. Their throats fur 
with human warmth, we too are numbered like 
prints in the new snow. 
 
    It is not possible to 
drink this again, the beloved enters the small house. 
The house becomes technical, the pool has 
copper sides, evaporating by the grassy slopes. 
The avenues slant back through the trees; the 
double music strokes my hand. Give back the 
fringe to the sky now hot with its glare, turning 
russet and madder, going over and over to 
the landing-stage, where we are. We stand 
just long enough to see you, 
 
     we hear your 
fearful groan and choose not to think of it. We 
deny the consequence because only thus is the flame’s 
abstract review the real poison, oh true the 
fish dying in great flashes, the smell comes from 
shrivelled hair on my wrist. That silly talk is 
our recklessly long absence: the plum exudes its 
fanatic resin and is at once forced in, pressed 
down and by exotic motive this means the rest, 
the respite, we have this long. 
 
     Only 
the alder thrown over the cranial push, the 
waged incompleteness, comes with the animals 
and their watchful calm. The long-tailed bird 
is total awareness, a forced lust, it is that 
absolutely. Give us this love of murder and 
sacred boredom, you walk in the shade of 
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the technical house. Take it away and set up 
the table ready for white honey, choking the 
white cloth spread openly for the most worthless 
accident. The whiteness is a patchwork of 
revenge too, open the window and white fleecy 
clouds sail over the azure; 
     it is true. Over and 
over it is so, calm or vehement. You know 
the plum is a nick of pain, is so and is also 
certainly loved. Forbearance comes into the 
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